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[1979] SLR (HC) 22High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ATTA vs. GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY [1980] GLR 119

15 March 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 16 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 22
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OSCOLAATTA v GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY [1980] GLR 119 [1979] SLR (HC) 22
APAATTA v GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY [1980] GLR 119, [1979] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookATTA v GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY [1980] GLR 119, [1979] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Ghana Commercial Bank v. Tabury [1977] 1 G.L.R. 329.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to suit on the ground that there was improper service of notice of intention to commence. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

J. A. Dawson for the plaintiff.

Atta Erskine (for Brown & Co.) for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

The plaintiff who claims to be the owner of the V.W. private car No. W.R. 9226, has instituted this action against the defendants, the owners of the tipper truck No. G.J. 4735, claiming damages for damage allegedly caused to the vehicle No. W.R. 9226, by driver Alfred Kofi Afful, the defendants’ servant or agent, who was at the material time in charge of the tipper truck No. G.J. 4735. The plaintiff claims that the accident involving both vehicles mentioned herein, and as a result of which his said vehicle was damaged, was caused solely through the fault of driver Afful.

The defendants who (entered a conditional appearance) having in their statement of defence denied liability, have pleaded further, in paragraph (5) of the statement of defence, as follows:

“At the summons for directions stage of the suit herein the defendants will make an application to this honourable court to strike out the writ of summons herein on the ground that it is bad in law in that the plaintiff failed to give to the defendants notice of his intention to commence the suit herein against the defendants in accordance with section 33 of the Ghana Highway Authority Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 298).”

Counsel for the defendants, pursuant to the conditional appearance filed and the subsequent pleading in paragraph (5) of their statement of defence quoted (supra) has, now at the summons for directions stage, taken a preliminary objection to the effect that the plaintiff failed to give the proper statutory notice as required under section 33 of N.R.C.D. 298, before he instituted this action and that, therefore, the action is not maintainable at this stage; the same not being properly before the court. Section 33 (1) of N.R.C.D.

[p.121] of [1980] GLR 119 provides, “No suit shall be commenced against the Authority until one month at least after written notice of intention to commence it has been served upon the Authority by the intending plaintiff or his agent.”

To this objection learned counsel for the plaintiff has replied that the action is maintainable at this stage and, therefore, the objection cannot be sustained, since in his view, the proper statutory notice as required under the provisions of section 33 of N.R.C.D. 298, has been given to the defendants. Counsel claims that a written notice dated 1 December 1977 was served on the Regional Manager, Ghana Highway Authority, Takoradi, and the action was commenced on 23 May 1978. The notice referred to by counsel for the plaintiff has been placed before the court and the last two paragraphs read as follows:

“My instructions in the circumstances are to demand from the Ghana Highway Authority the sum of ¢5,620 being losses incurred by my client.

Take notice also that a month from the date of this letter I shall institute action against the Authority for the recovery of the amount involved.”

I have here quoted in extenso the above two paragraphs of the said letter because it is my view that the said two paragraphs are more relevant to the matter before me presently. It is significant to note also that the letter carrying the said notification was addressed to the “Regional Manager, Ghana Highway Authority, Takoradi.” (The emphasis is mine.) It is the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff that this is a sufficient notification as required under the provisions of section 33 (1) of N.R.C.D. 298 and having been given, well beyond the statutory period in advance, showing the plaintiff’s intention to commence the action, and setting out clearly all the necessary particulars, it cannot be successfully argued that the action is not properly before the court. The court has been called upon, therefore, to decide as to whether or not this action has been instituted in compliance with the relevant provisions of N.R.C.D. 298. Section 33 (2) of N.R.C.D. 298 states clearly further that, The notice as required under subsection (1) “shall state the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims.” Since it is my view that the letter said to be the notice given by the plaintiff appears to contain almost all the necessary particulars required under the Decree, I would like to

[p.122] of [1980] GLR 119 reproduce the letter here for the sake of easy reference and clarification:

“TC/2L/12/MC/52 1 December 1977 The Regional Manager, Ghana Highway Authority, Takoradi.

Dear Sir, ACCIDENT INVOLVING VEHICLES Nos. W.R. 9226 AND G.J. 4735 I write to you on the instructions of my client, Mr. Dick Atta of Sefwi-Wiawso, owner of vehicle No. WR.

9226.

My information is that on or about 3 November 1975, a vehicle of the Ghana Highway Authority driven by one Alfred Kofi Afful in the course of his employment, collided with my client’s vehicle while overtaking it in circumstances which leaves no doubt of the negligence of the said Alfred Kofi Afful.

As a result of this accident, my client’s vehicle was towed to a workshop where it remained under repairs for a period of 63 days before repairs were completed and my client paid a total of ¢4,340 for the repairs.

Furthermore, while the vehicle was at repairs my client was spending on the average the sum of ¢10 a day on transport totalling ¢630.

My instructions in the circumstances are to demand from the Ghana Highways Authority the sum of ¢5,620 being losses incurred by my client.

Take notice also that a month from the date of this letter I shall institute action against the Authority for the recovery of the amount involved.

Yours faithfully, (Signed or bearing the stamp of Joseph Amowee Dawson, Barrister-at-law and Solicitor.) cc. Mr. Dick Atta, P.O. Box 48, Sefwi-Wiawso.”

In my judgment, the letter quoted (supra), appears to contain the necessary particulars which the intending plaintiff is called upon by N.R.C.D. 298, s. 33 to supply; it would, therefore, have been

[p.123] of [1980] GLR 119 sufficient notice if it was duly served on the Authority as required and specified under N.R.C.D. 298. It seems to me that what the defendants are saying is that they never received any such notification given in compliance with the provisions of the Decree, and therefore the action should not have been commenced, the statutory notification in strict compliance with the provisions of the N.R.C.D. 298, being a condition precedent to commencement of proceedings against the Authority. It may be necessary, therefore at this stage to refer to section 34 of N.R.C.D. 298 which provides:

“34. The notice referred to in section 33 and any summons, notice or other document required or authorised to be served upon the Authority in connection with any suit by or against the Authority may be served by delivering it to, or sending it by registered post addressed to the Chief Executive of the Authority or to such other officer of the Authority as may be prescribed by regulations made under section 43 of this Decree.”

Now by section 52 of the Decree, being the interpretation section, “Chief Executive means the Managing Director.” It seems to me that the chief executive or the managing director is not the same as the regional manager. It does not appear from the provisions of the Decree that any other officer of the Authority has been prescribed by regulations made under section 43 of the Decree. Counsel for the plaintiff made it clear that he has not been able to come upon any such regulations and the court’s attention has not been drawn to the existence of any such regulations. It appears therefore that no regulations have been made under section 43 of the Decree prescribing other officers or officer of the authority upon whom such a notice may be served. It is clear therefore that for our purpose here the only officer prescribed by the Decree is the chief executive who is the same as the managing director.

In my judgment, the defendants or the authority, being a creature of a statute, must be treated and dealt with as such and in strict compliance with the provisions of the originating statute. And therefore any person or body of persons who wishes or comes to deal with the authority must of necessity do so strictly within the provisions of the statute which created the Authority, i.e., within the provisions of N.R.C.D. 298. Failure to comply strictly with the provisions of N.R.C.D. 298, when one wishes for instance, to commence proceedings against the authority, would render the whole proceedings a nullity, i.e., make it a non-starter, no matter the stage of the proceedings. It appears that this is so because N.R.C.D. 298 clearly

[p.124] of [1980] GLR 119 indicates the governing body of the authority. Section 9 (1) of the said Decree provides that, “The governing body of the Authority shall be a Board of Directors”; and section 9 (2) also provides that:

“(2) The Board shall consist of— (a) a Chairman and eight other members all of whom shall be appointed by the National Redemption Council; and

(b) the person appointed Chief Executive under section 15 of this Decree.”

By section 15 (1) of the Decree:

“15. (1) The Authority shall have a Managing Director to be designated Chief Executive who shall be assisted by three Deputy Chief Executives to be designated respectively as Deputy Chief Executive (Administration), Deputy Chief Executive (Development) and Deputy Chief Executive (Maintenance).”

Section 15 (3) of N.R.C.D. 298 provides:

“(3) The Chief Executive shall be a civil engineer and a person of a recognised technical and professional standing and shall be appointed by the National Redemption Council on the recommendation of the Commissioner and shall hold office for a period of five years upon such terms and conditions as the Council may specify in his instrument of appointment, and may be re-appointed for further periods of live years.”

Section 19 (1) of N.R.C.D. 298 also provides that “The Deputy Chief Executive (Administration) shall be the Secretary to the Authority and shall act as Secretary to the Board.” This makes it quite clear that the secretariat of the authority is directly under the chief executive and it necessarily follows therefore that any such notification going to the chief executive would have to pass through the secretariat and perhaps receive due attention. Again section 32 (2) and (3) of the said Decree provide:

“(2) Where in the discharge of any functions of the Authority, damage is done to the property of any person, the Authority shall pay reasonable compensation for such damage.

(3) The amount of any compensation to be paid under subsection (2) of this section shall, in the case of dispute, be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38).”

It may be seen from the provisions of the Decree as quoted (supra), that the chief executive is a very important and responsible

[p.125] of [1980] GLR 119 officer who heads an important wing of the governing body of the authority. The chief executive is by virtue of section 15 (2) of the Decree responsible for the day-to-day direction of the business of the authority, implementation of the decisions of the board and for administration, organisation and control of all employees of the authority. This perhaps, accounts for the reasons why the chief executive has been specifically prescribed by the Decree as being the only appropriate person to be served with notice or document concerning any suit by or against the authority. It is my view, therefore, that service of any such notice or document concerning any suit by or against the authority will not constitute the required statutory notification or service, if it is given to any officer of the authority other than the chief executive.

Even though the Decree appears to be silent as to the situation of the head office of the authority the court will take judicial notice of the fact that the chief executive is at the head office which is in Accra, being normally the headquarters of a national statutory body such as the authority. The chief executive being at the head office is expected to be served there with any such notice or document. Would service of notice in the circumstance on the regional manager of the authority in Takoradi be accepted as the required statutory notification on the chief executive? My answer is No! Because that will not amount to service of notice in compliance with the provisions of both sections 33 and 34 of N.R.C.D. 298.

Since no suit shall be commenced against the authority until one month at least after written notice of intention to commence it has been served upon the authority by the intending plaintiff, a suit filed without such prior statutory notification must be deemed to be still-born. The cause of action may have arisen alright, yet it cannot be given the required legal recognition since the prescribed statutory condition precedent has not been fulfilled. A suit filed without prior fulfilment of those statutory conditions must be deemed to have been filed contrary to the provisions of the Decree and must therefore not be entertained.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff cited the case of Ghana Commercial Bank v. Tabury [1977] 1 G.L.R. 329 and seems to have submitted that this case is an authority for saying that service of any such notice on the regional manager of the authority being a responsible officer, must be deemed to be proper notice on the authority within the meaning of service in N.R.C.D. 298. Even though I agree with the views expressed by my brother Sarkodee J., my understanding of his judgment in the Tabury case is not exactly what counsel would

[p.126] of [1980] GLR 119 want this court to accept. Sarkodee J. made it abundantly clear in his judgment that all statutory modes of service must be strictly adhered to, and I could not agree with him more. This is exactly what Order 9, r. 8 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), says at the tail end of its provisions:

“…and where by any statute, provision is made for service of any writ of summons, bill, petition, summons, or any process upon any corporation, or upon any society or fellowship or any body or number of persons, whether corporate or incorporate, every writ of summons may be served in the manner so provided.”

That is, as provided under the provision of the statute prescribing modes of service.

In Ghana Commercial Bank v. Tabury (supra), the facts being that the plaintiff issued a writ of summons claiming damages for unlawful seizure of his goods and also for unlawful imprisonment. The writ was served on a clerk at the head office of the defendants, a banking institution, established under the Ghana Commercial Bank Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 115), s. 15 of which provided that, “A document may be served on the Bank by leaving it at or sending it by post to the Head Office of the Bank.” The defendant failed to enter appearance and the plaintiff therefore applied and obtained an interlocutory judgment in default. The defendant subsequently applied to set aside the default judgment. Sarkodee J. held, among other things, granting the application (as stated in the headnote at p. 330):

“(2) Order 9, r. 8 of L.N. 140A (dealing with service on corporations) drew a distinction between cases where a statute provided modes of service and where it did not so provide. All statutory modes of service must be strictly adhered to and this obviously would exclude service of process on the defendants under Order 9, r. 8. Service therefore must be effected in the manner provided by section 15 of N.R.C.D. 115 which provided that a document could be served on the bank by leaving it or sending it by post to the head office of the bank. Even though N.R.C.D. 115 was silent as to the person with whom the document or writ should be left, it would be proper to serve somebody who could represent the bank or some other responsible officer who must accept service in the normal course of his business. In the circumstances, the service effected on the defendants’ clerk was improper and the defendants therefore had no notice of the writ. That failure to serve the writ as required by law was a fundamental defect affecting the very root of the proceedings.”

[p.127] of [1980] GLR 119

It is needless to say that there is a distinction between the Tabury case and the instant case before the court. In the former, the statute simply provided that a document could be served on the bank by leaving it or sending it by post to the head office of the bank. The statute did not mention the person to whom the document or writ should be given. Obviously the statute intended that the document or notice should reach the bank and it would be more in keeping with commonsense if it is given to or brought to the notice of a responsible officer at the head office. It would appear from section 15 of N.R.C.D. 115 that proper service could be effected on the bank by leaving the document or writ at or sending it by post to the head office of the bank. The suggestion here is therefore that it would appear proper and more in keeping with commonsense, the normal course of events and prudence, instead of simply leaving the document or writ at the head office, to leave same with a responsible officer who would accept same and bring it to the notice of the bank. The statute obviously intended that the document or writ should be brought to the notice of a responsible officer of the bank, not just to leave it anywhere at the bank. In the present case before the court, however, even though section 34 of N.R.C.D. 298 talks about effecting service by delivering the notice or document, or summons to, or by sending it by registered post, unlike section 15 of N.R.C.D. 115, where no particular officer has been specified, section 34 of N.R.C.D. 298 mentions specifically the chief executive, as the officer to whom the notice, summons or document may be delivered or addressed by a registered postal packet. It is my view that since a particular officer has been named by the statute, no other officer apart from the prescribed officer shall qualify to receive or be served with any such notification. Therefore if the intending plaintiff fails to give the statutory notice to the authority through the chief executive, as in this case, he is precluded by the Decree from instituting an action against the authority.

Apart from there being a clear indication from N.R.C.D. 298 that there is every intention that any such impending action against the authority must be brought to the notice of the chief executive before the plaintiff goes to court, there is also a clear direction or intention from the legislature that whenever any body claims that he has a cause of action against the authority for damage done to his property and that there is a possibility of a legal action being instituted against the authority for recovery of damages, the authority must be given a chance of making an offer of a reasonable compensation for such damages. In such circumstances where a dispute

[p.128] of [1980] GLR 119 arises as to the amount of compensation payable, such a dispute must be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38): see section 32 (2) and (3) of N.R.C.D. 298.

It is my view that the giving of the proper statutory notice as required under both sections 33 and 34 of N.R.C.D. 298 to the chief executive of the authority, amounts to affording the authority the chance of making an offer of a reasonable compensation for damage caused by the authority. Even when an offer of compensation is made and there is a dispute as to the adequacy or otherwise, the dispute has to be settled as an arbitration. It seems to me, therefore, that unless the intending plaintiff who claims damages from the authority for damage done to his property has gone through the procedure outlined, fully satisfying the combined provisions of sections 32, 33 and 34 of N.R.C.D. 298, he will not in law be entitled to institute an action against the authority for recovery of damages for damage done to his property.

I must in the circumstances and for the reasons given above uphold counsel’s preliminary objection and hold that the plaintiff, having in my view failed to comply with the provisions of N.R.C.D. 298, by giving the proper statutory notice of his intention to commence these proceedings against the authority for the recovery of damages for an alleged damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle, is precluded by law from instituting the proceedings here. The same must therefore be considered premature. The suit is accordingly struck out as not being properly before the court. The defendants are awarded ¢400 costs.

DECISION

Preliminary objection upheld.

Action struck out.

D. R. K. S.

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