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[1979] SLR (CA) 5Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

LARTEY AND OTHERS vs. BAKU II AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 257

25 April 1979 · ANIN JA · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (CA) 5
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OSCOLALARTEY AND OTHERS v BAKU II AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 257 [1979] SLR (CA) 5
APALARTEY AND OTHERS v BAKU II AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 257, [1979] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookLARTEY AND OTHERS v BAKU II AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 257, [1979] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana Ct. App. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Moore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C.

(2) Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench).

(3) Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.

(4) Briscoe (R.T.) (Ghana) Ltd. v. Ampomah, Court of Appeal, 16 June 1969, to be reported in [1969] G.L.R.; digested in (1969) C.C. 100.

(5) West African Express Ltd. v. Berger, Court of Appeal, 3 February 1969, to be reported in [1969] G.L.R.; digested in (1969) C.C. 55.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to an application for extension of time within which to apply for a review of a judgment of the ordinary bench by the full bench of the Court of Appeal under N.R.C.D. 101, s. 3 (2) (a).

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf for the applicants.

E. D. Kom for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

Anin J.A. delivered the ruling of the court. On 5 March 1979, we upheld the plaintiff-respondents’ counsel’s preliminary objection to the competency of the motion for leave to apply for the review of the judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal by the full bench under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), and after dismissing the motion, we reserved [p.259] of [1980] GLR 257 our reasons. We now give those reasons.

The final judgment of the ordinary bench was delivered on 20 July 1977; and the instant application for leave for review was not filed until 31 January 1979—that is, after a lapse of one year and seven months. At the hearing of the motion, learned counsel for the respondents argued a preliminary objection that it was time-barred and ought consequently to be dismissed in limine. He cited in support the relevant rules of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), which regulate the time limits for the lodging of the motion. For the applicants, learned counsel conceded that the relevant procedural rules are contained in C.I. 13; but he entreated us to waive non-compliance with the relevant rules for his client and allow the motion for review to be heard on the merits in the interest of justice since important issues of law, especially estoppel and the customary land law, fall for determination in the suit.

Whether a review application or an appeal has been properly lodged before a court or not, depends on the relevant enactments and statutory rules regulating them, and in what circumstances a review or appeal lies and how it may be lodged. Litigants do not enjoy a common law right to appeal or review at will. In the famous words of Lord Atkin in Moore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43 at pp. 44-45, P.C.:

“After all, it is to be remembered that all appeals in this country and elsewhere exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled no jurisdiction is given to any Court of Justice to entertain them … It is quite true that their Lordships, … like any other Court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction.”

Equally pertinent and eloquent was the observation of Akufo-Addo C.J. in Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76 at pp. 82-83, C.A. (full bench):

“It must be appreciated that there is no inherent right of appeal in a litigant; nor indeed is there an inherent power in any court to hear appeals. Both the right and the power are creatures of statute, and unless the enactment creating the right of appeal and the power to hear an appeal is explicit, clear and unambiguous in its language, no such right and no such power can ever materialize. When however the right and the power do materialize they are exercisable only within the framework of the conditions imposed for their exercise.”

[p.260] of [1980] GLR 257

What, then for the instant motion are the relevant statutory rules, conditions and time limits? The review jurisdiction of the full bench of this court is contained in section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), which provides:

“3. (2) A full bench of the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction— (a) to review and determine a decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof upon a question of law, where such Justice or Division gives leave for such review and determination;

(b) to review and determine any other decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof, where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”

The procedure prescribed for the exercise of the above review jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal is defined in section 6 of N.R.C.D. 101 as follows:

“6. The Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) shall with such modifications as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree, apply to the full bench of the court of Appeal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 3 of this Decree.”

Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), contains the following provisions on the time limits for lodging civil appeals, both final and interlocutory:

“8. (1) Subject to the provisions of any enactment governing the same a civil appeal shall be lodged within,

(a) fourteen days, in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, or
(b) three months, in the case of an appeal against a final decision,

unless in the case of an appeal against a final decision, the court extends the period within which an appeal may be lodged.

(2) The periods specified in the preceding sub-rule shall (a) in the case of an appeal as of right, be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against, and

(b) in any other case, be calculated from the date on which leave is granted.

[p.261] of [1980] GLR 257

(3) A civil appeal shall be deemed to have been lodged when the notice of appeal has been filed.

(4) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal in respect of a final decision shall not be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the

period prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be lodged.

(5) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal shall be supported by an affidavit, (a) stating that leave has been granted where necessary, and the date of the leave;

(b) setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application; and

(c) giving the grounds of appeal which, prima facie, show good cause that the appeal is of substance.

(6) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) of this rule where a person has applied to the Court below for an extension of time within which to lodge a civil appeal and a period of not less than one month has expired since the time when the said application was made without the Court below having granted or refused the application, the applicant shall be entitled to move the court to have the application determined by the Court.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

Applying the above rules mutatis mutandis to an application for review from a final decision, it is clear that such an application shall be lodged within three months of the date of the final decision. Failing that, an application for extension of time within which to apply for a review may be filed within a further grace period of three months. In other words, such an application for extension of time ought to be filed not later than six months from the date of the final decision in respect of which a review is sought. After the lapse of the maximum period of six months from the date of the final decision, no application for review may be filed. If indeed such an application is filed outside the legally permissible time limit of six months, the court is incompetent to entertain or hear same for lack of jurisdiction.

By way of comparison, reference may here be made to the time limits prescribed for civil appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), r. 10 as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), which provides for an initial period of three months for lodging an appeal against a final decision and for a further grace period of three months within which an application for enlargement of time in which to appeal may be made.

[p.262] of [1980] GLR 257

Prior to the amendments introduced by L.I. 618, the total maximum period allowed for lodging an application for the enlargement of time within which to appeal from a final decision of the High Court to this court was four months; made up of an initial period of three months from the date of the decision plus a further grace period of one month. Hence after the expiration of four months, the court was incompetent to entertain an application for the enlargement of time in which to appeal from a final decision under the unamended L.I. 218: see Nye v. Nye (supra); Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.; R.T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. v. Ampomah, Court of Appeal, 16 June 1969, to be reported in [1969] G.L.R.; digested in (1969) C.C. 100 and West African Express Ltd. v. Berger, Court of Appeal, 3 February 1969, to be reported in [1969] G.L.R.; digested in (1969) C.C. 55.

Having regard to the clear and unambiguous language of C.I. 13, r. 8, we are satisfied that the present application ought to have been filed within six months of the final decision of the ordinary bench. The defendant-applicants are clearly guilty of unreasonable delay, their motion having been filed thirteen months outside the permitted maximum period of six months. This court consequently lacks jurisdiction to entertain this time-barred motion; hence it was dismissed in limine.

In a desperate bid to salvage this time-barred floundering motion, learned counsel for the defendant-applicants implored us to invoke rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 dealing with waiver for non-compliance in his client’s favour. Undoubtedly, this rule enables the court, when properly seised with jurisdiction to entertain a motion, to waive non-compliance with any rule of practice or procedural direction or order if the non-compliance was not wilful and if the interests of justice so require. By exercising this power in appropriate cases, the court can do substantial justice between the parties. But, as Lord Atkin remarked in Moore v. Tayee (supra) at p. 45 when dealing with legislation in pari materia, the appellate court can only invoke its power to waive rules only if it is seised of the appeal and has jurisdiction to entertain it. Here, the motion is time-barred and consequently the court is not seised with jurisdiction to entertain it and is powerless to invoke rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 in the applicant’s favour.

It was for the above reasons that we dismissed the motion in limine on 5 March 1979.

DECISION

Preliminary objection upheld.

Application for leave to apply for review dismissed.

S. Y. B.-B.

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