PEKI AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 61
17 March 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 21 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Donkor v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 598, S.C.
(2) Baddoo v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 1012, C.A.
(3) R. v. Child (1846) 2 Cox C.C. 102.
(4) R. v. Hoare (1817) 6 M. & S. 266; sub nom. R. v. Dillon 2 Chit. 314; 105 E.R. 1242. (5) State v. Kofi (Otu), High Court, Cape Coast, 7 November 1967, unreported; digested in (1968)
C.C. 16.
(6) Lows v. Telford (1876) 1 App.Cas. 414; 45 L.J.Q.B. 613; 35 L.T. 69; 40 J.P. 741; 13 Cox C.C.
226, H.L.
(7) R. v. Bathurst (1755) Say. 225; 96 E. R. 860.
(8) Scott v. Brown (Matthew) & Co., Ltd. (1884) 51 L.T. 746; 1 T.L.R. 54.
(9) Collins v. Thomas (1859) 1 F. &, F. 416; 175 E.R. 788.
(10) R. v. Wilson (1799) 8 T.R. 357; 101 E.R. 1432.
(11) Taunton v. Costar (1797) 7 T.R. 431; 101 E.R.1060.
(12) Turner v. Meymott (1823) 1 Bing. 158; 7 Moo. 574; 1 L.J.C.P. 13; 130 E.R. 64. (13) Beddall v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch.D. 174; 50 L.J.Ch. 401; 44 L.T. 248; 29 W.R. 484. (14) Milner v. Maclean (1825) 2 C., & P. 17; 172 E.R. 8.
(15) R. v. Smyth (1832) 5 C. & P. 201 ; 1 Mood. & R. 155; 172 E.R. 939.
[p.63] of [1979] GLR 61
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEALS against convictions for forcible entry contrary to section 202A (1) of Act 29. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Okyere Darko for the appellants.
Florence Okine for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The appellants were jointly charged with the offence of forcible entry contrary to section 202A (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), as amended by the Criminal Code, 1960 (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 47). The facts of the case which were established by overwhelming evidence and accepted by the court are that the complainant was engaged in putting up a building consisting of two rooms and a verandah on land which the first appellant claimed to be his. The complainant engaged one Nene Nyazor, a mason, to put up the said building which was a cement block building. On 21 July 1972 the complainant visited the site in the company of three other persons. The mason was then actually working on the building with his workmen and was at the top of the building which had then reached window level and the door and window frames had then been fitted. While the complainant and the mason and the other three persons and workers were on the site, they heard the other appellants led by the first appellant and others, about fifteen altogether, singing war songs in a war-like manner, they came to the site in a furious mood; they were holding iron bars, cutlasses, hammers, pick-axes and sticks. On the orders of the first appellant, the other appellants started to break the building. The mason on top of the building was naturally frightened and had to jump down and the appellants completely demolished the whole building using the instruments they had brought. The complainant asked those with him not to do anything fearing that resistance might result in bloodshed or death.
These facts were never seriously challenged at the trial and in arguing the appeal on behalf of the appellants the said facts were also apparently accepted. The original grounds of appeal filed by the appellants are as follows:
“(1) Conviction is wrong in law.
(2) Verdict is unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced.
(3) In the alternative sentence of imprisonment is illegal as it contravenes the provisions of section 297 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30).”
Perhaps in order to understand the so-called alternative third ground of appeal it may be necessary to advert to the order made by the trial court. On convicting all the appellants the learned district magistrate passed the following sentences: the first appellant was fined ¢200 and the other five appellants ¢100 each. In addition each of the appellants was ordered to enter into a bond in the sum of ¢100 each on his own recognisance to be of good behaviour for twelve months; in default the first appellant to go to prison for twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour and each of the other appellants to go to prison for eight months’ imprisonment with
[p.64] of [1979] GLR 61 hard labour. On application by counsel for the appellants, the learned district magistrate purporting to act on the authority of Donkor v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 598 at p. 602, S.C. allowed a respite of the sentence and granted each appellant bail in the sum of ¢600 with one surety each to be justified. I shall deal with the legality of this course of action presently in this judgment. In the meantime it is necessary to find out in what manner section 297 (3) of Act 30 was contravened. Now section 297 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), is as follows:
“(3) Where a person convicted of any offence is sentenced to pay a fine the Court may direct that if he fail to pay it within the time appointed for payment (which may be either forthwith or within a specified time, as the Court thinks fit), he shall suffer imprisonment until it is paid. Such imprisonment shall be in addition to any imprisonment to which he is sentenced for his offence; and, in the case of a felony or misdemeanour, shall not exceed one-fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such offence, and shall not in any case exceed twelve months. . . .”
The provision of the law relating to recognisance for keeping the peace is section 299 of Act 30 and it is as follows:
“The Court before which a person is convicted of any offence (other than an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law) may, if it thinks just, according to the circumstances of the case, order that, in lieu of or in addition to any other punishment, he enter into his own recognizance, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace and being of good behaviour; and that, in default of such recognizance or sureties he be imprisoned, in addition to the term, if any, of imprisonment to which he is sentenced, for any term not exceeding six months nor exceeding the term for which he is liable to be imprisoned for the offence of which he is convicted or, if no term of imprisonment is specified for the offence of which he is convicted, for a term not exceeding two months.”
Although the sentences of the trial court have not been neatly expressed, I do not see anything in the sentences contravening sections 297 (3) and 299 of Act 30. In fact in this appeal no arguments were addressed to me on ground (3) and I take it that it has been abandoned. I accordingly dismiss ground (3) as being misconceived or in the alternative abandoned.
The learned district magistrate however granted a respite of sentence relying on Donkor v. The State (supra). That was a decision of the then Supreme Court which was delivered by Ollennu J.S.C. I had the privilege of being counsel for the Republic in that case. The facts of the case and the principle of law applicable to the said case which was applied by the court are irrelevant here. The court allowed the appeal of the appellant who had been convicted and sentenced to a term of eight months’ imprisonment with hard labour by the circuit court and whose appeal to the High Court had been dismissed and in the concluding passage of the judgment Ollennu J.S.C. said at p. 602:
[p.65] of [1979] GLR 61
“the conviction of the appellant by the circuit court, and the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court have occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice. But there is this saving grace, namely, that both the circuit court and the High Court granted a respite of sentence, therefore the appellant has not served the term of eight months’ imprisonment with hard labour that was imposed upon him.” (The emphasis is mine.) The passage emphasised is apparently the authority which the district magistrate relied upon to grant the respite of sentence. It is noteworthy however that the authority which enabled the circuit court to grant respite was not indicated. The attention of the court was not directed at that. The court was merely gratified that the appellants had not suffered since their appeals had been allowed. The court made no decision on authority to grant bail and the case can hardly be an authority on the power to grant bail. The previous provision which permitted suspension of sentence pending appeal was section 332 (1) of Act 30 as amended by section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1962 (Act 116). Before the amendment the power to grant the respite was in the circuit court; after the amendment it devolved on the High Court but it was a respite which could only be granted “After the filing of a petition of appeal by any person entitled to appeal, and pending the hearing.” It was not a power which the circuit court or High Court could exercise in the case of a person who had not filed his petition of appeal.
Section 332 of Act 30 as amended has now been repealed by section 114 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), in Schedule III thereof and the subsisting provision now is section 26 (5) of Act 372. It is as follows:
“(5) The Court before which a person is convicted or the Court to which an appeal is made may if it thinks fit on the application of an appellant admit the appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal.”
(The emphasis is mine.) The provision persistently mentions appellant and it seems to me that if a convicted person has not appealed so as to bring himself within the designation “appellant,” the trial court and the appellate court will have no legal authority to grant bail. In this case at the time the learned district magistrate gave bail, and thus granted a respite of sentence, the appellants had not then appealed. They were convicted on 26 April 1973, granted bail on the same day and they filed their appeal on 27 April 1973. In my opinion the grant of bail in the circumstance is not in accordance with law and should be deprecated. Donkor v. The State (supra) did not decide that bail can be granted before an appeal is filed. If that is what it decided then it would have been per incuriam having regard to the then state of the law. I will now proceed with the second ground of appeal.
The second ground of appeal was never seriously argued. The fact stated in this judgment were amply supported by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the relevant and substantial parts of the said
[p.66] of [1979] GLR 61 evidence were never challenged in cross-examination. Indeed the line of defence adopted by the appellants was that the land belonged to the first appellant and he was therefore entitled to behave as he did. He agreed he demolished the building but said he did it with the assistance of the other appellants by using their bare hands and not the instruments allegedly used. Of course no tribunal bent on doing justice can resolve this issue of the use or non-use of implements in favour of the appellants. Clearly it is inconceivable and blatant prevarication to allege that the five appellants using their bare hands could demolish within a few hours a cement block building of two bedrooms and a verandah which had reached window level. Does it make sense for any sane person to attempt to demolish a block building with his bare hands? I think the learned district magistrate was supported by the evidence on record and the commonsense of the matter when he found as a fact that the appellants entered the land in dispute in the manner alleged and with sticks, iron bars, pick-axes and other instruments demolished the building of the complainant. The second ground of appeal is therefore untenable and I dismiss it.
The first ground of appeal is wrongly or rather inadequately formulated. The ground alleges error of law without indicating or identifying specifically the nature of the error having regard to the facts accepted or disputed. When I drew counsel’s attention to the inadequacy of the formulation he filed an amendment headed “Particulars of law involved in support of ground (1) of the original grounds of appeal” as follows:
“(1) The learned trial magistrate failed to make any positive finding on ‘possession’ which is an essential ingredient of the offence of forcible entry.
(2) Since there was no finding by the learned trial magistrate on the issue of ‘possession,’ the appellants could not be said to have entered the land in question.”
The gravamen of counsel’s argument in support of ground (1) as amended is that the trial magistrate made no finding of fact in regard to who was in possession at the relevant time and consequently the entry of the appellants did not constitute forcible entry because the intention of the legislature is to prevent a person in possession of land or a building from being ousted by another person from the said land or building by means of violence instead of resorting to the civil court for redress. The argument of counsel is in effect that to succeed the prosecution must prove that the complainant is either the owner of the land or he is in possession; that the appellants made an entry on the land and that they entered with violence. He submits that no evidence was led that the complainant is the owner or is in possession and so an essential ingredient of the offence is missing and so the conviction cannot be sustained.
I think the submission on the law is correct. To buttress the submission counsel for the appellant referred me to the case of Baddoo v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 1012, C.A. delivered by Amissah J.A. on 15 November 1968, in which Amissah J.A. said as follows at pp. 1013-1014:
[p.67] of [1979] GLR 61
“Now the offence created by section 202A (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), which after a period of absence from our statute book starting from 1960 has now re-appeared through N.L.C.D. 47 is as follows:
‘202A (1) Whoever with violence makes an entry into any building or land, whether or not he is entitled to the possession thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he does so in pursuance of a warrant or other lawful authority to use such violence’. Two things must be established if a conviction under this section is to be sustained: there must have been an entry into a building or land and secondly, this entry must have been with violence. To prove entry, it must be shown that irrespective of whether the accused had title to the property or not, he did not have possession of it at the material time. Possession must be with somebody else. If a complainant therefore complains that an accused has forcibly entered his land, that complainant must show to the satisfaction of the court that he, and not the accused, was in possession of the land at the time. A positive finding on possession, if it is in issue, is essential.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The argument of counsel is that the learned district magistrate did not make a positive finding of fact that the complainant was in possession. In so far as counsel insists on a formula characterised as “positive finding” in accordance with Amissah J.A.’s dictum I think he may have read too much into that dictum or he may have an erroneous conception of what Amissah J.A. was driving at by his use of the expression “positive finding.” Although the statement of the law by Amissah J.A. is binding on me and if I may say so with respect, it is impeccable, nevertheless the application of the law so submitted to the facts is misconceived. Nene Nyazor, the mason, who was putting up the building was employed by the complainant. He was his agent. He went on the land in pursuance of the agency. His acts were therefore the acts of his principal and even if the complainant had been absent, the fact that he was on the land on behalf of the complainant doing work for him, is sufficient evidence of possession and the well known common law principle of vicarious responsibility will transform the possession of the mason to a possession of the complainant.
As the learned author of Russell on Crime (12th ed.), Vol. 1 puts it at p. 285 “whatever a man does by his agents is his own act.” A fortiori in this case when the complainant was actually on the land supervising his workmen, I do not see the need for the magistrate to make a so-called positive finding of fact, so to put it, that the complainant is in “possession.” What is a positive finding of fact in this regard? In my opinion the facts of the case as accepted by the court amount to a finding that the complainant was in possession. The dictum of Amissah J.A. that “a positive finding on possession, if it is in issue, is essential” does not mean that a trial court must perforce use such special words as “I positively find that A. is in possession.” There is no need for any such formula. Amissah J.A.’s words must be understood as laying down the proposition that any findings of fact by a trial court from which it can be reasonably
[p.68] of [1979] GLR 61 inferred that A. is in possession is enough. The word “possession” need not even appear in the finding.
I cannot, speaking for myself and with all due respect to Amissah J.A., see how the duty which all tribunals have to make findings of fact can be made more burdensome or less onerous or indeed enlarged and in any way whatsoever made more meaningful by adjectival addition of “positive,” “specific,” “definite” or the like. A finding is a finding no matter the adjectival appendage it carries and no matter how superlative the adjective may be. I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Amissah J.A. did not intend his words to carry the meaning which counsel is now advocating. My reason for this confidence will appear presently: two English cases R. v. Child (1846) 2 Cox C.C. 102 and R. v. Hoare (1817) 6 M. & S. 266 are quoted in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th ed.) at p. 1307 as authority for the proposition obvious from a reading of the statutory provision, that in forcible entry a complainant’s “title is not part of the issue” at the trial “and probably need not for the purpose of conviction be stated with precision.” Amissah J.A. who it is being submitted would insist on a firm finding positively stated regarding possession, referred with approval to R. v. Child (supra) in his judgment in Baddoo v. The Republic (supra).
After all said and done, possession is a fact deducible by inference from circumstances and other facts proved or found. Such facts by the demands of our law can be proved either by direct evidence or they can be deduced from circumstantial evidence irresistibly pointing to their existence. It is facts of a specie which cumulatively establish possession and the facts of this case accepted by the court do amount to possession in the complainant at the relevant time.
The offence of forcible entry under section 202A (1) of our Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), as amended by N.L.C.D. 47 was originally a common law offence. As Blackstone says in his Commentaries it is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements with menaces, force and arms and without the authority of the law: see 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries at p. 148. The common law offence in its pristine purity with its sanction was found inadequate to prevent breaches of the peace and in order to restrain persons from having recourse to violent means to do themselves justice a number of statutes was passed to augment the common law sanction. These statutes, the Forcible Entry Act, 1381, the Statute of Forcible Entry, 1391, the Forcible Entry Act, 1429, and the Forcible Entry Act, 1588, are the genesis of our section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended by N.L.C.D. 47. As Archer J., as he then was, said on 7 November 1967 in State v. Otu Kofi, High Court, Cape Coast, unreported; digested in (1968) C.C. 16 because of the English experience we are entitled to look at the English provisions as a guidance in interpreting our own. The policy of the English statutes as was said in Lows v. Telford (1876) 1 App. Cas. 414 at p. 426, H.L. would seem to require a person to resort to the courts to enforce a right of entry unless they are in a position to enter in a peaceable and easy manner. The policy of our section 202A (1) of Act 29 was similarly described by Archer J. in State v.
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Otu Kofi (supra). Our section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended by N.L.C.D. 47 provided as follows:
“202A.(1) Whoever with violence makes an entry into any building or land, whether or not he is entitled to the possession thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he does so in pursuance of a warrant or other lawful authority to use such violence.”
The conduct of the first appellant and his associates, the other five appellants, falls in my view very squarely within the language and spirit of these words. In Russell on Crime (12th ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 284, Bacon’s Abridgment and 1 Hawkins c. 64 s. 25 are cited as authority for the kind of conduct which has long been held as amounting to forcible entry:
“A forcible entry must be with a strong hand, coming with a multitude of people or any excessive number of persons, or with unusual weapons, or with menace of life or limb; it must be accompanied with some circumstances of actual violence or terror . . .”
Can it be said that the conduct of the appellants does not fall within the language of this definition? Were they not armed with unusual weapons like iron bars, cutlasses, hammers, pick-axes and sticks? The first four are iron implements and in their variety included cutlasses. The cutlasses in particular were unusual if the purpose was merely to demolish the building.
There was some argument that no violence was used on the complainant and his workmen. That argument would seem to be directed at showing that a person entitled to possession can take possession in as violent a manner as he wishes provided does he not threaten or offer any violence to any of the inmates of the house. I do not think it is actually threatening or offering violence specifically to A. or B., an inmate of the house, that is the essence of this offence. Nor do I think such conduct is necessarily the conduct that the law seeks to discourage. There are ample provisions in the Criminal Code to meet these types of conduct. It is the entry accompanied by circumstances of terror that, as is stated in Russell on Crime (supra), the law is designed to discourage. In this respect, having regard to the manner of entry, what was the need for sticks and cutlasses if they are not things which show the entry to “be accompanied with some circumstances of terror.” The argument that no force was used on any person and so the appellants are not caught by the provisions of section 202A (1) as amended is in my view ill-conceived. Apart from the fact that section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended makes no mention of “violence to person” but uses the word “violence” by itself, the English experience in interpreting the forcible entry statutes has been against this argument.
In Russell on Crime (12th ed.) at p. 284, R. v. Bathurst (1755) Say. 225, a case I have not had the opportunity to study, is quoted as authority for this proposition:
“An entry may be forcible not only in respect of a violence actually done to the person of a man, as by beating him if he refuses to relinquish his possession; but also in respect of any other violence in the manner of the entry as by breaking open the doors of a house,
[p.70] of [1979] GLR 61 whether any person be in at the time or not, especially if it be a dwelling-house.”
Some argument was also urged on me that the first appellant is the owner of the land; that he is the lawful owner and that the complainant is a trespasser and he is therefore entitled to oust him. I think before the Forcible Entry Acts, and even under the Act of 1381 a lawful owner of land was entitled to use reasonable force to regain his property from any person unlawfully in possession. The English Forcible Entry Act, 1381, as found in Russell on Crime (12th ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 280 provides:
“The King defendeth that none from henceforth make any entry into any lands and tenements, but in case a where entry is given by the law, and in such case not with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but only in peaceable and easy manner. And if any man from henceforth do to the contrary, and thereof be duly convict, he shall be punished by imprisonment . . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It would seem that if the entry is peaceable and in an easy manner then it is not forcible entry as it will then be without violence and accordingly if a trespasser is so ejected it will not be an offence of forcible entry: see Scott v. Matthew Brown & Co., Ltd. (1884) 51 L.T. 746 and Collins v. Thomas (1859) 1 F. & F. 416. It seems to me that the same applies under our section 202A (1) of Act 29. But it must be noted that in both the English statute and under our section, it is forcible entry with violence which is what the law prohibits and not peaceful and reasonable entry. In point of fact, it is my opinion that once entry is peaceful and reasonable and is not with violence, a person with a claim of right commits no offence against section 202A (1) of Act 29 if he uses reasonable force to remove a trespasser or any person for the purpose. A person entitled to possession, indeed the lawful owner cannot dispossess even a trespasser by making an entry on his own land with violence. Indeed even forcible entry against a tenant at will would seem to be an offence: see R. v. Wilson (1799) 8 T.R. 357 at p. 364; Taunton v. Costar (1797) 7 T.R. 431; Turner v. Meymott (1823) 1 Bing. 158 and Beddall v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch.D. 174, all cited in Russell on Crime (12th ed.) at p. 283.
The facts of this case show that the first appellant and his associates, the five other appellants, were armed in an unusual manner and were singing and brandishing their weapons in such a way as to intimidate the complainant and his workmen and to deter them from defending the uncompleted building from being destroyed. Milner v. Maclean (1825) 2 C. & P. 17 is a respectful English authority for the proposition that such conduct constitutes the offence of forcible entry. Furthermore the appellants displayed such force as the holding of cutlasses and sticks calculated to prevent resistance for, as the complainant deposed to without being challenged, he feared that resistance would result in bloodshed or even death. Such conduct also on the authority of R. v. Smyth (1832) 5 C. & P. 201 is squarely caught within the language of the English statute and in my view it also falls within the provisions of our section 202A (1) of Act 29.
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It seems therefore that in his exposition and application of the law of forcible entry under section 202A (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), the learned district magistrate did not fall into any error whatsoever. Accordingly for the reasons I have stated in this judgment it seems to me that ground (1) of the grounds of appeal also fails. I hold that the learned district magistrate was right in the view he took of the facts and the law and in his application of the law to the facts. The convictions of the appellants are therefore unexceptionable. The sentences were quite lenient.
In the circumstances, I will dismiss the appeals, the convictions and sentences are confirmed. The bail granted to the appellants by the trial court is cancelled.
The recognisances ordered by the learned district magistrate should be entered into by the appellants within ten days of this decision and if the fines have not been paid, they should also be paid within the said ten days. In default the appellants should serve the terms of imprisonment which the magistrate imposed in case of default.
The appeals are all dismissed.
DECISION
Appeals dismissed.
L. F. A.
