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[1978] SLR (HC) 29High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

OPATA vs. AKUSSIE AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 262

17 March 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 29
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OSCOLAOPATA v AKUSSIE AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 262 [1978] SLR (HC) 29
APAOPATA v AKUSSIE AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 262, [1978] SLR (HC) 29 (Ghana).
BluebookOPATA v AKUSSIE AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 262, [1978] SLR (HC) 29 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Rhodes v. Swithenbank (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 577; 58 L.J.Q.B. 287; 67 L.T. 856; 37 W.R. 457; 5 T.L.R. 352, C.A.

(2) Dyke v. Stephens (1809) 30 Ch.D. 189; 55 L.J.Ch. 41; 53 L.T. 561; 33 W.R. 932; 29 S.J. 682. (3) Brocklebank, Re; Ex parte Brocklebank (1877) 6 Ch.D. 358; 46 L.J.Bcy. 113; 37 L.T. 282; 25 W.R. 859, C.A.

(4) Payne, Re; Randle v. Payne (1883) 23 Ch.D. 288; 52 L.J.Ch. 544; 48 L.T. 194; 31 W.R. 509, C.A. (5) Woolf v. Pemberton (1877) 6 Ch.D. 19; 37 L.J. 328; 25 W.R. 873, C.A.

(6) Ward v. Ward (1843) 6 Beav. 251; 12 L.J.Ch. 332.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to an action by a next friend on behalf of an infant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

P. A. Adjetey for the plaintiff.

Narter Olaga for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

This is a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff, an infant, whose father is dead is the owner of a house at Teianshi in Labadi. In the statement of claim it is pleaded inter alia that the infant plaintiff “brings this action by his mother and next friend who was the wife of the deceased.” In their statement of defence the defendants pleaded, inter alia, “that no written authority was filed at the registry before the name of the next friend was used in the action and that the action is not properly before the court.” On 21 March 1977, the solicitor for the plaintiff took out summons for directions asking for directions that the case proceed to trial on the issues as to the ownership of the house. The summons came before me on 30 March 1977 but counsel for the defendants did not file any additional issues, he rather raised a preliminary objection to the propriety of the summons for directions being taken. He submitted, no doubt in the light of his pleadings, that the case was not properly before this court.

The basis of his submission is that the plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of Order 16, r. 19 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The rule reads:

“Before the name of any person shall be used in any action as next friend of any infant . . . such person shall sign a written authority to the solicitor for that purpose, and the authority shall be filed in the Registry of the Court in which the cause or matter is proceeding.”

In this case a search made by the solicitor for the defendants disclosed that no written authority of the alleged next friend had been filed in this case before the name of the next friend was used, and the question that this poses is, what is the consequence of this failure?

It seems to me that to understand the consequence it is necessary to appraise the status and powers of a next friend in proceedings commenced

[p.164] of [1979] GLR 262

by infant plaintiffs. As Lord Esher M. R. said in Rhodes v. Swithenbank (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 577 at p. 578. C.A. the next friend “undoubtedly has the conduct of the action in his hands.” The nature of this was indicated by Bowen L.J. in the same case at p. 579 when he pointed out that the next friend of an infant plaintiff is “the officer of the Court to take all measures for the benefit of the infant in the litigation in which he appears as next friend.” Rhodes v. Swithenbank decided that if the next friend does anything in the proceeding apart from just merely conducting it, then whatever he does must be done with the paramount interest of the infant in view or it must be done with the sanction or approval of the court otherwise it will be invalid and must be set aside. Moreover the authorities show that a next friend must not have an interest adverse to the infant’s.

In a sense a next friend is not a party to the suit: see Dyke v. Stephens (1809) 30 Ch.D. 189. The object however behind the idea of having a next friend apart from the necessity of obtaining the services of an adult able and willing to look after the interest of the infant is as James L.J. pointed out in Ex parte Brocklebank (1877) 6 Ch.D. 358 at p. 360, C.A. to give security for the costs of the defendant but of course because of his peculiar position, if he is ordered to give security for costs and he does not do so and the action is dismissed, proceedings in another action by another next friend but against the same defendant for the same purpose will not be stayed: see Re Payne (1883) 23 Ch.D. 288, C.A.

Although preference is usually accorded to a father or mother (Woolf v. Pemberton (1877) 6 Ch.D. 19, C.A.) the court generally expects the next friend to be a substantial person and it is desirable therefore that he be a relation or a friend of the family and not merely a volunteer.

His status and powers make it clear that his consent to the use of his name is not merely a technical requirement. Consequently as was decided in Ward v. Ward (1843) 6 Beav. 251 where a person is named as a next friend without his consent he can apply to have his name struck out and the solicitor so using his name is liable to be mulcted in costs.

It would seem from the decision in Ward v. Ward (supra) that the use of a person’s name without his consent does not make the proceeding void. Clearly the concern of the court is to have an adult able and willing to exercise control over the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the infant and if need be to give security for the costs of the defendant. Order 16, r. 19 is quite clearly designed to attain this purpose. The plaintiff’s solicitor was clearly under a duty before he commenced this action to obtain the consent of the next friend and indeed to take instructions from the next friend not the infant. The provisions of Order 16, r. 19 were certainly not complied with by the solicitor for the plaintiff.

I am inclined to agree with counsel for the defendant that the summons for the directions is not properly before me as a very essential step in the proceedings provided in Order 16, r. 19 has been breached. This however is an action commenced for the benefit of an infant. It is now common-place that in proceedings involving infants the court takes a jealously anxious approach to safeguard the interest of the infant and make sure

[p.265] of [1979] GLR 262

that nothing is done that will jeopardise that interest. In view of this I think I ought to have recourse to Order 70, r. 1 which provides:

“Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court or Judge shall think fit.”

I will adjourn the summons for directions sine die for the counsel for the plaintiff to secure and file the necessary written consent; I will also order that such consent if filed, shall be taken to have been filed before the name of the next friend was used in these proceedings.

Since the failure to file the written consent was due to the fault of the solicitor for the plaintiff I order that the costs of this application which I assess at ¢40 should be paid to the defendant personally by the solicitor of the plaintiff.

Order accordingly.

DECISION

Proceedings adjourned sine die.

Order accordingly.

J. D.

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