AKATI vs. NARTEY [1980] GLR 218
12 April 1979 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 27 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Izenkwe v. Nnadozie (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 361.
(2) Benyi v. Amo [1959] G.L.R. 92.
(3) Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 16; [1956] A.C. 501; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 1080; 100 S.J.
358, P.C.
(4) Pearson v. Glazebrook (1867) 3 L.R.Exch. 27; 37 L.J.Exch. 15; 17 L.T. 260; 31 J.P. 834.
(5) Amah v. Kaifio [1959] G.L.R. 23.
(6) Tackie v. Nelson (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 419.
(7) Quist v. Kwantreng [1961] 2 G.L.R. 605.
[p.220] of [1980] GLR 218 (8) Ababio v. Akro & Co.; Re Proposed Bimpong Forest Reserve (Twifu Portion) [1963] 1 G.L.R.
195, S.C.
(9) Sikpo v. Lassinueh (1922) F.C. ‘22, 29.
(10) Ankrah v. Chochoe (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 469.
(11) Bramwell v. Bramwell [1942] 1 K.B. 370; [1942] 1 All E.R. 137; 111 L.J.K.B. 430; 58 T.L.R. 148, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant against the judgment of the district court wherein he granted the plaintiff, inter alia, recovery of possession of a disputed house and arrears of rent. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Acheampong for the defendant-appellant.
No appearance by or for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court Grade I, Tema. In the judgment the learned magistrate upheld the plaintiff-respondent’s (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) claim for payment of arrears of rent and recovery of possession. On his own motion the trial magistrate also awarded the respondent mesne profits even though this was not claimed by him. The circumstances which led to the institution of the action as can be gleaned from the evidence on the side of the respondent are these:
All the parties and their witnesses live at Ashiamang. The defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) told Mary Nartey, the plaintiff’s first witness, sister of the respondent, that he wanted to sell his house at plot No. D/34, Ashiamang and the latter promised to find him a buyer. Mary Nartey told her brother, the respondent, about the house and the respondent showed immediate interest. Consequently, a meeting was arranged between the parties, and they met at Mary’s house. Negotiations for sale took place, and it was agreed that the appellant would sell his house at plot No. D/34, Ashiamang to the respondent for a price of ¢6,000. Subsequent to these negotiations and oral agreement, the respondent, on 18 February made a part-payment of ¢4,800 to the appellant. Then on 20 February 1975 the balance of ¢1,200 was paid. Both payments were made in the presence of Mary at her house. Thereafter a receipt marked exhibit A was issued by the appellant. This receipt reads:
“I the undersigned (HENRY KWASI AKATI) proprietor of Liberty Clinic and owner of house No. D/34, Ashiamang
[p.221] of [1980] GLR 218 received the sum of ¢6,000 (six thousand cedis) only from Mr. J. A. Nartey of P.O. Box 3913, Accra, being full payment of the cost of selling my house No. D/34 to him in good faith.
I therefore faithfully issued him this receipt in the presence of the undersigned witnesses transferring the ownership of the said house into his name to prove and certify that the above-numbered house has with effect from the date of this receipt become his bona fide property forever.
Dated this 20 February 1975 at Ashiamang.
(Sgd.) H. K. Akati HENRY KWASI AKATI.
(Owner/Seller)
(Sgd.) J. A. Nartey.
(Purchaser)
(Sgd.) Mary Nartey.
Witness to buyer.”
After these payments, the appellant sent the following statutory declaration to the Tema Development Corporation (T.D.C.):
“STATUTORY DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP OF HOUSE No. D/34, ASHIAMANG BY MR.
HENRY KWASI AKATI TO MR. J. A. NARTEY I the undersigned (HENRY KWASI AKATI) the owner of house No. D/34 built at Ashiamang make statutory declaration and say as follows:
1. That I am the declarant herein.
2. That I am the rightful owner of house No. D/34 built at Ashiamang near Tema.
3. That I wish to advise the Tema Development Corporation that I have transferred the ownership of the above-mentioned house to Mr. J. A. NARTEY, P.O. Box 3913, Accra.
4. That I wish the Tema Development Corporation to cancel my name from their records and replace same with the name of Mr. J. A. Nartey so that any correspondence from the Tema Development Corporation, Tema District Council, etc., in connection with the above-mentioned house should with effect from the date of this declaration be sent to him for his necessary action.
5. That the right to utilize the said property is now solely reserved to him at all time without internal or external interference whatsoever.
6. That in support of this statement, I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true in accordance with the Statutory Declaration Act, No. 389 of 1971.
Sworn at Tema this 20 February 1975 after the said statement has first been read and interpreted to declarant in Ewe language by Mr. P. K. Gbesorgbor when he seemed to be perfectly understood the contents before I signed thereto.
(Sgd.) H. K. AKATI DECLARANT.
BEFORE ME, (Sgd.) K. PARRY.
COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS.”
In response to this declaration, the T.D.C., wrote to the appellant with a copy to the respondent demanding the payment of arrears of ground rent in the sum of ¢51 before any action would be taken on the application contained in the statutory declaration. The appellant did not pay this amount but the respondent said he paid ¢52 in the name of the appellant and a receipt was issued to him. This receipt was tendered and marked exhibit D in the proceedings. It would seem that after this payment, the T.D.C. took action on the statutory declaration because on 10 June 1975, the appellant wrote the following letter to the T.D.C.:
“Henry K. Akati, House No. D/34.
P.O. Box 42, Ashiamang.
10 June 1975.
The Managing Director, Tema Development Corporation, P.O. Box 46, Tema.
Dear Sir, WITHDRAWAL OF OWNERSHIP OF HOUSE NO. D/34 FROM MR. J. A. NARTEY I respectfully wish to inform you that it is my immediate desire to withdraw the ownership of my above-mentioned house sold to Mr. J. A. Nartey.
[p.223] of [1980] GLR 218 I therefore advise you to cancel all the necessary documents affecting the transfer of the house into his name.
I further wish to inform you that I have now sold the house to Mr. James Ayiku Okornor, now resident in house No. D/325, Ashiamang.
In these circumstances, I advise you to cancel all documents concerning the house in Mr. J. A. Nartey’s name and replace same with the name of Mr. James Ayiku Okornor, and consequently transfer the house into his name.
With a copy of this letter, I have accordingly informed Mr. J. A. Nartey.
Please, accept my sincere apologies for the inconveniences caused to you in this transaction; and thank you in anticipation.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) H. K. Akati. cc: Mr. J. A. NARTEY, P.O. Box— Accra.”
The appellant’s defence to the action is not consistent. In his evidence he said he did not sell the house, but merely wanted to pledge or mortgage it for money to build a new house in which to run his clinic. According to him, Mary, the respondent’s sister, approached him and he told her that he did not want to sell the house but merely wanted to pledge or mortgage it to raise funds to put up a new building for his clinic. Mary asked how much he needed, and he told her ¢6,000, so she promised to inform her brother. Later he was called to meet Mary and her brother, the respondent. The respondent paid him ¢4,800 and he issued a temporary receipt. He was promised the balance of ¢1,200 but this was never paid. In June of the same year, the respondent complained to the police at Ashiamang that he had sold a house to him but had refused to give him possession. He said the respondent gave the assistant superintendent of police in charge of the station the sum of ¢1,200 to be given to him, the appellant, so that he would sign the documents on the house, but he never took the money nor signed the documents. But he was released on bail. Again, the respondent reported him at the Michel Camp and he was taken into military custody at Michel Camp and interrogated about this transaction between him and the respondent. The soldiers asked him to refund the ¢4,800 or else he would be taken to T.D.C. to sign certain
[p.224] of [1980] GLR 218 documents. He did not have the amount so he was taken to the office of T.D.C. at Ashiamang and he was pressurised to sign exhibit A, the receipt, exhibit C, a letter from T.D.C. to him and exhibit E, his letter of withdrawal of ownership. According to him after he had been forced to sign these at the T.D.C. offices, he was taken back to Michel Camp and he was still asked to pay the ¢4,800 to the soldiers for collection by the respondent, but the respondent refused to accept the money. He said he was released, after he had been taken to T.D.C. to sign the statutory declaration.
The appellant denies the tenancy agreement and the sale. He said if he wanted to sell it, he would have asked for a price between ¢15,000 and ¢20,000. He said the respondent never demanded any rent from him. However, when he was cross-examined he prevaricated; he retracted his evidence that he was forced to sign exhibit C, the T.D.C. letter to him. That letter does not even bear his signature; it could not because he was the addressee of that letter. He also shifted his ground that he was forced to sign exhibit E, his own withdrawal letter, and the receipt evidencing the sale—exhibit A.
On the basis of this evidence the court held that there was a sale of the house to the respondent; that as the respondent became entitled to the house from 20 February 1975, the respondent was entitled to arrears of rent in the sum of ¢480. Finally, the court held, “As this is a court of summary jurisdiction which can grant equitable reliefs, even where they are not claimed, I would also award him mesne profits from the time this action was instituted to the end of April 1976 and that also works up to ¢480.” The appellant was also ordered to quit the premises as from the end of April.
Against this judgment the appellant has appealed to this court on one original ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence and four additional grounds. Lately counsel has filed another additional ground namely, “The trial district court had no jurisdiction to try the suit since the value of the subject-matter exceeded ¢2,000.” This latter additional ground and the original one were the pivot of counsel’s argument. The respondent did not attend court neither did his counsel to reply to the appellant’s argument. I will deal with the original ground first. As to whether or not there was a sale of the house, I think there is overwhelming evidence in favour of the respondent’s contention that the agreement between them was one of sale and not a mortgage or a pledge. The steps taken by the appellant to effect the change at the offices of T.D.C. belie his assertion that he merely raised a loan and pledged the house to the respondent as security. The appellant’s contention that pressure was brought to bear upon him to execute the documents
[p.225] of [1980] GLR 218 tendered by the respondent has no basis. The receipt evidencing the sale was issued on 20 February 1975 and the appellant conceded that it was issued on the date of issue.
The respondent did not start harassing the appellant with arrests until June 1975, so his claim that he was forced to sign exhibit A could not by any stretch of imagination be correct. The circumstances under which the other documents, i.e. the statutory declaration, the letter from the T.D.C. to the respondent demanding payment of ground rent, and his own letter advising the T.D.C. to withdraw the respondent’s ownership, came to be issued, are such that no pressure could have been brought to bear upon him to execute them. The circumstances of the appellant’s story as narrated do not coincide with the realities of life. No lender of money would rush to a borrower with money on a silver platter. That version of the facts is most unimpressive. There is overwhelming evidence to support the sale of the appellant’s house to the respondent. The letter, exhibit E, which the appellant wrote to the T.D.C. is eloquent testimony of the sale. The magistrate’s finding on the question of sale cannot be assailed.
However, with regards to the tenancy agreement, the case put up by the respondent was conflicting. The respondent’s claim that after the sale he entered into a tenancy agreement with the appellant was not supported by his own witness, the principal witness in the whole transaction. The very nature of her evidence shows that there could not have been any tenancy agreement. The central point of her evidence was that the appellant sold a house to her brother but the former refused to give her brother possession of the house. The subsequent conduct of the respondent also belies any such agreement. When the appellant refused to give up the house, the respondent used all manner of stratagems to get him out of the house. He complained to the police, and then to the army, and upon each complaint the appellant was arrested. The respondent’s complaint on each occasion was that he had paid money to the appellant for the purchase of his house but the appellant had refused to put him in possession. If there was a mutual understanding that the appellant was to continue living in the house subject to payment of rent, the respondent would not have harassed the appellant in that way subsequent to the agreement. It seems to me that the tenancy agreement was invented by the respondent to circumvent the cumbersome procedure he would have to take to recover possession. The respondent’s sister could not have had such a terrible memory that she would have clearly forgotten the tenancy agreement yet remembered every detail appertaining to the sale. The inference which the trial magistrate drew from the evidence of the principal witness could not
[p.226] of [1980] GLR 218 be right. The finding of the magistrate on that aspect of the tenancy agreement is contained in this passage of his judgment:
“Although this aspect of the plaintiff’s story was not corroborated by his witness, that alone is not sufficient to say that there was no tenancy agreement. As counsel for the plaintiff stated, memory might fail a person, and the old lady might have forgotten it. But the circumstances surrounding the transaction compel me to hold that there was a tenancy agreement. The defendant himself stated that he needed money to put up a new and bigger house, and I think after he had received the ¢6,000 he started to put up that house. It is my view that after the plaintiff had paid the full amount of ¢6,000 if he had not agreed to rent the place, he should have had to give vacant possession of the place to the plaintiff. The deduction I make here is that it was because he agreed to rent the place that he continued to stay in the house and use it as his clinic until he put up a new house and what he is telling the court that he only pledged or mortgaged the house cannot be true.”
This is a mere surmise, a mere conjecture and not an inference from the evidence. On the contrary, I think the conduct of the respondent in reporting the appellant to the police, and the sister’s account of the sale transaction outweigh any such inference. The appellant’s continued stay in the house after the sale cannot lead to a probable conclusion that there was a tenancy agreement. The very conduct of the appellant shows he had a change of heart after the sale and he wanted to repudiate the agreement. This would better explain his clinging onto the house and not letting it go. I think on that aspect of the matter, the learned magistrate misdirected himself on the evidence by holding that there was a tenancy agreement between the parties. That finding must necessarily be perverse.
The next ground of appeal is the question of jurisdiction raised at this appeal. Counsel’s submission was that the appellant put the title of the respondent to the property in issue; that being so, he contended that the question before the court was one of title and as the value of the property was above ¢2,000, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
To determine the jurisdiction of a court to hear any particular matter, what ordinarily must be looked at is the plaintiff’s claim and not the defence put forward by the defendant. Normally, it is the claim which determines which court has jurisdiction to hear it and the defence should not ordinarily oust the jurisdiction of the court. The dicta of Coussey J.A. in Izenkwe v. Nnadozie (1953) 14 W.A.C.A.
[p.227] of [1980] GLR 218
361 confirms this fundamental principle.
He said at p. 363:
“In the first place it is a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiff ‘s demand and not by a defendant’s answer which, as in this case, only disputes the existence of the claim, but does not alter or affect its nature. In other words, ordinarily it is the claim and not the defence which is to be looked at to determine the jurisdiction.”
However, there are certain cases where it is not clear from the complaint of the plaintiff the category into which that particular case falls. In cases like that, it has been held that it is the issue between the parties which must determine the type of case it is. Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) in Benyi v. Amo [1959] G.L.R. 92 had to decide whether the case before him was a “succession” or “land” matter, so as to determine whether he had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. He relied on the dicta of the Privy Council in Vanderpuye v.
Botchway (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 16 at p. 21, P.C. where the eminent Lords said, “…… in order to determine into which category a particular suit falls the court must apply the test of what is the real issue between the parties and not look only at the wording of the plaint.”
Where a tenant challenges the title of his landlord and the latter has to establish his title as landlord, the proof of title in such a case will be ancillary to the main matters at issue. But where a tenant denies the title of the plaintiff, and claims ownership in himself, title is put in issue, and the question of title to land is raised. In Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (27th ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 1028, para. 2192 appears the following statement, “A defence set up by a person sued as tenant, that he is owner in fee simple subject to a quit rent, raises a question of title.” In a situation like this the defence alters and affects the nature of the claim because whereas on the face, it was a mere landlord and tenant matter, the defence makes it necessary to establish title to the land. In Pearson v. Glazebrook (1867) 3 L.R. Exch. 27, section 50 of the County Courts Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict., c. 108), gave the landlords a summary remedy in the county courts. The plaintiffs took out summons against the defendant as their tenant. The defendant claimed to be a freeholder subject only to payment of quit rent, and contended that a question of title having arisen the judge had no jurisdiction to decide the case. The judge refused to adjudicate. It was held on appeal that as the defendant had made a
[p.228] of [1980] GLR 218 bona fide claim of ownership the jurisdiction of the county court judge was ousted. Martin B. stated at p. 29:
“It seems to me that the act shews, on the face of it that it applies only to a clear case of landlord and tenant.
A summary remedy is given to the landlord; but, if it turns out that there is reasonable ground for supposing that a question of title will arise, the power and jurisdiction of the county court judge is gone.”
The same principle should be applicable in this country. In Amah v. Kaifio [1959] G.L.R. 23, even though the reported judgment is silent on this aspect of the matter, the summary of the facts given shows that the suit was originally commenced in the district court for recovery of possession and arrears of rent, in respect of the house in question. In her defence, the defendant denied she was a tenant and alleged that the property did not belong to the plaintiff’s family but to her own family. When the case came on for hearing, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant’s defence raised the question of title to land, and would support an application for transfer to the Land Court. The district magistrate accordingly reported the pendency of the case to the Chief Justice who made the order for the transfer to the Land Court: see also Tackie v. Nelson (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 419. In 1958 when Kaifio’s case went before the district court, the jurisdiction of the magistrate court was regulated by the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), and the magistrate court had no jurisdiction in claims relating to ownership, possession or occupation of land. But the rationale of the case still holds good. The Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), gives the district court jurisdiction to hear cases affecting ownership, possession and occupation of land whose value does not exceed ¢2,000. The same Act gives the district court jurisdiction in all civil causes relating to landlord and tenant of any premises, etc. The complaint of the plaintiff on the face appears to be simply a matter of landlord and tenant. The matter was brought on the undefended list and heard summarily without pleadings. The defendant’s defence was not disclosed until the plaintiff was cross-examined. The real issues which the trial court had to decide were whether the plaintiff or the defendant was the owner of the premises, and whether the plaintiff has rented it to the defendant. The district court was only competent to deal with the first issue if the value of the premises did not exceed ¢2,000. The evidence in the case shows that the house was undersold even at ¢6,000. Taking it at that value, since the action related to a question of ownership, possession or occupation of land, the magistrate’s jurisdiction was ousted, and he ought to have declined jurisdiction to pronounce upon the matter.
[p.229] of [1980] GLR 218
However, since the defendant was represented and the value of the house was not in dispute, I felt a bit uneasy about the question of jurisdiction being raised at this appeal. My disturbance stemmed from the fact that in spite of lack of jurisdiction, under section 37 (3) of Act 372 the magistrate could have heard the case if both parties agreed that he should do so. Section 37 (3) provides:
“(3) Where in any action, cause or matter the amount claimed or the value of any land or property exceeds the amount or value specified in subsection (1) of this section, the Court shall, notwithstanding that subsection, proceed to hear the case if the parties agree that it should do so.”
As both parties were represented by counsel and no objection was raised by either side, I wondered whether the parties could be deemed to have agreed that the court should hear the matter, so that lack of jurisdiction cannot be raised at this stage. I received no assistance from counsel in solving the problem, but on checking with the authorities, I am constrained to hold that the agreement to confer jurisdiction cannot be implied. It must be expressed and it must be apparent from the proceedings that such agreement was given.
In Quist v. Kwantreng [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 605 at p. 610, Ollennu J. (as he then was), stated, “Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by implication, it must be conferred specifically, otherwise there is none.” In the instant case it does not even appear that the court adverted its mind to the question of jurisdiction, it was ostensibly trying a case for recovery of rent and ejectment. Even though the whole proceedings show, that what was at issue was the question of ownership and possession, there is nothing in the proceedings to show that the parties had agreed that the court should hear the case in spite of the value of the land, unless failure on their part to raise objection could be construed as amounting to such an agreement. But it is my view that if the legislature wanted to say that the court had jurisdiction unless the parties objected to it, it would have said so unequivocably. It is the rule that there is no jurisdiction where the value is above ¢2,000 unless the parties by agreement submitted to the jurisdiction, and this agreement must appear on the face of the proceedings. The parties’ failure to raise the objection cannot be construed to amount to such agreement. In Quist v. Kwantreng (supra) Ollennu J. stated at pp. 613-614:
“Since as an inferior court, the jurisdiction of the local court in any matter must be apparent on the proceedings before it, the giving of the necessary consent which should vest the local court with jurisdiction to continue hearing such a case, must be
[p.230] of [1980] GLR 218 given expressly and be recorded as part of the proceedings it is not consent which should merely be implied, it is consent which must be positively expressed, otherwise it will not appear on the face of the proceedings and there will be a complete absence of jurisdiction.”
The learned judge was commenting on the repealed section 98 (2) of the Courts Act, 1966 (C.A. 9) which was later amended by the Courts Amendment Act, 1962 (Act 130), s. 27. The repealed subsection reads, “Where it appears that the subject-matter of a land cause exceeds £G200 the Court shall not exercise jurisdiction except with the consent of the parties.” In Hartrampf’s Vocabularies, the word “agree” is defined as being synonymous with “consent” so the effect which the repealed section 98 (2) had should be the same as section 37 (3) of the current legislation, i.e. the Courts Act, 1971. It follows that an agreement or consent by the parties must be positively expressed and cannot merely be inferred from the parties’ failure to raise objection. Under the Courts Act, 1971, s. 27, the district court grade I is an inferior court. The jurisdiction of an inferior court is always defined by the statute creating it, and as it has been stated in Quist v. Kwantreng (supra) at p. 613 “. . . nothing is deemed to be within its jurisdiction unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that it is vested with jurisdiction in the particular matter.” And in Ababio II v. Akro & Co. [1963] 1 G.L.R. 195 the Supreme Court per Ollennu J.S.C. held (as stated in the headnote) that, “[W]here jurisdiction is to be conferred by consent, such consent should be express, precise and unambiguous. It must not be presumed. It does not mean that jurisdiction exists provided there is no objection.” The objection can be taken anytime, even at this court.
In Narh Sikpo v. Lassinueh (1922) F.C. ‘22, 29 an objection, to the jurisdiction of the provincial commissioner was raised before the full court which heard the appeal. The provincial court did not have original jurisdiction to try cases in which a question of title to land was raised. The court heard a case in which the plaintiff sued for trespass and gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the full court contending that the provincial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. It was conceded by the respondent’s counsel that the provincial court had no jurisdiction but contended that the objection was too late. It was held that want of jurisdiction on the part of the provincial court was shown on the face of the record and the proceedings were null and void. The penalty which the appellant has to suffer for not being timeous in raising the objection was that he paid his own costs. Ankrah v.
[p.231] of [1980] GLR 218
Chochoe (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 469, illustrates the same point. Claims relating to ownership, possession or occupation of land within the meaning of section 20A of the then Gold Coast Courts Ordinance (as amended) were reserved to the Land Court. The Divisional Court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiff brought an action for recovery of possession and for account of mesne profits. The lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal. The Court of Appeal lamented that the question of jurisdiction was not raised at the court below to save cost, but the objection was sustained, the court per Verity C.J. saying at p. 471:
“In my view, therefore, the appeal must succeed on this ground. It is, I think, most regrettable that the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the Court below. Although this Court is bound to entertain an objection on the ground of jurisdiction even though it be raised here for the first time in the course of the proceedings, yet it is most desirable that such an objection should be raised at the earliest possible moment in order that, if it be upheld, the parties shall be saved the time and expense of litigating in a Court which has not the jurisdiction to adjudicate. For this reason I would make no order as to costs, for had the appellant raised this question at an earlier stage the matter would doubtless have been rightly disposed of in the Court below and no appeal have been necessary.”
In this case, it is clear that the writ and the supporting affidavit on the face of them was clearly a matter relating to landlord and tenant of house No. D/34, Ashiamang. Even though, in the accompanying affidavit, the plaintiff deposed that the defendant had no defence to the action, the action was placed on the general list, and the court proceeded to hear the matter without the defendant filing any intention to defend the action. His defence therefore was not disclosed until the cross-examination of the plaintiff. The procedure employed by the trial court was wrong. The Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II, Order 2, rr. 9-11 set out the procedure where a liquidated demand is made in a claim supported by affidavit that the defendant has no defence to the action. Where the writ and affidavit are served on the defendant, if he wants to defend the action, he must file a notice in writing of his intention to defend. He will state his ground for defending the action. The notice must be filed not less than five days before the date fixed for hearing. It is upon this notice that the court will determine whether or not leave should be granted. It is also upon this notice from which the court will determine the nature of the defence set up by the defendant.
[p.232] of [1980] GLR 218
What happened in this case was that on the returned date, when the parties and their counsel appeared before the learned trial magistrate, the claim of the plaintiff was stated and the defendant pleaded “not liable.” Then counsel for the defendant announced that he had been shown certain papers and he requested for time to discuss them with his client. The matter was therefore adjourned to another date for hearing. After a number of adjournments it eventually came on for hearing without any notice being filed. His defence was therefore never disclosed, and the question of title did not rear its head until the plaintiff gave evidence. His evidence on the main was to establish his title to the property, and the questions put to him at the cross-examination clearly showed the plaintiff’s title was not only challenged but that the defendant asserted title in himself. If the trial court had followed the laid down procedure, it would have been evident at the initial stages that the defendant’s defence raised a question of title, and the court would have been in a good position to appreciate the real nature of the claim before him at the initial stages.
When it became evident that title was in issue, the magistrate should have ascertained the value of the property and since it is plain from the proceedings that it was more than ¢2,000 he ought to have refused to adjudicate, because his jurisdiction was ousted. In Tackie v. Nelson (supra), the plaintiff took out summons for arrears of rent and order for ejectment. T was later joined as co-defendant, who asserted a claim to the reversion. The defendant lessees admitted their liability but supported the second defendant’s claim against the plaintiff. Counsel for the second defendant appellant contended that even though it was a case of landlord and tenant, title was raised to land so it was a case relating to ownership, occupation and possession of land and the competent court was the native court and not the Supreme Court. Counsel for the respondents resisted that contention and submitted that since the native court had no jurisdiction to deal with cases under the Rent Ordinance, the Supreme Court was the competent court to hear the case. It was held that the Supreme Court was the court which had jurisdiction to give the plaintiff all the remedies which she sought and therefore competent to hear the case. The district court now is almost in the same position in which the Supreme Court was then in the Nelson case. The district court has jurisdiction to deal with cases under the Rent Act and cases affecting ownership, occupation and possession of land the value of which exceeds ¢2,000 if the parties agree. The jurisdiction of the district court to hear cases affecting land whose value exceeds ¢2,000 is limited; it is subject to the agreement of the parties. That agreement is a condition precedent to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
[p.233] of [1980] GLR 218
Since that condition was not fulfilled the district court had no jurisdiction, and the whole trial is null and void and should be set aside, and I do so order.
There is one last aspect of the appeal I would like to comment on. The trial magistrate granted the respondent what the magistrate described as equitable relief and under this guise he awarded the respondent mesne profits in the sum of ¢480, even though he conceded this was not claimed in the writ or evidence. The practice and procedure of the district court is regulated by Schedule 2 of Cap. 4, Order 5, r. 3 which provides that a plaintiff shall not obtain a judgment for any sum exceeding that stated in the particulars, except for subsequent interest and costs of the suit. It follows that the district magistrate has no power to make any award, be it equitable or legal if a claim for it has not been stated in the particulars of the claim. In any case mesne profits is not an equitable remedy. The expression “mesne profits” is only another term for damages for trespass arising from the particular relationship of landlord and tenant: see Bramwell v. Bramwell [1942] 1 K.B. 370, C.A. It is a relief for which a claim must be made in the writ. Where the respondent in this case alleges that the defendant is his tenant, and there is no evidence that that tenancy has been determined—in spite of the fact that non-payment of rent was a ground for determining the tenancy—it cannot be said that the appellant was holding on without the consent of the landlord, and therefore his occupation was wrongful. The respondent’s evidence was that the appellant agreed to pay rent but never did, so he took action. He never said he gave notice to quit at anytime—even if there was a tenancy. Even if there was a tenancy it was never determined and the only course open to the plaintiff was to institute another action for mesne profits. The magistrate did not have the power to award damages in the form of mesne profits when this was not asked for.
As the district magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the case, the whole trial was null and void and the appeal is allowed. The amount awarded, if paid must be refunded to the appellant. But as the ground of jurisdiction was not raised timeously, I will direct that each party bears his own costs.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
