REPUBLIC vs. GA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE DAMANLEY [1980] GLR 609
26 September 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 22 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Fulham, Hammersmith & Kensington Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 K.B. 1;[1951]1 All E.R. 482; 115 J.P. 132; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 423; 95 S.J. 237;49 L.G.R. 275, D.C.
[p.611] of [1980] GLR 609
(2) Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra. 504; 93 E.R. 664.
(3) Republic v. Judicial Committee of the Ada Traditional Council; Ex parte Nene Buernortey Puplampu, High Court, Accra, 14 December 1978, unreported.
(4) R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281; [1942] 1 All E.R. 56; 111 L.J.K.B.
234; 166 L.T. 118; 106 J.P. 50; 40 L.G.R. 62; 58 T.L.R. 88, D.C.
(5) State v. Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 G.L.R. 238.
(6) R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners; Ex parte de Polignac (Princess Edmond) [1917] 1 K.B. 486; 86 L.J.K.B. 257; 116 L.T. 136; 33 T.L.R. 113; 61 S.J. 182, C.A.
(7) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.
(8) Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700; 53 L.J.Ch. 891; 51 L.T. 729; 33 W.R. 60; 1 R.P.C. 81, C.A.
(9) R. v. Williams; Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608; 83 L.J.K.B. 528; 110 L.T. 372; 78 J.P. 148.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for certiorari to quash the purported arbitration of a matter referred to the Ga Traditional Council. The facts are stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
R. I. Quansah for the applicant.
J. Amoako-Glover for the second respondent.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
The applicant, chief Alhaji Adamu Damanley, by counsel moves for an order of certiorari to quash certain proceedings and decision of the Ga Traditional Council. The said proceedings and decision dated finally on 3 August 1978, are exhibited in these proceedings, and marked AD5. In substance the decision adjudges and recommends that the second respondent, chief Lebbo Baako, be the recognised chief of Sabon Zongo, as opposed to the applicant. Exhibit AD5 is in fact proceedings before what has been described as an arbitration committee.
The facts upon which the application is founded are contained in the statement supporting the application, and not in the ostensible affidavit of the applicant. This departure from the practice as laid under Order 59, r. 2 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), has been aggressively attacked. Those objections, being a pivot of the respondent’s reply, I shall consider later. For the present the facts, may be briefly stated. It would appear from exhibits AD2 (a)-(d), C and D, that around July and August 1977, the applicant, sponsored by the Sempe stool, was appointed the chief of
[p.612] of [1980] GLR 609
Sabon Zongo. It is evident that upon this step erupted open opposition and hostility from the second respondent as a rival contestant. The resulting or apprehended disturbance to public order appeared to have caused some concern to the political administration, and the Regional Commissioner for Greater Accra eventually decided to avail himself of the services of the Ga Traditional Council. The council’s response to the commissioner’s request was to communicate by letter to the applicant its decision to embark upon the hearing of the dispute, and to request the applicant to state his version of the facts in writing and to produce any documents upon which he relied. The council’s letter is marked AD3. It would seem that some remonstrance raised by the Sempe stool to AD3 was brushed aside by the council as shown by exhibit AD3B. The two letters AD3 and AD3B have been hotly put in issue and are consequently set out below in full:
“AD3 Ga Traditional Council P.O. Box 42 Accra Ghana 11 May 1978 Our Ref: GTC/064/15/78 DISPUTE BETWEEN ADAMU DAMANLEY AND CHIEF LEBBO BAAKO OF SABON ZONGO.
I have instructions from my president to inform you that, the above matter has been referred to this council by the Regional Commissioner for cordial relation to be established between the two contestants in Sabon Zongo.
(2) This matter is considered as purely traditional in character which could conveniently and amicably be dealt with by council.
(3) In the light of this, I am requesting you to furnish this registry at your earliest convenience, in writing all relevant facts and documents which you may wish to rely on at the time of settlement.
(4) I hope, I can count very much on your co-operation in this matter for a lasting solution.
(Sgd.) D. N. K. Mensah-Ashiley for: Registrar Alhaji Adamu Damanley, Sabon Zongo, Accra.”
[p.613] of [1980] GLR 609 “AD3B Ga Traditional Council P.O. Box 42 Accra Ghana 22 May 1978 Our Ref: GTC/023/Vol. 2/4/78 DISPUTE BETWEEN ADAMU DAMANLEY AND CHIEF LEBBO BAAKO OF SABON ZONGO I have instructions from my president Nii Amugi II, Ga Mantse to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 16 May 1978 on the above subject-matter.
(2) The Regional Commissioner, Greater Accra Region, considered this particular matter as purely traditional in character and therefore referred it to this council as a competent judicial body as far as chieftaincy matters are concerned to adjudicate.
(3) In view of this, I regret to inform you that, council is unable to accede to your request as contained in paragraph (2) of your letter under reference.
(4) Meanwhile, I shall be grateful if you would make available any relevant facts or documents to Adamu
Damanley to defend his cause before this council at your earliest convenience.
(5) I hope, I can count on your usual co-operation in this matter.
(Sgd.) J. T. Doku Registrar The Secretary Sempe Mantse We P.O. Box 394 Accra c.c. Alhaji Adamu Damanley, Sabon Zongo, Accra”
The process of settlement of the dispute having thus been set in motion the applicant and the respondent appeared before a panel of three for the hearing on diverse dates from 27 June 1978 to 13 July 1978.
The main ground of want of jurisdiction seems to rest on the contention of the applicant that the proceedings were before a committee of the Ga Traditional Council to whom the Regional Commissioner had referred the dispute. Were that all there is to the position
[p.614] of [1980] GLR 609 the submission of Mr. Quansah may be summed up thus, that under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) (hereafter referred to as the Act) the Ga Traditional Council would have no jurisdiction; because:
(i) section 15 by reference to cause or matter affecting chieftaincy takes cognisance of chiefs only as designated in section 49 of the Act. The applicant and the respondent being only community head men are therefore excluded.
(ii) that in not instituting the action either by oath or in the form of writ as prescribed by regulation 4 of the Chieftaincy (Proceeding and Functions) (Traditional Councils) Regulations, 1972 (L.I. 798), no jurisdiction was conferred on the council.
(iii) that the admitted reference by the Regional Commissioner was not a mode of instituting proceedings within the Act. Where a traditional council is concerned any reference even under section 9 [of the Act] was cognisable by the Regional House of Chiefs. In any case such reference could only be made through the Chieftaincy Secretariat.
(iv) that the foundation of the dispute of who was head of Sabon Zongo, was primarily an issue of caretakership of land, and for which the person was only answerable to the allodial owner.
Consequently, the council not having any jurisdiction in land matters under the Act, wrongly assumed that jurisdiction in declaring that the Baakos are the owners of the Sabon Zongo lands; to the extent of proscribing both parties from observing any allegiance to or being sponsored by James Town stool or Sempe stool; such proscription seeking to question the claims of the two stools as allodial owners.
It follows that assuming the tribunal was the traditional council then clearly there was want of jurisdiction on the foregoing premise as to procedure under the Act, and as to subject-matter in regard to the issue of communal headship and in determining the issues of ownership or possession of land. But this finding avails nothing if, as Mr. Amoako-Glover contends, the proceedings and decision were by way of arbitration. For with an arbitration the limit of jurisdiction in civil causes, appears to be the sky. The tribunal could decide the issue of headship and it seems incidentally that of ownership of Sabon Zongo lands. Mr. Quansah has not attempted to challenge that aspect of the jurisdiction.
Now the question of the nature of the tribunal I think is one of fact. The law is that if the jurisdiction of a tribunal is directly challenged, as for example by way of certiorari or prohibition, the burden of proving absence of jurisdiction rests upon the party making [p.615] of [1980] GLR 609 the challenge: see per Devlin J. in R. v. Fulham, Hammersmith & Kensington Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 K.B. 1 at p. 11. The applicant naturally relies on exhibits AD3 and AD3B, those being as it were the summons requiring the applicant’s appearance at the tribunal. Together I think they discharge the burden of proof that the matter had been referred to the Ga Traditional Council. It is for the respondent then to rebut that the reference to and the forum was not the Ga Traditional Council. Mr. Amoako-Glover has gone to great lengths to show that those exhibits miscarried their instructions. The registrar misunderstood his directives, and confused the dual personality of Nii Amugi II; as the Ga Mantse with his second capacity as President of the Ga Traditional Council. Consequently, when the reference was made to Nii Amugi II in his capacity as Ga Mantse, exhibits AD3 and AD3B had mistakenly spoken of a reference to the Ga Traditional Council. The use of the letter-heads of the Ga Traditional Council has been explained away as arising from convenience, as the Ga Mantse uses the offices and staff of the council for administrative purposes, even in respect of his status as Ga Mantse. There is an affidavit from Nii Amugi II himself to the effect that in fact he appointed a customary arbitration tribunal as Ga Mantse, and not as President of the Ga Traditional Council.
I am prepared to concede that the style of letter-heads of AD3 and AD3B is insignificant. But it may be observed that two different persons signed AD3 and AD3B. It is hard to imagine that the registrar in writing exhibits AD3 and AD3B would do so without having the commissioner’s letter on file. The insistence in AD3B that the council was minded to perform its duty, when the Sempe stool appeared to be obstructive, leaves me in no doubt that the writer of AD3 and AD3B knew what he was about. The explanation that he was confused, as to the nature of his instructions, is most unconvincing. Exhibits AD3 and AD3B were unlike the various affidavits, written at a time when no foresight could have contemplated the present motion. That situation gives these two exhibits the mark of untinkered credibility. In this proceeding the letter of the regional commissioner has not been produced. That in my opinion is what might well have discharged the onus that rests upon the respondent. That letter was written to Nii Amugi II as President of the council. He has deposed in support of the respondent. The respondent could have, in better support, availed himself of that document. I think by analogy I may apply the case of Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra. 504, and presume the worst against the party who withholds the evidence. Notwithstanding all the explanations so ably contended by
[p.616] of [1980] GLR 609
Mr. Amoako-Glover, I hold that the respondent not having discharged the onus resting on him, the reference by the regional commissioner was to the Ga Traditional Council.
It seems the probability of the matter was that the Ga Mantse must have come to the conclusion, upon receiving the commissioner’s letter, that the commissioner had misconceived the jurisdiction of the Ga Traditional Council. The next best thing he must have thought was to retain the cause and to appoint an arbitration panel to try the dispute. The outcome was the Nii Boi Maclean II committee and exhibit AD5. Now on the face of AD5 the tribunal was patently an arbitral body. This the applicant has impugned. He has contended that there was on his part no voluntary submission to such arbitration. He had gone there to meet the Ga Traditional Council and regarded the panel as the judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council. He had to pay the ¢250 as a demand of the procedure there, he thought. The respondent points to the record of evidence, which here is exceptionally admitted since record of evidence as a rule is no part of the record in certiorari proceedings. It shows the remarks “Both parties were asked to pay a customary arbitration fee of ¢250 each and they paid in full through the Ga state linguist. . .” That in my opinion is very equivocal. One wonders by what inter- pretation was arbitration distinguished from action on suit or hearing. For what was there to rule out the applicant’s misconception that before the Ga Traditional Council such fee is demanded.
Nor am I impressed with Mr. Glover’s contention that the applicant is presumed to know the law, that is the statutory fees at the Ga Traditional Council, and to know that Nii Boi Maclean II and the other two panelists were not members of the Ga Traditional Council, and so could not make up a judicial committee of that august body. I think the submission has too much of the academic flair. One has to liken it to saying that counsel finding a judge of the High Court on a Court of Appeal criminal panel must first question the credentials of such a judge to sit there before opening his grounds. Or that a litigant, appearing before the High Court in person, should participate in the day’s proceeding only when he satisfies himself that the presiding judge happens to be one of the duly sworn judges of the Third Republic of Ghana. The presumption that every citizen is presumed to know the law, it has been said, is better expressed as that ignorance of the law is no excuse! Further, the fact of the presence of the Ga state linguist, who I imagine could well have acted in the same capacity at a judicial committee, must have only deepened the applicant’s misconception. Neither does exhibit LB3 (I should have expected a similar note to have gone to the
[p.617] of [1980] GLR 609 applicant), nor LB4 take the respondent’s contention any further. The two exhibits read:
“LB3 Ga Traditional Council P.O. Box 42 Accra Ghana 8 June 1978 Our Ref: GTC/064/19/78 DISPUTE BETWEEN ADAMU DAMANLEY AND CHIEF LEBBO BAAKO OF SABON ZONGO Further to my letter No. GTC/064/15/78 of 11 May 1978, I wish to inform you that a three-man committee has been appointed to adjudicate upon the above matter.
2. You are therefore requested to get prepared in readiness to appear before the committee to defend your cause at a hearing date to be announced soon.
3. I rely on your co-operation in this instance.
(Sgd.) D. N. K. Mensah-Ashiley.
For: Registrar Chief Lebbo Baako Sabon Zongo Accra”
“LB4 Ga Traditional Council P.O. Box 42 Accra Ghana 20 June 1978 Our Ref: GTC/023/Vol. 2/5/78.
Sir, DISPUTE BETWEEN ADAMU DAMANLEY AND CHIEF LEBBO BAAKO OF SABON ZONGO, SETTLEMENT OF I am directed by Nii Boi Maclean II, the chairman appointed for the three-man committee to adjudicate upon the above matter to invite you to the committee’s first sitting at the Ga Mantse’s palace, Kaneshie on Tuesday 27 June 1978, at 9.00 a.m.
[p.618] of [1980] GLR 609
My further instruction from the chairman is that each party, i.e. Alhaji Adamu Damanley and Chief Lebbo Baako should not bring more than twenty elders.
It is my earnest hope that all shall co-operate in the interest of peace and tranquility.
(sgd.) J. T. DOKU Registrar 1. Alhaji Adamu Damanley Sabon Zongo, Accra 2. Chief Lebbo Baako Sabon Zongo, Accra cc. The Reg. Adm. Officer Regional Administration Greater Accra Region Accra”
Thus parties are informed to the appointment of a “three-man committee” which to any such litigant was in no way different in complexion from a three-man judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council. The exhibits carry the further edict commanding the parties to appear at a date to be announced “to defend their cause.” Then goes the invitation for their attendance on 27 June from “Nii Boi Maclean II, the chairman appointed for the three-man committee to adjudicate upon the matter.” Again the terms can be the same as for a judicial committee. Then follows what might have over-awed the parties of the might and majesty of the three-man committee, namely, that “each party . . . should not bring more than twenty elders.” One is driven to ask wherein lies the semblance of voluntary submission to the august panel. In my opinion, in the terms and tone of exhibits LB3 and LB4, one might well speak of a litigant submitting to adjudication by the High Court in a case where he is in substance compelled to appear by force of a writ of summons. Indeed, it seems to me the foregoing manoeuvre was a necessary inducement for the exaction of the said arbitration fee. I do not find it improbable that with the atmosphere thus created the applicant must have been obliged to submit to the three-man committee without being any wiser that it was a tribunal distinct and different from the judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council, and this in spite of the ¢250 arbitration fee paid by each party. Assuming, however, that I am wrong on this finding, there is the question whether having received a reference to the Ga Traditional Council, the Ga Mantse could empanel arbitrators to sit on the dispute. First, the Ga Mantse would have no mandate to usurp jurisdiction over the
[p.619] of [1980] GLR 609 dispute because the reference was to the council. Secondly, with exhibits AD3 and AD3B, it would be a fraud on the parties, in the legal sense of suppressing material facts from the applicant in taking such a step. Thirdly, the reference having been made, as I have found, to the Ga Traditional Council, the Ga Mantse as president had no power by himself to delegate the functions of the council to an arbitration committee. On the merits then, I rule that the contention that the reference was to the Ga Traditional Council has not been displaced; and consequently I find that the institution of the arbitration was void ab initio, irrespective of any submission by the parties. In any case I further rule that the submission by the applicant was not voluntary in the sense that there was no choice presented, but one that was imposed.
The foregoing ruling, however, does not end the matter. As I indicated earlier the facts relied on by the applicant were set out in the accompanying statement and not in an affidavit. The affidavit took the form of verifying the facts set out in the statement as being true. Mr. Amoako-Glover has raised formidable objections, not in limine, but in the course of arguments, against the defect. The sum of it all amounts to this: that an affidavit is a condition precedent, as a mode of putting before the court all material facts, the better for the court to judge the conduct and bona fides of the applicant in such an application and that the failure to comply with the rule is an incurable irregularity, so fatal that leave was wrongly granted. The foundation of the objection is Order 59, r. 2 (2) of L.N. 140A, which requires that the application for leave ex parte “shall be accompanied by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and the grounds on which it is sought, and by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.” It would seem that the last clause has given rise to some differences of opinion in practice. The result has been that a body of respectable practitioners still embody the facts together with the grounds in the statement settled by counsel with an affidavit by the applicant deposing merely, in effect, that “the facts in the statement are true.” The difference of opinion appears to arise as to the exact meaning of the word “grounds.” By grounds it seems to me one is limited to legal grounds upon which the relevant prerogative order will lie: see Republic v. Judicial Committee of the Ada Traditional Council; Ex parte Nene Buernortey Puplampu, High Court, Accra, 14 December 1978, unreported.
In R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281 the court pointed out that the facts relied on should be stated in the affidavit. In the annotation to the rule in the Annual Practice (1952) at p. 1305, the point is made that “It is not enough to lodge a statement verified by affidavit.” I do not quite agree with Mr. Quansah that the
[p.620] of [1980] GLR 609 requirement of an “affidavit of facts” is an English practice direction which is not binding on him. In my view, the question is whether that form of practice is in accord with the meaning of the words contained in Order 59, r. 2 (2), so as to comply with the conditions laid down for an application ex parte for leave. In State v. Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 G.L.R. 238, where the Supreme Court had to consider the proper application of Order 59, r. 2 (2) and (3), the Supreme Court stated at p. 245:
“The purpose of filing an affidavit in support of an application [for extension of time after six months] is to enable the court to verify the facts alleged as reasons for delay. Furthermore, the application for leave was not in proper form, because it was not accompanied by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and the grounds on which the relief is sought, also an affidavit testifying the facts relied on.
In my view the contention of the respondent’s counsel raises objections in limine which must precede considerations for the grant of leave, and inasmuch as the appellant has failed to comply with the conditions precedent (a) for the application for an extension of time, and (b) for the application for leave to apply for the writ of certiorari, the High Court should not have entertained the application.”
From the above passage I am satisfied that the phrase “an affidavit testifying the facts” puts it beyond doubt that the applicant must himself depose to the facts in an affidavit. I hold that the instant form adopted by the applicant does not conform with Order 59, r. 2 (2) of L.N. 140A. Beyond that point as to what is intended by an “affidavit” in Order 59, r. 2 (2), the case of Ex parte Kusada (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In Kusada’s case there was neither a statement nor affidavit because there was no motion filed as the application was oral. So that there was no attempt at compliance with the rule. In the instant case, there is a motion filed with a statement, except that the statement sets out the facts as well instead of postponing those to the deponent’s affidavit. So that here one is faced with what is really a defect in practice, rather than outright failure to comply with the rules. It will be in my view the task of this court to decide whether the defect here carries the same penalty as that in Kusada’s case.
In advancing the necessity for an affidavit by the applicant himself, Mr. Amoako-Glover would go further to say that the absence of such an affidavit here has produced the result of not disclosing material facts, and thus amounting to absence of uberrima fides. On such premise it was submitted that leave to apply was wrongly
[p.621] of [1980] GLR 609 granted, and consequently the application should be dismissed. I think the case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners; Ex parte de Polignac (Princess Edmond) [1917] 1 K.B. 486 relied on by Mr. Glover is clearly distinguishable on the facts from the present. There the applicant to prohibit an assessment for income tax, as not being a citizen of the United Kingdom, had in fact deposed to an affidavit in applying for leave. On the hearing it was shown by the commissioners, showing cause, that the applicant had in fact taken a leasehold in Chelsea, but by various guises tried to make it appear that it was taken by a brother of hers living in London. On the court being satisfied that there was conscious concealment and misstatement of the facts in the affidavit in support of the leave, discharged the leave, on the ground that the applicant having failed to make full disclosure of facts within her knowledge, the order had been improperly obtained. In this case there is, as put by the respondent counsel, no affidavit in the true sense; but certainly the absence of it is not concealment or misstatement of facts. For concealment or misstatement seems to me to connote acts tainted with reproach. That in essence is the principle the case of Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (supra) illustrates, and which was put thus at p. 509 by Warrington L.J. “If there is a defect in that essential preliminary step such as that it ought to be treated as if it had not been taken, then the writ of prohibition cannot be granted, because the essential preliminary to its issue does not exist.” Or as put by Scrutton L.J. at p. 514:
“. . . it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts—facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it—the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”
In the instant case, the true position is that of mere professional aberration or inadequacy at the highest. The applicant’s advisers took a procedural view which as it turns out is not in accord with the rules of practice. But that cannot in my view amount to any fraud or turpitude in the applicant to attract the penalty of the court
[p.622] of [1980] GLR 609 setting aside the leave granted. The courts have always been reluctant to penalise parties for their errors, especially procedural errors, unless they result in injustice to the other party. In Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A. the court, faced with a similar situation affirmed that principle. At page 238 of the judgment the court relied on a passage in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700 at p. 710 by Bowen L.J. which I respectfully adopt:
“it is a well established principle that the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights . . . I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party.”
In R. v. Williams; Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608, D.C., the applicant had obtained a rule nisi to quash his conviction on ground of want of jurisdiction, in that one of the two justices who heard his case was by law disqualified from sitting. On cause being shown the rule nisi was discharged; because the affidavit on which the rule nisi was obtained did not state that any objection to the competence of the court was taken at the hearing before the justices, nor did it state that at the date of that hearing the applicant was without knowledge of the facts alleged to disqualify one of the justices. In its ruling the court made the point that although an applicant, who is directly aggrieved by a conviction is entitled ex debito justitiae to the remedy of certiorari on complaint of jurisdiction, he may by his conduct preclude himself from taking objection to the jurisdiction of an inferior court, and reduce himself to a person at the mercy of the discretion of the court. After citing Blackburn J. in R. v. Justices of Surrey (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 466 at p. 473, Channell J. at p. 614 concluded: “Therefore, if it be not the established rule that a writ will not be granted on an affidavit which does not aver absence of knowledge of facts which would disqualify the justices, at any rate this Court has a discretion whether to grant the writ or not.”
On the foregoing authority and for the reasons that the absence of affidavit, in due form in this case does not show any turpitude in the applicant, I think it right to consider the application as one at the discretion of the court, and any discretion which this court has, by reason of my view of the merits ought to be exercised by granting
[p.623] of [1980] GLR 609 the application. In the event I quash the decision or orders of the aforesaid arbitral panel complained of.
There will be costs of ¢450 to the applicant.
DECISION
Certiorari granted.
Arbitration proceedings quashed.
K. A. A. M.
