ABABIO II vs. BOSO TRADITIONAL COUNCIL [1979] GLR 53
26 April 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 14 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Odonkor v. Mate Kole (1914) P.C. ‘74-’28, 37.
(2) Nkum (Nana Kojo) v. Bonso (1926) F.C. ‘26-’29,165.
(3) Ababio v. Ackumpong (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 173.
(4) Enu I (Nana Obosu) v. Biney (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 70.
(5) Gyapon v. Kwabena II (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 213.
(6) Mbra v. Donkor, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, 51 unreported. (7) Blewey v. Assuah, High Court, Sekondi, 27 October 1967, unreported; digested in (1968) C.C. 31. (8) Kwansah XII v. Rockson, High Court, Cape Coast, 31 October 1969, unreported. (9) Frempong v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 76.
(10) Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391.
(11) Republic v. Tekperbiawe Divisional Council; Ex parte Nene Korle II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 199. (12) Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.
(13) Moosi v. Boateng [1975] 2 G.L.R. 396.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiff to recover money that should have been paid to him as Kyidomhene of Boso Traditional Area. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Alfred Kye for the plaintiff.
E. A. Osew for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA SEKYI J.
The plaintiff, Nana Addo Ababio II, claims to be the Kyidomhene of the Boso Traditional Area. According to him, as Kyidomhene he is entitled to certain sums of money which from time to time the [p.55] of [1979] GLR 53 government makes available to the Boso Traditional Council as allowance for the Kyidomhene. These sums, says the plaintiff, have not been paid to him. He has therefore brought this action for the court to determine how much is due to him as Kyidomhene and for the payment of the allowance with effect from April 1969. In support of his claim to be the Kyidomhene, the plaintiff has asked the court to take judicial notice of an entry in the Local Government Bulletin No. 32 dated 3 September 1976 which accorded him recognition as the Kyidomhene of the Boso Traditional Area.
The defendants resist the claim of the plaintiff on two grounds: first, the plaintiff’s action is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy over which the High Court has no original jurisdiction; secondly, entries in the Local Government Bulletin No. 20 of 26 April 1974 show that the plaintiff is the Ankobeahene and that one Nana Opong Kwatia II is the Kyidomhene. It would appear that the allowance of the Kyidomhene is more than that of the Ankobeahene. The defendants say that the publication in Local Government Bulletin No. 32 was made without their knowledge or consent and that Nana Opong Kwatia II is still the Kyidomhene.
Upon being served with the writ and statement of claim, the defendants entered an appearance and filed a motion supported by an affidavit inviting the court to strike out the action for want of jurisdiction. They rely on section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), as amended by the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), s. 5 (3) which provides as follows:
“(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment the High Court, a Circuit and a District Court shall not have jurisdiction to entertain either at first instance or on appeal any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”
There is nothing new about the legislature depriving the High Court of jurisdiction in certain matters. Such restrictions have always been part of our law, and examples will be found in the Chiefs Ordinance, 1904, the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), and now the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). An examination of the decided cases shows that the attitude of the courts has been to uphold the validity of such restrictions. Thus in Odonkor v. Mate Kole (1914) P.C. ‘74-’28, 37 at p. 38, the Privy Council held that section 4 (1) of the Chiefs Ordinance, 1904, took away from the courts any power of inquiry into a destoolment which had been confirmed by the Governor. This decision was followed in Nana Kojo Nkum v. Bonso (1926) F.C. ‘26-’29,165. In Ababio v. Ackumpong (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 173, it was held that under section 17 of the Courts Ordinance as the subject-matter of the dispute was cognisable by the paramount chief’s tribunal the Supreme (Divisional) Court could not exercise jurisdiction. In Nana Obosu Enu I v. Biney (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 70, the West African Court of Appeal held that section 75 (1) of the Courts Ordinance precluded the Supreme (Divisional) Court from inquiring into the question whether the election of the defendant as Paramount Chief of Nkusukum
[p.56] of [1979] GLR 53
State was in accordance with native law and custom. In Gyapon v. Osei Kwabena II (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 213, an adjudication would have decided the ownership of land as between chiefs in Ashanti. It was held again that section 17 imposed a restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme (Divisional) Court. In Mbra v. Donkor, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, 51 the Court of Appeal, while upholding the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over traditional courts, said at pp. 57-58:
“It must therefore be presumed that in the absence from the Statute Book of Section 88 of the Courts Ordinance, the High Court would have full jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters set forth in that section. All therefore that the section has achieved is to exclude from the jurisdiction of the High Court any power of adjudication upon such matters.”
In Blewey v. Assuah, High Court, Sekondi, 27 October 1967, unreported; digested in (1968) C.C. 31 Archer J. held that paragraph 66 of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), completely ousted the original and appellate jurisdiction of the High Court and disabled that court from considering whether there was evidence to support the decision of a committee of inquiry as to ownership of a stool.
Since the 1969 Constitution came into force other decisions have been given which show that the law is unchanged. Thus, in Kwansah XII v. Rockson, High Court, Cape Coast, 31 October 1969, unreported, Owusu J. upheld a preliminary objection founded on paragraph 66 of N.L.C.D. 84 that the High Court had no jurisdiction to determine a dispute as to whether the defendant had been duly nominated, elected and installed as a chief. In Frempong v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 76, an appeal from a conviction by a district court, Quashie-Sam J. referred to paragraph 66 of N.L.C.D. 84 and said at p. 78:
“By this provision of the Decree, the civil jurisdiction of the High Court, or the circuit court or the district court, is ousted whether as a court of first instance or an appellate court in any cause or matter as mentioned therein. It is quite clear on the record that the whole of these criminal proceedings were founded on the recovery of an alleged stool property from the appellant as a destooled chief. In my opinion I do not think that a court ought to circumvent the provisions of the Decree and arrogate to itself jurisdiction which it has not, and from which it is clearly prohibited, by assuming jurisdiction under the colour and guise of criminal proceedings. This I think is precisely what the trial court did, the impropriety of which was carried into the order of injunction against the appellant who was in possession of the cocoa farm and was disputing ownership with the complainants. Indeed, it is this same circumvention by which the trial court purported to order the regent, an opponent of the appellant, to be caretaker of the farm in dispute. The trial
[p.57] of [1979] GLR 53 court ought to have discerned or perceived the mischief into which it was being led by such a civil matter, touching the recovery of stool property, being instituted before it under the cloak of criminal proceedings.”
In Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391 at p. 401 Abban J., while holding that article 114 of the Constitution gave the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over traditional courts, said of paragraph 66, “There is no doubt that these provisions of paragraph 66 of N.L.C.D. 84 completely oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in chieftaincy matters.” In Republic v. Tekperbiawe Divisional Council; Ex parte Nene Korle II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 199 at pp. 208-209 Abban J. said that sections 52 and 113 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which replaced paragraph 66 of N.L.C.D. 84, “oust the jurisdiction of the High Court from hearing either at first instance or on appeal, disputes involving chieftaincy.”
The weight of judicial opinion thus appears to be in favour of upholding the limitation put on the jurisdiction of the High Court by section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). However, it has been held in Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317 and Moosi v. Boateng [1975] 2 G.L.R. 396 that the High Court now has concurrent original jurisdiction with traditional courts in chieftaincy matters.
In Republic v. Boateng (supra) the applicant sought an order of prohibition or injunction to restrain the respondent from exercising the functions of chief of Akwatia. Hayfron-Benjamin J., as he then was, held that although the applicant had alleged that the respondent as chief purported to exercise judicial powers over the people of Akwatia prohibition was not the proper remedy as the order did not lie to prohibit a person from exercising judicial functions generally. He however held that the injunction sought was in the nature of quo warranto and granted it. If it was, then the objection that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application was sufficiently answered by article 114 of the 1969 Constitution; but Hayfron- Benjamin J. appears to have gone further. After referring to section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and sections 15 and 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), he stated at pp. 327-328:
“It is quite clear that Parliament having the power to establish inferior and traditional courts, section 52 operates effectively to divest the circuit and district courts of jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. The position is not the same in the case of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. These are courts established by the Constitution, and by article 102 (2) it is specifically provided that: ‘The Judiciary shall have jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal including matters relating to this Constitution, and such other matters in respect of which Parliament may by or under an Act of Parliament confer jurisdiction on the Judiciary.’ It is quite clear therefore that Parliament can only add to but not to take away the
[p.58] of [1979] GLR 53 jurisdiction of the superior courts which has been conferred by the Constitution.”
And then after referring to articles 113 and 114 of the Constitution he stated at p. 328:
“It is quite clear from the foregoing provisions that the High Court is vested with original jurisdiction in all matters and section 13 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), makes this quite clear.”
Finally he said at p. 330:
“It is clear that all that is established by the Constitution is that where a chieftaincy matter commences in a traditional council or a house of chiefs appeal proceedings lie therefrom ultimately to the Supreme Court through the National House of Chiefs. If, however, the proceedings are commenced in the High Court proceedings lie from there to the Court of Appeal and thereafter to the Supreme Court as in all other civil proceedings. I am satisfied that the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this application.”
In Moosi v. Boateng (supra) the plaintiffs brought an action in the High Court for (a) a declaration that the defendant Boateng was not a member of the Asona royal family of Osiem, had no claim to be installed as chief of Osiem, and had not been installed as such chief: (b) an injunction to restrain him from exercising the functions of chief of Osiem, and (c) an injunction to restrain the Okyeman Traditional Council from recognising him as chief of Osiem or paying him allowances as such chief. Coupled with these reliefs was an application for an order for the preservation of stool property and the appointment of a caretaker of those properties pending the determination of the suit. While agreeing with the defendant that the various reliefs sought by the plaintiff were causes or matters affecting chieftaincy Quashie-Sam J. held, following Republic v. Boateng (supra) that the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with traditional councils and houses of chiefs in chieftaincy matters. He said at p. 405:
“There is certainly no doubt that the jurisdiction of the High Court is derived from article 113 (1) of the Constitution by the provisions of which Parliament can only enlarge and not subtract from its jurisdiction. It follows that any enactment which purports to subtract from the jurisdiction as already conferred by the Constitution must, to that extent, give place to the Constitution. From the submissions and arguments so ably presented by learned counsel for the parties, that is the situation in which I find section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). They each offend against the Constitution in so far as jurisdiction of the High Court is concerned. In this respect
[p.59] of [1979] GLR 53
I wish to adopt the decision of Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) in the matter of Republic v. Boateng;
Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.
In the result I hold that the High Court has jurisdiction concurrent with a traditional council or a house of chiefs to entertain any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy as defined in section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).”
The relevant provisions of the constitution are article 102 (1), (2), and (4), article 113 (1) and article 114. Article 102 (2) has already been quoted above. Clauses (1) and (4) provide as follows:
“102. (1) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the judiciary of which the Chief Justice shall be the Head; and accordingly no organ or agency of the executive shall be given any final judicial power . . .
(4) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
Article 113 (1) provides as follows:
“113. (1) The High Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters and such other original, appellate and other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by this Constitution or any other law.”
Article 114 also provides as follows:
“114. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior and traditional Courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”
Article 102 (1), (2) and (4) may be summarised thus: The judicial power of Ghana is vested in the judiciary which consists of the superior courts established by the Constitution and the inferior and traditional courts established by Parliament. The judiciary comprising the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court as the superior courts, the circuit courts, the district courts grades I and II as inferior courts, and the traditional councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs as inferior and traditional courts have jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal and any other matters in respect of which jurisdiction may be conferred upon them by Parliament. Article 102 (2) does not say that the High Court shall have jurisdiction in all matters;
[p.60] of [1979] GLR 53 what it does say is that the judiciary shall have jurisdiction in all matters; and the judiciary, as I have pointed out above, includes traditional courts. Therefore, it cannot be said that section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and sections 15 and 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), are in conflict with article 102 (2) of the Constitution and must give way to it so as to permit the High Court to exercise an original jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters concurrently with traditional courts.
In its expanded form article 113 (1) will read: The High Court shall have original, appellate and other jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters and such other original, appellate and other jurisdiction not being civil or criminal as may be conferred upon it by the Constitution or any other law. Thus, for example, article 113 (2) confers on the High Court jurisdiction to determine any matter relating to industrial and labour disputes, and article 114, a supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior and traditional courts. It will be observed that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, like its original jurisdiction, is derived from article 113 (1). Article 113 (1) does not say that the High Court shall have jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters; what it does say is that the High Court shall have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. There does not appear to be any good reason for importing the word “all” into article 113 (1) so as to give it wider scope. If the word “all” were imported into article 113 (1) it would mean that the High Court has not only an original but also an appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters. As far as the Constitution is concerned it is the judiciary as a whole, and not the High Court, which has jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters.
The jurisdiction in all matters, including civil and criminal matters, which article 102 (2) confers on the judiciary is shared out among the various courts of which, according to article 102 (4), the judiciary consists by the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and other legislation. In the case of the High Court, section 14 (1) (a) of Act 372 gives the court an original jurisdiction in all matters. The question is whether section 52 of Act 372 successfully takes away the jurisdiction which the High Court has under section 14 (1) (a) to entertain at first instance a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. In my opinion, since the Constitution did not confer on the High Court either an original or an appellate jurisdiction in all matters, it was competent for the legislature to curtail its jurisdiction by precluding it from entertaining either at first instance or on appeal any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy as defined in section 113 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).
In the case before me, although the plaintiff’s action is for money had and received to his use a genuine question has been raised on the pleadings as to whether he is the Kyidomhene or the Ankobeahene. If he is not the Kyidomhene, then such sums as the defendants have received to the use of the Kyidomhene are not money had and received by the defendants to the plaintiff’s use and his claim must for that reason be dismissed. In my view, this preliminary question ought not to be tried in this court, and counsel for the defendants is right in saying that this
[p.61] of [1979] GLR 53 court is precluded by section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), from doing so. Counsel for the plaintiff says his client is prepared to go before the Boso Traditional Council for the trial of the question whether or not he is the Kyidomhene. This will have to be done. Accordingly, I order a stay of proceedings in this suit pending the determination of the question by the Boso Traditional Council. DECISION Order accordingly.
S. O.
