AMPADU vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 71
26 June 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 15 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 14Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R v. Kuree (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 175.
(2) R v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.
(3) Twumasi-Ankrah v. R (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673.
(4) Tetteh v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 670, S.C.
(5) Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140, C.A.
(6) Republic v. Amesi (Quao) High Court, Accra, 17 March 1978, unreported.
(7) R v. Van Der Vyver [1961] Crim.L.R. 399, C.C.A.
(8) R v. Tilley; R. v. Tilley [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1309; [1961] 3 All E.R. 406; 45 Cr.App.R. 360; 125 J.P.
611; 105 S.J. 685, C.C.A.
(9) R v. Harvey (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 546.
(10) R v. Rickard (1918) 88 L.J.K.B. 720; 119 L.T. 192; 82 J.P. 256; 26 Cox C.C. 318; 13 Cr.App.R.
140, C.C.A.
[p.73] of [1979] GLR 71 (11) R v. Day [1940] 1 All E.R. 402; 162 L.T. 407; 104 J.P. 181; 38 L.G.R. 155; 27 Cr.App.R. 168, C.C.A.
(12) R v. Harden [1963] 1 Q.B. 8; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 553; [1962] 1 All E.R. 286; [1962] Crim.L.R. 248;
126 J.P. 130; 106 S.J. 264; 46 Cr.App.R. 90, C.C.A.
(13) R v. Smith (Michael Graham) (1968) 52 Cr.App.R. 648; [1968] Crim.L.R. 674; 112 S.J. 783, C.A. (14) R v. O’Sullivan [1969] 1 W.L.R. 497; [1969] 2 All E.R. 237; 133 J.P. 338; 113 S.J. 161; sub nom.
R v. O’Sullivan (John David) 53 Cr.App.R. 274, C.A.
(15) R v. Brownhill (1913) 76 J.P.J. 616; 29 T.L.R. 156; 8 Cr.App.R. 258, C.C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction and sentence for falsification of accounts and stealing. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Dy-Yaka for the appellant.
Achigiba for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
On 5 June 1978, I allowed the appeal in this case, quashed the conviction of the appellant, set aside the concurrent sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each of the six counts imposed on him by the circuit court and acquitted and discharged him. I reserved my reasons for allowing the appeal and I now proceed to give the said reasons.
The appellant in the case is a store-keeper employed by the State Construction Corporation in their carpentry and joinery stores. He was assisted in his work at the relevant time by another employee, an assistant store-keeper, called Mabel Kwame. It is alleged that in 1973 by falsifying documents in his possession he stole a number of bedhooks, drawer handles and drawer knobs, the property of his employers. He was arraigned before the circuit court charged with falsification of accounts on four counts and stealing on four counts. The first count charged him with falsifying an original requisition form No. 147260 by entering twenty bedhooks in the said requisition in the place of the figure 2 appearing in the duplicate requisition. The stealing which was count (2) and founded on the said falsification is in respect of the extra eighteen bedhooks involved valued at ¢58.50. In count (3), the appellant was said to have falsified an original requisition form No. 143068 by entering 200 drawer handles in the place of the figure 2 appearing on the duplicate requisition. The extra 198 drawer handles valued at ¢594 involved were the subject of the stealing charge in count (4). The alleged falsification charged in count (5) was similar to the charge in count (3) and the original requisition in that count is No. 160101 and the 198 drawer handles also valued at ¢594 therein were the subject-matter of the stealing charge in count (6). Count (7) also a charge of falsification involved drawer knobs. Instead of the figure 2 on
[p.74] of [1979] GLR 71 the duplicate requisition form there was 200 on the original and the appellant was said to be responsible for the entry of 200. The 198 drawer knobs valued at ¢248.10 formed the stealing charge in count (8).
The appellant was the store-keeper from 1971 to 1974 and as I have already pointed out he had an assistant store-keeper Mabel Kwame. He has tally cards on which are recorded the various items in the store. Indeed it is the tally cards which control the items in the store and which at any point of time should show the state of the stocks. When store materials are received, it is the duty of the store-keeper to prepare a receipt for the said materials. He then enters the receipt number and the quantity received on the relevant tally card.
According to the stores regulations of the State Construction Corporation, in order to issue out materials from the store, the store-keeper needs approved requisition from the Works Superintendent. Normally the requisitions are prepared by the office of the Works Superintendent and approved by the Works Superintendent, thereafter the original copy is given to the person sent to collect the items. The collector presents the original requisition to the store-keeper. On receipt of the original requisition, the store-keeper prepares way-bills to cover the items and he then gives the items to the collector. The collector then signs the way-bill as an indication that he has received the items. This is the usual practice. However in the carpentry and joinery section of the State Construction Corporation where the appellant worked, the Works Superintendent, contrary to regulations has adopted the system of permitting the collectors to receive materials without signing any way-bills and later way-bills are then prepared and sent to him for scrutiny.
All the requisitions the subject-matter of the four falsification charges were approved requisitions for the number of items appearing on the relevant duplicate requisitions. The case for the prosecution is that the figures on the originals have been altered and since the appellant is the store-keeper he altered the figures. It is also the case of the prosecution that the alterations were made to facilitate the stealing of the extra items which the alteration gave rise to.
The evidence which the prosecution led was that apart from the appellant, his assistant Mabel Kwame also had access to the store and to the records. It was also given in evidence that all the materials, the subject-matter of the charges, were materials that were used at the State Construction Corporation yard and that none was meant for outside jobs. The State Construction Corporation has a security service which scrutinises materials going outside. In the light of all this, it seems to me that it was necessary for evidence to be led firstly as to who actually altered the figures and secondly whether the materials alleged stolen were never used on State Construction Corporation jobs within the yard. Evidence as to who altered is really necessary because the appellant gave evidence that the alteration was done by his assistant and not by him. Evidence that these materials were not in fact used by the State Construction Corporation will show that the State Construction Corporation had sustained loss. As the said evidence was not led, serious doubt does arise as to whether it was the
[p.75] of [1979] GLR 71 appellant who inserted the figures and as to whether the State Construction Corporation had indeed sustained loss of these items.
The one outstanding aspect of this case is that Mabel Kwame the assistant was never called by the prosecution. The appellant was convicted on the first six counts: three for falsification and three for stealing but on the seventh and eighth counts he was acquitted because the learned circuit judge was satisfied that it was the assistant Mabel Kwame who made the false entry in count (7). This is very significant because the modus operandi of the alleged offences in counts (7) and (8) is identical with the modus in respect of all the six other counts. Furthermore although the appellant is apparently a person of good character the said Mabel Kwame was dismissed from the service of the State Construction Corporation because of her involvement in the theft of some cement.
In the course of the trial specimens of handwriting were taken from the appellant and other employees of the State construction Corporation. As in his statement to the police the appellant had indicated that a duplicate key to the store was with his assistant, it stands to reason that a specimen of handwriting was also taken from the assistant. The specimen of handwriting was sent to the forensic laboratory but the result was never made available to the court. In the light of all these facts it is necessary to consider the reason which persuaded the learned circuit court judge to convict the appellant. The reasons are contained in his findings with regard to counts (1) and (2); he said:
“The tally card No. 430, page 5, exhibit D, shows that on 30 August 1973 the date on which both exhibits A and B were prepared, the store-keeper issued out twenty bedhooks. The accused has denied having made the entry of twenty bedhooks on exhibit D on 30 August 1973. He, however, agreed with the suggestion by learned counsel for the State that the initials against the bedhooks issued on 6 August 1971 as appearing in exhibit D were his. I have had a close look at the initials against the bedhooks issued on 30 August 1973 appearing on the tally card, exhibit D, and I have no doubt in my mind that they are the same as those admitted by the accused. It is my finding therefore that on 30 August 1973 the accused issued out twenty bedhooks out of his store and debited from his stock in accordance to the tally card—exhibit D twenty bedhooks. The evidence of the second prosecution witness shows that the accused dishonestly appropriated eighteen bedhooks to his own use and gave him only two. I am also satisfied that to steal the eighteen bedhooks the accused falsified the original requisition No. 147260 (exhibit A) submitted to him by the second prosecution witness entering twenty bedhooks on the said requisition instead of two.”
It seems therefore that the learned circuit court judge compared the appellant’s admitted initials against bedhooks issued on 6 August 1971 with the disputed initials against the bedhooks issued on 30 August 1973. He found that they were similar and from that he drew the conclusion that the appellant falsified the requisition and stole the extra bedhooks. He
[p.76] of [1979] GLR 71 therefore convicted because by his comparison of the initials he was satisfied that it was the appellant who falsified the original requisition. It seems to me that that conclusion is a non sequitur. But before considering the dangers of the court itself making the comparison when no evidence at all had been led about who made the alterations, I intend to consider the defence which the appellant put forward that the alteration was made by his assistant, a defence which was accepted by the court in regard to counts (7) and (8). I think it is now commonplace that for the prosecution to succeed on a charge, it must prove the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Cases like R v. Kuree (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 175; R v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.; Twumasi-Ankrah v. R (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673; Tetteh v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 670, S.C. and Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140, C.A. all support the proposition that if a material witness is not called and the evidence of such a witness is capable of removing all reasonable doubts from the prosecution’s case or in the alternative if the absence of such evidence creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, then the prosecution have failed to prove their case with that degree of certainty which the law demands and a conviction cannot be sustained. This is the ratio in the case of Republic v. Quao Amesi delivered by me at the High Court in Accra on 17 March 1978, unreported.
In this case the prosecution did lead evidence to show that those with opportunity to falsify were the appellant and Mabel Kwame. They had no evidence whatsoever to show which of the two did the falsification. The most incriminating piece of evidence led by the prosecution is that, one witness concluded that the appellant falsified the figures because he had the custody of the requisitions. This conclusion is obviously unsatisfactory because Mabel Kwame also had custody of the requisitions since like the appellant she also had access to them. Since the two of them were the only persons in charge, I cannot see how the appellant can be convicted without the evidence of Mabel Kwame unless of course evidence as to handwriting was led to show beyond reasonable doubt that the falsifications were made by the appellant. Was such evidence led? Although there was no such evidence led, the learned circuit judge did the comparison himself by having a close look at the initials and although the appellant denied that he made the initials the circuit judge’s own impressions were that they were made by the appellant. In this connection it is worthy to note that Dr. W. R. Harrison, Director of the British Home Office Forensic Science Laboratory, Cardiff, in two articles the first on “Aspects of Forensic Science” [1954] Crim.L.R. 511 and the second the “Disguised Hand” [1962] Crim.L.R. 751 was able to demonstrate as he put it in [1954] Crim.L.R. 511 at p. 517: “that the comparison of handwriting for evidence of authorship has a scientific basis and does not depend upon ‘flair’ or subjective impressions.”
I think it is now a recognised obvious legal position that when a judge sits without a jury be acts both as the judge of facts as well as the judge of the law. How far can a jury or a judge as judge of the facts legitimately form an independent opinion as to handwriting without the assistance of a handwriting expert? A few English cases throw some persuasive light
[p.77] of [1979] GLR 71 on the problem. In R v. Van Der Vyver [1961] Crim.L.R. 399, C.C.A. the appellant was convicted at Quarter Sessions on three counts of obtaining by false pretences involving worthless cheques. Some witnesses identified him as the person who had given the worthless cheques. Others failed to so identify him and the evidence of identification was thus, it would seem, unsatisfactory. The appellant denied the charges and called a handwriting expert who testified that he could not have written the cheques. The deputy chairman in directing the jury on the evidence of the handwriting expert said, inter alia, that the jury were entitled to form an independent view presumably by comparing the handwriting themselves. In allowing the appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal per Barry, Hinchcliffe and Winn JJ. criticised the direction of the deputy chairman. They held that although the expert opinion was adequately put to the jury, nevertheless there was no sufficient direction as to the facts upon which that opinion was based and upon which therefore the jury themselves would have been entitled to form an independent opinion. The leading English case on the matter however would seem to be R v. Tilley and Tilley (1961) 45 Cr.App.R. 360, C.C.A. In that case the appellants were convicted at West Kent Quarter Sessions for stealing a car. Their evidence was that they bought the car and obtained a receipt and this was tendered in evidence. At the trial the appellants, at the request of the prosecution, wrote down the wording of the receipt on a piece of paper. This was apparently done to see whether the original receipt was a self-serving document written by any of the appellants. However upon obtaining this document, the prosecution did not pursue the matter any further. During the course of an overnight adjournment the original receipt and the document written by the appellants were photographed and the trial judge in summing-up invited the jury to form their own view as to the genuineness of the receipt by considering any similarity it had with the document. Ashworth J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal quashing the convictions, relied on the decision of Blackburn J. in R. v. Harvey (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 546 and the judgment of Salter J. in R v. Rickard (1918) 13 Cr.App.R. 140, C. C.A. as well as the views of Croom-Johnson J. in R v. Day (1940) 27 Cr.App.R. 168, C.C.A. and held in effect at p. 364 that a tribunal of fact, namely, the jury in that case “should not be left unassisted to decide questions of disputed handwriting on their own.”
In R. v. Rickard (supra) Salter J. had said at p. 143: “it is clear from the nature of things that to leave a question of handwriting to a jury without assistance is a somewhat dangerous course.” R v. Tilley and Tilley (supra) was quoted with approval and followed in R v. Harden [1962] Crim.L.R. 248 at p. 250, C.C.A. It was also followed by Edmund Davies L.J. in R. v. Smith (1968) 52 Cr.App.R. 648, at p. 651, C.A. and by Winn L.J. in R v. O’Sullivan (1969) 53 Cr.App.R. 274 at p. 281, C.A. In the last case Winn L.J. at p. 282 drew attention to the dangers facing a tribunal of fact making comparisons unassisted. He said:
“The fact remains that there is a very real danger where the jury make such comparisons, but as a matter of practical reality all that can be done is to ask them not to make the comparisons themselves and to
[p.78] of [1979] GLR 71 have vividly in mind the fact that they are not qualified to make comparisons. It is terribly risky for jurors to attempt comparisons of writing unless they have very special training in this particular science.”
One English case which would seem to cast doubt on this authoritative statement is R v. Brownhill (1913) 8 Cr.App.R. 258 at p. 267 where the Court of Criminal Appeal did itself make a comparison of handwriting. I think however that R. v. Brownhill (supra) is distinguishable. This was at the appellate stage and the court had had the assistance of a Dr. Birch an expert in handwriting.
In the appeal before me, the learned circuit court judge without any assistance purported to make a comparison of the initials of the appellant with initials, the authorship of which the appellant denies. The comparison of handwriting as Dr. Harrison so ably points out, has a scientific basis and is not just based on impression. The scientific data or facts which demonstrated the similarity were not indicated. As the English Court of Criminal Appeal pointed out in R v. Van Der Vyver (supra) attention ought to be directed at the facts upon which an opinion is founded as to a handwriting. In this case apart from mere general impression there were no facts whatsoever to ground the opinion. Moreover even if an expert had assisted the judge and given as his opinion that the initials of the appellant which he admits as his own were identical with the disputed initials and therefore the appellant did make the disputed initials, the central issue as to who altered the original requisition would still remain unresolved.
I cannot understand why the prosecution took the trouble of taking specimen handwriting ostensibly to prove that the entries in the original requisitions were falsified by the appellant and then abandoned making available the fruits of their efforts without any explanations whatsoever. Can it be that the result was not favourable to the prosecution and so it was suppressed? Surely if the result showed that the falsification was done by the appellant then there can be no explanation for not utilising it since there was no other evidence showing his connection with the falsification. It follows therefore that the basis of the conviction of the appellant is erroneous in law.
Looking at the case as a whole it seems to me that the prosecution did not prove that it was the appellant who falsified the entries. They also did not prove that the State Construction Corporation lost any property. Apart from proving that there were entries tending to show that these items had been taken to be used by the corporation, evidence was not led to show that the corporation did not use the said items.
In the result, I find the conviction quite unsatisfactory. It is for these reasons that on 5 June 1978, I quashed the conviction of the appellant, set aside the sentence imposed on him and acquitted and discharged him.
DECISION
Appellant acquitted and discharged.
L. F. A.
