PENNIE AND ANOTHER vs. EGALA AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 234
20 April 1979 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 42 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 54Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1238; 109 S.J. 496; [1965] 2 All E.R. 871, C.A.
(2) Ghana Muslims Representative Council v. Salifu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 246, C.A.
(3) Clay, In re; Clay v. Booth [1919] 1 Ch. 66; 88 L.J.Ch. 40; 119 L.T. 754; 63 S.J. 23, C.A.
(4) Mmera v. Achampong [1962] 1 G.L.R. 74.
(5) Election of First President, Re; Appiah v. Attorney-General [1970] 2 G. & G. 530.
(6) Mbene v. Ofili (1968) 1 A.L.R. 235.
(7) Yorkshire Miners’ Association v. Howden [1905] A.C. 256; 74 L.J.K.B. 511; 92 L.T. 701; 53 W.R.
667; 21 T.L.R. 431, H.L.
(8) Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch.D. 210; [1954] 3 W.L.R.990; 119 J.P. 48; 98 S.J.
886; [1954] 3 All E.R. 698; 53 L.G.R. 68, C.A.
(9) Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] W.N. 537; 94 S.J. 803; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064.
(10) Peru (Republic of) v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1887) 36 Ch.D. 489; 56 L.J.Ch. 1081; 57 L.T. 337; 36 W.R. 217; 3 T.L.R. 848.
[p.237] of [1980] GLR 234
(11) Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410; 81 L.J.K.B. 217; 105 L.T. 753; 27 T.L.R. 143; 55 S.J. 168, C.A.
(12) Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881) 17 Ch.D. 615; 44 L.T. 557; 29 W.R. 511, C.A.
(13) Lyndon v. Standfridge (1857) 2 H. & N. 45; 26 L.J.Ex. 386; 29 L.T.O.S. 111; 21 L.J.P. 327; 5 W.R. 590.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiffs for an order to declare the election and nomination of the first and second defendants as the chairman and presidential candidate respectively of the People’s National Party null and void. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
William Fugar for the plaintiffs.
Offeh for the first defendant.
Riley-Poku for the second defendant.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
The plaintiffs in this case maintain that they are registered members of the People’s National Party (hereinafter called P.N.P.) a political part registered with the Electoral Commissioner in his capacity as Registrar of Political Parties. The first defendant is a founding member of this party and the second defendant is a registered member. The P.N.P. was formed in accordance with the Political Parties Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 208). The application for its registration was submitted to the registrar on 5 January 1979. In accordance with section 1 of the Decree, the application for registration was accompanied with two copies of the party’s constitution and two copies of the manifestoes or rules of the party. Both copies of the constitution lodged with the registrar were tendered in this trial as exhibit B and exhibit 2. In this action the plaintiffs seek the following reliefs:
(a) a declaration that the first defendant’s election and appointment or both as chairman of the People’s National Party on 9 March 1979 is ultra vires the constitution of the said party;
(b) an order that the said purported election be declared null and void;
(c) a declaration that the first defendant is not qualified to be elected as Chairman of the People’s National Party;
(d) and injunction restraining the first defendant, his agents, servants, privies from performing any of the functions of Chairman of the People’s National Party or chairman of any of the organs of the said party;
(e) a declaration that the second defendant’s election and appointment or both as presidential candidate for the 1979 presidential election for the People’s National Party is ultra vires the
[p.238] of [1980] GLR 234 constitution and therefore null and void;
(f) an order restraining the second defendant from holding himself up as the presidential candidate for the People’s National Party.
The plaintiffs have brought this action in their capacity as members of the People’s National Party. As their capacity is seriously challenged, it is necessary to recount their evidence of the circumstances which led to their registration as members and the role they have played in the party. According to the evidence, the first plaintiff was appointed by Imoru Egala to head the intelligence network of the People’s National Party; the second plaintiff is a member of the organization. The object of the network is to test and determine the popularity of the party at various places all over the country. Whenever the interim chairman, Mr. Imoru Egala, is attending a rally, the members of the network would proceed to the area ahead of time and conduct some security checks to ensure that the place would be safe for the chairman. The organisation does both intelligence and security work. Both plaintiffs’ involvement with the party began in February 1979, but they decided to have an official seal to their membership before the national congress of the party. The plaintiffs belong to the Ajumaku-Enyan-Essiam District Constituency. Each of them said he filled his application form and lodged it at the district office at Essiam with the secretary, called Ameen Abbass. The first plaintiff said about a week or so after he had presented his form, his membership card was sent to him in Accra per a bearer. The second plaintiff said after he had lodged his application form at Essiam he went to the party head office on 7 March 1979 and saw membership cards being issued. He enquired if he could have his card issued to him there, and when he received an encouraging response, he filled a form there and then, had a card issued to him. He further enquired if the head office could process the application forms from his constituency and he was told there would be no problem, so he sent for all the application forms lodged at the Essiam office. One Ishmael Aidoo brought all these forms to him, and he took them to the party headquarters in Accra. Before he presented them, he said he took out his own form which he had filled and destroyed it so as not to cause confusion because he had already filled a form and obtained his membership card. The membership cards issued to the plaintiffs were tendered and marked exhibit A and exhibit D in these proceedings, and the dates of issue are 8 and 7 March respectively.
On 9 March 1979 the People’s National Party held their national party congress at the Baden Powell Memorial Hall. The first plaintiff said as head of the intelligence network system of the party, he posted some men from his team within and without the congress hall
[p.239] of [1980] GLR 234 to keep order and also to see that peace prevailed. One of such men was the second plaintiff. The first plaintiff himself did not attend the congress because he is physically handicapped.
The account given by the second plaintiff of the activities of that day of the congress was that at 8.30 p.m. he reported for duty at Imoru Egala’s house with others from the same network. When they got there, Imoru Egala was waiting for the party functionaries to go with them to Baden Powell Memorial Hall in a group. Mr. Egala asked the second plaintiff to go ahead and he would follow with his party functionaries.
The second plaintiff went to the congress under the cover of an observer, but in fact he was there as an intelligence and security man. He described in detail the proceedings of the night. Even though it was challenged that he was not a member of the People’s National Party and also did not attend the congress, by the end of his evidence, it was beyond any doubt that that man was at the congress. Counsel for the first defendant conceded to this point when he suggested to him that he attended the congress as a spy. When the second plaintiff sought to tender the card which admitted him into the conference hall as an observer, objections were raised on grounds that the card was not signed by the general secretary and that the witness could have picked up the card anywhere. The objection was overruled and I must say that the evidence of the second plaintiff confirms his assertion that he was at the congress, and from evidence heard in this court (which is recast below in this judgment) about the way the congress was held the security was so tight that no unauthorised person could have gained admission into the hall. The second plaintiff’s evidence that he was allowed into the hall with the observer’s card, exhibit E, is very probable, and I have had no evidence to counteract it.
At this stage I shall pause to deal with the issue of locus standi raised by counsel for the second defendant. It was Mr. Riley-Poku’s contention that before the plaintiffs can bring this action, they must be members of the party. Part two of the constitution deals with membership of the party. There are two types of membership, foundation members and ordinary members. The procedure laid down for persons wishing to be members of the party is contained in article 9. Special forms are filled and when the application is accepted, the applicant shall be enrolled as a member and membership card shall be issued to him. From the evidence this procedure was followed by the plaintiffs. The defendants have contended that the plaintiffs should have called the persons who processed the application forms, i.e. Ameen Abbass, or the person who issued the card at the party headquarters to establish the authenticity of the
[p.240] of [1980] GLR 234 card, since they, the defendants, deny that the plaintiffs are members of the party. The general-secretary led evidence to show he was the only person authorized to sign party cards at the headquarters and he has never delegated that power to any one, and that he did not recognize the signatures on the plaintiffs’ cards. Other cards were shown to him which the witness conceded were properly issued by the party, but those cards had not been signed by him. He, however, conceded that they were properly issued. These were cards issued to Dr. Limann and Mr. Imoru Egala. At that stage he qualified his evidence and said he had issued cards on appointment to office and assumption of duty on 9 March 1979. The plaintiffs’ cards were issued on 8 and 7 March respectively, so even if the evidence of the general-secretary were accepted that he was the only signatory of all membership cards issuing from the headquarters since 9 March 1979, the plaintiffs’ cards would not be within the class of cards which could have been issued by him personally.
So much has been made of the authenticity of the membership cards of the plaintiffs. The main thrust of the arguments of the defendants on the matter is that the plaintiffs’ cards were not issued out by the general-secretary of the party, and that all such cards were issued personally by him and none other. The evidence, however, has proved this false. There is nothing to give the slightest indication by a look at the cards (exhibits A and D) that they are not genuine. Each bears a number. Merely saying that they are not genuine does not amount to much. If, for instance, the defendants had buttressed their allegation with other concrete facts, if for instance they had said that none of the cards they have issued did bear any of the numbers on the exhibits, or that cards bearing those numbers have been issued to persons other than the present holders (the plaintiffs), then a greater burden would have been cast on the plaintiffs. Indeed S.M.C.D. 208, s. 16 (1) (a) makes it incumbent on the party secretariat to maintain an accurate and permanent record of a list of the party membership. Such a record should be at the secretariat and in the possession of the general-secretary, the second defendant witness. Such a document could have been produced for the purpose of faulting the plaintiffs in their assertion that they are members.
In a situation like the present, it is very easy merely to say that the membership cards borne by the plaintiffs are not genuine. I do not think this is a case in which it can be reasonably argued that since it is the plaintiffs who are asserting the positive, the burden of establishing that fact conclusively lay on them. All the party records and documents are in the possession of the defendants and their witnesses—the tasks of establishing the want of authenticity with respect to the membership cards lay more with the defendants. For
[p.241] of [1980] GLR 234 their part, in my view, the only burden that rested on the plaintiffs was the lighter one of establishing that they are holders of party cards which ostensibly are genuine. The burden then shifted onto the defendants to show by the means at their disposal that the allegation of the plaintiffs cannot be true.
On this issue the probabilities are weighted more in favour of the plaintiffs and I will accept their story and hold that they are members of the party and that the cards they hold, exhibits A and D, are genuine.
I would also like to add that, in deciding whether or not the plaintiffs are members of the party, I have taken into consideration their evidence that the first plaintiff was the head of an intelligence network of which the second plaintiff was a member. The first defendant denied this and even disowned the plaintiffs. When he was asked whether he knew the plaintiffs, he looked at them, studied them and said he did not know them anywhere. His direct words were, “I do not know the first plaintiff. I have never met him. I do not know the second plaintiff.” The questions and answers reproduced hereunder as part of the cross-examination are illuminating:
“Q. Are you saying you do not know the plaintiffs?
A. No, I do not know them.
Q. You came to court early this morning, before 9 a.m.?
A. Well, at 9 a.m.
Q. When you entered the court you went to a man on the bench and greeted him?
A. Yes.
Q. That was the first plaintiff.
A. Well, I greeted everybody in the room.
Q. When you greeted the first plaintiff you did not merely greet him. You had a chat with him?
A. No.”
I think the first defendant’s denial of the plaintiffs was most unfortunate; because it is not in consonance with the truth. The first plaintiff gave a vivid account of how he came to know the first defendant and I did not think that that evidence was fabricated. I believe that he did give a correct account of his relationship with the first defendant.
The denial by Mr. Imoru Egala of the first plaintiff is reminiscent of the denial of Jesus by Peter before the Jews. The first plaintiff is a physically handicapped person, but his upper faculties are very alert. For what reason would he invent a story which he knows
[p.242] of [1980] GLR 234 would be so obviously untrue? The details he gave about how he came into contact with Mr. Imoru Egala at Essiam at a party organised by the Scripture Union to celebrate his home-coming from treatment abroad was not a mere figment of imagination. I accept the plaintiffs’ evidence that they did work for the party in their intelligence network and that they know Mr. Imoru Egala and that he knows them very well. In any case since it is an issue whether or not the plaintiffs are members of the party, their locus standi could not have been determined as a preliminary point on mere affidavit evidence: see Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 2 All E.R. 87, C.A.
With the question of locus standi removed, I shall proceed with the plaintiffs’ case and deal with the immediate factors which sparked off this action. The plaintiffs complain that the procedure adopted in transacting business at the congress was not in accordance with the laid down rules as contained in the constitution. The first of these matters was the appointment or election of Imoru Egala as party leader and chairman. The account given by the second plaintiff and confirmed by one of the delegates from the plaintiffs’ constituency as to what transpired at the congress is as follows: The meeting was opened with a hymn, Lead kindly light, and then a prayer by a woman, whom the second plaintiff referred to as “a lady comrade,” and the second plaintiff witness referred to as “Auntie Esther,” the queenmother of Ekumfi Traditional Area. Then Mr. Imoru Egala was introduced as chairman for the evening congress. Dr. Ekow Daniels introduced the constitution. There were protests and objections from the delegates on the ground that they had not been supplied with copies of the constitution for study before the congress. They mentioned Dr. Chinebua, Miss Lucy Blay, and a delegate from the Volta Region in particular as some of the delegates who raised objections to the adoption of the constitution on the ground that they had not been given time to study it. Members of the working committee, notably Dr. Ekow Daniels, appealed to delegates saying that due to the proximity of the inauguration day which was the next day, they should adopt the constitution in order that they could transact the evening’s business. The main business which the congress was to transact was the election of the national party chairman. Dr. Ekow Daniels appealed to the gathering to adopt the constitution and send in their proposals for amendments later, in three weeks time. After that, a motion for adoption of the constitution was moved and a leader from each constituency went to the microphone and announced his acceptance. The constitution was thus adopted.
After the hurdle over the constitution had been cleared, Krobo Edusei got up, raised Imoru Egala’s hand and declared in Twi that Egala was the man they all want to lead the party and to be chairman
[p.243] of [1980] GLR 234 of the party, and that those in favour of his proposition should show by hand. At this, a large noise broke out and there was an uproar; people burst out singing and shouting. When peace was restored, people put up their hands to speak but nobody was called. There was no voting. The chairman was called to speak and he made his acceptance speech, after which the meeting broke up. Nothing was heard again until about 30 March when the plaintiffs heard on the national radio and read in the local papers that the second defendant, Dr. Hilla Limann, has been nominated as the People’s National Party presidential candidate.
The plaintiffs contend that the election of Mr. Imoru Egala was not in accordance with the laid down procedure as set out in the People’s National Party constitution and that therefore the election or appointment is ultra vires the constitution. The plaintiffs maintain that by article 55 (5), “No person shall be elected as a chairman who is not qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly,” and by the Elections and Public Offices Disqualification Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 206), the first defendant was disqualified from election to, or appointment to or from holding any public office, because he is a person against whom an adverse finding had been made by the Jiagge Assets Commission. They also maintain that even though article 55 (4) requires that the chairman shall be elected without debate and by secret ballot consisting of all the members of the National Party Congress, the first defendant’s election was not in accordance with article 55 (4). They also maintain that the nomination of the second defendant by the first defendant is ultra vires the constitution and should be declared null and void.
The defendants’ answer to the action is that the writ of summons and statement of claim do not disclose any reasonable cause of action. It has been argued on their behalf that the action is not properly before the court, because it should have been brought under Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), by originating summons. A preliminary legal point was raised on this point; I overruled it and reserved my reasons to be incorporated in the judgment. This is a convenient point to pause and deal with that matter.
The answer given to this objection by counsel for the plaintiff is that Order 54A of L.N. 140A gives a discretion to a party to apply by originating summons to the court for his rights in a document to be determined and declared. However, Order 2, r. 1 of L.N. 140A makes it mandatory to commence every action by a writ of summons, and that from the nature of reliefs being claimed, the action has been rightly commenced under Order 2, r. 1 of L.N. 140A.
[p.244] of [1980] GLR 234
Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 provide:
“1. Any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
2. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of a statute, may apply by originating summons for the determination of such question of construction, and for a declaration as to the right claimed.”
The wording of these provisions are clear: Order 54A, r. 1 gives power to the court to determine the question of construction of a private document and declare the rights of parties thereunder. Order 54A, r. 2 gives discretionary powers to the court to declare the legal or equitable rights of a party upon the construction of a statute. It is clear that only declaratory judgments may be given under these procedures. According to the endorsement of the writ in this case, the plaintiffs are not asking merely for the declaration or determination of their rights upon construction of the Political Parties Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 208); or the constitution of the People’s National Party. They are asserting their rights under the constitution and alleging that that right has been infringed. What they are asking is a declaration that the act, which, they assert, constitutes infringement of their right, should be declared null and void. They are also, however, asking for a remedy in the form of an injunction.
Even though in determining their rights which have been infringed, it will be necessary to interprete or construe certain parts of the constitution and the Decree, that will only be ancillary to the real issues before the court. Order 54A cannot adequately deal with the situation and give the plaintiffs the reliefs they seek. It is Order 2, r. 1 which has got the force to deal with the situation posed in this case. Order 2, r. 1 states in very mandatory terms that every action shall be commenced by a writ of summons and the nature of claim made, or relief or remedy required in the action. The injunction in this action is a remedy which the court will have no power to issue under Order 54A. It is my view that the action has been properly commenced under Order 2, r. 1. It is under that order that all the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs can be effectively dealt with.
I shall now continue to deal with the other defences raised in this action. The first defendant denies that his appointment or election is ultra vires the constitution. He averred in his defence that he was
[p.245] of [1980] GLR 234 properly elected at the delegates congress in accordance with the voting procedure of the constitution of the party. He further averred that article 55 (5) of the constitution was amended “by congress in session” and that he had taken steps with a view to set aside the adverse findings. He also pleaded in the statement of defence that “congress in session” waived the requirements of article 55 (4) and (6) because there was only one nomination filed and presented to the “congress in session.” He conceded that he had nominated the second defendant but averred that he did so in accordance with the provisions of the constitution as amended by congress resolution as contained in the minutes of 9 March 1979.
The second defendant contended that the plaintiffs did not represent any interest at district, regional or national level and that they have not suffered any particular damage or injustice. His (the second defendant’s) defence to the action is that he was duly nominated and elected by the central committee to whom the congress had delegated its power of nomination of presidential candidate. He contends that his nomination is intra vires the constitution and not ultra vires.
The issues filed for trial were:
“(a) whether or not the first defendant is disqualified by article 55 (5) of the constitution of the People’s National Party from holding office as chairman of the said party;
(b) whether or not the first defendant was duly elected as chairman of the party by the People’s National Party Congress on 9 March 1979;
(c) whether or not the nomination of the second defendant as the party’s presidential candidate for the
1979 presidential election by the central committee of the party is ultra vires.”
Before dealing with these issues, I would like to dispose of a matter which reared its ugly head in the course of the trial. This concerns the contents of the constitution. When the preliminary objection was raised in the matter, even before pleadings had concluded, references were made in the course of argument to the constitution. I noticed that counsel on both sides had copies and there was a general concensus about the contents of it. When the trial resumed on 17 April 1979 references were made to certain parts of the constitution, notably to article 55 (4) and (5). No dispute was raised about the constitution, a copy of which I had been supplied from the defendants’ side. A representative of the Electoral Commissioner was called on the side of the plaintiffs to tender formally, a copy of the constitution which the People’s National Party had lodged with their application for registration. Mr. Asilijoe, acting secretary at the Electoral Commission, led formal evidence and tendered a copy
[p.246] of [1980] GLR 234 of the constitution without any objection from either side. He also tendered the amendment to the constitution, exhibit C, which the party had lodged. I regarded the tendering of this copy as a mere formality; I continued to make references to the copy which had been supplied to me earlier because I found it convenient, the lettering of the printing were bolder, well spaced and clearer and therefore kinder to my eyes. The copy tendered by the registrar’s representative was a carbon copy and the lettering were small and closely typed. I observed that counsel on both sides also referred to the copies which they had. We all assumed that what was tendered by Mr. Asilijoe as exhibit B was identical in contents and substance to the copies which we all had. But when the first defendant gave evidence and referred to the amendment to remove a clause from the constitution, I asked him to show from the constitution which clause they sought to remove, it became evident that he referred to article 55 (5) which said a person who is disqualified from being elected to the National Assembly shall not be eligible to be elected national chairman of the party. When the first defendant tried to point this clause out in the constitution tendered from the Electoral Commission’s office, we discovered that that clause is not contained in that document.
At the request of counsel for the defendants, the registrar was recalled to tender the other copy of the constitution and this was done. This copy was the original of which exhibit B is a carbon copy. Its contents are therefore identical with exhibit B; it did not contain the clause which sought to disqualify from election to party chairmanship, a person who is not qualified to be elected to the National Assembly. In both copies of the constitution tendered by the registrar, article 55 is sub-divided into nine clauses. It became necessary for the plaintiffs’ counsel to tender the copy of the constitution which the defendants had given to the court through the general-secretary of the party who was called on the side of the defendants. This is exhibit H. The general-secretary, Dr. Owusu Afriyie, said exhibit H is a draft of the constitution. Suddenly from then onwards the defendants’ counsel qualified the description of this document, referring to it as “draft.” The constitution tendered as exhibit B and the one tendered as exhibit H are not identical. Due to the speed with which this case has to be tried, and the limited time I have to produce the judgment (which has to be produced today barely 24 hours after the trial) it has not been possible for me to make article by article comparison of the two documents. But I have examined the relevant articles, viz., articles 47 and 55, which affect this matter. I consider these relevant because article 47 deals with the functions and powers of the national congress and article 55 deals with election
[p.247] of [1980] GLR 234 and appointment of the party chairman. The contents of those articles in exhibits B and H diverge slightly. Whereas article 47 in exhibit B is sub-divided into eleven paragraphs, the same article in exhibit H is sub-divided into ten paragraphs. The powers given to the national congress in both documents are identical, but there is an additional power given in exhibit B, article 47 (the copy lodged with the Electoral Commissioner) contained in sub-paragraph (g). The sub-paragraph reads, “it shall have power to elect the national leader and deputy national leader of the party in accordance with the constitution who will be the party’s candidates for president and vice-president.”
This sub-paragraph is absent in article 47 of exhibit H (what was termed the draft constitution). The major difference in article 55 in both copies of the constitution is that exhibit B has nine paragraphs whereas exhibit H has ten sub-paragraphs. Article 55 (5) of exhibit H reads, “No person shall be elected as chairman who is not qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly.” This disqualification is not imposed by article 55 of the constitution tendered by the representative of the Electoral Commissioner. It is evident that the two documents conflict, and if a choice has to be made between them, then the one which was tendered by the registrar’s office should be chosen because that one is purported to be an official document and it has been produced from proper custody. Although produced from proper custody, exhibit B is not an ancient document, the mere production of which makes the contents sacrosanct. But there is much to make its contents suspect. The evidence led by the defendants shows clearly that it ought to contain paragraph (5) of article 55 which is contained in exhibit H. If the object of the notice of amendment was in fact to amend that article by the deletion of that sub-paragraph, then the presumption is that the sub-paragraph existed and should have been contained in exhibit B. The fact that that sub-article does not appear in the document produced from the office of the Electoral Commission, exhibit B, casts a shadow of gloom and doubt on the whole affair. There would seem to have been some juggling with the contents of the document. If the necessary amendment had been effected before the filing of exhibit B at the Electoral Commission there certainly would not have been the need to consider the amendment contemplated in exhibit C. It is my view that the genuine constitution filed originally would have contained the article which the party sought to amend. I would regard exhibit H to be identical with the document which must have been filed with the Electoral Commissioner on 15 January 1979.
[p.248] of [1980] GLR 234
The notice of amendment fled with the Electoral Commissioner exhibit C in March 1979 contained a directive expressed in no uncertain terms that article 55 (5) should be deleted. The directive reads, “Paragraph (5)—delete.”
Article 55 (5) in exhibit H reads, “(5) No person shall be elected as a chairman who is not qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly,” and Article 55 (5) in exhibit B reads:
“(5) A candidate for election to the office of chairman shall be deemed to have been duly elected (a) if the number of votes cast in his favour is not less than one-half of the number of the total membership of the National Party Congress;
(b) if, where there is more than one candidate for the election, he has a majority of all the votes cast at the election and he has not less than one-half of the number of the votes cast by the total members of the National Party Congress.”
Surely, it was not article 55 (5.) of exhibit B which was sought to be deleted. Again the other amendment sought to be made by exhibit C shows clearly that article 55 sought to be amended is the article 55 in exhibit H and not article 55 in exhibit B. For there is no mention of executive-secretary in paragraph (8) of article 55 of exhibit B. Whereas paragraph (8) of exhibit-H reads, “The executive-secretary of the party shall be the presiding officer for the elections,” paragraph (8) of article 55 of exhibit B reads, “The chairman shall be chairman of all the national organs and shall have a casting vote.”
When the general-secretary was recalled by the court and both exhibits B and H were shown to him, he said that what the party meant to delete was article 55 (5) of exhibit H. He said, however, that he did not see the copies which were filed by the party so he could not help to solve the mystery surrounding the matter. It was Dr. Ekow Daniels who, according to him, filed them. Efforts by counsel for the first defendant to get Dr. Ekow Daniels to give evidence proved futile. From the totality of the evidence before the court and the concessions made, I have come to the conclusion that the truth of the matter is that the constitution of the People’s National Party is what is contained in exhibit H, and that is the constitution which the Party sought to amend by exhibit C, and it must have been that constitution which the party filed at the office of the Electoral Commission. It is therefore exhibit H which should regulate the party’s affairs.
The criticism levelled against the plaintiffs’ action is that it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and that under Order
[p.249] of [1980] GLR 234
25, r. 4 of L.N. 140A the writ and statement of claim should be struck out. It was in effect submitted on behalf of the second defendant that the plaintiffs’ action cannot be sustained in law and that it should be struck out. Counsel for the second defendant referred me to Ghana Muslims Representative Council v. Salifu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 246, C.A. and passages in the 1967 edition of the White Book at p. 272. The basis of counsel’s argument is that the plaintiffs are merely asking for declaratory orders and that they have alleged no rights which have been infringed. This submission was propped with the case of Clay, In re; Clay v. Booth [1919] 1 Ch. 66, C.A. and Mmera v. Achampong [1962] 1 G.L.R. 74.
In reply to these submissions learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that a plaintiff’s pleadings do not consist merely of his writ of summons and statement of claim but all pleadings filed must be considered in deciding whether or not on their face any reasonable cause is disclosed. He particularly referred to paragraph (6) of the reply to the statement of defence which further explains the basis of the plaintiff’s action. Paragraph (6) of the reply reads:
“In final reply to the first defendant’s statement of defence the plaintiffs say that as registered members of the party they are entitled as of right to institute proceedings to ensure that the provisions of the party’s constitution are upheld and complied with by members.”
On the issue of infringement of right, Mr. Fugar, counsel for the plaintiffs, referred to a number of authorities of similar situations in which the plaintiffs’ claims have been upheld by the courts. He referred me notably to the cases of Re Election of First President; Appiah v. Attorney-General [1970] 2 G. & G. 530; Mbene v. Ofili [1968] 1 A.L.R. 235; Yorkshire Miners’ Association v. Howden [1905] A.C. 256, H.L.; Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch.D. 210, C.A. and finally to the famous Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064.
On the submission that on the face of the pleadings no cause of action is disclosed, I cannot improve upon the discourse on Order 25, r. 4 of L.N. 140A as contained in the case on which Mr. Riley-Poku relied in his argument. In Ghana Muslims Representative Council v. Salifu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 246, C.A. the Court of Appeal referred to the Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1887) 36 Ch.D. 489 in which Order 25, r. 4 of the old English Rules was explained. The rule was stated in identical terms as our rule.
The sum total of this discourse on the rule is that Order 25, r. 4 gives specific powers to the court to strike out pleadings where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. It is therefore pertinent to
[p.250] of [1980] GLR 234 examine the pleadings and see whether any reasonable cause of action is shown. The claim endorsed on the writ does not merely ask for declaratory orders, but even if that is all it did, it would not be a ground to strike out the action. Order 25, r. 5 of L.N. 140A provides:
“5. No action or proceedings shall be open to objection, on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not.”
The submission is that the plaintiffs are merely asking for declaratory orders which on the pleadings cannot establish any rights; they must therefore be struck out. That submission, in my view, is untenable. The submission was based on Clay v. Booth [1919] 1 Ch. 66, C.A. In that case the beneficiaries of an estate brought an action in the Palatine court based on a rule copied from the rules of court and analogous to our Orders 54A and 25 (5) of L.N. 140A, for the construction of a deed of indemnity and a declaration that an executor was not entitled to reimbursement of costs he had been ordered to pay and he had in fact paid. The executor had at the time not instituted such an action. The plaintiffs thus sought by their action a declaration against a prospective claim that the defendants might make. It was held that the court could not make such a declaration. A lower court had made the declaratory order but the order was discharged on appeal. The principle in this case is not applicable to the present case.
On the writ of summons, statement of claim and reply, the plaintiffs are saying that they are members of the People’s National Party and that this party is regulated by a set of rules contained in its constitution. They say that there have been infringements of these rules to their detriment, and that as a result of these infringements the first and second defendants are holding themselves out as chairman and presidential candidate respectively of that party. In these proceedings, they are asserting their right as members of the party to see that the constitution is not violated. The plaintiffs are alleging that the election of the first defendant as chairman is contrary to the rules of the constitution and that the nomination of Dr. Limann is also not in compliance with the rules. Whether the election and nomination complained about were made in accordance with the constitution depends on the construction of the terms of that constitution. This cannot be done until evidence has been led. In the 1967 White Book at p. 272 appears this statement on which Mr. Riley-Poku
[p.251] of [1980] GLR 234 relies. It reads:
“. . . but a pleading will not be struck out under this Rule ‘unless it is not only demurrable but something worse than demurrable’, i.e., such that no legitimate amendment can save it from being demurrable. (per Chitty, J. in Rep. of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch.D. 496.”
And a few lines down the same page appears this comment:
“On an application to strike out the statement of claim and to dismiss the action, it is not permissible to try the action on affidavits when the facts and issues are in dispute.”
These passages are comments on the English rule Order 18, r. 19 which corresponds with our Order 25, r. 4 of L.N. 140A.
This rule should not be applied in an action which involved questions of general importance. It is a matter of public notoriety that this country has suffered coups d’etats on the stated grounds that the governments at the time had mismanaged the affairs of the country. For the most part of the past thirteen years, this country has not had a civilian administration. Now the country is in the process of voting into power a constitutional government and electing a popularly accepted president. Several parties have put themselves out as being competent to run the affairs of this nation. These parties are nominating candidates for the presidential election. The question whether one of such parties is complying with its own laid down procedure for nominating a presidential candidate for the nation, or appointing a person to head that party, is a question of public interest and importance, and the plaintiffs should not be driven out of the court without being heard. As the court said in Ghana Muslims Representative Council v. Salifu (supra) at p. 264:
“The court will not permit a plaintiff to be ‘driven from the judgment seat,’ without considering his right to be heard, ‘excepting in cases where the cause of action is obviously and almost incontestably bad’: per Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410 at p. 419, C.A.”
Where there is a reasonable ground for the maintainability of that action, the action will not be struck out under Order 25, r. 4. On the face of the writ of summons, statement of claim and reply, I cannot in all fairness, say that no reasonable cause is disclosed in this action. That submission therefore is untenable.
This leads me to the vital question whether the plaintiffs have any rights which have been infringed. In this country political party activities were banned from 1972 until 1 January 1979 when the
[p.252] of [1980] GLR 234
Political Parties Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 208), lifted the ban and legalized political activities. The Decree also instituted a system of compulsory registration, and conferred on them, i.e. the political parties, the dignity of corporateness. The Decree requires that the party shall have adequate written constitution, manifesto and rules which shall comply with the terms of the Decree. But even though the law, i.e. by S.M.C.D. 208, s. 4 (2) has endowed the political, parties with the attributes of legal personality, the general law applicable to such an organization is the law of unincorporated associations, and according to that law the legal basis of such an association is contractual: see Law of Unincorporated Association by Lloyd at p. 97 et seq.
As a voluntary society, the constitution of the organization is an enforceable agreement based on contract. It is a binding agreement between the members: see Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881) 17 Ch.D. 615, C.A. It is a contract that the rules and regulations by which the society is to be governed will be binding on the members. The position of the political parties is analogous to that of Trade Unions. By statute their rules are bound to provide the manner in which their rules are to be made, altered, amended and rescinded, but the same general principles apply to them as to any other unincorporated association. Since the basis of the association is contractual, breach of the terms of the constitution will give cause of action to the individual members.
Article 55 (4) of the party’s constitution provides, “The chairman shall be elected without debate by secret ballot consisting of all members of the National Party Congress,” and by article 55 (6), “A candidate for an election to the office of chairman shall be deemed to have been duly elected.” Therefore, any election which was made not in strict conformity with these principles are ultra vires the constitution and in breach of the contractual rights of the members, each and everyone of them. And the breach of any contractual obligation is actionable in law. If the plaintiffs are contending that there is a breach in the application of the rules then they have a right to sue, and since the reliefs they seek are directly against the two defendants, they would not have achieved their aim by suing the organization as a whole.
There is a dearth of authorities in this area of the law in this country but authorities abound in England and other common law countries on the subject. In Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, rule 19 of the rules of the defendant trade union provided that, “The regular contributions of employed members shall be as per tables . . . and no alteration to same shall be made until a ballot vote of the members has been taken and a two-thirds, majority
[p.253] of [1980] GLR 234 obtained.” At a delegate meeting of the union, without any ballot, a resolution was passed increasing the amount of the contributions of employed members. The plaintiffs, two members of the union, claimed against two executive committee members of the union and the union itself, a declaration that the alteration adopted at the delegates meeting was invalid. It was held on appeal that the matter in question was not a mere irregularity in the internal management of the union but that it was a matter of substance and it was tinctured with oppression. The reliefs sought were therefore granted. In his judgment Jenkins L.J. said at page 1068, “I cannot regard the mere paying by individual members of the increased rates without demur as equivalent to a ballot vote at which a two-thirds majority was obtained in favour of the alteration.”
Again in Mbene v. Ofili (1968) 1 A.L.R. 235, a Nigerian High Court case, the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants for a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to act as representatives or bank signatories of the Post and Telecommunication Telephonist Union of Nigeria, and an injunction restraining them from acting in a representative capacity for the union. The constitution of the union authorized the president-general, the secretary-general and treasurer-general to sign all approved cheques on behalf of the union. These office holders were the plaintiffs and they were the approved bank signatories for the union. There was a general executive meeting at which the union broke up into two factions, A and B. Faction A were the plaintiffs and B, the defendants. Faction B at a later meeting purported to pass a resolution denouncing faction A and after the meeting wrote to inform the bank that they were the approved signatories. In the action brought by group A, it was held by the Nigerian High Court that group B had no authority to appoint the officers and it also did so irregularly and therefore their act was ultra vires of the general executive council and the court had power to interfere and declare it invalid.
Edwards v. Halliwell (supra) would seem to be on all fours with the present case. The account of the plaintiffs in this case as to how the first defendant’s election was made diverges from the account given on the side of the defendants’ and as contained in the minutes tendered in support of the defendants’ case. The minutes are typewritten and loosely inserted between the leaves of what purports to be a minute book. The general secretary said he did not remember when he prepared them, but from the way they are preserved, they could easily have been prepared any time even while this trial was going on and inserted in the book. The sheets were very clean and crisp which are signs of newness. Be that as it may, what the defendants conceded as recorded in the minutes of the procedure adopted
[p.254] of [1980] GLR 234 in electing the chairman is not regular. The first objection that may be levelled against the procedure adopted is that it offended against article 55 (4) and (6) of exhibit H. Article 55 sets out the procedure by which the national chairman shall be elected. The relevant article is 55 (3)-(6). Of these rules only 55 (3) was complied with. The articles make it clear that even if only one candidate was presented to the congress, there ought to be a vote taken; this vote should be by secret ballot: see also article 65 (1). Where only one candidate was presented, he could not be duly elected if less than one-half of the number of the total membership at the congress did not cast their votes in his favour. See also article 55 (6) (a). This position is not different from what happened in Halliwell’s case. From the evidence it is clear that the congress was convened specifically to adopt the constitution and elect a national chairman, and each delegate went to the congress knowing that he had a right to cast his vote. Mr. J. K. Bentum, a member from the constituency of the plaintiffs, says he did not have the chance to vote. He said that he came to the meeting with the understanding that the congress was going to elect a party leader and national chairman. The card which gained him admittance to the Baden Powell Memorial Hall was to be used in voting, but there was no voting. He did not have the chance to express his support for or opposition to the person who was held out as national chairman.
The defendants’ explanation as to why a secret ballot was not conducted is contained in Dr. Owusu Afriyie’s evidence. He is the general-secretary of the party. He said there was to be nomination and election of the national chairman of the party. He said he was the returning officer and nominations should have been sent to him before the day of the congress, but by close of nomination only the first defendant had filed his nomination paper for election as national chairman. According to him, he told Nana Okutwer Bekoe that only one person had filed his nomination paper, and he later announced this to the people. He conceded there was stampeding and yelling when Imoru Egala’s name was announced as the only candidate for the election. He said because of the yelling and stampeding, he could not conduct a secret ballot. He tendered the alleged nomination paper. I cannot believe that of all the founding members of the party, the list of which was exhibited with their application for registration, nobody except the first defendant was willing to head the party. It appears that no opportunity was given to anybody else to offer himself. This matter of filing of nomination papers was not communicated to all the founding members. In my view, the account of the plaintiffs and their witnesses as to how the name of the first
[p.255] of [1980] GLR 234 defendant came to be mentioned as party leader and national chairman accords more with the truth of what happened than the evidence of the general-secretary. The stampeding and yelling would seem to me to be signs of protest rather than expression of support. The delegates wanted to speak, but none was given the chance. That could not have amounted to a unanimous support for the nomination of the first defendant. Mr. Bentum, the second plaintiff’s witness, had some apprehension that there might be trouble and he conveyed his fears to the first plaintiff as security man so that he could use his good offices to nip trouble in the bud. I agree with counsel for the plaintiffs that his right to vote has been infringed as well as those members who put him up as their delegate. The fact that the first defendant was alleged to have been accepted by popular acclamation is not synonymous with a ballot vote at which not less than one-half majority was to be obtained in favour of his election.
Article 55 makes it abundantly clear that even if only one candidate for the post of the chairman of the party shows up, there still must be an election to test the approbation of the members of the national party congress. As noticed above, article 55 (5) (a) reads, “if the number of votes cast in his favour is not less than one-half of the number of the total membership of the national party congress.” The juxtaposition of that sub-article and article 55 (5) (b) demonstrates this beyond any peradventure. The first sub-article caters for a situation in which only one candidate emerges and the second deals with a situation in which there are more than one candidate. On this ground alone, I would declare the election invalid and grant the injunction sought.
But there is another ground. This concerns the alleged amendment of article 55 (5). Mr. Imoru Egala said at the congress on 9 March 1979, that the constitution of the party was amended by the deletion of article 55 (5) (a) (quoted above). The constitution was drafted in compliance with S.M.C.D. 208 which provides that any person against whom any adverse finding has been made was disqualified from holding public office. The Elections and Public Offices Disqualification (Disqualified Persons) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 216), named the first defendant as No. 68 on the schedule as a person against whom an adverse finding has been made by the Jiagge Assets Commission. When a statute has decreed this or that, it would be against public policy to allow a group of persons to contract out of the provision of the statute. Therefore the purported amendment, if made, could not have circumvented the law. At any rate, in view of section 13 (a) of S.M.C.D. 208, that purported amendment could not have come into effect on 9 March 1979 when it was purported to have been effected. The first defendant was therefore not a person
[p.256] of [1980] GLR 234 qualified to be elected to head the People’s National Party and that purported election is ultra vires the constitution. That is not a mere irregularity which all the force of congress can cure. Accordingly, I declare the nomination and election of the first defendant null and void. Since he is disqualified from holding public office, he is restrained from putting himself up as national chairman of the party.
The nomination of a presidential candidate is the prerogative of the national congress: see article 47 (g) of exhibit H. The defendants concede that the nomination was not made by congress. The first defendant said that he nominated the second defendant in consultation with and the approval of the central committee. The second defendant says he was nominated by the central committee. The first defendant recounted the forces which militated against him and forced him to take that step. He said he acted in the supreme interest of the party because the nomination date was closing on 2 and 3 April so he called an emergency meeting of the central committee and explained the exigencies of the matter to them. He nominated the second defendant and the committee approved subject to the ratification of the decision by congress.
The plaintiffs maintain that only congress had power to nominate a presidential candidate and since that body did not nominate the second defendant his nomination by another body, even if the central committee did it, could not be ratified by the congress. The defendants contend that article 47 (1) of exhibit H gives the congress the power to delegate its powers to the first defendant who should act in consultation with and approval of the central committee. The said article 47 lists the powers and things which the congress is authorized to do. Article 47 (j) reads, “it shall have power to decide upon any proposal or matters, and transact any other business which shall be duly submitted to the meeting.” After listing all these powers specifically, if article 47 (j) was meant to give an unlimited power to the congress, then article 47 (a)-(j) would not have been set out in such detail. Article 47 (j) can only be construed noscitur a sociis. In the words of Pollock C.B. in Lyndon v. Standfridge (1857) 2 H. & N. 45 at p. 51:
“it is a general rule of construction that, where a particular class is spoken of, and general words follow, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most comprehensive, and the general words treated as referring to matters ejusdem generis with such class.”
I do not think that article 47 (j) should be construed to extend the powers of the congress beyond the power specifically given in the preceding paragraphs. The clause should take its colour from the company it keeps. Article 47 (j) did not empower the congress to
[p.257] of [1980] GLR 234 delegate its power of appointing a presidential candidate to the central committee when it had been specifically stated in mandatory terms that congress shall exercise that power. That purported resolution to delegate that power is therefore ultra vires the constitution. The subsequent purported nomination by the first defendant of the second defendant with approval of the central committee was invalid; I declare it null and void. He, the second defendant, is restrained from holding himself out as presidential candidate on the basis of that nomination. I would grant the plaintiffs costs assessed at ¢500 inclusive of counsel’s costs.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
Order of injunction against the second defendant.
S.O.
