KWETEY vs. BOTCHWAY AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 722
25 October 1979 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 27 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 45Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Sasu v. Nyadualah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 221, C.A.
(2) Besseler Waechter Glover & Co. v. South Derwent Coal Co., Ltd. [1938] 1 K.B. 408; [1937] 4 All E.R. 552; 107 L.J.K.B. 365; 158 L.T. 12; 54 T.L.R. 140; 43 Com.Cas. 86.
(3) Levey & Co. v. Goldberg [1922] 1 K.B. 688; 91 L.J.K.B. 551;127 L.T. 298; 38 T.L.R. 446.
(4) Rickards (Charles) Ltd. v. Oppenheim [1950] 1 K.B. 616; [1950] 1 All E.R. 420; 209 L.T.J. 111;
66 Pt. 1 T.L.R. 435; 94 S.J. 161, C.A.
(5) Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341; 23 L.J. Ex. 179; 18 Jur. 358; 2 W.R. 302; 2 C.L.R. 517. (6) Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. [1969] 1 A.C. 350; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1491; 111 S.J. 848, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
COUNTERCLAIM for an order for the recovery of possession of a fishing vessel. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Oppong for the plaintiff.
Kudjawu for the first defendant.
Dr. A. K. Fiadjoe for the second defendant-counterclaimant.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
This is a counterclaim filed at the instance of the second defendant, Cecilia Kwetey. She claims as follows:
“(i) A declaration of title to fishing boat No. T.F. 298.
(ii) An order for the recovery of possession of the said boat.
(iii) An order for perpetual injunction against the plaintiff and the first defendants, their servants or agents from interfering with the said boat in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff’s title.
(iv) An order for specific performance and/or damages for breach of contract of sale against the first defendants.
[p.725] of [1980] GLR 722
(v) Damages for the wrongful detention of the said boat against the first defendants.
(vi) Damages for loss of use of the said fishing boat.”
Some salient points in the facts of this case are buried in the records of the first defendants, the Agricultural Development Bank, and in the secret corners of the minds of the officials of the bank. Some documents which would have shed light on the case were not tendered, and top officials of the bank called at the instance of Kwetey and who could have given some information about this transaction were evasive and tried to be as non-committal as they could be in the delivery of their evidence. It was obvious that they deliberately withheld as much information as they could. Nor were they forthright in the little they were prepared to divulge. The circumstances whereby the second defendant secured the alleged sale of the boat T.F. 298 to herself are curious, and the reticence of the bank officials who actively aided her to secure the contract should excite anybody’s curiosity. The bank did not call any evidence. The managing director and the operations manager of the bank were both called at the instance of Kwetey. The facts culminating in this case so far as I can gather from the evidence and undisputed parts of the pleadings are these: By a hire-purchase agreement dated 30 June 1966, the plaintiff in the original suit, Otema Botchway, hired the vessel, which was registered as No. T.F. 298, from the Boatyard Division of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. After some time the engine broke down, and she took a loan from the Agricultural Development Bank, the first defendants, for the purchase of a new engine. The terms of that loan transaction could not be gleaned from the evidence because the borrower, Otema Botchway, an elderly woman of 65, and who is illiterate, could not remember all the terms but she did remember that she secured the loan with her house; the managing director of the Agricultural Development Bank who was subpoenaed by the second defendant was just evasive. In a case in which he had been subpoenaed and asked to produce the mortgage deed on the vessel, he said that he did not remember anything “off-hand.” Dr. Agyekumhene, who was in charge of the operations department which dealt with matters of this kind deposed that his knowledge of the vessel T.F. 298 “centres only around the rehabilitation exercise.” The engine which the plaintiff purchased was second-hand, and it broke down in no time. It would appear that the Agricultural Development Bank had financed similar projects which had broken down so the bank embarked upon a general rehabilitation exercise to render seaworthy all such boats. T.F. 298 had the benefit of this
[p.726] of [1980] GLR 722 exercise. The policy of the bank was to rehabilitate the vessels and let the owners pay the expenses, but failing which it was to sell to the highest bidder to recover its expenses.
The second defendant, Cecilia Kwetey, heard of this exercise on 28 November 1977; she said one Bamford told her that the Agricultural Development Bank was rehabilitating a number of boats for sale. She went to inspect the boats at Tema fishing harbour and then applied in writing to the bank on the same day to buy one. She tendered her application personally to the managing director, Mr. Ben Selormey. Hitherto, Mr. Selormey had been approached by one Mr. Nartey, Cecilia Kwetey’s uncle, who informed him that his niece was interested in the rehabilitated boats. With that introduction, Cecilia Kwetey received a favourable response when she went to see the managing director. He directed her to Dr. Agyekumhene at the operations department, who assisted her to comply with the formalities.
The application letter which was tendered as exhibit 1 was dated 28 November 1977. According to the operations department stamp impressed upon it, it was received at that department on 5 December 1977. It would seem therefore that Mr. Selormey’s evidence that Mr. Nartey contacted him in February 1978, and that subsequently, Cecilia Kwetey came to see him could not be correct. The contact must have been made earlier than 5 December 1977.
On 9 February 1978, the bank wrote to Otema Botchway offering her the first refusal of the rehabilitated boat and demanding a payment of ¢149,775.01, which was the balance unpaid and outstanding on the boat. It would appear that the letter never reached Otema until a copy was given to her solicitor on 23 March 1978. A copy of this letter was tendered as exhibit 2. The letter gave Otema up to 28 February to settle her indebtedness with the bank. The relevant part of the letter reads:
“It is, however, a firm decision that whoever will buy the boat shall be called upon to pay the total amount in full before the boat is released to him.
We are therefore pleased to inform you that you have up to 28 February 1978 to accept the offer and settle the total amount of ¢149,775.01 if you are still interested to take back the boat. The offer is made to you as the original owner of the boat and the bank will NOT CONSIDER any proposal from you to transfer the boat to any other person. If you are not able to pay or make any acceptable arrangement to settle the full amount of ¢149,775.01 by the deadline stated above, the bank reserves the right to advise itself on what to do with the boat without
[p.727] of [1980] GLR 722 any further communication with you. But it must be borne in mind also that you shall remain liable for any loan arrears which may be recovered from the sale.”
This letter was signed by Dr. Agyekumhene. The deadline given in the letter expired on 28 February 1978.
What has puzzled me throughout this case is why the bank assumed the right to sell the boat. In their evidence, neither the managing director nor the operations manager did give the impression that the bank had the right to sell, neither of them knew the details of the original transaction concerning the sale of the boat between Otema and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, nor did they have any idea of the loan transaction whereby the bank advanced money to rehabilitate the boat. These two men are top officials of the bank, if anybody should have access to documents about these matters, then I think it should be these two. They were subpoenaed to come to court and testify about this transaction; they were particularly asked to produce the mortgage deed between Otema and the bank, yet they came to court and feigned ignorance of the whole transaction. The clear impression I had of these two men, especially Mr. Ben Selormey, was that they were not candid with the court. The only unchallenged evidence was that Otema borrowed money to buy an engine for the boat, but she secured the loan with her house. Therefore the bank could not have had the power to sell the boat. The fact that Otema did not challenge the letter exhibit 2 addressed to her by the bank did not confer power on the bank to sell the boat. However, on 21 March 1978, Dr. Agyekumhene addressed another letter to the second defendant, Cecilia Kwetey. The letter reads:
“Agricultural Development Bank, P. O. Box 4191, Accra.
21st March, 1978.
Madam Cecilia Kwetey, P.O. Box 256, Tema.
Dear Madam, SALE OF FISHING BOAT REG. NO. T.F. 298 We refer to your letter dated 28 November 1977 expressing the desire to buy one of the fishing boats our bank was rehabilitating and advise you with pleasure that the 40-footer boat Reg.
[p.728] of [1980] GLR 722 No. T.F. 298 has been approved for sale to you at ¢150,000.00 (One hundred and fifty thousand cedis only).
Please note that the boat is without nets.
You will be required to pay the total amount in full within fourteen days from the date of this letter or lose the boat to another applicant.
We hope to hear from you without delay.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Dr. J. K. Agyekumhene.
Ag. Chief Manager Operations. cc: The Manager, Ghana Commercial Bank, Derby Avenue Branch, Accra.
The Managing Director, Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra.”
The letter is self-explanatory. The second defendant was given fourteen days from the date of the letter to pay up or lose it to another customer. There is no evidence as to when she received this letter, but the inherence I draw from the evidence and from the way business had been conducted between the bank and Kwetey is that the letter was handed personally to her.
On 23 March 1978, the Solicitor for Otema went to see Dr. Agyekumhene about Otema’s indebtedness to the bank. It was at the meeting that he learned for the first time that a letter—exhibit 2, had been sent to Otema. The solicitor told the bank that his client had not received the letter, so Dr. Agyekumhene kindly supplied him with a copy. The solicitor pleaded that his client be given time to comply with the terms of the letter. Dr. Agyekumhene said the bank had already committed itself in respect of that boat so the plaintiff should wait until 4 April 1978, when the deadline given to Kwetey would expire.
It would seem that Cecilia Kwetey when she received the offer contained in exhibit A went and slept on her oars. On the deadline, i.e. by 4 April 1978, nothing had been heard of her, so the bank accepted payment of ¢60,500 from Otema towards her indebtedness. Then on 19 April 1978 the bank again accepted a payment of ¢150,000 being the full purchase price of the same boat from Kwetey. Kwetey’s evidence as to the mode of payment is conflicting. She said she gave two cheques to Mr. Ben Selormey personally.
[p.729] of [1980] GLR 722
She supported her evidence of the payment with a pay-in-slip which shows a payment of ¢150,000 to Agricultural Development Bank, Tema Branch, on 19 April 1978. Mr. Selormey denied that the payment was made through him. He even denied he had any knowledge about the payment. Kwetey lives at Tema, but she brought the cheques all the way to the managing director in Accra. She explained that she preferred to deal directly with top men because she got tossed about if she passed through the normal channels and the evidence shows that she was actively encouraged by the top men at the bank to by-pass the regular channels for such applications. What has puzzled me is why she received such an encouragement in pushing through her application and yet in these proceedings, when she subpoenaed the managing director to give evidence of his support, she was met with such cold shoulders. Anyone who is conversant with the routine at our banks and especially with an application like the one we are dealing with, will come to the conclusion on looking at Kwetey’s application that some powerful hand must have given it a big push. One does not have to wander far when it is considered that the managing director himself said he had been approached by Kwetey’s uncle in respect of this application. All indications point in the direction that Kwetey’s application was influenced by some contact. On the same day that she presented these cheques at the head office, an acknowledgement letter was given to her with a copy to the Tema branch. On the same day, the cheques were paid into the sundry creditors account of the bank at Tema. Since Kwetey’s counterclaim turns on this letter, it will be necessary to quote the letter here. It was marked exhibit C. It reads:
“Agricultural Development, Bank, P.O. Box 4191, Accra.
Ghana.
19th April, 1978.
Madam Cecilia Kwetey, P.O. Box 256, Accra.
Dear Madam:
PAYMENT FOR BOAT REG. NO. T.F. 298 We acknowledge with thanks receipt of two Ghana Commercial Bank cheque Nos. DV D2/032953 and 032861 for
[p.730] of [1980] GLR 722
¢50,000 and ¢100,000 respectively in payment for the fishing boat Reg. No. T.F. 298 which our bank has sold to you.
The two cheques totalling ¢150,000 (One hundred and fifty thousand cedis) are being paid into the special rehabilitation account at our Tema branch where official receipt pay-in-slip will be prepared for you.
By a copy of this letter the Tema branch is being requested to arrange for the release of the boat to you.
We wish you good luck and success in operating the boat.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) A. K. Foliba. for: Chief Manager Operations. cc: The Manager, Agric. Development Bank, Tema.”
The letter confirms Kwetey’s evidence that the payment was made at the head office Accra. This letter was signed by A. K. Foliba for Chief Manager of Operations, even though the offer made to her on 21 March 1978 was signed by Dr. J. K. Agyekumhene, the Chief Manager of Operations. It is worthy to note that the payment was made by cheques; on the same day that they were paid in, without waiting for them to be cleared, the payment was acknowledged by the bank. And on that very same day the bank’s Tema branch was asked to release the boat to her. The way Kwetey’s matter was handled goes against the pattern of a normal banking transaction as we know it in this country.
When the plaintiff Otema had wind of the feverish attempt being made by Kwetey to appropriate the boat, she took this action. The payment and acknowledgement were on 19 April 1978, and the plaintiff instituted her action on 25 April 1978. Otema took the action against the bank, Cecilia Kwetey and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, Boatyard Division, asking the court to declare the sale null and void, to set it aside, and to put her in possession; she also asked for general damages. Kwetey counterclaimed for the reliefs referred to earlier in this judgment.
Consequent upon an ex parte application filed on behalf of Otema on 4 May 1978, this court, presided over by Agyepong J., made an interim order restraining the Agricultural Development Bank and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation from transferring ownership and possession of the boat to Kwetey. Then on 4 July upon another application made on behalf of Kwetey to Agyepong J. the officer in charge of Ghana Navy, Tema, was appointed receiver
[p.731] of [1980] GLR 722 and manager of the boat and the parties were restrained in the interim from having any dealing with the boat. The application was made ex parte. This order was vacated on 25 July 1978 and the court ordered the boat to be released to the plaintiff Otema. In an affidavit sworn to by Otema and filed on 11 July 1978 in support of the motion to set aside the order for appointment of receiver and manager, Otema deposed that the bank had released the boat to her. In fact, throughout the proceedings, the bank never asserted that it had any right to sell the boat. It more or less by implication and conduct submitted to the plaintiff’s claim. On receipt of the boat, the plaintiff, Otema, discontinued her claim against the defendants. The second defendant Cecilia Kwetey persisted in her counterclaim, and this is the judgment on her claim.
The defence filed by the plaintiff to the counterclaim was to the effect that the bank had no right to sell the boat. She contended that since the bank advanced money to buy only the engine and repair the same, its right against her is in personam and not in rem. It was also contended that if the plaintiff gave the bank permission to sell the boat, that offer lapsed when the plaintiff made a part-payment of the amount outstanding against her account and the bank accepted same. Therefore the bank had nothing to sell, and Kwetey acquired no right under the purported contract which she can enforce.
It was pleaded on behalf of the bank that the officer who wrote exhibit A, the acknowledgement acceptance letter by the bank, sent that letter by error, and the official who purported to sell the boat had no authority to do so, so his acts were ultra vires his powers. The evidence led on behalf of the bank did not support this contention, and that line of defence was quietly jettisoned. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that the bank actively assisted and encouraged Kwetey in her bid and desire to purchase the boat. The offer made to her to purchase the boat (T.F. 298) was communicated by no less a person than Dr. Agyekumhene, the then acting Chief Manager of Operations. The receipt of the payment was made on his behalf by Mr. Foliba, whom Dr. Agyekumhene said was in a position to commit the bank. Even though Dr. Agyekumhene said he did not instruct Mr. Foliba to write exhibit C, the letter was not seriously denied by the bank. Dr. Agyekumhene in answer to a question by the court said he saw the letter for the first time in court. But no evidence was led in denial of that letter. I do not believe that the bank was unaware of the existence of exhibit C. While this matter was pending at this court, counsel for Kwetey held discussions with the managing director with a view to settling records in each others possession. To confirm and put the discussions on record, Kwetey’s solicitors wrote to the managing director. A copy of this letter was
[p.732] of [1980] GLR 722 admitted by consent into evidence and marked exhibit D. In exhibit D, a mention was made of the acknowledgement receipt of the payment of ¢150,000 by Kwetey. It could therefore not be correct from Mr. Selormey and Dr. Agyekumhene to swear before this court and testify that they did not know about the payment. On these facts the issues settled for trial were:
(1) whether the Agricultural Development Bank sold the boat to Kwetey on 21 March 1978;
(2) whether the Agricultural Development Bank had authority from Otema to sell the boat;
(3) whether the Agricultural Development Bank had breached the contract of sale by non-delivery; and
(4) finally whether Kwetey is entitled to her reliefs.
The Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), s. 1 (1) defines a contract for the sale of goods as a “………. contract whereby the seller agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price ….” Therefore an agreement to sell will constitute a valid contract of sale. By its letter dated 21 March 1978, the bank agreed to sell the vessel to Kwetey on condition. The letter is quoted above. The letters exhibits 1, A and C and the payment would seem to constitute a contract for the purchase of the boat T.F. 298. These letters contained the requisites of a valid contract, i.e. offer, acceptance and consideration. There was a full payment so when the bank did not deliver it would seem that it had breached the agreement. However, when the facts are examined closely, it is apparent that the bank did not have the right to sell.
With regards to the bank’s right to sell the boat, the full facts of the transaction between the bank and Otema have not been put before the court. As I said, the conduct of the witnesses from the bank have been evasive. The exact nature of the contractual or legal relations between the bank and Otema is not fully revealed by the evidence in this case. But the inference I draw from the evidence is that the bank advanced money only for the engine and its subsequent rehabilitation. There is no indication that the boat was mortgaged to the bank. On the contrary, the plaintiff, Otema, deposed that she mortgaged her house to secure the loan granted her by the bank. Therefore, the bank could not purport to exercise any right under a mortgage when it offered to sell the boat to Kwetey. Kwetey contended that Otema requested the bank to sell the boat, so the sale was not without authority . This was denied by Otema in her evidence. But from her pleadings, I believe that such a request must have been made but whether the bank accepted the request is not discernible from the evidence. The bank denied this and refused to tender the letter in which Otema made the request. Otema also
[p.733] of [1980] GLR 722 denied this, but paragraph (7) of her statement of defence to the counterclaim betrays her denial. Paragraph (7) reads:
“(7) The plaintiff will contend that by their conduct the first defendants had abandoned the plaintiff’s request that they should sell the boat after rehabilitating same, and they had made a new offer which the plaintiff accepted by making the part-payment thereof.”
I believe that this request must have been made but it will only be relevant if it were known when it was made. If it preceded the bank’s letter—exhibit 2 giving her the first option to pay for the repairs and take possession or lose it to the bank to deal with it without further notice to her—if Otema made her request before they wrote exhibit 2—then, of course, that offer lapsed. But if it were made after the bank had given her the option to pay, then the request by the plaintiff would have given the bank authority to sell the boat, if the bank accepted the request. However, from the reaction of the parties subsequent to exhibit 2 dated 8 February 1978, and received by counsel for Otema on 23 March 1978, no request could have been made after this letter; it could only have been made prior to exhibit 2 and if Otema gave the bank any right of sale, that right was waived when the bank made a new offer which Otema accepted and made part-payment. It follows that the bank could have had no right to sell the boat. No evidence has been led to show that the bank acquired a right in rem which it could exercise against the boat.
The principle which was applied in Sasu v. Nyadualah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 221, C.A. is applicable to the present situation. The evidence supports a simple creditor-debtor relationship between Otema and the bank and the latter acquired no right in rem which it could exercise by sale of the boat; it acquired a right in personam against Otema for the repayment of the loan. But if it were correct that Otema mortgaged her house to secure the repair charges, then the bank could exercise any of the rights conferred by section 15 of the Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 96). But no right in rem has been established in respect of the boat.
The question then is what rights and obligations did Kwetey and the bank incur vis-a-vis each other, and what rights have been acquired by Kwetey in respect of the boat? With regards to the boat, the principle to apply is nemo dat quod non habet, so Kwetey acquired no right whatsoever over the boat. She has established no title to it which the court can decree in her favour. Consequently, no order for recovery of possession will be made in her favour, because she has no right to possession. No injunction will be imposed on Otema in respect of her dealings with the boat T.F. 298. The claim against
[p.734] of [1980] GLR 722 Otema Botchway is therefore dismissed. The claim against the Agricultural Development Bank in respect of reliefs asked under claims (i), (ii) and (iii) are also dismissed.
I revert to the question, what is the legal relationship between the bank and Kwetey? It was Dr. Akyekumhene’s evidence that Kwetey did not pay the contract price within the stipulated time so the bank was at liberty to regard itself as discharged from its obligation to sell the boat to her. He said the offer the bank made to her lapsed. It is my view that the bank’s offer to sell the boat, communicated to Kwetey by exhibit A, and Kwetey’s acceptance and payment of the purchase price constituted a binding contract of sale. When Kwetey breached the condition to pay within a stipulated time, the bank was at liberty to treat that breach as a repudiation of the contract by her and refuse to sell the boat (even if it had any boat to sell) to her. However, when in spite of the lateness in paying the purchase price, the bank accepted the payment and directed their branch to release the boat to her, the bank must be deemed to have waived its right to insist that the contract be performed according to its original tenor. The bank merely forebore to insist on acceptance according to strict terms so the original contract remained unaffected. The bank’s contention that Kwetey did not pay the purchase price within the stipulated time and therefore the bank’s offer to sell to her lapsed cannot hold. In Besseler Waechter Glover & Co. v. South Derwent Coal Co., Ltd. [1938] 1 K.B. 408 at pp. 416-417, Goddard J. (as he then was) said of such relationship:
“But if what happens is a mere voluntary forebearance to insist on delivery or acceptance according to the strict terms of the written contract, the original contract remains unaffected, and the obligation to deliver and to accept the full contract quantity still continues. . .
It does not appear to me to matter whether the request comes from one side or the other, or whether it is a matter which is convenient to one party or to both. What is of importance is whether it is a mere forbearance or a matter of contract.”
My view of this present matter is that the bank forbore to insist on payment within the stipulated time, and their acceptance of the money and direction to release the boat to her is a conduct from which it may clearly be inferred that it waived its right to insist on payment within the terms of the contract. And having led Kwetey to believe that it had accepted the payment, the bank cannot now be heard to set up her lateness as basis for its non-delivery of the boat. Having accepted payment, the bank was obliged to deliver what it had contracted to sell; therefore its non-delivery constituted
[p.735] of [1980] GLR 722 a breach of the contract. In Levey & Co. v. Goldberg [1922] 1 K.B. 688, there was an agreement for sale of cloth to be delivered within a certain period. At the request of the defendant, the plaintiff voluntarily withheld the delivery during the period. Subsequently, the defendant refused to accept delivery. In an action for breach of the contract, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was in breach for not delivering within the stipulated time, and that the request he made was insufficient to vary the original contract. It was held that the forebearance by the plaintiff to deliver the goods at the request of the defendant was not a variation but a waiver and that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action.
On this subject, Dr. Fiadjoe referred me to Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim [1950] 1 K.B. 616, C.A. This was a case in which Denning L.J. (as he then was) drew an analogy between a waiver and an estoppel. The facts of the case show that according to the terms of contract the plaintiffs were to complete a car which they had been commissioned by the defendant to build. After the time for delivery had passed, the defendant went on and pressed for delivery. The defendant’s conduct was held to amount to a waiver of the original terms in the contract, and that he could not go back and rely on the original terms. On these authorities, I am fortified in holding that the bank waived its right to terminate the contract when Kwetey breached it. With the knowledge of the breach the bank accepted payment. It may be inferred from that conduct that the bank recognised the continued existence of the contract. Therefore failure to deliver amounted to a breach on its part. But the truth of this whole matter as shown in evidence is that the bank did not deliver the boat to Kwetey because it must have realised at some stage that it did not have the right to sell. It could not be correct when Dr. Agyekumhene said that the bank refused to sell because Kwetey defaulted with the terms of payments. Even if Kwetey had paid within the stipulated time, I cannot see how the bank could have taken the boat from Otema—so to speak, and given it to Kwetey. It would have been a very bad treatment given to a customer with such long standing as Otema was with the bank.
What are the remedies of a plaintiff in circumstances like these? In addition to the reliefs which I have disposed of, in her counterclaim, Kwetey sued for an order for specific performance and/or damages for breach of contract of sale and damages for the wrongful detention of the boat. As established by the evidence, the bank never had title to the boat, so it could not have transferred that which it did not have to Kwetey. Therefore Kwetey never had title nor possession to entitle her to a claim in detinue. She could not claim in detinue to recover a boat she never owned nor possessed. Her claim
[p.736] of [1980] GLR 722 could only be based on a right ex contractu and not on an infringement of a right ex delicto. The claim for damages for wrongful detention should also therefore be dismissed, and I do so order.
I revert to the claim for specific performance and/or damages for breach of contract. Even though the breach appears ostensibly to consist of non-delivery of the boat, the evidence shows that the bank had no right to sell. In every contract of sale of goods, there is an implied warranty on the part of the seller that he will have the power to transfer the property in the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract: see section 10 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1962. As I have already indicated above, the truth of what precipitated the purported sale to Kwetey remains in the files of the bank and the sealed lips of the bank officials. What is known is what has been established in this case. The evidence established a contract, whereby the bank sold a boat to Kwetey. It is also established that the bank had no title to transfer to Kwetey so Kwetey took nothing. This was a sale of a specific item—boat No. T.F. 298. By operation of Act 137, a seller is under an obligation to deliver the goods to the buyer. The bank was not in a position to deliver and did not deliver to Kwetey. This is a fundamental term by operation of the law, and a breach of it constitutes a fundamental breach.
Section 55 of the Act provides the remedy for such a breach and section 56 provides for the assessment of damages in the event of such breach. By section 56 the measure of damages is the loss sustained by the buyer and which could have been foreseen by the seller at the time when the contract was made as likely to result from the breach. This no doubt was fashioned on the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341. That rule has been interpreted and restated in the modern case Koufos v. Czarnikow (C.) Ltd. [1969] 1 A.C. 350, H.L. The decision in that case was that the measure of damages recoverable by the aggrieved party is the loss which the buyer has actually suffered which was foreseen by the other party to be the likely result. Where goods are to be delivered for re-sale, it is easy to assess the damages suffered by the buyer from non-delivery—the market price rule may be applied to determine the actual loss. But in a case like this, where the counterclaimant was expecting to buy the boat for her own use, i.e. to send the boat to sea for catch which she was expected to sell, what is her loss? Is it the profit she would have made had the sale gone through and she had had possession of the boat? It is my view that what the buyer would have earned if she had succeeded in getting the boat is merely speculative and not loss which she has actually sustained. It is this highly speculative loss that she contended she is entitled to be recouped in respect of. And she led evidence to show that she would have earned ¢6,000 [p.737] of [1980] GLR 722 net profit per day. But this cannot be right. The profit she would have made is not loss actually sustained by her. Such loss falls outside the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale (supra) and our section 56 of the sale of Goods Act, 1962. The profit which she would have made had she taken delivery of the boat and sent it to sea for fishing does not flow naturally and in the usual course of things from the non-delivery of the boat.
In my view, what occurred in the usual course of things is the loss of the value of the boat diminished by the price. Her loss should be assessed on the basis of what it would cost her to buy an alternative boat of the kind of T.F. 298 at the time when the bank failed to deliver the boat. There is no evidence, that it would have cost her more than she paid That being the case, her loss is the price she paid. There is evidence that the purchase price has been re-paid by the bank into Kwetey’s account. Therefore her loss should be nominal. I must mention that when this transaction fell through the bank assisted Kwetey to buy another boat in her mother’s name, bigger in size than T.F. 298. The new boat was a 45-footer, and T.F. 298 was a 40-footer. If Kwetey were entitled to claim profits which she would have earned from the T.F. 298 from the bank, the sale to her of 45-footer boat, albeit taken in her mother’s name would have been looked upon as a mitigating factor.
In conclusion, it is my judgment that this is not a case where the court can decree specific performance in favour of the buyer. Even though it is a discretionary remedy, the facts make the application of that remedy impossible. The bank had delivered the boat to her true owner even before the case came on for trial. The only remedy open to Kwetey is a claim for damages and I find that her damages should be nominal. Her damages should be nominal because, this is a contract, which given the best advice, the bank would not have concluded, and Kwetey would not have got the offer to buy the boat if her application had passed through the normal banking process. It was through the influence of people in top positions that she secured the offer, people whose duty it was to protect the interest of the bank and its customers. She cannot therefore complain of a breach which to all intent and purposes is purely technical and occasioned no actual loss to her. I award ¢2,000 damages for breach of contract. I award costs assessed at ¢200 in favour of Otema against Kwetey and ¢600 against the bank in favour of Kwetey.
DECISION
Judgment for the counterclaimant.
S. O.
