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[1978] SLR (HC) 36High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS EX PARTE ODURO [1979] GLR 354

11 October 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 36
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS ex parte ODURO [1979] GLR 354 [1978] SLR (HC) 36
APAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS ex parte ODURO [1979] GLR 354, [1978] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS ex parte ODURO [1979] GLR 354, [1978] SLR (HC) 36 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Clarke (1758) 1 Burr. 606; 97 E.R 471.

(2) Cobbett v. Hudson (1850) 15 Q. B. 988; 16 L.T. (o.s.) 124; 14 Jur. 982: 117 E.R. 731.

(3) Thompson, Re (1860) 6 H. & N. 193; 30 L.J.M.C. 19; 3 L.T. 294, 409; 25 J.P. 166; 7 Jur. (N.S.)

48; 9 W.R. 203; 9 Cox C.C. 70; 158 E.R. 80.

(4) Daley, Re (1860) 2 F. & F. 258; 175 E.R. 1050.

(5) R. v. Clarke (1762) 3 Burr. 1362; 97 E.R. 875.

(6) Child, Ex parte (1854) 15 C.B. 238; 139 E.R. 413; sub nom. Re Fitzgerald; Ex parte Child 2 C.L.R.

1801.

(7) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Ibrahim alias Telley [1977] 1 G.L.R. 7. (8) Republic v. Attorney-General; Ex parte Kakraba-Quashie, High Court, Ho, 3 May 1978, unreported.

(9) Republic v. Attorney-General; Ex parte Quaye-Mensah, High Court, Ho, 4 May 1978, unreported. (10) Dumoga, In re [1961] G.L.R. 44.

(11) Okine , In re [1959] G.L.R. 1.

(12) Akoto, Re [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 523, S.C.

(13) Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206; [1941] 3 All E.R. 338;110 L.J.K.B. 724; 116 L.T. 1; 58 T.L.R. 35; 85 S.J. 439, H.L.

(14) State v. General officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Exparte Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 192, C.A.

(full bench).

(15) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394. (16) Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25. (17) R. v. Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Sarno [1916] 2 K.B. 742; 86 L.J.K.B. 62; 115 L.T. 688; 80 J.P. 389; 32 T.L.R. 717; 14 L.G.R. 1060.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of habeas corpus to secure the release of General I. K. Acheampong. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Osei Akyeampong for the applicant.

J. E. K. Aikins, Director of Public Prosecutions and Osafo Sampong, Senior State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The applicant, Emmanuel Oduro, is a solicitor’s clerk and he brings this application for an order of habeas corpus for the purpose of liberating General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong whom he alleges to be illegally detained. He states in his affidavit that Acheampong is his friend, but does not set out therein any facts establishing that relationship. He also states that Acheampong “once worshipped” at his, the applicant’s church without giving any indication as to how long ago Acheampong stopped worshipping at the church. Although he claims to have personal knowledge of the matters set out in his affidavit, it is clear that his knowledge of those matters is derived from what be claims to [p.356] of [1979] GLR 354 have heard in a radio broadcast. It is, therefore, not surprising that when counsel was asked what the mode and manner of arrest was he answered that he did not know, and when asked where the place of detention was he again answered that he did not know.

Although a prima facie case of illegal detention by officers of the Republic was made out in the applicant’s affidavit, the applicant failed miserably to show that he was entitled to apply for the release of Acheampong. By section 1 (2) of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), the categories of persons who may apply for an order of habeas corpus are (a) any person alleging that he is being unlawfully detained; (b) any person entitled to the custody of the person alleged to be detained and (c) any other person acting on behalf of the person alleged to detained. No difficulty arises with regard to an application by person in the first category; except in cases of disability, such as insanity or infancy, there can hardly ever be any question as to the capacity of the person detained to make the application for his own release. In the second case, there must be proof that the applicant is entitled to the custody of the person alleged to be detained. The third category comprises all other persons who can show that they have the authority of the person alleged to be detained to make the application. Thus there is implied authority on the part of a husband to apply for the release of his wife: R. v. Clarke (1758) 1 Burr. 606; or of a wife for the release of her husband: Cobbett v. Hudson (1850) 15 Q.B. 988, or of a father for the release of his son: Re Thompson (1860) 30 L.J.M.C. 19. Where authority cannot be implied and express authority is lacking the court may permit a relation or friend to apply provided he can show that access to the person alleged to be illegally detained has been denied so that it is impossible to obtain instruction from him: Re Daley (1860) 2 F. & F. 258. But a mere stranger or volunteer cannot come to court to ask that a person alleges to be illegally detained be released. Thus, in R. v. Clarke (1762) 3 Burr. 1362 the court refused to permit the secretary of a Lunatic Friend Society to apply for habeas corpus on behalf of a person who was alleged to be wrongfully detained as a person of unsound mind. The ground for the decision was that the applicant had not shown that he was acting on behalf of any one who had a right to demand the release of the person detained. In that case, the body was not produced, but the court admitted evidence as the cause of the detention. A further application for inspection of the body at the place of confinement was also refused. In Ex parte Child (1854) 15 C.B. 238 where the applicant claimed to be an attorney for the person alleged to be detained the application for habeas corpus was refused on the ground that there was no affidavit to show that the attorney was duly authorised by him. Said Jervis C.J. at p. 239:

“A mere stranger has no right to come to the Court and as that a party who makes no affidavit, and who is not suggested to be so coerced as to be incapable of making one, may be brought up by habeas corpus to be discharged from restraint. For anything that appears, Captain Child may be very well content to remain where he is.”

[p.357] of [1979] GLR 354

That case, too, concerned a person of unsound mind and there again the body was not produced.

In the present case, thee applicant is not even an attorney: he is a mere clerk, and the affidavit does not show that he has the authority of Acheampong for making the application. If the English practice is anything to go by, the proper course in a case such as this is for the court to give the other party an opportunity of answering the charge of illegal detention without requiring him to produce the body of the person alleged to be detained. Therefore, while declining to order production of the body, I ordered the Attorney-General, as the chief law officer of the Republic to submit a report in writing stating the grounds of the detention. The report filed by Dr. G. Koranteng-Addow, Attorney-General, states:

“It is a notorious fact that on 5 July 1978 General I.K. Acheampong was forced by the Armed Forces to resign his position as Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council as well as Supreme Commander of the Ghana Armed Forces. This step put him on the Army Reserve List. For security reasons he has since been put under house arrest. An Executive Instrument (E.I. 150) Preventive Custody (No. 42)

Order has since been made to cover his detention.

Attached to the report is E.I. 150 of 1978 which is in the following terms:

“E.I. 150.

PREVENTIVE CUSTODY (NO. 42) ORDER, 1978 IN exercise of the powers conferred on the Supreme Military Council by section 2 of the Preventive Custody Decree. 1972 (N.R.C.D. 2) this Order is made this 30th day of August, 1978.

The Supreme Military council hereby authorises the arrest and detention with effect from the 5th day of July, 1978 of GENERAL I. K. ACHEAMPONG, being a person in respect of whom the Council is satisfied that it is in the interest of national security so to do.

LT. GENERAL F. W. K. AKUFFO Chairman of the Supreme Military Council.”

Mr. Aikins has submitted that having regard to the issuance of E.I. 150 of 1978 the arrest and detention of Acheampong is lawful and this application for an order of habeas corpus directing that he be released ought, for that reason, to be dismissed. Counsel relies on the High Court cases of Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Ibrahim [1977] 1 G.L.R. 7; Republic v. Attorney-General; Ex parte Kakraba-Quashie, High Court, Ho, 3 May 1978, unreported; and Republic v. Attorney-General; Ex parte Quaye-Mensah, High Court, Ho, 4 May 1978, unreported. In each of these cases the High Court was called upon to consider whether the arrest and detention of the applicant under the authority of preventive custody orders made by the National Redemption Council or Supreme Military Council in purported exercise of the

[p.358] of [1979] GLR 354

powers conferred on them by N.R.C.D. 2, s. 2 was valid. Ironically, the preventive custody order in each case was signed by Colonel (now General) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong as Chairman of the National Redemption Council or the Supreme Military Council.

In Ex parte Ibrahim, Taylor J. held that as the National Redemption Council was the supreme legislative body, its motives in making an instrument under N.R.C.D. 2, s. 2 could not be questioned. In Ex parte Kakraba-Quashie, Lamptey J. accepted the reasoning of Taylor J. and came to the same conclusion. In Ex parte Quaye-Mensah, Andoh J. relied on the judgment of Adumua-Bossman J. in Re Dumoga [1961] G.L.R. 44 and held that where a statute confers a discretion upon an executive officer to arrest and detain persons the courts cannot inquire into the exercise of that discretion provided the executive officer acts in good faith. Re Dumoga was preceded by In re Okine [1959] G.L.R. 1. Both of these High Court decisions, like the later decision of the Supreme Court in Re Akoto [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 523, relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206. Since then, however, the attitude of the courts has undergone some change, for in State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 192, the full bench of the Court of Appeal approved of the dissenting opinion of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson as a correct statement of the strict common law doctrine of reasonable cause, and held, with respect to the power conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 93), on the Attorney-General, that on an application for an order of habeas corpus it is not sufficient merely to exhibit the Attorney-General’s written consent for the citizen’s detention. The return, the court held must go further to state clearly facts from which the object of the detention may reasonably be ascertained, as the respondent must satisfy the court of the existence of the facts justifying the detention. This important decision was not referred to in Ex parte Ibrahim, Ex parte Kakraba-Quashie of Ex parte Quaye-Mensah. It is a moot question whether those would have been decided in the same way if the attention of the judges had been drawn to it.

Before Taylor J. gave his decision in Ex parte Ibrahim he had had occasion to consider the legality of detentions under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 236), in two cases, namely, Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394 and Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25. In the former, he said at p. 399:

“I think the law is now so well settled and there is no need for an authority to support it, that when by law power is given to a person or body, the person or body must exercise the power in accordance with the terms of the enabling law. The legislative body and the executive body are separate entities both as a matter of pure legal theory and as a practical reality. Where, therefore, the legislature gives an executive body executive powers, such powers can only be exercised within their terms. If they are not so exercised, then quite

[p.359] of [1979] GLR 354

apart from any administrative machinery to rectify and regulate their proper exercise, the courts in exercise of their judicial function as guardians or legality have the powers, and these can be resorted to, to remedy the situation particularly in cases affecting the liberty of the subject.”

Those two decisions have behind them the full weight of the authority of Ex parte Braimah, which was overlooked in Ex parte Ibrahim.

In my opinion, no distinction cut in this twentieth century be legitimately drawn between the exercise of power by petty officers of state and the like exercise by high officers of state. I take my stand with Low J. in R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Sarno [1916] 2 K.B. 742 at p. 752 and say with him:

“ I wish . . . emphatically to protect myself from being supposed to assent to some of the arguments which have been used at the Bar. For instance, I do not agree that if the Executive were to come into this Court and simply say ‘A person is in our custody, and therefore the writ of habeas corpus does not apply because the custody is at the moment technically legal,” the Court would have no power to consider the matter and, if necessary, deal with the application for the writ. In my judgement that answer from the Crown in reply to an application for the writ would not be sufficient if this Court were satisfied that what was really in contemplation was the exercise of an abuse of power. The arm of the law in this country would have grown very short, and the power of the Court very feeble, if it were subject to such a restriction in the exercise of its power to protect the liberty of the subject as that proposition involves.”

As I see it, the plain truth is that when the Council makes an executive instrument under N.R.C.D. 2, s. 2 it is no less bound to exercise the power in accordance with the section than is a regional commissioner bound to act in accordance with section 3 when he exercises the power conferred on him by N.R.C.D. 236. Further, if the position is that had section 2 conferred the power on regional commissioners the reasons for making such an executive instrument could be inquired into I fail to see why the same cannot now be done. In my opinion the fact that the council is itself the author of the Decree makes no difference.

Having made my position clear, I must say again that the applicant before me has not shown that he has the authority of Acheampong for bringing this application. He is in fact employed as a clerk by the solicitor whom he “engaged” for this application. There is nothing in the affidavit filed by him to show that either he or the solicitor attempted to gain, and were denied, access to Acheampong. I therefore dismiss the application and award against the applicant, Emmanuel Oduro, ¢150 costs.

DECISION

Application dismissed with costs.

J. D.

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