ANANE vs. ASANTEWAA [1979] GLR 519
19 January 1979 · OWUSU-ADDO J · ≈ 5 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a district court judgment ordering the appellant to give up premises to her landlady, the respondent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
D. K. Duku for the appellant.
JUDGMENT OF OWUSU-ADDO J.
This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the Kumasi district court grade II dated 28 March 1978, entering judgment in favour of the plaintiff and ordering the defendant to give up possession of a room occupied by him in house No. 13, Block 17, Kwadaso.
The first ground of appeal argued was that before the commencement of her suit in the trial court, the plaintiff ought to have made a declaration in compliance with regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), since her claim was brought under section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220). Counsel for the appellant submitted that non-compliance with the aforementioned regulation divested the trial magistrate of jurisdiction
[p.520] of [1979] GLR 519
to try the case. A fortiori the whole trial resulting in the judgment appealed against is a complete nullity. On the second ground of appeal, counsel urged that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof that she reasonably required the room for personal use and referred to paragraph (1) of the particulars of her claim, which he urged, was inconsistent with her evidence. The inconsistency referred to is that she averred in her statement of claim that she required the room for occupation in Kumasi to enable her look after her aged mother. But her evidence disclosed that her sole reason for bringing the action was that her husband Yaw Donkor, who used to work as a secretary receiver at Kenyasi in Brong-Ahafo, where they lived, had left Kenyasi for Kumasi so she also required her room in Kumasi for her personal occupation in order to be near her husband.
The third ground of appeal argued was that the trial magistrate failed to consider the defence put up by the defendant. Considering these grounds in the reverse order, I find that in the judgment, though short, the trial magistrate dealt adequately with the evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendant before arriving at his conclusions. The third ground therefore fails.
The only serious ground for consideration is the question of non-compliance with regulation 18 of L.I. 369 by the plaintiff. Before considering this ground I shall first set out the facts briefly: The plaintiff issued a writ of summons in the trial court claiming recovery of her room being occupied by the defendant. She averred that she had lived at Kwayem for nearly 30 years looking after her farms but she needed her room to live in Kumasi in order to look after her aged mother.
In her evidence she said the defendant had occupied her room for about 30 years at a monthly rent of four cedis. Since her husband had left his work as secretary receiver in Kenyasi to stay in Kumasi she needed the room for her personal occupation in order to be near her husband. She stressed that prior to the institution of the action she had given the defendant three months’ notice to give up possession of the room but he ignored it and refused to vacate the room.
The main defence put up was that the plaintiff wanted the room in order to hire it at a higher rent. He said the plaintiff demanded ¢200 rent advance and sought to increase the rent from ¢4 to ¢20 a month but he resisted. He denied that the plaintiff required the room for her personal occupation. His witness Yaw Amankwaah confirmed his story as to the demand for rent advance and the plaintiff’s request for rent increase.
The offending regulation reads:
“18. Where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k), he shall furnish to the appropriate Rent Officer a declaration as in Form 14 of the First Schedule hereto.”
The form is so specified:
“FORM 14 DECLARATION BY LANDLORD CONCERNING USE OF PREMISES Regulation 18 From: ……………………………………………
……………………………………………
……………………………………………
To: The Rent Officer……………………………..
…………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………..
I, …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
hereby declare that the premises now occupied by AB. are required by me for the purpose of ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. and that the premises will not be relet to another tenant within a period of ……………………../*or that the tenant will be re-instated on the completion of the works. The works are expected to be completed on or about the ………………………………………………………… day of …………………………………….., 19 ………………………………
…………………………………
Signature of Landlord.
*Delete if inapplicable.”
There is no question of doubt that the plaintiff’s application was brought under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 which reads:
“17. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 . . .:— (g) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for personal occupation as a dwelling house by himself, a member of his family or any person in his whole time employment, such premises being constructed to be used as a dwelling house, so, however, that — . . .
[p.522] of [1979] GLR 519
(ii) no such order shall be made if the Magistrate or Judge is satisfied having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any alternative accommodation available for the person for whose occupation the premises are so required or for the tenant, that greater hardship would be caused by granting the order than by refusing it.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The real question is when can a landlord apply for possession under section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act ? Can he go to the rent magistrate for an order when the statutory requirement has not been complied with? The answer will depend to a large extent on the nature of the rent magistrate’s power to make such an order under section 17(1) (g). The exercise of the magistrate’s power however is not dependent upon the statutory requirement, but upon satisfactory evidence shown that the landlord reasonably requires the premises for his own use. Non-compliance with the aforementioned regulation of the Rent Regulations does not therefore oust the jurisdiction of the rent magistrate as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. The magistrate’s power to make an order for possession, as was done in this case, is clearly spelt out in Act 220.
What then is the purpose of the statutory requirement stipulated under regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations? It is to ensure fair-play so that a landlord, who has obtained possession of his house, does not turn round to let it to another tenant for a higher rent. In this appeal, considering the defence put up by the appellant that the respondent’s sole reason for instituting the action was to let the room for a higher rent, I hold the view that non-compliance with the statutory requirement under regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. I shall therefore order a hearing de novo. For the above reason the appeal is allowed and the suit is ordered to be heard de novo.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. D.
