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[1978] SLR (HC) 24High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

KANGAH vs. KYEREH AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 458

7 December 1978 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 22 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 24
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OSCOLAKANGAH v KYEREH AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 458 [1978] SLR (HC) 24
APAKANGAH v KYEREH AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 458, [1978] SLR (HC) 24 (Ghana).
BluebookKANGAH v KYEREH AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 458, [1978] SLR (HC) 24 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kyereh v. Kangah [1978] G.L.R. 83, C.A. (full bench)

(2) Nyamekye v. Tawiah [1979] G.L.R. 265.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for committal order for contempt of court against the respondent in respect of a prohibitive order given in an earlier proceedings between the parties (see [1978] G.L.R. 83, C.A. (full bench)). The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Dr. Ekow Daniels for the applicant.

A. Forson for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

This is an application brought by Opanyin Kangah, the petitioner-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) pursuant to an order of the court given under Order 59, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), on 15 June 1978, granting the applicant leave to apply for an order committing Kwesi Kyereh, the Sekondi Traditional Council and Victor Plange, the respondents herein for contempt of court.

The applicant has set out the grounds on which he has brought this application in the accompanying affidavit and I hereunder reproduce paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 of the accompanying affidavit which I consider to be relevant to the issues now before the court:

“2. That in 1972, I in my capacity as ebusuapanyin of Abrashieh Abradzi family of Sekondi for myself and as representing that family, filed a petition before the judicial committee of the Western Region House of Chiefs against the respondents asking for a declaration that the purported nomination, election and confinement of the third respondent by the first and second respondents was unconstitutional and against custom, and an injunction to restrain the first and second respondents from enstooling the third respondent.

3. The judicial committee of the Western Region House of Chiefs gave judgment in my favour. The appeal by the respondents was dismissed by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and the full bench of the Court of Appeal.

6. Since the final judgment delivered on 14 June 1977, the respondents jointly and severally have been violating the provisions of the judgment in particular:

(a) The third respondent has been attending the meetings of the Sekondi Traditional Council and has been participating in the proceedings.

(b) The said third respondent has been causing gong-gong to be beaten in his name as the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area.

[p.460] of [1979] GLR 458

(c) He has been attending public functions in his capacity as Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area which he is not. On 3 May 1978, the third respondent attended a function organised by the first and second respondents in honour of Major Cobbina. Not satisfied with being illegally there, he made a speech in his capacity as the Omanhene. That was reported on the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Television as follows:

‘The Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area Nana Anaisie, explained that the traditional council decided to honour Major Cobbina for his untiring efforts to restore Sekondi to its former glory. Major Cobbina was later presented with gifts. His wife was also presented with earrings, and necklace.’ 7. The respondent is still occupying the Sekondi Palace reserved for the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area in spite of repeated warnings.

8. In all, the third respondent has done and continues to do the acts complained of with the active encouragement of the first and second respondents.”

The applicant considers these alleged acts and conduct of the respondents as amounting to violation of the judgment he recovered against them and thereby making them guilty of contempt, and which said acts and conduct merit the committal of the respondents for contempt.

Learned counsel, Dr. Ekow Daniels, moving the court for the applicant, forcefully, inter alia, impressed upon the court that the judgment of the judicial committee of the Western Region House of Chiefs was given against the three respondents herein and that they cannot therefore claim to be ignorant of its provisions and effects. Counsel has submitted that the alleged acts and the conducts of the respondents complained of amount to utter disrespect for the authority of the superior courts and their judgments. By this, I believe, learned counsel is referring to the judicial committee of the Western Region House of Chiefs and the full bench of the Court of Appeal. Counsel submitted further that the respondents have by the said acts and conduct rendered nugatory the judgment obtained against them.

Counsel submitted further, that the attendance by the third respondent of the traditional council meetings was contrary to the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). He referred particularly to sections 14 and 16, and said they deal with membership of a traditional council. Counsel’s further submission was that allowing the third respondent to participate in the deliberations of the traditional council amounted to utter disrespect for the judgment of the court.

Counsel submitted further that the beating of gong-gong amounted to contempt because the gong-gong was beaten in the name of the third respondent, even though there is a regent for Sekondi Traditional Area.

[p.461] of [1979] GLR 458

Counsel again submitted that the publication in the daily newspapers and on radio which referred to the third respondent as Nana Kwamina Anaise, Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area, was in disrespect of the judgment. Counsel submitted further that it was wrong for the third respondent to have spoken for and on behalf of the Sekondi Traditional Area, since he was not a chief at the time, as provided by section 48 of Act 370. The third respondent lives in the Omanhene’s Palace at Sekondi and this also amounts to a disrespect for the judgment. These acts, counsel submits, as done by the respondents, have made nonsense of the judgment in question and the respondents should therefore be taught how to respect the law of the country.

The affidavit filed by the respondents in opposition to this application did not seek to admit or deny the allegations made in the applicant’s affidavit in support thereof. Learned counsel for the applicant has therefore invited the court to call the respondents into the witness-box for them either to admit or deny the allegations on oath. This invitation was opposed by Mr. Forson, learned counsel for the respondents who referred to Order 19, r. 14 of L.N. 140A and conceded that under Order 19, r. 14 non-admission or denial of the averments made in the applicant’s affidavit by the respondents amounted to admission of same and that therefore, there was no need to call evidence in proof of same.

The court gave its ruling holding that the affidavit filed by the respondents, inasmuch as the same did not seek to either admit or deny the averments made in the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application, the respondents must, by virtue or Order 19, r. 14, be deemed to have admitted the facts stated therein. Counsel for the applicant was therefore called upon to satisfy the court that the matters referred to in the applicant’s affidavit as being the acts and conduct he complains of amount to contenpt of court to warrant the grant of the order of the court which the applicant now seeks. Learned counsel for the applicant in his bid to satisfy the court made the submissions to which I have already referred.

Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Forson, submitted that the application is misconceived and must be struck out. It is his view that the acts and conduct complained of should offend against the judgment and the order of restraint made therein. The contempt committed must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel submitted further that since the allegation is not that the third respondent attended the traditional council meeting as a member, he commits no contempt; he could have been called as a co-opted member. The third respondent commits no contempt, even if he holds himself out as the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area, when he has been so nominated, elected and installed. It is further submitted that paragraph 6 (c) of the affidavit in support of the application is a reported speech and the respondents should not be held to it.

The court adjourned the matter for ruling on 23 November 1978, but decided later that the applicant should be called upon to file a supplementary affidavit verifying the points as to whether or not the third

[p.462] of [1979] GLR 458 respondent has been enstooled as the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area. If so, when such enstoolment took place, and by whom the third respondent was so enstooled. The applicant was called upon on 16 November 1978 to file such an affidavit as supplementary to his original one, if he so wished. He was directed to serve the respondents with a copy of such an affidavit (if any). The applicant pursuant to that order filed a supplementary affidavit on 21 November 1978. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the said affidavit are:

“2. That I say that on 29 July 1972 the said Mr. Victor Plange was ‘captured and confined on authority of Kwesi Kyereh.

4. Therefore the said Victor Plange was installed on 19 August 1972. He rode in a palanquin and was taken through the principal streets of Sekondi . . . “

The respondents did not file any affidavit in reply to the applicant’s supplementary affidavit and, apart from the fact that their failure to admit or deny the facts stated therein may amount to admission of same by the respondents, learned counsel for the respondents intimated to the court that the respondents do not wish to deny the facts contained in the said supplementary affidavit since they are all basically true.

The question therefore is whether or not the acts and conduct of the respondents as referred to in the original and supplementary affidavits of the applicant constitute contempt of court. In my view for these acts and conduct complained of to be held to amount to contempt of court they must be strictly proved to be wilful disobedience or violation of the court’s judgment or order. Now it is here necessary to refer to the judgment and order or both of the judicial committee of the Regional House of Chiefs which has been affirmed by both the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and the full bench of the Court of Appeal.

It is important to note here that when a judgment or order of a judicial committee of a House of Chiefs is brought before the High Court for the purpose of enforcement, that judgment or order must be dealt with in the same manner as a judgment or order of the High Court is normally dealt with. In other words, it must be treated as if it were a judgment or order of the High Court itself; see section 30 (1) of Act 370 provides:

“30. (1) Upon an application made by a party to any proceedings before a judicial committee of a House of Chiefs in whose favour a judgment or order was made by that committee, that committee shall forward a copy of the judgment or order to the High Court with a request for execution and upon the payment by the applicant of the necessary fees the High Court shall take such steps and issue such process as may be necessary for the purpose of the execution of the said judgment or order as it would take or issue if it were a judgment or order of that court.”

It is my view, therefore that contempt proceedings brought before the High Court in respect of proceedings before a judicial committee of a House of Chiefs must be regarded as contempt proceedings brought in

[p.463] of [1979] GLR 458 respect of proceedings before the High Court itself.

I will now refer to the judgment of the judicial committee of the Western Region House of Chiefs given at Sekondi on Friday 15 March 1974 which runs as follows:

“In the result this committee will grant the reliefs sought by the petitioner, and hereby declares that the alleged nomination, election and confinement of the third respondent is unconstitutional and grant an injunction to the petitioner restraining Kwesi Kyereh and the Sekondi Traditional Council from enstooling Mr. Victor Plange an Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area. Costs to petitioner . . .”

Against this judgment the respondents appealed to the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and the following is the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs, given on 20 February 1976: “In our view, the findings of the trial members were fully justified by the evidence and we will accordingly dismiss this appeal. Costs to be assessed at ¢3,200.” Further appeal to the full bench of the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 14 November 1977 by a decision of four to one reported in Kyereh v. Kangah [1978] G.L.R.83.

The judgments of the two adjudicating Houses of Chiefs and that of the highest court of the realm the Court of Appeal, show clearly that the petitioner was not given any more relief than what he claimed. In fact he could not properly have been given a relief he did not ask for since that would have been done without jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal, in its judgment, referred to the applicant’s claim and per Sowah J.A. at p. 86 said:

“There was again no reply and quite properly he instituted his petition claiming a declaration that the nomination was unconstitutional and void and an injunction restraining Kwesi Kyereh, the first appellant and the Sekondi Traditional Council from proceeding with the election and installation of Victor Plange as Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area.”

The judgment of the Regional House of Chiefs therefore declared the alleged election and confinement of the third respondent as invalid and further granted an injunction order restraining Kwesi Kyereh and the Sekondi Traditional Council from enstooling Mr. Victor Plange as Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area.

Now the issue for me to decide, therefore, is essentially whether the respondents have done anything or refrained from doing something in wilful disobedience or violation of the judgment of the Regional House of Chiefs as quoted in extenso (supra). Since they would be liable for committal, it is my view that proof that they have so wilfully disobeyed the court’s order or judgment must be strict and be beyond all reasonable doubt: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 8, para. 46, p. 25 at p. 26 where it is stated, “A party who wilfully disobeys an injunction

[p.464] of [1979] GLR 458 is liable to committal (Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health (1865), L.R 1 Eq. 42;” see also Oswald’s Contempt of Court (3rd ed.) p. 31 where it is stated, “As to committal for disobedience to a judgment or order—a person may be committed to prison for disobeying a judgment or order requiring him to do any act other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing anything . . .”

I will now therefore proceed to examine critically the acts and the conduct of the respondents which have been called in question and to determine whether or not they amount to contempt of court in the circumstances of this application.

It may perhaps be necessary at this juncture to ascertain the actual force behind, or effect of the judgment of the judicial committee of Western Region House of Chiefs given on the 15 March 1974. I think for all intents and purposes the practical effects of the judgment of the said committee was clearly set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal given on 14 June 1977 (see [1978] G.L.R. 83 per Sowah J.A. at p. 85) which reads:

“The appeal is from the decision of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs whereby it confirmed by a majority the judgment of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs which had held that the nomination of the third appellant, Victor Plange, by the first appellant, Kwesi Kyereh, for election and installation onto the stool of Sekondi Traditional Area which had become vacant by reason of the demise of Nana Anaisie IV was against the custom and usages of the Sekondi people; the nomination was accordingly declared improper and void.”

It is my view therefore that by virtue of the decision of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs as confirmed by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and subsequently by the Court of Appeal (full bench), the purported nomination, election and confinement of the third respondent by the first and second respondents were declared to be null and void and of no legal or customary effect or consequence whatsoever. Paragraph 4 of the applicant’s supplementary affidavit seems to suggest that actual installation or enstoolment took place on 19 August 1972. It is my view further that any such purported installation or enstoolment of the third respondent stemming from the unconstitutional and void nomination and election was also void ab initio. For if the nomination of a candidate for a stool is declared customarily void then any subsequent election and installation of any such candidate based on the void nomination must be held to be incurably bad and customarily void.

That the respondents accept this as the correct position of things which is in keeping with the customary procedure and practice regarding installation of an omanhene in the Sekondi Traditional Area is borne out by the fact that the third respondent has not made any attempt to refer to himself as the Omanhene

[p.465] of [1979] GLR 458 of Sekondi Traditional Area throughout these proceedings: see particularly paragraphs 8 and 9 of the respondents’ affidavit in opposition to this application. Paragraph 8 reads, “That the third respondent as a member of the Anaisie royal family is entitled as of right to live in the Ahenfie.” He here refers to himself as a member of the Anaisie royal family (which fact, I believe, is not in dispute) but he has not stated that he is occupying the ahenfie as the Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area. This view is further supported by learned counsel for the respondents, submission in this matter which said that the third respondent commits no contempt, even if he holds himself out as the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area, when he has not been so nominated, elected and installed.

The view that even if the third respondent had been installed on 19 August 1972, the judgment of the Regional House of Chiefs given on 15 March 1974 had nullified such an installation is amply supported by the Court of Appeal (full bench) decision reported in Nyamekye v. Tawiah [1979] G.L.R. 265. In this case, a conflict arose between three royal houses composing the Nsona stool family of Breman Essiam as to which one of two of the three component houses was entitled to nominate a candidate for election and installation on the stool when the stool became vacant.

The three houses are known as Tawiah, Eduful and Yaw Ackon royal houses, and the dispute which culminated in the appeal was broadly between Tawiah and Eduful houses. The appellant’s case was that such a conflict arose in or about 1910 and to prevent its recurrence in the future, the three families agreed to nominate a candidate to the stool by turns. He said following that agreement, and as between 1910 and 1972, Tawiah and Yaw Ackon families have each nominated two candidates for the stool by turns, while the Eduful family had had only one turn. The appellant therefore said that with the death in 1972 of Nana Abom III of Yaw Ackon branch, the right to nominate a candidate devolved on his branch, that is, the Eduful branch of the family.

The appellant said he duly exercised that right and nominated one Kwasi Abiram of his branch of the family for installation. But the Tawiah branch whose right to nominate would arise after his Eduful candidate had left the stool, in defiance of the agreed rotary practice, nominated a rival candidate by name Yaw Ntebiah for installation. He in fact was installed by the kingmakers as Nana Anamafo Poku II. Indeed it was he who fought this action in the right of the Tawiah family. The appellant’s complaint was that Nana Anamafo Poku’s nomination transgressed the customary rotatory practice and was void on that account. He sought an order to annul it and an interim injunction to restrain the installation of the said Nana Anamafo Poku. The evidence shows that the Tawiah family were not enjoined pendente lite from enstooling the co-respondent, Nana Anamafo Poku, so that at the date when the judicial committee of the Regional House of Chiefs determined the dispute, the said Anamafo Poku, the co-respondent, was on the stool. But that fact did not inhibit that tribunal from finding for the appellant.

The tribunal held that the

[p.466] of [1979] GLR 458 branch family properly entitled under the rotatory system to nominate a candidate should have been the Eduful section, that is the appellant. It therefore found for the appellant’s family and entered judgment in its favour. That judgment which was reversed on appeal by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs was restored by the full bench of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal per Apaloo C.J. (see [1979] G.L.R. 265 at p. 269) held:

“In our judgment, both the so-called consultation and the decision to accept the respondent’s nomination were a pious farce. They did not have the slightest semblance of legality. We find nothing in the appellant’s conduct or evidence which supports the respondent’s patently false denial of the rotatory system . . .

Although its judgment was sketchy . . . the Judicial Committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs arrived at the right conclusion and its judgment ought not to have been disturbed.’

Now what this court is being called upon to determine is whether or not the respondents have done anything in wilful disobedience or violation of the judgment of the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs given on 15 March 1974. Surely it cannot be gainsaid that the purported installation of the third respondent on 19 August 1972, cannot be held to be a wilful disobedience or violation of the judgment given in 1974. The judgment was not meant to and can not have a retrospective effect on the action or conduct of the respondents done or exhibited in 1972. It appears that action was taken before the applicant’s petition was heard, because as in Nyamekye v. Tawiah (supra) the first and second respondents in this case too were not enjoined pendente lite from enstooling the third respondent, and they therefore committed no contempt by so doing.

The applicant’s main complaints seem to be what he has set out under paragraph 6 of his affidavit in support of this application. He starts by saying “since the final judgment delivered on 14 June 1977, the respondents jointly and severally have been violating the provisions of the judgment.” These alleged acts of violation have been set out in paragraphs 6 (a), (b) and (c), 7, 8 and 9 of the said affidavit in support. I propose to deal with these in the light of the submissions made thereon by both counsel in this matter.

It seems to me that the judgment given on 15 March 1974 only sought to restrain the first two respondents, Kwesi Kyereh and the Sekondi Traditional Council from enstooling the third respondent, Victor Plange, as the Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area. It appears the third respondent himself was not restrained from doing anything, since the purpose of the order was to prevent his enstoolment and it being perhaps impossible or uncustomary for the third respondent to enstool himself as omanhene.

Even the first and second respondents were only restrained, after the nomination, election and confinement of the third respondent have been declared unconstitutional, from enstooling the third respondent as Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area. It is difficult therefore to see

[p.467] of [1979] GLR 458 how anything done short of enstooling or being a preparation, directly or indirectly, towards enstooling the third respondent by the first and second respondents can amount to wilful disobedience or violation of that injunction order or judgment. There must be evidence of actual installation or full preparation towards installation or enstoolment, otherwise the first and second respondents cannot be held to be guilty of contempt. Of course, they could be guilty of contempt if they do, or attempt indirectly to enstool the third respondent; that is to say, if for instance they instigate others to enstool the third respondent, knowing that they themselves can not do so without committing contempt. It is my view, however, that the applicant has not been able to show that the first and second respondents have actually enstooled or even attempted to enstool the third respondent, Victor Plange, as Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area “since the final judgment delivered on 14 June 1977.”

A positive complaint against all the respondents is that the third respondent, upon the first and second respondents’ encouragement, does attend traditional council meetings and takes part in the council’s deliberations. In fact, it is not certain as to the capacity in which he attends such meetings. It seems to me, however, that he does attend such meetings not as a chief since he himself seems to accept that he is not a chief within the meaning of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971, s. 48 (1) of which provides:

“48. (1) A Chief is an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a Chief on the National Register of Chiefs . . .”

The third respondent claims he has not since the said judgment been installed as a chief and since he has not been so installed he cannot apply for his name to be inserted in the National Register of Chiefs for him to qualify as such under the Act. It is clear therefore that he attends the traditional council meetings as an ordinary citizen resident in the traditional council area. In any event, the judgment has not restrained him from attending such meetings as an ordinary citizen of the traditional area.

It seems to me that even if the third respondent regards himself as a chief; and for that matter as Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area, and other people also consider him as such and even refer to him as Nana Anaisie, Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area, when in fact and in law he is not a chief or omanhene, he commits no contempt, because he cannot, by so merely holding himself out as such or others regarding him as such, become enstooled as such without going through the proper customary nomination, election and installation or enstoolment. There are sanctions under Act 370 against any person who purports to act as a chief when he is not in fact a chief. Section 52 (1) of Act 370 provides:

[p.468] of [1979] GLR 458

“52 (1) If it appears to him to be necessary so to do in the interests of public order the Minister may by executive instrument— (a) prohibit any person who is not a Chief (whether or not he was formerly, a Chief) from purporting to exercise any of the functions of a Chief,

(b) require that no person shall treat as a Chief a person subject to such prohibition.”

It seems to me that the applicant being perhaps aware of these sanctions refrained from asking for an order to restrain the third respondent from conducting himself in the manner the applicant now complains of and no such prohibitive orders were issued under that judgment and the respondents cannot therefore be held to have committed contempt if the third respondent so conducts himself.

There is one significant fact which both sides of the dispute seem to accept or acknowledge, and this is that they all seem to agree that there is a regent for the Sekondi Traditional Area. It is my view that a regent for a traditional area is appointed only when the stool becomes vacant or even where the chief is, in the meantime, incapacitated by reason of some bodily infirmity, and cannot, therefore, perform the functions of a chief or when the chief travels and is therefore away from his people for a considerable length of time. A regent is appointed in any such case for him to act in place of the demised, sick or absent chief. It is my view, therefore that the fact that the Sekondi Traditional Area has a regent now presupposes that the traditional area has no chief as at present and that the regent will perform all the functions normally performed by the chief until an installed chief takes over.

This therefore means that the applicant himself knows or should know that the third respondent has not been enstooled as Omanhene of Sekondi Traditional Area since 15 March 1974, by the first and second respondents herein. The applicant again knows or should know as a fact that the third respondent was not restrained by the judgment of 15 March 1974, from doing anything and that therefore, he has not been restrained from doing any of the things he, the applicant, now complains of. It is my view therefore that the applicant has failed to satisfy me that any of the respondents has wilfully disobeyed or violated any part of the judgment of the 13 March 1974 as confirmed by the Court of Appeal or at all. The application for a committal order against the respondents for contempt therefore fails and the same is dismissed with ¢1,500 costs in favour of the respondents.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

S. Y. B. – B.

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