DEDE II vs. ANSAH AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 746
31 October 1979 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 9 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 28Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASE REFERRED TO
Keymer v. Reddy [1912] 1 K.B. 215; 81 L.J.K.B. 266; 105 L.T. 841, C.A.
[p.748] of [1980] GLR 746
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to set aside the ex parte grant of an interim injunction on grounds of non-compliance with court order. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Oppong for the plaintiff-respondent.
A. A. Owusu for the defendant-applicants.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
On 28 September 1979, the plaintiff-respondent herein filed a writ of summons claiming (a) a declaration that the appointment of the first defendant, Peter Yaw Ansah, as the Yamfohene without the knowledge of the plaintiff is null and void; and (b) an order restraining the first defendant from being sworn in and acting as Yamfohene. This writ which was unaccompanied by a statement of claim was served on the first and third defendants on the same date, i.e. 28 September 1979. It does not appear that the second defendant was ever served though on 4 October 1979 an appearance under protest was entered for and on behalf of all the defendants.
Meanwhile, on 3 October 1979, the plaintiff-respondent herein had filed and moved an ex parte motion for an order of interim injunction against the defendant-applicants herein restraining “the first defendant from acting in any way as the Yamfohene and the second and third defendants from doing anything that will promote the proclamation of the first defendant as the Yamfohene.” The application was granted as prayed and on the same date the order was drawn up and served on the defendants. Copies of the motion with its supporting affidavit and the order drawn up have been exhibited in the present application as exhibits A and B respectively.
The applicants herein seek an order of this court to set aside or vacate the court’s order of 3 October 1979. Counsel for the applicants submitted, inter alia, that not only were the facts upon which the earlier order had been granted false and unmeritorious but also that the plaintiff-respondent has failed to comply with the court order; it appeared under the circumstances that the earlier application had been brought in bad faith.
The court has power to order an injunction whenever it is just or convenient to do so: see Order 50, r.7 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Motions for such orders normally should be, and usually are made upon notice to the party against whom the order is sought. However, in a proper case, an interlocutory injunction will be granted ex parte; that is to say, before the other party has had the opportunity to appear to oppose it. Order 52, r. 3 of L.N. 140A provides:
[p.749] of [1980] GLR 746
“3. Except where according to the practice now existing any order or rule might be made absolute ex parte in the first instance, and except where not withstanding rule 2 a motion or application may be made for an order to show cause only, no motion shall be made without previous notice to the parties affected thereby. But the Court or a Judge, if satisfied that the delay caused by proceeding in the ordinary way would or might entail irreparable or serious mischief, may make any order ex parte upon such terms as to costs or otherwise, and subject to such undertaking, if any, as the Court or a Judge may think just; and any party affected by such order may move to set it aside.”
It is clear from the above provision that this is a measure of extreme urgency and if it is intended that it should endure for any length of time, it is customary for the court to limit its duration until a day on which the matter may be heard on motion.
To grant or refuse the application was in the discretion of the sitting judge. The available evidence was contained in the affidavit in support of the application which has been exhibited as exhibit A. It could not be said that the judge had no basis for making the order. It was quite clear from the present order drawn up that the judge did not intend the order made under the circumstances to be final; the judge, not having heard from the other side made the order to endure for only a short time. Paragraph (3) of the said order—exhibit B states, “It is hereby ordered that motion be granted as prayed up to hearing of the motion on notice.”
The application was heard on Wednesday, 3 October 1979. If it was not possible to hear the motion on notice on the next day which was Thursday, 4 October 1979, because the other side needed at least two clear days notice, I should have thought that Monday, 8 October 1979 would have been a more appropriate date for the hearing of the application, if the other side had been served with notice of it. No such notice was filed as anticipated by the judge and none has been filed since.
Counsel for the respondent conceding that there has been some delay, attributed this to the fact that (a) more information or facts were required by him to enable him file a more comprehensive affidavit in support of the application on notice; (b) the defendants had entered appearance under protest; and (c) just as the plaintiff was about to comply with the court’s order of 3 October 1979, the present application was filed and served on her. It was counsel’s argument that in the last two situations he felt that any further move or step to be taken by the plaintiff would be stultified by an application brought by the defendants to set aside the writ and also the
[p.750] of [1980] GLR 746 interim order. He decided therefore to wait and see the outcome of the present application.
The only facts upon which the court depended to grant the ex parte application were contained in the respondent’s affidavit in support of his application, exhibit A. To substantiate her claim, more information or facts were required. On this I agree with respondent’s counsel that further investigation was necessary; a statement of claim, containing more detailed facts than what was contained in exhibit A was required to help the court come to a decision on the matter. The respondent failed to furnish not only the court but also the applicants with the necessary or the detailed facts. Up to the time of hearing this application the required statement of claim had not been filed. Counsel for the respondent has attributed this inactivity partly to the fact that an appearance under protest had been entered. Order 12, r. 24 of L.N. 140A states:
“24. A defendant before appearing shall be at liberty, without obtaining an order to enter or entering a conditional appearance, to take out a summons or serve notice of motion to set aside the service upon him of the writ or notice of the writ, or to discharge the order authorising such service.”
The effect of this rule is to require the defendant who has an objection to the issue or service of the writ to apply to the court to set aside the writ or the service on him; the burden is on the defendant to make his objection in due time, otherwise, his appearance if conditional will become unconditional, or if he has not entered appearance he will be in default of appearance. There is no time limit within which this application could be made, but by necessary implication of the English Court Rules, the application is made within fourteen days after the entering of conditional appearance or within such other time as may be limited by the court. Consequently, no time having been fixed by the court, the defendants were required to move the court to set aside the writ or the service on them within fourteen days. On the expiration of the time so limited, if no application objecting to the writ or the service of it is made by the defendants, a presumption is raised against them of waiver of the objection. The time, however, even though it has expired, may be subsequently enlarged in a proper case, and the defendants’ objection heard and determined: see Keymer v. Reddy [1912] 1 K.B. 215, C.A. Up to 18 October 1979, the defendants had not moved the court to set aside the writ or service of it. Nothing therefore prevented the respondent from proceeding with her case if she was desirous of doing so. And, up to date, no step has been taken to file a statement of claim or to
[p.751] of [1980] GLR 746 file the motion on notice as ordered by the court; the latter situation was clearly a flagrant disregard for the order of the court.
The application before the court was one asking the court for one of its equitable reliefs. It was therefore necessary for the respondent, then the applicant in that application, to comply with the general equitable norms. He who comes to equity, it is said, must come with clean hands. How can the respondent require the court to do equity to her when she herself is not prepared to obey the orders of the court? He who wants equity must also do equity. Again, delays defeat equity, is an equitable maxim of great repute. Could it be said that in the circumstances of this case, the conduct of the respondent has been fair and that she had acted in good faith, when she has made the court to make an order which it would probably not have made ex parte? It is quite clear on the evidence before me that there were more facts than were disclosed to the court in the ex parte application. Having urged on the court the urgency of the situation and the court having exercised its discretion in her favour on the assumed state of emergency, was it fair to either the court or the applicants, for the respondent to delay bringing the full facts to the notice of the court? Up to the time of hearing the present application the respondent had not filed the motion on notice. Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. I do not think in the particular circumstances of this case, the respondent has acted vigilantly.
I have purposely refrained from going into the details of the facts now put before me, in case they may prejudice any subsequent application that the respondent may decide to bring. There is, however, evidence that the first applicant has been proclaimed the chief of Yamfo. I am inclined to believe that the previous application was brought to embarrass the first applicant and the rest of the kingmakers. Until a proper application is made, the first applicant must be taken for what he is worth; he cannot be made to exist in a vacuum indefinitely. This, in my opinion, would result in hardship and inconvenience to the first applicant and the rest of the kingmakers. The continued existence of the interim order made on 3 October 1979, in my opinion, would be unjust in the circumstances. Accordingly, I grant the application as prayed and set aside the order made by this court on 3 October 1979.
There will be costs of ¢150 in favour of the applicants.
DECISION
Application granted.
Interim injunction set aside.
K. A. A. M.
