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[1979] SLR (HC) 55High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

OWUSU AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 460

23 July 1979 · ANDOH J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 55
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OSCOLAOWUSU AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 460 [1979] SLR (HC) 55
APAOWUSU AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 460, [1979] SLR (HC) 55 (Ghana).
BluebookOWUSU AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 460, [1979] SLR (HC) 55 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for bail before trial on a charge of abetment of murder contrary to Act 30, ss. 20(1) and 46. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

D. Dwira for the applicants.

Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ANDOH J.

The two accused are farmers at Yakese and have been charged with the offence of abetment of murder contrary to sections 20(1) and 46 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). They were arrested on or about 23 May 1976 and they are still on remand pending their trial at the High Court, Sekondi. They now apply for bail and the question which arises is whether regardless of the provisions of section 96 (7) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment)

[p.462] of [1980] GLR 460

Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 309) this court has the power to grant them bail. Section 96 (7) (a) provides:

“(7) A court shall refuse to grant bail – (a) in a case of treason, subversion, murder, robbery, hijacking, piracy or escape from lawful custody.”

At first glance of the above provision, one may be tempted to say that the court is ousted of jurisdiction in granting bail in the offences listed above but then it is significant to note that the section does not say that the court shall refuse bail when a person is charged with any of the offences. It rather says that the court shall refuse bail in cases of treason, etc. The mentioning of a “case” means or implies that it is only when on the summary of evidence, a case of murder, treason, subversion, robbery, etc. could be said to have been committed, that the court is mandatorily estopped from granting bail.

I think it was not without reason that section 96 (7) (a) of Act 30 as amended by section 2 of the N.R.C.D. 309 mentions a “case” instead of a “charge.” Therefore, if from the summary of evidence, the court is of the view that a case of treason, subversion or murder is not or cannot be made out, the court will have the right to grant bail in appropriate cases even though a person is charged with any of the offences mentioned.

In the supporting affidavit of the applicants they averred:

“(1) That we are the deponents herein.

(2) That we were charged with abetment of murder contrary to section 20 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).

(3) That we were arrested at Yakese on or about 23 May 1976 and have been in custody since our arrest.

(4) That there is no prospect of our case being heard in the very immediate future.

(5) That our continued incarceration is having adverse effect on our health particularly for Kofi Abokyi who needs special medical treatment on his eye.

(6) That we are informed and believe same to be true that there is nobody attending our cocoa farms and in the two previous seasons strangers harvested our cocoa and bolted away with the proceeds and that as a result our families are not being properly cared for.

(7) That we are prepared to give adequate guarantees to ensure our appearances in the court in any future trial.

(8) That our return to Yakese will not stir up any troubles or emotions as these have completely subsided during the past two years.

(9) That the evidence connecting us with this charge as can be seen from the summary of evidence is weak, flimsy and untenable.

(10) That if this bail is not granted to us it will work a great deal of hardship on us and may even cause us a great deal of injustice.

(11) That we humbly pray this honourable court to grant us bail pending our trial.”

The affidavit was served on the Attorney-General’s Department on 10 July 1979. There was no affidavit in opposition but the learned principal state attorney was allowed to argue in opposition. From the affidavit it is clear that the applicants were arrested on 23 May 1976 and they are still in custody. Their case cannot come on at this criminal session. By the end of the 1978 – 79 criminal session, it means that the applicants would have served more than three years; in fact three years and two months in custody.

I consider the period of incarceration alone most unfair when the two accused are presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. From the summary of evidence it seems to me that the applicants were under the guard of police officers at the time when the incident which claimed two lives occurred. In fact, with regard to the second accused, I fail to understand the basis for the charge preferred against him. The fact that the gun used in the dastardly act was admittedly his would not support the charge unless there is proof of abetment. It must be noted, that the prosecution’s duty is to prove his guilt not peradventure but beyond all reasonable doubt. From the summary of evidence, the evidence of abetment, so far as the first accused is concerned, is slim.

But I do not want to analyse the summary of evidence and irrespective of section 96 (7) (a) of Act 30, as amended by section 2 of N.R.C.D. 309, the Constitution, 1979, deals specifically with a situation such as the one under consideration. I think this provision in the Constitution, 1979, has been incorporated therein from the Constitution, 1969. Chapter Six of the Constitution, 1979, deals with Fundamental Human Rights and article 21 (1)-(4) reads:

“21. (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except as may be authorised by law in any of the following cases, that is to say, (a) in execution of the sentence or order of a Court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted; or

(b) in execution of the order of a Court punishing him for contempt of court; or

(c) in execution of the order of a Court made to secure the fulfilment of an obligation imposed on him by law; or (d) for the purposes of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court; or (e) upon reasonable suspicion of having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law of Ghana; or (f) for the purposes of the education or welfare of a person who has not attained the age of majority; or

(g) for the purposes of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious disease; or

(h) for the purposes of the care or treatment or the protection of the community, where a person is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant;

or (i) for the purposes of preventing the unlawful entry of that person into Ghana, or for the purposes of effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal of that person from Ghana or for the purposes of restricting that person while he is being lawfully conveyed through Ghana in

the course of his extradition or removal from one country to another.

(2) A person who is arrested, restricted or detained shall be informed immediately, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his arrest, restriction or detention and of his right to consult counsel of his own choice.

(3) A person who is arrested, restricted, or detained, (a) for the purposes of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court or (b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law of Ghana, and who is not released, shall be brought before a Court within twenty-four hours.

(4) Where a person arrested, restricted or detained in any circumstances as is mentioned in paragraph (b)

of clause (3) of this article is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him – (a) he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to trial; and (b) he shall not be arrested at any time on a charge arising from the facts in respect of which he was originally arrested.”

Awaiting trial for three years and more is clearly such a delay as by the Constitution, a court shall be bound to grant bail. It is a situation like this, an abuse tantamount to suppression or oppression, which the Constitution seeks to check or avoid.

The Constitution, unlike section 96 (7) (a) of Act 30 as amended by section 2 of N.R.C.D. 309 does not discriminate against the nature of an offence. It is all-embracing and unlimited in scope. The Act is subordinate to the Constitution which is supreme. Parliament can only add thereto but cannot purport to take away or restrict the power thus conferred on the courts by the Constitution to grant bail when a person arrested, restricted or detained in circumstances as are mentioned in clause 3 (b) of this article is not tried within a reasonable time.

Three years’ incarceration without trial is an unreasonable time and any argument to the contrary such as that put forward by the learned principal state attorney cannot be taken seriously especially when the incarceration is said to affect the health of the applicants, particularly the second accused; a fact which is not denied by the respondent. Accordingly from the summary of evidence, and more so, by virtue of article 21 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1979, I consider that this is a deserving case for which bail should be granted; and to ensure that the applicants do appear at a later date for trial, the following conditions are imposed:

(1) Each accused is granted bail in the sum of ¢5,000 with surety to justify.

(2) The surety must own a building to the value of ¢5,000 at least.

(3) The registrar must be satisfied of the credit-worthiness of the surety.

(4) Each accused is ordered to report once weekly at Yakese or the nearest police station. Case adjourned to a date within one month for mention upon the ascertainment of the registrar of the vacation judge’s itinerary. Case adjourned to 28 August 1979 for mention.

DECISION Application for bail pending trial granted.

K. A. A. M.

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