REPUBLIC vs. DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE GRADE I, TEMA; EX PARTE AKOTIAH AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 341
24 October 1978 · AGYEPONG J · ≈ 12 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 37Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283.
(2) Sam v. the State [1967] G.L.R. 283.
(3) Bakuma v. Ekor [19721 1 G. L.R. 133, C.A.
(4) Republic v. Constitutional Committee Chairman; Ex parte Barima II [1968] G.L.R. 1050. (5) Binortsor v. Nordor (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 226, C.A.
(6) R. v. Jackson; Ex parte Ofori Atta II (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 421, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for certiorari and prohibition directed against the District Court Grade 1, Tema, in respect of private prosecution of the applicants for the offences of conspiracy to steal and stealing. The facts are sufficiently stated in the headnote.
COUNSEL
Applicants in person.
Respondent represented by its registrar.
Willie Amarfio for the private prosecutors.
JUDGMENT OF AGYEPONG J.
[The court after considering and dismissing as without substance, six grounds in support of the application for certiorari and prohibition, here referred to ground 7, i.e. whether once Attorney-General or the police have decided against prosecution of the applicants, there could be no private prosecution and continued:] There is nothing in section 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), which disables a private person from launching a private prosecution where the Attorney-General or the police decline or decide against prosecution. Section 61 (1) of Act 30 provides:
“61. (1) Any person who believes from a reasonable and probable cause that an offence has been committed by any person may
[p.343] of [1979] GLR 341 make a complaint thereof to a District Magistrate who has jurisdiction to try or enquire into the alleged offence, or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person accused is alleged to reside or be.”
The jurisdiction conferred on a private citizen to institute private prosecution is unqualified except by the provisions of section 61 (1) and (2). Subsection (2) reads:
“(2) Every complaint shall be made orally or in writing, but if made orally shall be reduced into writing by the Magistrate and in either case shall be signed by the complainant and the Magistrate.”
And of course the provisions do not include the ground urged by Mr. Akotiah.
Ground 8 (i) That a human corpse could not be the subject of a stealing charge could properly be urged in the District Court Grade I, Tema. It could be argued as a preliminary objection. But certainly in the present circumstances, it cannot be a ground for certiorari.
Indeed, if the charges of conspiracy to steal and stealing the corpse of the Ada mantse appearing in the summons could be proved to be bad in law, it is not apparent on the face of the record that they are bad in law. Therefore the proceedings of certiorari to quash the summons will fail: see Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283 at p. 293. For it was held in Sam v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 283 by Archer J. (as he then was) that a human skull interred with the body could be the subject of a stealing charge. A fortiori, so could the body of a paramount chief, which is removed from a hospital mortuary without the knowledge or consent of the elders or kingmakers of a traditional area, be the subject of a stealing charge, because, unlike the skull which was actually interred, the corpse of the paramount chief was in the legal possession of the elders and the kingmakers, ready for the performance of a burial and other rites befitting a paramount chief.
In addition, I would for the sake of public policy, hold that a corpse in Ghana can be the subject-matter of a stealing charge, since this will enable the courts to pass heavier sentences on accused persons than those prescribed by the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1965 (Act 301), s. 27 (4), which provides that:
“27. (4) Any person contravening any of the provisions of this section [that is no person shall exhume without authorisation] shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty cedis or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both,” and in this way deter people from stealing or exhuming dead bodies and using parts thereof for the performance of ritual. As far as I am aware, Sam v. The State (supra) is still good law.
Ground 8 (iii) To say that the information that the applicants have conspired to steal, and have stolen the corpse of Nene Dake II, Ada Mantse, discloses no triable offence known to the law, is to ignore not
[p.344] of [1979] GLR 341 only the existence of the decision in Sam v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 283 (supra) which Mr. Akotiah has not proved to this court has been overruled by a higher court, but also the Criminal Code. 1900 (Act 29), s. 123 which reads:
“123. (1) Any of the crimes of stealing, fraudulent breach of trust, robbery, extortion, or defrauding by false pretences can be committed in respect of anything, whether living or dead, and whether fixed to the soil or to any building or fixture, or not so fixed, and whether the thing be a mineral or water, or gas, or electricity, or of any other nature, and whether the value thereof be intrinsic or for purpose of evidence, or be of value only for a particular purpose, or to a particular person, and whether the value thereof do or do not amount to the value of the lowest denomination of coin . . .
(2) In any proceedings in respect of any of the crimes mentioned in subsection (1) it shall not be necessary to prove ownership or value.”
I now come to ground 8 (ii). Mr. Akotiah contended that the private prosecution was in contravention of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 39 (1) (a) and (b) which provide:
“39. (1) In criminal matters a District Court (Grade I or Grade II) shall have jurisdiction to try summarily— (a) an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding N¢1,000.00 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both;
(b) any other offence (except an offence punishable by death or by imprisonment for life or an offence declared by any enactment to be a first degree felony), if the Attorney-General is of the opinion that having regard to the nature of the offence, the absence of circumstances which would render the offence of a grave or serious character and all other circumstances of the case the case is suitable to be tried summarily.”
Mr. Akotiah submitted that stealing was a second degree felony punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years and inasmuch as there was no affidavit or other evidence that the Attorney-General’s opinion was sought before the prosecution, the District Court Grade 1, Tema, was not clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
In his reply, Mr. Amarfio did not specifically or at all deny that the opinion of the Attorney- General was not sought by his clients before they launched the private prosecution, but he submitted that there was no distinction between private prosecution and public prosecution in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). Consequently he further submitted that anybody who undertook a private prosecution was clothed with all the powers of a public prosecutor.
Mr. Amarfio referred to section 56 and the immediately following sections of Act 30, which, in his view, gave the same powers to the private prosecutor as those of a public prosecutor, as witness the provision in
[p.345] of [1979] GLR 341 section 57 that a public prosecutor can intervene in a private prosecution and continue the prosecution.
Mr. Amarfio again referred to section 59 and the immediately following sections and submitted that those section showed that a private person could prosecute, and when so prosecuting, he was as competent as a public prosecutor. In Mr. Amarfio’s opinion, the private prosecutor did not require the fiat of the Attorney-General—he was in the position of the public prosecutor who had got a continuing fiat of the Attorney-General to prosecute any criminal matter in any court of competent jurisdiction, subject only to the conditions imposed on the private prosecutor in sections 57 and 58 of Act 30. Mr. Amarfio concluded that section 39 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), should be read in its generality.
Now the offence of stealing is by the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). s. 124 as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1962 (Act 108), and the Criminal Code (Amendment) Decree. 1969 (N.L.C.D. 398), a second degree felony. Act 30, s. 296 (2) made a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years except where a statute provided for a lesser punishment. It is now punishable by imprisonment for 25 years: see Sam v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 283 at p. 289 and section 296 of Act 30 as substituted by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 5.
I agree with Mr. Amarfio that Act 30 confers on any private person the right to initiate private prosecution, subject to the stated conditions and that the needs no fiat of the Attorney- General, but the private prosecutor, like the public prosecutor, must go to the court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed this appears to have been recognised by Mr. Amarfio in his submission. What section 39 (1) (b) of Act 372 says is that in the case of stealing which is an offence outside the ambit of section 39 (1) (a) of the said Act, the district court grade I (and for that matter the district court grade II) has no jurisdiction unless the Attorney-General is of the opinion that having regard to the nature of the offence, the absence of circumstances which would render the offence of a grave or serious character and all other circumstances of the case, the case is suitable to be tried summarily.
No inferior court has jurisdiction except that conferred on it by statute: see Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133 at p. 142, C.A. Section 39 (1) (a) of Act 372 confers jurisdiction on the district court in criminal matters to try summarily an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding ¢1,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both. On the other hand section 39 (1) (b) of the same Act says that the district court has no jurisdiction in all other criminal offences unless the Attorney-General permits it (but even this permission will not extend to an offence punishable by death or by imprisonment for life or an offence declared by an enactment to be a first degree felony.)
As rightly contended by Mr. Akotiah, there is no affidavit or other, evidence from the private prosecutors herein or from the district court grade I magistrate, Tema, the respondent, that the opinion of the Attorney-General was sought and that summary trial of this offence was permitted
[p.346] of [1979] GLR 341 by the Attorney-General. The opinion of the Attorney-General was the more necessary in this case because the police appeared to have declined or decided against prosecution after due investigation.
It follows that the submission of Mr. Akotiah that the private prosecutors herein contravened section 39 (1) (b) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), is well-founded. Of course if the police had prosecuted the applicants, the permission of the Attorney-General would have been implied. This would be so by reason of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 60 (3) and (4), which are:
“(3) A public officer in the exercise of his duties may institute proceedings under this section in the name and on behalf of his Minister.
(4) Nothing in this section shall require a Minister to sign a complaint or charge sheet in proceedings instituted in his name and on his behalf under this section.”
In his ground (3) which I have said is the same as ground (2) Mr. Akotiah submitted that the district magistrate made findings of fact against the applicants herein when they had not appeared before him. The learned magistrate, Mr. Akotiah contended, was therefore in breach of the rules of natural justice.
In reply Mr. Amarfio conceded that the learned district magistrate ought properly to have stated in the summons that prima facie he was satisfied that a case had been made out against the applicants herein to warrant the issue of the summons. Mr. Amarfio contended, however, that the words “Prima facie” are not magical words, the non-use of which in the circumstances would vitiate the summons. If this were so the law would be demanding technical exactitudes of the magistrate. The magistrate’s order must be read in its context and not out of its context. The learned magistrate as a matter of fact stated in the summons he issued after the non-execution of the warrants that the applicants herein and the ninth person should appear before the court on 19 May 1978, “to show cause why they should not be dealt with according to law.” But I understand the words “to show cause why they should not be dealt with according to law” not to mean to show cause why they should not be prosecuted. If a Commissioner or Minister of State threatens that any persons who contravene an enactment will be dealt with according to law, he means that they will be put before the court for prosecution; not that he will hand them over to the court for sentence.
It has already been mentioned that warrants were first issued for the arrest and detention of the applicants to make their appearance in court possible on the next adjourned date, but that the warrants could not be executed, hence the summons was issued, directed to each of the applicants. After hearing the information, the learned magistrate expressed his satisfaction that the applicants had committed the offences of conspiracy to steal and stealing and in the warrants he ordered that the applicants herein should be brought before the court to answer the charges.
It seems to me that what was in the mind of the learned magistrate was
[p.347] of [1979] GLR 341 that it was necessary for the applicants to come to court and be tried on the charges.
I therefore subscribe to the view of Mr. Amarfio, and so hold that notwithstanding the language of the summons, what the learned magistrate really wanted to say was that a prima facie case had been made out against the applicants herein to warrant their appearance before the court. And they were to appear to answer the charges as stated in the warrant. I would therefore apply the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 60 (2) which is as follows:
“(2) The validity of any proceedings instituted or purporting to be instituted in pursuance of subsection (1) shall not be affected either by any defect in the complaint or charge sheet or by the fact that a summons or warrant was issued without any complaint, or, in a case of a warrant without a complaint on oath.”
And I hold both the warrants and the summons valid.
In any case, if the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case, and the applicants actually appeared before the court, and the court heard the prosecution’s case before calling upon the applicants to make their defence, no real injustice would have been caused to the applicants herein by any defect in the summons, unless legal bias was proved against the magistrate in which case any conviction of the applicants could be quashed by the High Court by certiorari.
It seems to me also, assuming the district court had jurisdiction, that it would be premature for me to quash the proceedings so far in the district court, and prohibit the court from entertaining the private prosecution, unless a real likelihood of bias could be proved against the district magistrate: see Republic v. Constitutional Committee Chairman; Ex parte Barima II [1968] G.L.R. 1050 and Binortsor v. Nordor (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 226 at p. 229, C.A.; the better thing for the applicants herein to do, would in the circumstances, be to appear before the court, and if there is breach of the rules of natural justice during the trial, apply to the High Court for the issue of the prerogative orders of certiorari and prohibition: see R. v. Jackson; Ex parts Ofori Atta II (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 421, C.A.
To sum up, I allow the application of the applicants herein on the sole ground that section 39 (1) (b) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), was contravened by the private prosecutors and the respondent, the District Court Grade I Magistrate, Tema.
Accordingly I order that the proceedings so far of the private prosecution be brought up to the High Court for the purpose of being quashed, and they are hereby quashed. I also hereby prohibit the district court from continuing the hearing of the case.
DECISION There will be costs of ¢50 in favour of the applicants herein. Application for certiorari and prohibition granted. S. Y. B. – B.
