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[1978] SLR (HC) 17High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

ARHIN vs. KISIWAA [1979] GLR 311

12 July 1978 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 17
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OSCOLAARHIN v KISIWAA [1979] GLR 311 [1978] SLR (HC) 17
APAARHIN v KISIWAA [1979] GLR 311, [1978] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookARHIN v KISIWAA [1979] GLR 311, [1978] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Gadd v. Houghton (1876) 1 Ex.D. 357, 46 L.J.Ex. 71, 35 L.T. 222; 24 W.R. 975, C.A.

(2) Dickson v. Reuter’s Telegram Co. (1877) 3 C.P.D. 1; 47 L.J.Q.B. 1; 37 L.T. 370; 42 J.P. 308; 26 W.R. 23, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for damages for loss of lotto prize-money suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s breach of warranty of authority. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Ohene Anobah for the plaintiff.

Adjei Mensah for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.

In this case the plaintiff sues the defendant for ¢1,152 damages, being the prize, which, but for the defendant’s default, he would have been entitled to on certain lotto tickets.

The plaintiff, now a farmer at New Adubeasi, was then at Sunyani. The action arises on these facts: On 12 June 1974, the plaintiff bought from the defendant, as lotto receiver No. 1834 in Sunyani, three lotto tickets, Nos. 17, 81 and 69. At the draw in Accra on 15 June 1974, those three numbers were declared as having won each respectively a prize of ¢384. Those tickets Nos. 17, 81 and 69 were issued respectively from lotto booklets numbers NC.241/757166, NC.241/757168 and NC.241/757173. After the necessary processing procedures of the said winning tickets, at the headquarters in Accra, of the Department of National Lotteries, the plaintiff was given in return for the said three tickets acknowledgement vouchers, exhibits A 1-3.

However, in further pursuit of his prize the plaintiff was eventually met with the rude shock of being told that the Director of the Department of National Lotteries had declared the plaintiff’s winnings void. It was explained that the sale of the said tickets was irregular; it having been found that those three tickets were not authorised allocation to the defendant. According to the directors the three tickets, evidenced by exhibits A 1-3, had originally been issued to lotto seller No. 1258 in whose account the sale of A 1-3 had been properly acknowledged. It was the contention of the plaintiff that by the act of the defendant, in offering to him those tickets, he has suffered damage to the extent of the prize money of ¢1,152.

The defendant did not appear at the trial nor did her counsel. From her statement of defence, however, her stand may be summed up as follows: although she admits lotto receiver’s number 1834 as hers, she denies selling any tickets from the aforesaid booklets; and in particular

[p.313] of [1979] GLR 311

Nos. 17, 81.69 to the plaintiff or at all: or ever stamping the said tickets with her registration No. 1834. Her case was that the said lotto booklets NC.241/757166, NC.241/757168 NC.241/757173 were never issued to her by the director, nor did she ever act as agent to the receiver to whom those tickets officially allotted, who was revealed to be lotto receiver No. 1258. The defendant accounts for the presence of her registration stamp on the said three tickets to be the result of fraud or some error.

The material issues thus joined in my view are whether or not the said tickets were sold to the plaintiff by the defendant and whether or not she had stamped tickets Nos. 757166, 757168, 757173 with her registration stamp. Also the questions whether the defendant was the registered lotto receiver No. 1834, and whether or not the tickets referred to in exhibits A had been among the tickets officially allotted to her by the director fall to be decided. Lastly is the issue whether or not tickets Nos. 17, 81 and 69 were winning tickets in the draw of 15 June 1974, and how much was the winning prize on each.

There is no difficulty in making the following findings of fact: (1) that the defendant was a registered lotto receiver registered as No. 1834: (2) that for the week in question tickets or booklets Nos. NC.241/757166, NC.241/757168 and NC.241/757173 were not among her authorised allocation from the director.

On the issue whether the three tickets herein were winning tickets I find exhibit B is proof that they were. Besides the statement of defence did not anywhere deny the fact that those were winning tickets. Indeed, paragraph 11 of the defence may be taken as admission of the fact that the three were winning tickets.

The weekly lotto is governed by the National Weekly Lotto Act, 1961 (Act 94). Broadly the Act legalises a state monopoly of the conduct of weekly lotto in this country by the government, making the Department of National Lotteries, i.e. the director, the sole proprietor. By section 11 the Act provides and gives the director power for the making of regulations for its operations,—wide enough to make the director’s decisions virtually indisputable. Those include appointment of lotto receiver, or sellers.

The legal relationship of an accredited seller or receiver with the director, as representing the Department of National Lotteries, is that of an agent and a principal. As to his relationship with the public who treat with such agent, the agent warrants that she has the authority of the director to conduct the business of a lotto receiver. On purchasing the said tickets here in issue therefore the plaintiff then contracts with the director as a disclosed principal of the defendant agent. Any breach of the contract therefore raises a liability directly against the director or vice versa. For it is settled law that an agent of a disclosed principal acting within the scope of his authority generally never incurs any liability upon a contract: see Gadd v. Houghton (1876) 1 Ex.D. 357, C.A.

In this case, however, by selling the tickets referred to in exhibit B, which had not lawfully been allotted to the defendant by the director, the defendant was acting outside the scope of and in breach of her agency.

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The defendant in consequence becomes directly liable to the plaintiff; not on the basis of that same contract, for the plaintiff only contemplated a contract with the principal, but on the basis of breach of warranty of authority. In Dickson v. Reuter’s Telegram Co. (1877) 3 C.P.D. 1 at p. 5, C.A., Bramwell L.J. put it thus:

“if a person requests and, by asserting that he is clothed with the necessary authority, induces another to enter into a negotiation with himself and a transaction with the person whose authority he represents that he has, in that case there is a contract by him that he has the authority of the person with whom he requests the other to enter into the transaction.”

So here the defendant undertook that she was contracting within the authority conferred on her by the director. It turned out not to be so; and I hold that it is by breach of this warranty that the plaintiff suffered loss.

In assessing the damages the measure will be the bargain which, but for the breach of the warranty, the plaintiff would have recovered from the principal if the principal were bound. According to the plaintiff this is the prize he was reported to have won on the three tickets namely ¢1,152.

The averment of the prize in paragraph (3), and of the consequent damages claimed in paragraphs (6) and (7) of the statement of claim were denied by the statement of defence, and consequently put in issue. There was a burden on the plaintiff to prove this. I do not regard exhibits A 1-3 as proof of the prize to be won as the contents were hearsay. However, there was this evidence from the plaintiff:

“On 15 June 1974 in the evening results were announced on Radio Ghana. I got to know that I had won on all the three tickets. On 16 June 1974 I went to the defendant in her house to claim my prize. This was to be

¢1,152 less her discount but she could not pay as she said the money was rather too much.”

I hold therefore the amount representing the plaintiff’s loss of bargain was ¢1,152 less the agent’s discount.

No evidence was given of the rate of the discount the agent was entitled to; but I think the fact that lotto receivers pay cash at a discount of about ten per cent in Sunyani is notorious enough to merit judicial notice. In the event, for ¢1,152 the plaintiff would have received ¢1,036.80. Accordingly I enter judgment for the plaintiff for ¢1,036.80 with costs of ¢250.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff, D. R. K. S.

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