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[1978] SLR (CA) 18Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

NYAMEKYE vs. TAWIAH AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 265

22 June 1978 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 18
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OSCOLANYAMEKYE v TAWIAH AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 265 [1978] SLR (CA) 18
APANYAMEKYE v TAWIAH AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 265, [1978] SLR (CA) 18 (Ghana).
BluebookNYAMEKYE v TAWIAH AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 265, [1978] SLR (CA) 18 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Tsrifo V v. Dua VIII [1959] G.L.R. 63.

(2) Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418, S.C.

(3) Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232, S. C.

(4) Banahene v. Adinkra [1976] 1 G.L.R. 346, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL to the full bench of the Court of Appeal in a chieftaincy dispute. It is not necessary to state the facts.

COUNSEL

Parties in person.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. [His lordship reviewed the evidence and continued:] As respondent’s evidence about the persons who successively occupied the stool and the royal house from which they hailed tallied with the appellant’s and therefore lent support to the rotatory principle urged by the appellant, it was submitted to the appellate National House of Chiefs that whatever defects there might be in the trial tribunal’s judgment, its holding in favour of rotation must be right and should accordingly be left undisturbed. The appellate house rejected that submission and delivered itself as follows:

“A plaintiff succeeds on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. The onus of proof always lies on him who alleges a certain fact, and unless this proof is made, the plaintiff cannot succeed. It is therefore wrong to submit that the plaintiff must succeed because certain aspects of his evidence were corroborated by the defendant.”

If this proposition of law means that a party cannot prove his case by admissions from the mouth of his opponent or his adversary’s witness, it is wrong and offends both principle and authority. In Tsrifo V v. Dua VIII [1959] G.L.R. 63 at pp. 64-65 Ollennu J. said:

“Where the evidence of one party on an issue in a suit is corroborated by witnesses of his opponent, whilst that of his opponent on

[p.267] of [1979] GLR 265

the same issue stands uncorroborated even by his own witnesses, a Court ought not to accept the uncorroborated version in preference to the corroborated one, unless for some good reason (which must appear on the face of the judgment) the Court finds the corroborated version incredible or impossible.”

This enunciation of principle was approved by the Supreme Court in Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418 at p. 423. See also Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232, S.C. and Banahene v. Adinkra [1976] 1 G.L.R. 346, C.A.

How does the principle stand in relation to the facts of this case? The only matter on which the parties were in disagreement was that the three “royal houses” agreed in 1970 to nominate a candidate to the paramount stool by turns and that that agreement was acted upon until it was breached to give rise to the present dispute. The appellant and his witnesses produced both viva voce and documentary evidence in proof of this. The respondent and his sole witness although professedly controverting this issue made admissions which support the appellant’s case. On what sound principle of justice can the tribunal reject this story which, in the event, is practically one way? There is no suggestion and there can be no warrant for suggesting that the appellant’s story, corroborated as it was, by the respondent is “incredible or impossible.” In our judgment, the trite learning on the “burden of proof” ought not to be permitted to obfuscate the facts of this case.

The last reason advanced by the National House of Chiefs for reversing the trial tribunal’s conclusion of fact seems to be based on acquiescence. Although the house did not use that word it expressed itself in a manner which amounts to it. It said, “The petitioner’s [meaning the appellant] own conduct and evidence go to confirm the defence denial of the existence of any strict rotation system.” On this issue, the appellant’s testimony which the trial tribunal did not reject was as follows:

“After the death of Kwaw Bom III a successor should have been taken from Eduful’s house. What happened was after the death of Kwaw Bom III I nominated Kwame Essumang. Kwaku Tawiah also nominated Yaw Ntebiah. I challenged that nomination. The section of Yaw Ackom also disagreed with that nomination because by rotation it had not reached the turn of that section. When I challenged that nomination the Asafohenefo consulted together. When they came back, they decided on Yaw Ntebiah. I disagreed and told them of my disagreement and left.”

There is other evidence that this witness carried his objection by a timeous complaint to the district administrative officer at Saltpond and thereafter to the regional commissioner. When no help was forthcoming, he commenced this action. As he put it, “I have not foregone my right to nominate a candidate and it is because of that I have taken this action to enforce my rights.”

[p.268] of [1979] GLR 265

Yaw Denkyi, the head of the Yaw Ackom branch of the “royal house,” also swore on this issue as follows:

“After the death of Kwaw Bom III it was the turn of Eduful to nominate a candidate. But Tawiah nominated Yaw Ntebiah. Eduful objected to it and so did Yaw Ackom because it was not his turn. We went to Gyase and Eduful nominated his. Yaw Ackom and Eduful objected that it would bring dispute. Kwaku Tawiah still proceeded and nominated Yaw Ntebiah . . . Eduful nominated Kwasi Abiram. It is not our custom at Essiam to have two candidates nominated for the stool. The two candidates were mentioned at Gyase. The oman came to Gyase.

The two candidates were mentioned to the oman. Gyasehene mentioned the two names to the oman. Eduful objected. The oman asked him to stop what he was saying and that they themselves were going into consultation about it. One Bruce from Eduful’s line objected and he was also hushed down by the oman. The oman went into consultation came back to say that they had accepted Kwaku Tawiah’s nominee called Ntebiah. Eduful disagreed with the selection of the oman. Yaw Ackom also objected. Eduful and Yaw Ackom went away dissatisfied and discontented. Eduful complained to the district administrative officer at Saltpond. Later the matter was taken to Bernasko at Cape Coast.”

The respondent was not present at the nomination. Custom did not permit his presence there. He was accordingly in no position to offer evidence contrary to what Eduful and Denkyi related. Denkyi said it was uncustomary for two candidates to be nominated for the stool. In cross-examination, the respondent conceded this to be so. He was asked, “Do you know that in the history of Essiam no two candidates have ever been presented?” His reply was, “Yes.” Yet the Gyasehene Bronya who, as stool functionary, should at least be credited with some knowledge of the custom, was able to say not only that two candidates from two rival houses were simultaneously presented to the oman but that “when the two candidates were presented to the oman no one objected to either,”. and further that, “When the oman made their choice no one objected.”

In view of the known and admitted custom on the matter, Bronya’s evidence was inherently incredible. The trial tribunal did not pronounce on this aspect of the case but the appellate National House in the face of the intrinsically probable testimony of Eduful and Denkyi held that, “their objection came after the oman had made their choice.” So in the opinion of the house it was of no avail because in its view of the custom, “Any objection to be valid, should have been raised to the oman prior to the presentation of the candidates and not after.” In our opinion, the National House’s holding that Eduful’s objection was made after the oman had made its choice was a complete travesty of the facts.

We think, on a proper view of this case, the right conclusion must be that Eduful objected to the nomination of the respondent as soon as this was made and persisted in this objection. His objection was overriden by

[p.269] of [1979] GLR 265

the oman which then repaired for consultation. When it returned and announced its decision, Eduful demonstrated his disgust at the unconstitutionality of the oman’s conduct by walking out. In our judgment, both the so-called consultation and the decision to accept the respondent’s nomination were a pious farce. They did not have the slightest semblance of legality.

We find nothing in the appellant’s conduct or evidence which supports the respondent’s patently false denial of the rotatory system. This is the least satisfactory of the many reasons given by the appellate National House for reversing the trial tribunal’s finding that the occupancy of the paramount stool of Breman Essiam rotates among the three “royal houses.” Although its judgment was sketchy and somewhat insufficiently reasoned, the Judicial Committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs arrived at the right conclusion and its judgment ought not to have been disturbed.

Before we are done, we feel constrained to make this observation. The policy reason underlying the statutory conferment of both original and appellate jurisdiction in chieftaincy disputes on traditional tribunals, is that the personnel of those courts are, by reason of their background and training, knowledgeable in indigenous law and custom to competently determine these matters. It is becoming, unhappily, not uncommon for them to seek to resolve issues which demand the application of customary law and worldly wisdom by needless resort to the subtleties of English common law, e.g., joinder of parties, burden of proof, etc., a subject on which their expertise is, to say the least, doubtful. And as this case illustrates, they founder in the result.

Accordingly, an authoritative exposition and development of the relevant customary law is the loser by this approach. We cannot but deprecate this tendency. We venture to hope that traditional tribunals will confine themselves to their area of competency and thus assert their value in the ascertainment and advancement of customary jurisprudence.

We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the National House of Chiefs. The decision of the Central Regional House of Chiefs will be restored with costs here and in the National House.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. D.

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