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[1979] SLR (HC) 42High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

KINI vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 412

13 July 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 25 min read

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OSCOLAKINI v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 412 [1979] SLR (HC) 42
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193, C.A.

(2) Atunde v. Commissioner of Police (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 171.

(3) Asamoah v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Written Judgments, July-December 1958 (Criminal), p.39.

(4) Biney v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 14 April 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 70. (5) Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 40.

(6) R. v. Mensah [1960] G.L.R. 53, C.A.

(7) Commissioner of Police v. Sarpey and Nyamekye [1961] G.L.R. (Part II) 756, S.C. (8) Seedi v. Commissioner of Police (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 29.

(9) Moore v. Taye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242; affirmed (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C.

(10) Pon (Kojo) v. Atta Fua (1927) P.C. “74 -’28, 95; [1927] A.C. 693; 96 L.J.P.C. 121; 37 L.T. 706, P.C.

(11) Commissioner of Police v. Lagos (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 56.

(12) R. v. Igbinovia (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 79.

(13) Agbettoh v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 G.L.R. 413; Written Judgments, July-December 1963 (Criminal) 44, S.C.

(14) R. v. Neal [1949] 2 K.B. 590; [1949] 2 All E.R. 438; 65 T.L.R. 557; 113 J.P. 468; 93 S.J. 589; 33 Cr. App. R. 189; 48 L.G.R. 93, C.C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant against his conviction and sentence for causing damage contrary to section 172 (1) (b) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

G. K. Mensa-Etsi for the appellant.

J. O. Amui, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

The appeal in this case has already been allowed. I did this to put an end at once to the continued stay of the appellant in [p.415] of [1980] GLR 412 prison. I now proceed to give the reasons why in my opinion the appeal should be allowed.

The charge in this case is causing damage contrary to section 172 (1) (b) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and the particulars of offence supporting the charge were: “Ahojo Kini, farmer: For that you on 10 March 1978 at Yendi in the Northern Magisterial District and within the jurisdiction of this court did kill one cow valued ¢1,200 the property of one Dagbanga Kpawuli.”

Section 172 (1) (b) of the Criminal Code, 1960, the section under which the accused was charged, reads:

“172. (1) Whoever intentionally and unlawfully causes damage to any property by any means whatsoever: . . .

(b) to a value exceeding [£100 i.e. ¢200], shall be guilty of a second degree felony.”

The relevant facts led by the prosecution in support of the charge are that the complainant is a cattle owner in the village of Ngani. The appellant is a farmer in the village of Sabari. One evening after the complainant’s herd of cattle had returned from pasture, he noticed that one cow was missing when he inspected his kraal. On investigation two persons who gave evidence said they saw the appellant slashing a cow at a certain place and that when they confronted him he explained that the cow was in his farm. The complainant was then taken to the scene and he found a dead cow. He identified it as his and he reported to the police. His investigation cautioned statement and a further statement when he was charged, in both of which he denied the offence, were tendered in evidence as exhibits A and B respectively—the only two exhibits in the case. It is therefore upon these facts that the appellant was arraigned before the district court, grade II, for the offence for which he stood trial.

The appellant when called upon for his defence denied slashing and killing the cow of the complainant. He said he knew nothing about the dead cow. In the course of the prosecution’s case when the two witnesses for the prosecution gave evidence that they saw him slash and kill the cow he cross-examined them and challenged their evidence and denied killing the said cow.

In the course of the trial the district court moved to the locus in quo. At the close of the case for the defence the district magistrate adjourned the case for one week to deliver judgment. On the adjourned date, i.e. 13 April 1978, when the case was called the district magistrate recorded:

[p.416] of [1980] GLR 412

“Case is for mention and not for judgment as a sister of accused had alleged she killed the cow in question but not the brother, who is the accused in this case and I am going into it for proof of the actual cause of this offence. Case is adjourned to 18 April 1978.”

On 18 April 1978, the case was called again and the charge was read and explained to the accused in Twi and he was asked to plead to the charge. His plea of “not guilty” was recorded and the prosecution was called upon to give the facts. The prosecutor then gave the facts as the prosecution witnesses had deposed to already and thereupon the district magistrate delivered judgment. In the said judgment the trial magistrate merely indicated what the prosecution was relying upon as the facts to substantiate the charge and after that without making any finding of facts herself she noted:

“The court moved to the scene for locus in quo. The dead cow was by a farm and believe (sic) to be co-operative farm that the accused is a member and chairman. Cutlass wounds were seen on dead cow’s head, back and legs and the severe purposes (sic) marked exhibit C. Prosecution has therefore proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused. The value of the cow has been estimated to be ¢1,200.”

Without convicting the accused she then proceeded to sentence him as follows:

“I order that the accused pay half the value of cow being ¢1,200 which is ¢600 to the plaintiff’s first witness as there is a second offender who voluntarily handed over herself to the police and has been charged with the same offence and is to share the value in payment with the accused.

The accused is sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour.”

It is against this order and sentence of the district magistrate that the appellant has appealed on the following grounds:

“(1) The conviction is unreasonable having regard to the evidence.

(2) The trial magistrate did not consider the case of the defence.

(3) The trial magistrate was wrong in law in sentencing the appellant without firstly finding him guilty of the offence charged.”

The appellant was apparently most dissatisfied with the procedure at the trial. He complains that the real offender was in fact arrested by the police and as the record shows was tried and sentenced to

[p.417] of [1980] GLR 412 pay a fine. He succeeded in obtaining an affidavit from the said offender and in a motion to call fresh evidence filed the said affidavit, the relevant portions of which are:

“(10) That on Thursday, 9 March 1978 following an information that one of my grandchildren living at Damanko was sick, I went to my farm at about 6 a.m. with a cutlass to harvest some crops before leaving for Damanko.

(11) That on my arrival at the farm I saw many cows in the farm destroying my crops. One of the cows was lying apparently asleep in the farm.

(12) That out of annoyance I used the cutlass I was holding on the right hind leg of the sleeping cow. I also used the cutlass on the cow’s head and back. In all I slashed the cow four times.

(13) That I shouted as I slashed the cow. The cow rose and ran away. The others too ran away.

(14) That later I left for Damanko. But before I left and whilst waiting for a truck in front of H. E.

Lamptey’s house, I saw H. E. Lamptey and told him that I had used a cutlass on one of the cows which were destroying our farms.

(15) I spent about two weeks at Damanko before returning to Sabare through Yendi.

(16) That on my arrival at Yendi on the morning of 21 March 1978 I visited one Afu Dorfia a relative who told me that the appellant had been brought to court that morning for having slashed a cow in a farm about two weeks previously and the cow died.

(17) That on hearing this I realised that it was the cow I slashed and told Afu Dorfia that it was I who slashed the cow and not the appellant.

(18) That I followed that same morning to the court to give up myself as the person who damaged the cow but the case was adjoured to 6 April 1978, by the time I got there. I was then advised to report to the police at Yendi which I did that same day.

(19) That at the police station I was asked to make a statement which was taken down in writing and which I thumbprinted.

(20) That in that statement I mentioned H. E. Lamptey as the person I confessed to soon after I had cut the cow.

(21) That the police then asked me to go to Sabare village to invite H. E. Lamptey to the station.

[p.418] of [1980] GLR 412 (22) That on or about 27 March 1978, I accompanied H. E. Lamptey to the Yendi Police station where he made a statement in writing to the police in my presence.

(23) That I was later charged for court for causing damage to the cow.

(24) That at the court I pleaded guilty but the trial district magistrate said through an interpreter that she did not believe me and that she was going to adjourn the case for me to prove that I was the one who cut the cow.

(25) That I produced the cutlass at the adjourned date and the trial magistrate took me to her bungalow where she asked a policeman to bring out one goat for me to cut with the cutlass to prove that I was the one who cut the cow.

(26) That I told the trial magistrate that I could not cut the goat because the goat had not destroyed my property.

(27) That at that stage the trial magistrate asked whether or not I had a witness and I said Yes. She asked for his name and asked me to produce him at the next hearing date.

(28) That on the next hearing date my witness H. E. Lamptey appeared in court and the trial magistrate questioned him in English language which I do not understand.

(29) That the case was again adjourned to the next day to coincide with the appellant’s case.

(30) That on the next day which was 18 April 1978 both my case and that of the appellant were called and I was fined ¢300 and ordered to pay ¢600 being half of the cost of the cow. The appellant was also asked to pay ¢600 being the other half of the cost and in addition to serve twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour.

(31) That since I know and believe that I am solely responsible for the wounding and subsequent death of the cow I paid the whole ¢1,200 being the value of the cow.

(32) That the appellant was not even present when I cut the cow.

(33) That I attach a copy of the said proceedings in which I was involved, it is marked A.

(34) That to the best of my knowledge and belief there was only one cow involved and that was the cow I damaged with a cutlass.”

[p.419] of [1980] GLR 412

The prosecution did not challenge this affidavit which in my view reveals that in order to consider and adjudicate on the case for the appellant, the district magistrate has had to have recourse to holding inquiries in her bungalow, for what lawful purpose it is difficult to conjecture since the only outstanding matter left in the case was for her to deliver her judgment. This conduct of the district magistrate would seem to indicate that without further extraneous material she was in no position to adjudicate on the guilt of the appellant. In other words she had doubts and such doubts where, as in this case, they appeared to be reasonable ought to have been resolved in the favour of the appellant. Thus in a jury trial in Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193 at p. 198, C.A., Anin J.A. stated the law which is equally applicable to summary trials:

“where the prosecution has adduced prima facie evidence which, if unanswered, would raise a presumption that might justify . . . a verdict of guilty and the accused has called evidence to rebut that presumption, the judge must direct that . . . if his explanation falls short of acceptance but nevertheless creates a doubt, they must acquit. . . .”

In this case by her subsequent conduct, the district magistrate had doubts which she should resolve in favour of the appellant. These doubts were not resolved and therefore the apparent conviction cannot be sustained.

This case however has a number of unsatisfactory features. In a case so hotly contested where the appellant denies slashing the cow and witnesses assert that he did slash the cow, reasons become very necessary for a decision and therefore it was mandatory that the district magistrate should give reasons for accepting the case of the prosecution and rejecting the case for the defence. She did not do so and in my view her failure is a contravention of the provisions of section 177 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), which provides:

“177. (1) The Court, having heard what each party has to say and the witnesses and evidence so adduced, shall consider and determine the whole matter and may either convict the accused and pass sentence upon or make an order against him according to law or acquit him, as the case may be, and the Court shall give its decision in the form of an oral judgment, and shall record the decision briefly together with the reasons for it where necessary.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

[p.420] of [1980] GLR 412

In Atunde v. Commissioner of Police (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 171 at p. 173 de Comarmond Ag. C. J. commenting on the corresponding provision of section 245 of the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 43) said: “It is certainly desirable that reasons be given except where the reason for a decision is quite obvious.” This passage was quoted with approval by van Lare J.A. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Asamoah v. Commissioner of Police, Written Judgments July-December 1958 (Criminal), 39 at p. 41 where he said:

“In our view reasons for a decision are necessary where there is a conviction unless the reason is so clearly obvious and beyond doubt that guilt can be inferred from the facts and the circumstances of the case. If however in any case the reason for a decision is not so obvious to an appellate court then the trial court has erred in not recording his reason. We should remember that what may appear obvious to a Magistrate or a Judge may not appear to be so to the public. Nobody likes a decision against him, more especially in a criminal matter, if it is given summarily without reason.”

As the reason for apparently rejecting the defence’s and accepting the prosecution’s case is not obvious, it seems to me that the district magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant. For this reason I do not think her order can be sustained.

Counsel for the appellant indicated that the district magistrate did not specifically convict the appellant but that she merely proceeded to sentence the appellant and that for this reason the sentence cannot be sustained. He quoted the decision of Azu Crabbe J.A., as he then was, in Biney v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, Accra, delivered 14 April 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 70. In that case the appellant whose appeal had been dismissed by the High Court, Kumasi, was charged before the District Court, Bekwai, on two counts of pretending to be a police officer. The proceeding before the District Court, Bekwai, was very brief indeed and it is as follows:

“Charge read and explained.

Plea: Guilty. On 8 October 1966 the accused described himself as a mass education officer and also a Ghana National Trading Corporation wholesale keeper and collected various sums of money from the complainants promising to give them cement and provisions respectively. The accused bolted away. The

[p.421] of [1980] GLR 412 accused admits two previous convictions for similar offence. Sentence: two years imprisonment with hard labour.

(Sgd.) O. K. Ofori.

District Magistrate 13 December 1966.”

Upon these facts Azu Crabbe J.S.C. reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the appellant pleaded guilty to only one of the charges and it was not clear from the record which of the two charges he pleaded to. Furthermore, the district court passed a sentence on only one of the charges and it is not clear on which one the sentence was passed and finally the trial magistrate did not convict the appellant and for these reasons the appeal against conviction was allowed. The submission of counsel for the appellant is that as the district magistrate did not also specifically record a conviction but merely set out to pass sentence, the Biney case is also authority for me to quash the sentence.

If the Biney case is restricted to the particular facts of the case, taking into consideration in particular the facts that there were two charges and the holding of the district court that only one of the charges was read, then I think its ratio decidendi is unexceptionable. If however, as is urged before me in this appeal, it is also supposed to support a proposition simpliciter that failure to record a conviction means an appellant must necessarily be acquitted, then it seems to me that it may very well be in conflict with statutory provisions and some decided authorities and must be regarded as having been decided per incuriam.

I think the matter deserves some detailed consideration. One of the earliest cases said to be authority for the proposition is Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 40. In that case one of the appellants, Kwao Boadu, appealed against a decision of the Acting District Magistrate, Accra. He had been sentenced without a finding having been made against him. He appealed on grounds firstly, that the order was unreasonable having regard to the evidence and secondly, that his identification was unsatisfactory. The appellant was identified at an identification parade as a participant in the crime, by one Amaning and Donkor and in evidence by three persons: Obiri, Djamasi and Moses.

The appellant put forward what was described as a strong defence of alibi, etc. In a situation like that I would have thought it was necessary for the trial magistrate to review the case put forward by the prosecution as well as that put forward by the appellant and

[p.422] of [1980] GLR 412 give reasons and make findings against him, convicting him. This was apparently not done and he merely proceeded to sentence him. In view of the circumstance the West African court of Appeal in setting aside the sentence said at p.43:

“The decision is an ingredient of a conviction and we would say it is the main ingredient, for without a decision . . . we do not see how there can be either a judgment or a sentence.

We hold therefore that a failure to convict is not a mere irregularity but the omission of a vital part of a trial and that in its absence a sentence cannot lawfully be recorded or carried out.”

Clearly in a case where evidence has been led and the appellant has challenged it, he cannot be sentenced without a definite adverse finding being made against him, particularly in a case of such complexity involving 51 accused persons.

Republic v. Mensah [1960] G.L.R. 53, C.A. was also a case in which the appellant and others were tried before a Commissioner of Assize and Civil Pleas with the aid of assessors. The charges against the appellant were two, namely, house-breaking in count (3) and stealing laid in count (4). He was discharged on the house-breaking count by Mr. Commissioner Christian. There were in all about six accused persons and about six counts, four of which, namely courts(1), (2) (5) and (6) involved the other five accused persons. The assessors expressed an opinion that the appellant was not guilty of the crime of stealing but two were of opinion that he was guilty of receiving.

Without making a finding, as he was obliged to make as to whether the appellant was guilty of stealing or receiving, the Commissioner for Assize and Civil Pleas sentenced him simply to twelve month’s imprisonment with hard labour. Sarkodee-Addo J., as he then was, reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal, coram: van Lare J.A. presiding, Granville Sharp J.A. and Sarkodee-Adoo J. held following Marteifio’s case (supra) that the sentence must be set aside as the appellant had not been shown to have been convicted of any crime. In the course of the judgment he said at p. 55:

“In our view, faced with the conflicting opinions of the assessors, it was not only highly desirable, but also legally incumbent upon the learned Commissioner, to record conviction in respect of a stated offence before passing sentence on this appellant. This he did not do . . .”

Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (supra) was also followed by the erstwhile Supreme Court, Coram: Sarkodee-Adoo, Adumua-Bossman and Azu Crabbe JJ. S. C. in Commissioner of Police v. Sarpey

[p.423] of [1980] GLR 412 and Nyamekye [1961] G.L.R. (Part II) 756 at p. 759. In both R. v. Mensah (supra) and the said Sarpey case (supra) the court accepted the case of Seedi v. Commissioner of Police (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 29 as authoritative but distinguishable. In Seedi v. Commissioner of Police (supra) a magistrate passed sentence on the appellant without first convicting him or entering on the record a finding of guilt against him. On first appeal to the first appellate court, the appellate judge held as quoted at pp. 29 – 30:

“It is true that the Magistrate omitted to write the words ‘Found Guilty’ or ‘Guilty,’ but I hold that the fact of sentencing the appellant clearly shows that the Magistrate found the appellant guilty of the only charge upon which he was tried. If there had been two or more charges, it could have been contended that the sentence was ambiguous . . .

The omission to write the words ‘Found Guilty’ or ‘Guilty’ can be nothing else than a mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record. I therefore order that the words ‘Found Guilty’ be entered on the record.”

In dismissing a further appeal from this judgment to the West African Court of Appeal, Baker Ag. C.J. delivering the judgment of the court referred to the cases of Moore v. Taye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242 and Kojo Pon v. Atta Fua [1927] A.C. 693, P.C. and cited with approval the decision of Commissioner of Police v. Lagos (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 56, where the West African Court of Appeal had held that errors of the nature under consideration are oversights rectifiable by the appellate court, and said at p. 30:

“It is well established that this Court is bound by the record of the case and in this appeal we have a record of a trial Magistrate, which does not impose a finding but imposes a sentence.

There was only one charge and the Magistrate passed a sentence quite consistent with a finding of guilt under the said charge yet we are now asked in the absence of a finding to quash conviction. It may well be that in certain cases there may be a defect or an omission to which an objection might be raised which goes to the jurisdiction which would be fatal to the conviction—see Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Taye.

In our present case, however, the omission is one of procedure and might be described as a mere technicality and which in our opinion cannot be considered as fatal and is within the power and duty of the Court to remedy so that substantial justice may be done—see Kojo Pon v. Atta Fua.

[p.424] of [1980] GLR 412

This Court, in a case where there had been an omission by the trial Judge, Commissioner of Police v. Samuel Lagos, gave the following decision:

‘The only error in this case in the Supreme Court is that the learned Judge omitted, obviously by an oversight, formally to order that the findings and sentence be reversed before ordering the retrial. We accordingly substitute for the order made by the learned Judge in the Supreme Court, the following order: “It is ordered that the finding and sentence be reversed and the appellant be retried on the new charge by another Magistrate’.”

It is abundantly clear and obvious to us, as it must be to everyone that the Magistrate having imposed a sentence he did in fact find the appellant guilty and it is quite within the bounds of possibility when delivering his judgment he actually said so.

In a case where there is such an omission as this one, which was undoubtedly an oversight, to consider it fatal we are of opinion would be straining the law of procedure to such an extent that it would amount to a miscarriage of justice and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.”

It is interesting to note that Azu Crabbe J.A., as he then was, who delivered judgment in the Biney case was a member of the panel in the Sarpey case (supra). Reading the judgment of the court in the said Sarpey case (supra) Sarkodee-Adoo J.S.C. with whose opinion Azu Crabbe J.S.C., as he then was, must have concurred said at pp. 759 – 760, S.C. after he had considered the case of Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (supra):

“In Seedi v. Commissioner of Police there was only one charge before the trial magistrate and sentence was passed quite consistent with a finding of guilt under the said charge but a sentence was passed on the appellant without entering on the record a finding of guilty against him. The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court on the ground that ‘there was a material irregularity in the proceedings’. The appellate judge said that: ‘The omission to write the words “Found Guilty” or “Guilty” can be nothing else than a mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record. I therefore order that the words “Found Guilty” be entered on the record’.

Upon further appeal on the same ground to the West African Court of Appeal that court held: ‘That the omission

[p.425] of [1980] GLR 412 was a mere technicality and the Court [meaning the Divisional Court] could remedy it so that substantial justice might be done’.

In our view these two cases are distinguishable upon the facts as well as upon principle.”

In Biney v. The Republic (supra) which has been pressed on me, Azu Crabbe J.A., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the court coram: Ollennu, Azu Crabbe, Lassey JJ.A. said:

“In the Seedi case the court was not referred to the case of Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio which had decided only three years earlier that a failure to convict is not a mere technicality, but a fundamental error and that a sentence recorded without it is unlawful. In our view the Seedi case runs counter to the stream of modern authorities, and we conclude that that case was decided per incuriam.”

I must say that I find this conclusion of the Court of Appeal difficult to understand. In R. v. Mensah [1960] G.L.R. 53 the Court of Appeal considered the case of Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio and Commissioner of Police v. Seedi (supra). It found both cases to be authoritative although distinguishable. It did this after examining the two cases very carefully. A year later the erstwhile Supreme Court rather differently but strongly constituted also subjected the two cases to close scrutiny and came to the unanimous conclusion that they were authoritative and distinguishable. It is now said that Seedi (supra) seems counter to modern authorities and the modern authorities which destroy Seedi were neither mentioned nor discussed. Apart from the Biney case (supra) which repudiates Seedi I have not read a single other case old or modern which cast any doubt on the soundness of the ratio decidendi of Seedi. Leaving aside the fact that Azu Crabbe J.A., as he then was, who gave a decision in one of the cases which accepted the authority of Seedi is the leading exponent of its repudiation, I think the position in the circumstances is that two cases of our Court of Appeal support with reasons the ratio decidendi of Seedi and one case of our Court of Appeal rejects it on grounds that in deciding the Seedi case, the court omitted to consider a relevant case but this so-called relevant case was also considered by the court in the two cases in which it did not impugn the authority of the said Seedi case.

If the Biney case in the form in which it has been urged on me supports the proposition that the Seedi case is no longer good law and that mere failure to write “Found guilty” or “Guilty” or “Convicted” must in all cases mean that a sentence must be set aside and [p.426] of [1980] GLR 412 an appellant acquitted, then as I have already indicated, it is clearly in conflict with the view of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Mensah (supra) and the Sarpey case (supra) and I prefer to follow the reasoning of the court in the said Mensah and Sarpey cases which are two cases considered in the Biney case but never condemned.

I think the ratio decidendi in the Biney case, as I have stated it, if that is what it is, then it is very disturbing indeed. In a criminal trial on indictment it is provided in section 239 (1) of Act 30 that: “A plea of guilty, when recorded, shall constitute a conviction.” A trial on indictment is a most serious procedure than a summary trial: see the opinion of Kingdon C.J. in R. v. Igbinovia (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 79. If the ratio of Biney is correct then in a summary trial, if a person pleads guilty and the magistrate records it but fails to record further “convicted”, but proceeds to sentence him, then the accused on appeal must have his sentence set aside, but if the trial is on indictment then in view of section 239 (1), the sentence cannot be set aside and the apparent conviction will be confirmed. If Seedi is right, the apparent conviction in both cases will be sound and there will be harmony in the application of legal criteria in the administration of justice. I think this is a good enough reason satisfying the demands of justice that Seedi is good law and Biney is bad law.

In the Seedi case it will be recalled that Baker Ag. C.J. described the omission of the trial magistrate to record a finding of guilt a “technicality.” It follows that the omission to record a conviction in a case where a person pleads “guilty” is also a technicality. The law on the matter was put on a statutory footing on 9 February 1965 when the proviso to section 330 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), was amended by section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261). That proviso indicated the new conditions under which the High Court as an appellate court is empowered to dismiss appeals. The new proviso states:

“Provided that the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing provisions, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred or that the point raised in the appeal consists of a technicality or procedural error or of a defect in the charge but that there is evidence to support the offence alleged in the statement of offence in the charge or any other offence of which the accused could have been convicted upon that charge.”

Although this provision was not operative when the Seedi, Mensah, Sarpey and Marteifio cases were decided the provision was

[p.427] of [1980] GLR 412 the operative law on the date when the Biney case was decided and Biney was singularly silent as to the applicability of the provision. Biney did not show in what respect such a technicality as the omission complained of could have occasioned a miscarriage of justice in the Seedi case.

In his effort to find out what constitute a miscarriage of justice, Blay J.S.C., reading the judgment of the erstwhile Supreme Court in Agbettoh v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 G.L.R. 413 at p. 415, S.C., at which Azu Crabbe J.S.C., as he then was, presided, quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Neal (1949) 33 Cr. App. R. 189 at p. 192, C.C.A. “Now there is no doubt that to deprive an accused person of the protection given by essential steps in criminal procedure amounts to a miscarriage of justice.” What one may ask is the essential steps in the proceedings which an appellant would be deprived of in a case in which he pleaded guilty to a charge and the court omits to record a conviction, but has sentenced him? I am unable to offer an answer favourable to an appellant in the circumstance and I think therefore that the Seedi case is right. I do not therefore accept the submission of counsel that failure to record a conviction as was done in this case is necessarily fatal. It is rather for the other reasons I have already endeavoured to state in this judgment, that I allowed the appeal in this case. The appellant was sentenced to pay ¢600 to the complainant and was also further sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour.

However, since the appeal has been allowed, the apparent conviction was also quashed and the sentences and order set aside. It is for these reasons that I acquitted and discharged the appellant. DECISION Appeal allowed.

Conviction and sentence set aside.

D. R. K. S.

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