ESSILFIE vs. GHANA PORTS AUTHORITY [1980] GLR 469
27 July 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 15 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 33Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Soadwah v. Yeboah [1978] G.L.R. 428.
(2) Asiedu v. Timber and Transport Co., Ltd. [1978] G.L.R. 351.
(3) Nkrumah v. Ataa [1972] 2 G.L.R. 13.
(4) Joseph Suche & Co., Ltd., In re (1875) 1 Ch.D. 48; 45 L.J. Ch. 12; 33 L.T. 774; 24 W.R.184. (5) Watt; Ex parte Joselyne, In re (1878) 8 Ch.D. 327; 47 L.J. Bcy 91; 38 L.T. 661; 26 W.R. 645. (6) Cooper v. Brayne (1858) 27 L.J.Ex. 446; 31 L.T.(o.s.) 265.
(7) Moore v. Peachey (1892) 66 L.T. 198; 8 T.L.R. 406; 36 S.J. 324.
(8) Marshall v. James [1905] 1 Ch. 432; 74 L.J.Ch. 279; 92 L.T. 681; 53 W.R. 363; 49 S.J. 259. [p.471] of [1980] GLR 469
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the judgment-debtor for stay of execution and an order setting aside the garnishee order absolute made pursuant thereto.
COUNSEL
D. de Graft Aidoo for the plaintiff-judgment-creditor.
I. G. Carson for the defendant-judgment-debtors.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
The defendant-judgment-debtors have brought this motion praying the court for an order for stay of execution and for setting aside the garnishee order dated 1 June 1979. The background to this motion, briefly, is this: The plaintiff who had issued a writ against the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority as far back as 17 April 1973 finally obtained judgment against the said defendants in the sum of ¢10,802 together with ¢500 costs on 9 January 1979. The plaintiff’s action was rooted in breach of contract. After obtaining his judgment he sought by garnishee proceedings, to attach the debts which, he alleged, were owed by the Ghana Commercial Bank, main branch, Takoradi, to the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority in satisfaction of the judgment debt. The garnishee order nisi was issued and subsequently the plaintiff came to court again to pray for an order absolute. The garnishee did not answer to the summons and the plaintiff, consequently, obtained his order absolute against him. It appears from a letter addressed to the registrar of this court (which has been filed in the docket in this suit) that after the plaintiff had obtained his garnishee order absolute, the garnishee wrote to inform the registrar that he had no account in the name of Ghana Railway and Ports Authority. The plaintiff now brought an ex parte motion for garnishee order nisi to issue against “Ghana Commercial Bank, per the Manager, Harbour Branch, Takoradi,” which was alleged to be holding in favour of the defendants, i.e. Ghana Railway and Ports Authority, sums of money far in excess of the judgment debt. On 10 May 1979 the court granted the order nisi against the harbour branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank and summoned the garnishee to appear in court on 24 May 1979. The plaintiff, in the meantime, must have received a rude shock that the garnishee was not indebted to the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority because, on this same 24 May 1979, an ex parte motion was filed on his behalf wherein he sought the court’s order that the final order be directed against the accounts of Ghana Ports Authority which were kept by the garnishee. His reason for the ex parte application was that by virtue of section 2 (1) of the Ghana Ports Authority Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 96), the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority has now been divided into two distinct bodies with, each one, a legal personality of its own. After the garnishee had satisfied the court that it was
[p.472] of [1980] GLR 469 holding sufficient funds on behalf of the Ghana Ports Authority, the ex parte motion was granted and a garnishee order absolute was, in effect, granted.
In support of the motion for stay of execution and also to set aside the garnishee order, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the defendants-judgment-debtors herein by their port accountant who deposed as follows:
“(2) That on 7 June 1979 I received a letter dated 5 June 1979 from the manager of the Ghana Commercial Bank, Harbour Branch, Takoradi, informing me that he had received an order attaching the sum of ¢11,402 in our account with the bank.
(3) That the manager also forwarded a copy of the court’s order dated 1 June 1979 as well as an order for amendment dated 3 May 1979.
(4) That it was from the order dated 3 May 1979 that I learned that an ex parte application had been made substituting the Ghana Ports Authority, per the General Manager, Takoradi.
(5) That I am advised and verily believe same that the application to amend should have been on notice and therefore ought to be set aside.
(6) That furthermore, the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority was dissolved on 30 June 1977 and two new corporations established, namely, the Ghana Railway Corporation under S.M.C.D. 95 and the Ghana Ports Authority under S.M.C.D. 96. The Head Office of the Ghana Ports Authority is at Tema.
(7) That so far as I am aware no judgment had been obtained against the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority as at 30 June 1977 and no judgment would therefore have been obtained after that date when it had ceased to exist.
(8) That I am advised and verily believe same that any judgment obtained against the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority after 30 June 1977 is null and void.”
The plaintiff-judgment-creditor also filed the following affidavit in answer:
“(2) That all hearing notices and documents in this suit both before and after the coming into being of S.M.C.D. 95 and 96 were served on the defendants-judgment-debtors applicants and no objection was ever raised.
(3) That the defendants-judgment-debtors-applicants and the Ghana Railway Corporation under S.M.C.D.
95 and 96
[p.473] of [1980] GLR 469 inherited all the assets and liabilities of the former Ghana Railway and Ports Authority including those of their Railports Dance Band which committed the tort, which is the subject of this suit.
(4) That if the defendants-judgment-debtors-applicants are aggrieved in any way as to who should pay the judgment debt or part of it, the contest really should be between them and the Ghana Railway Corporation.
(5) That the allegation that my application for amendment should have been on notice is misconceived.
(6) That Mr. I. G. Carson, the present solicitor for the applicants, throughout the conduct of this suit, has acted as solicitor and counsel for the defendants and has not filed any change of solicitor nor filed any notice of withdrawal.
(7) That the judgment in this suit was obtained in a regular manner and has since been executed.
(8) That the defendants’ application is misconceived.
(9) That the judgment was satisfied on 6 June 1979 and the cheque paid on satisfaction was used within ten days after the order has been made to pay for the damage caused and losses suffered.”
Upon these matters deposed to in his affidavit the plaintiff has invited the court to dismiss the application.
Counsel for the plaintiff-judgment-creditor has, in court, sought to argue as a point of law that the motion of the defendant-judgment-debtors cannot be entertained and that it must consequently be dismissed. According to him the judgment was satisfied five days before the applicant filed his motion and that as execution has been carried out there is nothing to stay. For the same reason, as the garnishee order has been complied with and the plaintiff has recovered his judgment debt, the garnishee order cannot be set aside because the only order which can be set aside is one that is pending. Counsel referred the court to two cases in support of his argument, viz Soadwah v. Yeboah [1978] G.L.R. 428 and Asiedu v. Timber and Transport Co., Ltd. [1978] G.L.R. 351. These recent reported cases were, unfortunately for the applicants’ counsel, not produced in court for his perusal. He, however, contended that the decisions in these cases would presuppose that there existed a valid judgment. According to him, there is no such valid judgment here against the Ghana Ports Authority and as such the plaintiff could not have gone into execution against them. Counsel complained that the applicants have never had notice of any judgment against them and that the
[p.474] of [1980] GLR 469 only intimation they had of the judgment and the garnishee proceedings was what was only recently passed on to them by the garnishee. Counsel considered it eminently wrong for the plaintiff to have applied to substitute his clients on an ex parte motion and contended that where a party seeks an order which must compel another person either to do something or to make him suffer a liability then the application should be on notice. He submitted that as the applicants had no notice both the judgment and the garnishee order are void ab initio. Furthermore, he argued that the Ghana Ports Authority is the creature of a statute and the plaintiff is deemed to have notice of the Ghana Ports Authority Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 96), and what it contains. Any judgment that was therefore, obtained against the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority after 30 June 1977 was null and void as the judgment was against a non-existing person. He said that if the judgment is a nullity then the execution must be stayed and the garnishee also set aside.
The Railway and Ports Authority sued by the plaintiff was itself the creature of statute, namely, the Railway and Ports Act, 1971 (Act 358). This parent Act has truly been repealed in two separate Decrees. This repeal has been effected by section 33 (1) of the Ghana Railway Corporation Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 95), and by section 117 (1) of the Ghana Ports Authority Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 96). As both Decrees were to come into force on 1 July 1977 it meant that as from that date the Railway and Ports Authority became extinct by operation of each of these two Decrees. As from that same date the Ghana Railway Corporation and the Ghana Ports Authority were created by S.M.C.D. 95 and S.M.C.D. 96 respectively. Significantly, by section 9 (1) of S.M.C.D. 95 and by section 6 (1) of S.M.C.D. 96, all assets, liabilities and property of the erstwhile Railway and Ports Authority (established under the Railway and Ports Act, 1971), were, for the purposes of its functions in respect of the railways, to vest in the Ghana Railway Corporation and, for the purposes of its functions in respect of those specified ports, they were also to vest in the Ghana Ports Authority. Because these two Decrees had, in effect, dissolved the Railway and Ports Authority the applicants’ solicitor is clearly under some delusion that any judgment obtained against the Railway and Ports Authority after 30 June 1977 was a nullity. I have no doubt that it was this same sense of delusion which encouraged the complete disregard of hearing notices which were served on the solicitor of the Railway and Ports Authority (at the address where such notices had hitherto been served) before the plaintiff proceeded to obtain his judgment. In Nkrumah v. Ataa [1972] 2 G.L.R. 13 at p. 18, I had the occasion to observe that in the exercise of the court’s power to consider changes
[p.475] of [1980] GLR 469 in the law since the trial, it has to apply legislation, since enacted, which is sufficiently retrospective, and which extends to pending proceedings or gives new remedies but that it cannot, however, determine the substantive rights of the parties by applying subsequent legislation which is not retrospective. Jessel M.R. stated the matter more concisely when he said in In re Joseph Suche & Co., Ltd. (1875) 1 Ch.D. 48 at p. 50:
“it is a general rule that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them.”
Section 8 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), provides:
“8. (1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal or revocation takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed there under; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed or revoked.”
These provisions in section 8 (1) of C.A. 4—especially subsection 1 (c) and (e) have the effect of saving every liability which attached to the erstwhile Railway and Ports Authority and which was to be adjudicated upon as well as all rights of any person in a legal proceeding to recover any damages, compensations, debt, etc. This, indeed, must dispel the applicant’s enchantment that the plaintiff’s action abated when S.M.C.D. 95 and S.M.C.D. 96 came into force.
After obtaining his judgment against the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority which, ex facie, was regular, the plaintiff was entitled to go into execution against either the Ghana Railway Corporation or the Ghana Ports Authority (or against both of them)
[p.476] of [1980] GLR 469 on whom had devolved all the assets, liabilities and property of the erstwhile Railway and Ports Authority.
The first question is whether this court can stay an execution which has already been carried out. Asiedu v. Timber and Transport Co., Ltd. [1978] G.L.R. 351 squarely decided the point against the applicants that execution having completely terminated, there is no execution in progress which they can seek to stay.
The next question is whether this court can set aside the garnishee order which has already been acted upon. The applicants’ subsisting complaints about want of notice have already been noted. Indeed, Order 45, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), requires that the order nisi should be served on the garnishee and unless otherwise ordered, on the judgment-debtor or his solicitor. It has been explained that the order is an order nisi only for the purpose of enabling the garnishee to show that he owes no debt to the debtor: see In re Watt; Ex parte Joselyne (1878) 8 Ch.D. 327 per James L.J. Until the service of the order nisi no charge is, of course, created and so if before service, the garnishee bona fide pays the debt to the judgment-creditor, the attachment will be inoperative, as there is no debt to be attached: see Cooper v. Brayne (1885) 27 L.J.Ex. 446. Inasmuch as the debt is only bound in the hands of the garnishee upon service on him it would seem that it is purely a matter of prudence which will enure to the advantage of the garnishor to serve the order nisi on the garnishee, if practicable, before or at the same time as it is served on the debtor, as otherwise the debtor might assign the debt before service on the garnishee, and so defeat the proceedings. From the foregoing it seems to me that the non-service of the notice on the debtor is not by itself an irregularity of such a fundamental nature as to avoid the garnishee order absolute. If the service of notice of the garnishee order nisi on the debtor were a condition sine qua non to the making of the order absolute I do not think that the court would be given a discretion under Order 45, r. 1 of L.N. 140A in the matter to dispense with the service of such notice.
Indisputably, the court can set aside under its inherent jurisdiction any order which it has been induced to make, such as by fraud, mistake or even by innocent suppression of material facts. Thus in Moore v. Peachey (1892) 66 L.I. 198 there was an appeal by the garnishee from the refusal of a judge at chambers to set aside a garnishee order which had been made absolute owing to the mutual mistake of the judgment-creditor and the garnishee, and to order repayment of the sum paid under the said order by the garnishee to the judgment-creditor. What happened was that W. R. Moore, the judgment-creditor, obtained judgment against one Frederick Peachey.
[p.477] of [1980] GLR 469
He took out a garnishee order nisi against the garnishee (a bank) requiring them to pay to him moneys which it was alleged were held by the bank and belonged to the judgment-debtor, Frederick Peachey. The bank examined their books and discovered they had at that date a customer named Henry Frederick Peachey who had an account with them. By mistake they did not notice the difference between the Christian name of their customer and that of the judgment-debtor. On the return of the said garnishee order nisi the garnishee attended before the master and admitted, what they then believed to be the fact, that the bank held moneys belonging to the said judgment-debtor to meet the judgment debt, and an order absolute was thereupon made that the bank should pay the sum to the judgment-creditor and the order was complied with. The mistake was that both the judgment-creditor and the garnishee were misled into believing that the said customer was one and the same person as the judgment-debtor, and that the latter had a banking account at the appellant’s bank. When the bank discovered the mistake they applied to the judgment-creditor for the return of the sum paid, but failing to obtain this they made an application at chambers to have the order absolute set aside. The master referred the matter to the judge in chambers who refused the application. On appeal, it was held that the order must be set aside and the money repaid. Cave J. said at p. 199:
“In the case, however, before us the order absolute was made by the consent of the garnishee, but that consent was given entirely under a mistake, a mistake moreover which was made as much by the judgment creditor . . . as by the bank, the garnishee. No authority has been cited to me to show that this court has not power to set aside a garnishee order made absolute under such circumstances as have been shown to have existed in this case.”
Again, in Marshall v. James [1905] 1 Ch. 432 it was held that a garnishee order, made upon evidence afterwards proved to be mistaken, may be set aside although it has been made absolute and has been acted upon.
In all these cases where a garnishee order absolute has been set aside it has been principally because, unknown to the court, the claim of a third person to the debt attached has been affected. The flimsy ground of want of notice of the garnishee order nisi to the judgment-debtor cannot be a ground to set aside the order absolute where the garnishee has admitted owing the debt to the judgment debtor.
[p.478] of [1980] GLR 469
The only point of some substance is that the application to go into execution against the applicants should have been on notice to them. Counsel for the applicants has failed to satisfy me that the judgment, which has not been set aside, cannot be executed against the applicants. If it were otherwise then the failure to comply with the rules by giving notice to the applicants would have been such irregularity as to render the proceedings which resulted in the leave granted to the plaintiff to go into execution against the applicants a nullity. In my view, non-compliance with the rules of court in giving notice was a mere irregularity which did not render the proceedings invalid and that this gives the court a discretion in the matter. As far as I can see, the whole issue will boil down to the applicants making their own arrangement with the Ghana Railway Corporation to indemnify them for their share of the judgment debt. The proceedings have not worked any injustice whatsoever on the applicants and I accordingly dismiss their motion.
DECISION
Application for stay of execution and setting aside garnishee order dismissed.
S.O.K.O.
