COKER AND OTHERS vs. COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE BORDER GUARDS AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 346
12 June 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 5 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 24Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiffs against the defendants jointly and severally claiming the return of goods seized from them or payment of the sum of ¢142,001 being the value of the goods and damages for unlawful seizure and detention. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
J. A. Dawson for the plaintiffs.
Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.
In June 1978, the plaintiffs purchased various goods specified in the schedule to the writ of summons and stored them in a house at Half-Assini. Later, the same week, the second defendant, the officer in charge of the Border Guards Station, Half-Assini, caused the said house to be broken into and the goods to the total value of ¢142,001 removed. The goods were mainly adinkra cloths, kente cloths, wax prints and six boxes of robb ointment. The plaintiffs immediately approached the second defendant and demanded the return of the goods but the second defendant refused to release them. Later the defendants loaded the goods on to a Border Guards truck and took them away. Up till now the goods have not been released to the plaintiffs. Therefore they issued a writ against the defendants claiming against them jointly and severally the return of the goods or the payment of the sum of ¢142,001, the value of the said goods and damages for unlawful seizure and detention.
[p.348] of [1980] GLR 346 The defendants admit removing the goods from the house at Half-Assini but say that the plaintiffs had conveyed the goods from various places within Ghana to Half-Assini with the intention of smuggling them to the Ivory Coast and that upon information they searched the house on a warrant and found the goods. Finally the defendants contend that they issued a notice of seizure on the goods and that it was up to the plaintiffs to come forward and claim them which they failed to do. Subsequent to hearing of arguments the principal state attorney, counsel for the defendants, supplied the court with seizure notices No. 57/78 and 12/78 signed by the Officer Commanding Border Guards, Half-Assini, his authority for seizing the goods. The state attorney also submitted four search warrants authorising the search. It appears from the notices of seizure that the defendants seized the goods relying on the Customs and Excise Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 114). Not surprising though, the notices do not state the section of the Decree from which the defendants derive their power of search and seizure.
However, the learned principal state attorney found protection under section 42 (1) of N.R.C.D. 114. He added that under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 236), a Border Guards official has power to prevent crime and arrest offenders. In his view since the plaintiffs intended to smuggle the goods to Ivory Coast the Border Guards rightly seized them adding that the Border Guards were preventing the commission of a crime, namely, smuggling.
Section 42 (1) of N.R.C.D. 114 provides:
“42. (1) When a magistrate is satisfied by information upon oath that there is reasonable cause to suspect that any uncustomed or prohibited goods or goods on which the excise duties have not been paid or secured by certificates or otherwise as required by law are harboured, kept or concealed in any premises, he may issue a warrant under his hand authorising any officer to enter and search those premises, by day or by night, and to seize and take away any such goods.”
It is clear that before a magistrate can issue a warrant under the subsection authorising an officer to search premises, seize and take away goods he must be satisfied that the goods are reasonably suspected to be uncustomed, prohibited or goods on which excise duties have not been paid or secured by certificates or otherwise as required by law. In any such case the magistrate has a discretion to issue a search warrant where such goods are harboured or concealed in any premises. There is nothing before me to show that the goods which the defendants seized fall under any of the categories specified in
[p.349] of [1980] GLR 346
section 42 (1) of N.R.C.D. 114. That apart, the defendants have not been able to show that the plaintiffs intended to export the goods. Merely keeping large quantities of goods in a house in Ghana does not by itself mean an intention to export them or smuggle them out of the country and the fact that Half-Assini is only a few miles to Ghana’s border with Ivory Coast, in my view, makes no difference. A cleat intention to export or smuggle the goods must be shown. This can be arrived at by looking at the circumstance surrounding the whole situation. The act of the plaintiffs did not even amount to a preparation to commit a crime let alone an attempt to smuggle or export the goods. The Border Guards officer had no authority to enter the house, search and seize the goods. The seizure was therefore wrongful. Even if there was reasonable cause to suspect that the goods were uncustomed or prohibited or in any way fall within the subsection the officer was bound to bring a person in whose possession the goods were before a magistrate. The defendants cannot be heard to say that it has taken them more than a year to decide whether or not to comply with subsection 42 (2) (a) of the Decree.
The next point is whether the goods can be forfeited under section 49 (1) or 84 or both of N.R.C.D. 114. There is no doubt that section 49 deals with prohibited or restricted goods. None of the items described in the schedule to the writ can be said to be restricted or prohibited within the meaning of section 275 of N.R.C.D. 114. Also the goods can be forfeited only if the plaintiffs committed any of the offences specified in N.R.C.D. 114, s. 49 (1) The defendants cannot therefore rely on that section by way of defence. The goods cannot therefore be forfeited under that section of the Decree.
Finally, the plaintiffs have not committed any offence or done any act which offends against the provisions of N.R.C.D. 114 and which will render the goods listed in the schedule to the writ liable to forfeiture under section 84 of the Decree. On the whole my considered view is that the defendants misconceived the extent of their powers and acted a little too hastily. They have no defence to the action. I accordingly enter judgment against the defendants jointly and severally for the return of the goods as stated in the schedule attached to the writ or the payment to the plaintiffs of the sum of ¢142,001, the value of the said goods.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
D. R. K. S.
