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[1978] SLR (CA) 16Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

INTERPLAST LTD. vs. BONSU [1979] GLR 285

10 July 1978 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 16
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OSCOLAINTERPLAST LTD. v BONSU [1979] GLR 285 [1978] SLR (CA) 16
APAINTERPLAST LTD. v BONSU [1979] GLR 285, [1978] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana).
BluebookINTERPLAST LTD. v BONSU [1979] GLR 285, [1978] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Grimwood v. Moss (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 360; 41 L.J.C.P. 239; 27 L.T.490;39 J.P. 535; 23 W.R. 524.

(2) Howard v. Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch. 581; 64 L.J.Ch. 666; 73 L.T. 77;43 W.R. 645.

(3) Boston v. Khemland Brothers [1964] G.L.R. 277, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a decision of the trial circuit judge decreeing recovery of possession against the appellants for non-payment of rent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.

Parties in person.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

The respondent is the owner of business premises situate in Accra. On 1 July 1975, he, by deed, demised part of the premises to the appellant-company (which I will hereafter call the company) for a term of five years certain with an option for renewal. The subject of the demise was described as a “four door store” in house No. C.89/2, Liberty Avenue, Adabraka. The lease reserved a “yearly rent of ¢1,440” payable quarterly in advance in the sum of ¢360.

The lease then contained the usual covenants which it is not necessary to quote except clause 4 (a), that being the clause which was admittedly breached to give rise to this action. That clause is couched in familiar language and is as follows:

“Provided always and it is hereby agreed and declared:

(a) That if the rent hereby reserved or any part thereof shall remain unpaid for 30 days after becoming due for payment and shall have been demanded by the landlord in writing or if the tenant shall fail to comply with any of the convenants herein contained on its part, the landlord will only in such a case have the right to re-enter the demised premises in the name of the whole and thereupon determine the tenancy hereby created but without prejudice to any right of action or remedy of the landlord in

respect of any antecedent breach of any of the covenants by the tenant herein contained.”

The company failed or neglected to pay rent for six quarters ending 31 December 1976. According to the respondent, although he made a written demand for this, the company made default. Accordingly, on 23 February 1977, the respondent issued a writ in the circuit court claiming “possession of all that four door store on the ground floor of the premises known as house No.134 (formerly C. 89/2), Liberty Avenue, Accra.”

The evidence shows that the letter by which the respondent demanded the payment of rent was dated 7 February 1977. When this was brought to the notice of one of the directors of the company, he sought to verify the claim. He was satisfied that owing to oversight, payment of the rent was not made. Accordingly, a cheque dated 23 February 1977, was issued in favour of the respondent for the sum of ¢3,240 ( three thousand two hundred and forty cedis). The rent then due and unpaid covered the period October 1975 to December 1976. The payment offered by the company to the respondent extended up to December 1977. The respondent declined to receive payment and relied on his right to re-enter the demised premises in accordance with clause 4 (a) of the agreement.

As the defence was in the nature of a confession and avoidance, the respondent took out a summons under Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A), and sought liberty to sign judgment against the company on the ground that the defence filed discloses no defence to the action. Although the writ claimed both possession for non-payment of rent and arrears of rent, the judgment summons merely sought liberty to sign judgment in this action against the defendant “for the sum claimed on the writ of summons” On 26 May 1977, legal argument was addressed to the court on the summons. The respondent took the position that as the rent was in arrears for a year and a half, he was entitled to exercise his right of re-entry and that on the company’s own admission, it had failed to pay the rent at the stipulated time and its excuse of oversight was no defence in law. The company for its part, argued that it had tendered the rent in full to the respondent when it realised that due to an “administrative oversight” it had not made payment but that when the respondent refused to accept this, it paid it in full into court.

The learned circuit judge found for the respondent and decreed possession of the premises and delivered himself as follows:

“The defendants, however, contended that the non-payment of rent for eighteen months was due to an administrative oversight; this is no defence to this action. It is quite clear from their defence and the affidavit asking for leave to defend that they are in breach of the tenancy agreement because their non-payment of rent for eighteen months determined the agreement and payment of the arrears after the writ was issued will not revive the tenancy agreement.”

It is this holding that the company contests by this appeal on two grounds formulated in the notice of appeal:

“(1) The learned trial judge erred in holding that the defendant’s affidavit did not disclose any defence.

(2) The learned trial judge erred in holding that the agreement was terminated by the defendant’s failure to pay the agreed rent.”

[p.288] of [1979] GLR 285

As I said, in addition to the claim for possession, the respondent also endorsed on the writ, a claim for arrears of rent and mesne profits. As far as that part of the claim is concerned, the plea of “administrative oversight” can be no valid answer. That, however, was not an issue before the court. The company conceded its error and indeed paid or offered to pay the arrears and future rents in advance. It coupled this with an expression of regret for its oversight.

The real issue before the court was whether in view of the proved or admitted facts, the respondent was entitled to exercise a right of forfeiture and determine the lease which at the date of the writ and quite apart from the option for renewal, had three more years to run. The judge’s decision was that failure to pay the rent ipso facto determined the lease and this could not be revived by subsequent payment of the rent. As a matter of interpretation, I think the judge’s construction of clause 4 (a) relating to the right of re-entry, was quite wrong. The language of the clause properly construed, merely gives the respondent a right to re-enter and premises and thereby determine the lease. The lease is not determined before then. It is this right of re-entry that he sought to exercise by this action. Although in times past, the landlord may make an actual entry and forfeit the lease for breach of a covenant which reserves to him the right of re-entry, the usual practice at the present day is to sue for recovery of possession. Willes J. said as long ago as 1872 in Grimwood v. Moss. (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 360 at p. 364 that, “the bringing of the action of ejectment is equivalent to the ancient entry.”

Where such an action as the present is brought to enforce a right of forfeiture, the attitude of a court of equity is quite settled. Since in the eyes of equity, the object of a right of re-entry is to give the landlord security for his rent, it will relieve the tenant against forfeiture if he pays all the arrears and costs, even though such payment does not take place until after the date of forfeiture has passed: see Howard v. Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch. 581. Although it was at one time doubted whether the court can relieve against forfeiture for breach of covenant other than to pay rent, the Supreme Court in Boston v. Khemland Brothers [1964] G.L.R. 277 held that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture in all cases where the damage is capable of assessment. In this case, the respondent’s only complaint was the company’s failure to pay a fixed and ascertainable rent. When this fact was brought to its notice the company paid in full not only what was due but future rents as well. It then proceeded to express its “regrets for any inconvenience caused to the plaintiff by its oversight.” There is no suggestion that the company had made any previous default with its payment of rent. To enforce a right of forfeiture in these circumstances would cause great hardship to the company and would be plainly unjust. In my opinion, this is eminently a case in which a court of equity would grant relief against forfeiture. And the judge was supposed to be exercising the jurisdiction of a court of equity. I think he ought to have granted the company relief against forfeiture and denied the respondent possession of the demised premises.

[p.289] of [1979] GLR 285

The inherent justice underlying the equitable principle of relieving a tenant against forfeiture for failure to pay rent has been recognised by statute. It is the English Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict., c. 76). This is contained in sections 210-212 of the Act. The sections’ slightly verbose and somewhat archaic phraseology has been paraphrased in Cheshire’s Modern Real Property (10th ed.) at pp. 394-395 in these words:

“If the lessor sues for possession and the tenant at any time before the trial pays or tenders to the lessor or pays into court the rent and arrears and costs, all further proceedings are stayed and he regains possession under the old lease . . .

If the tenant does not . . . take this opportunity and judgment is given against him, he is barred from all relief in law or equity unless he applies for relief within six months after execution of the judgment.”

Section 111 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), expressly preserves these sections as statutes of general application which should continue to apply in this country.

In this case, according to the respondent’s own affidavit:

“the defendants [meaning the company] after the issue of the said writ of summons sent their cheque for ¢3,240 as rent to date and in full payment of the rent up to the quarter ending 31 December 1977 to my solicitor but upon my instructions same was returned to the defendants’ solicitors as the issue of the said cheque was belated and calculated to prejudice my case.”

When the respondent refused to accept payment, the company on 18 May 1977, paid all the rent then due and part of future rent into court. This was before the actual trial.

In my judgment, the company was entitled to be relieved against forfeiture of the lease both in equity and under the enabling provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852. As the judge held otherwise, I think his conclusion was wrong and ought to be reversed.

JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A. I agree.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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