SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1978] SLR (CA) 19Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

PRACTICE NOTE: BLEWUDZI AND OTHERS vs. DZOTSI AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 173

18 May 1978 · SOWAH JA · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 19
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAPRACTICE NOTE: BLEWUDZI AND OTHERS v DZOTSI AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 173 [1978] SLR (CA) 19
APAPRACTICE NOTE: BLEWUDZI AND OTHERS v DZOTSI AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 173, [1978] SLR (CA) 19 (Ghana).
BluebookPRACTICE NOTE: BLEWUDZI AND OTHERS v DZOTSI AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 173, [1978] SLR (CA) 19 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

Ababio v. Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 253.

COUNSEL

Kudjawu for the appellants.

E. D. Kom for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.A.

This is yet another appeal from the Circuit Court, Ho, wherein the issue of jurisdiction (or the lack of it) of the native tribunal which had tried cases in respect of the same land now in dispute and had given judgments in 1912 and 1913 was raised by the court suo motu which then held that it had no jurisdiction to hear them and the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed both on facts and law.

It appears from the evidence that the parties descended from a common ancestor Tsirimega. The said ancestor had three children, Atsu, Etse and Doe. The plaintiffs trace their line from Etse, while the defendants hail from the line of Doe. Acolatse was the son of Doe and Ashiade the son of a cousin of Acolatse. The traditional evidence given by the plaintiffs was that while Acolatse and is nephew Ashiade were both engaged in retail business in Togoland, a certain sum of money was deposited with Acolatse in the course of his business by persons from the community in which he lived for the purchase of gunpowder from the then Gold Coast. Acolatse failed to return to Togoland and did not refund or return the deposit. Accordingly the prospective purchasers, in reprisal, seized the goods (consisting of 8 bags of palm kernel) of his nephew Ashiade. Ashiade returned home and remonstrated with his uncle concerning his conduct and informed him of the fate which had befallen him. He demanded compensation for the loss of his wares. His uncle was unable to make good the loss but offered him a gift of the large piece of land which is now in dispute. He accepted it and apparently took possession thereof. The root of title of the plaintiffs is in the gift of Acolatse to Ashiade.

[p.174] of [1979] GLR 173

The plaintiffs, after this evidence contended that the parties had twice litigated the issues now before the circuit court and that two decisions had been given in their favour. The judgments were tendered and the plea of estoppel raised as an issue.

For the defendants, the traditional evidence led was only slightly different. They began their genealogical tree from Doe the brother of Etse from whom the plaintiffs trace their ancestry. Doe was said to have had three children, namely Gbeshi (female), Akorlor (male) and Acolatse (male) and the land in dispute was said to have been founded by Akorlor and not Acolatse. By what appears to be a strange coincidence, the evidence shows that Akorlor like his brother Acolatse was childless and that on the death of Akorlor the property descended to his nephew Dzotsi by his sister Gbeshi and it is through this nephew that they have their root of title. In passing, it should be observed that no reason was given why Acolatse should be superseded by his nephew in a matter of succession in an area where succession to property is strictly patrilineal.

The defendants further contend that the judgments relied upon concern other pieces of land and do not touch upon the present land in dispute.

Be that as it may, the issue whether the property was a gift to Ashiade by Acolatse or was originally owned by Doe and succeeded to by his son Akorlor had been settled once and for all. In the judgment of the Native Tribunal of Fia Sri II, Anloga, dated 31 December 1912, the court held:

“By the foregoing facts and reasons the old adage which says: ‘One kindness deserves another’ is necessarily applicable in this case. The tribunal found and believed that the property in question was a gift of old Akolatse to his nephew Ashiade the defendants’ father as in satisfaction of thanksgiving for the debts he had paid for him and that Blewudzi went into possession through old Acolatse but not the plaintiff as alleged.”

In a rather long judgment the learned judge held on the issue of estoppel that the present parties were privies to and successors of the parties in both the 1912 and 1913 suits. He held further on the question of identity of the subject-matter, “Consequently, in giving allowances for certain apparent errors of description, I think it would be fair to assume that the subject-matter of both suits is the same.” He proceeded, “Here the previous observation made by this court amply provides a perfect answer to the effect that the land in question is the same.”

The learned trial judge having found all the elements required upon which a plea of res judicata is established proceeded suo motu to challenge the jurisdiction of the court which delivered the judgements. He stated:

“However even though it has not been set down as an issue, this court must necessarily resolve whether those judgments are valid so as to operate as estoppel binding on the defendants. Reliance has been placed on them by the plaintiffs therefore a duty is cast on them to establish by unequivocal evidence that they are valid.”

[p.175] of [1979] GLR 173

It ought to be recalled that exhibits A and B were tendered without objection. The learned circuit judge failed to indicate in what respect there was a lack of jurisdiction. He however rather surprisingly observed:

“The judgments relied upon, namely exhibits A and B do not in this court’s considered view, operate as estoppel because they emanated from a native court of very inferior jurisdiction, and they are not binding on this court. Even the competency of that tribunal in going into the merits of that land suit was never established.”

With the greatest respect, all courts including inferior courts are creatures of legislation. The limit, scope and extent of their jurisdiction are structured in the statute creating them. If the learned circuit court judge had any doubts as to the competency of the tribunal he ought to have had recourse to the legislative instrument creating it. The relevant legislation (now repealed) creating the tribunal was contained in the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1883 (No. 5 of 1883), Cap. 113 (1928 Rev.), “An Ordinance to facilitate and regulate the exercise of certain powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities” dated 15 January 1883. In Part III headed “Native Tribunals,” section 10 of the Ordinance as amended by No. 7 of 1910 made the following provision:

“The head chief of every division, and the chiefs of subdivisions or villages shall, with their respective councillors, authorised by native law, form native tribunals, having power and jurisdiction to try breaches of any bye-laws made and approved in the manner in this ordinance before mentioned, or existing at the commencement of this ordinance, and to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in the causes and matters after mentioned in which all the parties are natives, or in which any party not a native consents in writing to his case being tried by the native tribunal.”

Section 11 provided the ambit of the civil jurisdiction of the court and amongst other matters did extend it to “All suits relating to the ownership or possession of lands held under native tenure, and situated within the particular jurisdiction of the tribunal.”

The rules of procedure governing the trial of cases were contained in section 40 and provided that:

“Every native tribunal shall in determining the rights of parties, and also in its procedure, be guided by the native custom prevailing in that part of the country in which it has jurisdiction, so far as such custom is not inconsistent with the principles of justice, or with this ordinance.”

Pursuant to section 43 of Cap. 113, rules and regulations contained in the Schedule had the same force and effect as if they were enacted in the body of the Ordinance. Rule 19 provided that where the composition of a tribunal consisted of literate chiefs the presiding chief should record or cause to be recorded the proceedings of the tribunal and should preserve the records.

[p.176] of [1979] GLR 173

Rule 20 made provisions for land cases headed by illiterate chiefs or where the presiding chief was illiterate and provided:

“In any decision by a head chief’s tribunal in respect of land, where the chief is an illiterate person he shall either follow the course prescribed in the preceding rule or within seven days of such decision send a linguist together with the parties to the suit to the Commissioner of the district in which the tribunal is situated, and the terms of such decision shall be reported by such linguist in the presence of the aforementioned parties and the same shall be recorded by the District Commissioner in a book kept for that purpose, and a copy of such record shall be given to each of the said parties free of any charge.”

With this brief historical background it seems obvious that exhibit A, the judgment delivered in the suit entitled Dzotsi of Tegbi and Ashiade Naglato Nyadror of Anyako in the native tribunal of Fia Sri II, Anloga on 31 December 1912 is a valid judgment and binds the parties. A fortiori the judgment contained in exhibit B dated 28 December 1913 is valid and of fall effect.

Mr. Kom, counsel for the respondents, having conceded that the Fia Sri II’s tribunal had jurisdiction to hear land cases contended that there was error in law on the face of the judgments in that members of the panel who heard the two cases had not been enumerated on the record and that Chief Sri did not indicate the capacity in which he signed those judgments. The short answer to the objection is that the 1893 legislation did not enjoin the native tribunal to spell out its membership.

The scheme of the Ordinance takes cognisance of the conditions in those days when perhaps the overwhelming majority of chiefs were illiterate. The rules of procedure followed closely the practice in the ahinfie or the chief’s house with which the head chief and village chiefs were familiar. In my view there is no mandatory provision that a tribunal under the Ordinance should indicate its membership and accordingly its absence on the face of them does in no way vitiate those judgments.

The view of the learned circuit judge that because these judgment emanate from an inferior court they are not binding on his court evidences with the greatest respect, a fundamental and surprising misappreciation of the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam. For an answer to his observation I ought to refer to one of the classical definitions of the doctrine in our laws which is contained in the judgment of Ohene Appoh Ababio v. Ohene Doku Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 253 at p. 245:

“Estoppel per rem judicatam is the rule that a final decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction once pronounced between parties cannot be contradicted by any one of such parties as against any other of such parties in any subsequent litigation between them respecting the same subject-matter. The word parties must be taken as including privies, a privy being a person whose title is derived from and who claims through a party.

[p.177] of [1979] GLR 173

Following upon the findings of the learned judge that the cause of action in the previous suits was the same as at present and that the present parties were privies in title to the parties in the former suit, the only conclusion deducible therefrom is that issue of estoppel has been established and the defendants barred from relitigating same cause. Accordingly the judgment of the circuit court is set aside together with the order of costs and judgment entered in favour of the plaintiffs.

The more difficult area of the plaintiffs’ claim is the request for an order for recovery of possession. The evidence indicates that the parties are closely related; the defendants and their ancestors before them, have been occupying portions of the land since its founding; it seems to me most inequitable to grant the said order which in effect would mean ejectment from their ancestral homes.

I will however grant the relief for injunction restraining the defendants their agents, workmen and servants and those claiming through them from extending the area they now occupy.

The plaintiffs will have their costs.

JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

J. D.

Scroll to Top