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[1979] SLR (HC) 9High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

AGYEI-ACHEAMPONG vs. DONKOR [1980] GLR 108

8 March 1979 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 18 min read

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OSCOLAAGYEI-ACHEAMPONG v DONKOR [1980] GLR 108 [1979] SLR (HC) 9
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[p.110] of [1980] GLR 108

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Hudson v. Temple (1860) 20 Beav. 536; 30 L.J.Ch. 251; 3 L.T. 495; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 248; 9 W.R. 243. (2) Tilley v. Thomas (1867) 3 Ch.App. 61; 17 L.T. 422; 32 J.P. 180; 16 W.R. 166. (3) Quadrangle Development and Construction Co. v. Jenner [1974] 1 W.L.R. 68; 117 S.J. 912; [1974] 1 All E.R. 729; (1973) 27 P. & C.R. 441, C.A.

(4) Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd. v. Cheng, [1960] A.C. 115; [1959] 3 W.L.R. 1011; 103 S.J. 1045;

[1959] 3 All E.R. 910; 110 L.J. 115; 229 L.T. 130; 27 S.J. 67, P.C.

(5) Stone and Saville’s Contract, In re [1963] 1 W.L.R. 163; 106 S.J. 1030; [1963] 1 All E.R. 353; affirming [1962] 1 W.L.R. 460; 106 S.J. 286; [1962] 2 All E.R. 114.

(6) Lardan v. Attorney-General (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 55.

(7) Punjabi Brothers v. Namih (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 381.

(8) Amoah v. West African Examinations Council [1971] 1 G.L.R. 63.

(9) Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 389; [1972] 1 All E.R. 1023; 116 S.J. 95, C.A.

(10) American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethican Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316; 119 S.J. 136;

[1975] 1 All E.R. 504, H.L.

(11) Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A.

(12) Fellowes v. Fisher [1975] 3 W.L.R. 184; 119 S.J. 390; [1975] 2 All E.R. 829, C.A. (13) Stratford (J.T.) & Son Ltd. Lindley [1965] A.C. 269; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 541; 108 S.J. 636; [1964] 3 All E.R. 102; [1964] 2 Lloyds Rep. 133, H.L.

(14) Schandorf v. Zeini [1976] 2 G.L.R. 418, C.A.

(15) Wroth v. Tyler [1973] Ch. 30; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 405; (1972) 117 S.J. 90; [1973] 1 All E.R. 897; 25 P. & C.R. 138.

(16) Adams v. Weare (1784) 1 Bro.C.C. 567.

(17) Selbit v. Goldwyn Ltd. (1923) 56 L.J. News. 305.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order for interim injunction pending the final determination of an action for specific performance for the sale of a house to the applicant. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Mensa-Bonsu for the applicant.

Pobee for the respondent.

[p.111] of [1980] GLR 108

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

The plaintiff by his writ of summons seeks an order for specific performance of an agreement made between him and the defendant for the sale to him of the defendant’s house. This property is known and styled house No. A.F. 5, and is situate at Ahenfie Street, Bekwai in Ashanti. He also claims in the alternative, damages for the breach of the said agreement by the defendant. With leave of the court, the said writ and statement of claim were served on the defendant together with a notice of an application for interim injunction on 7 February 1978. The application for interim injunction was for an order to restrain the threatened sale of house No. A.F. 5 in breach of the agreement between the parties. It is this application for interim injunction which is now under consideration.

It appears that in or around August 1977, the defendant, who was in urgent need of money, agreed to sell, and the plaintiff agreed to buy, house No. A.F. 5, Ahenfie Street, Bekwai, for the sum of ¢30,000. On 30 August 1977, the plaintiff paid to the defendant a sum of ¢4,000 in part-performance of this agreement. Subsequent payments were made by the plaintiff to the defendant in performance of the agreement, and by the end of October 1977, the defendant issued to the plaintiff a receipt as follows:

“Receipt I, the undersigned William Kwasi Donkor acknowledge the receipt of ¢16,000 (Sixteen thousand cedis) being part-payment of the purchase price of (Thirty thousand cedis) ¢30,000 in respect of house No. A.F. 5, Ahenfie Street (Old C.F.A.O.), Bekwai.

This sale of the entire building and its surrounding plot will not include the portion presently occupied by the vendor’s nephew Mr. Dominic Ofosu.

However, in the event of Mr. Dominic Ofosu offering his property for sale the said Mr. Ofosu shall give the purchaser Mr. Agyei-Acheampong the first option to buy the said land including the property thereon. It is our understanding that the present measurement of the land now occupied by the vendor’s nephew is 60 feet by 80 feet, the exact dimension would be delineated by a site plan yet to be drawn up. W. K. Donkor.”

This is the only written memorandum of the agreement extant. It is common ground between the parties that the property was the subject of a mortgage debt of which ¢7,411 was still outstanding.

The applicant contends that it was a condition of the agreement that the sale was to be completed when the property had been redeemed and the title deeds could be handed over to him upon full

[p.112] of [1980] GLR 108 payment of the purchase price. The respondent, on the other hand, asserts that completion of the sale was subject to the applicant going to the bank, either alone or in the company of the respondent, to pay off the outstanding mortgage debt. Therefore, when by 18 November 1977, the applicant had failed or neglected to pay off the outstanding bank loan of ¢7,411 he, the respondent, commenced negotiations with other persons for the sale of the property.

It would indeed be premature and wrong for me to pronounce, without hearing evidence, that the one or the other version was the agreement between the parties. However, an averment in paragraph (9) of the plaintiff ‘s statement of claim that the respondent said, “.. . unless the plaintiff was prepared to pay an additional sum of ¢10,000 over and above the agreed purchase price he would not perform his side of the said agreement,” coupled with the admission by the defendant that he had entered into a second agreement with a Mr. J. P. Cobbina to sell the same property to him for ¢40,000, suggests that it was not the failure to comply with any condition regarding who was to pay off the bank loan which prompted the respondent to enter into negotiations with Mr. J. P. Cobbina, but rather the offer of a higher purchase price.

It is clear from the only written memorandum of the agreement that no time was fixed for the full payment of the purchase price. But even if a contract does not expressly stipulate that time is of the essence of the contract between the parties, equity will imply time to be of the essence where the nature of the contract warrants it; as for instance, on the sale, either of a wasting asset such as a short leasehold: see Hudson v. Temple (1860) 20 Beav. 536; or of a house required for immediate occupation; see Tilley v. Thomas (1867) 3 Ch.App. 61 at p. 67. Equity will also infer that time is of the essence of any agreement for the sale of land where after one party has delayed unreasonably, the other gives him notice requiring performance at a reasonable future date: see Quadrangle Development and Construction Co. v. Jenner [1974] 1 W.L.R. 68, C.A. Time is also of the essence of any agreement where the contract is made conditional upon some act being done either by a fixed date or within a reasonable time: see Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd. v. Cheng [1960] A.C. 115, P.C.

Before I proceed further, I must point out that where a contract does not expressly stipulate that time is of the essence, a party, by reason of undue delay on the part of the other, where it is plain that that other does not intend to proceed with the agreement, is not obliged to give any notice requiring performance of the agreement at a reasonable future date: see In re Stone and Saville’s Contract [1963] 1 W.L.R. 163. It seems, however, that the applicant herein made

[p.113] of [1980] GLR 108 payments in part-performance of the agreement as and when requested by the respondent and there is no allegation that he refused to pay any sum of money when requested by the respondent. It thus appears from the authorities that the respondent was, on the averments of the parties, bound to give notice to the applicant requiring performance of the agreement at a reasonable future date. This, he failed to do.

So far, what we have is an agreement spelt out in a receipt exhibit AA1. In that exhibit, the parties to the agreement are certain; the property, the subject-matter of the agreement, is well-defined and the purchase price is stipulated as ¢30,000. The respondent does not deny that he has received more than half the purchase price from the applicant. There was thus a sufficient memorandum in writing, as well as a sufficient act of part-performance.

Now, land has a special value, the loss of which by the party so entitled cannot be measured in money; so specific performance of a contract to buy or lease land will almost invariably be granted where a sufficient act of part-performance has been executed, and there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the agreement. In my view, a strong prima facie case has been made by the applicant for the relief which he seeks, i.e., specific performance.

Order 50, r. (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), recites:

“(1) When by any contract a prima facie case of liability is established, and there is alleged as matter of defence a right to be relieved wholly or partially from such liability, the Court or a Judge may make an order for the preservation or interim custody of the subject-matter of the litigation, or may order that the amount in dispute be brought into Court or otherwise secured.”

Guided by this rule, our courts have repeatedly granted injunctions where an applicant has made out a prima facie case. In Lardan v. Attorney-General (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 55 at p. 58, Smith J. expressed the view that when dealing with an application for a temporary injunction “the applicant must show a fair prima facie case in support of the right claimed.” In Punjabi Brothers v. Namih (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 381, Sarkodee-Addo J. made it clear that the applicant for an interlocutory injunction must show a strong prima facie case in support of the right claimed. See also Amoah v. West African Examinations Council [1971] 1 G.L.R. 63. But in considering whether to grant such temporary relief, “He must have regard not only to the strength of the claim but also to the strength of the defence, and then decide what is best to be done”: see Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] [p.114] of [1980] GLR 108

1 All E.R. 1023 at p. 1029, C.A. per Lord Denning M.R. And in considering what is best to be done, the court must consider the relative convenience or inconvenience which might result to the parties.

Counsel for the respondent has invited me to abandon all our accustomed practice and to adopt the principles laid down by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R. 504. In that case the House of Lords declared that there was no such rule that an applicant for interlocutory injunction must first establish a prima facie case; and that all that the court need do is to satisfy itself that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. The House of Lords per Lord Diplock said at p. 510:

“… in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial.”

According to counsel, when applying this new rule, the only relevant factor for consideration in the granting or refusal of such relief is the balance of convenience.

I would myself not have hesitated to decline this invitation to adopt this new approach by the English courts had not our Court of Appeal approved of it in Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A. For as already stated, the first rule of Order 50 of L.N. 140A demands that the courts should ascertain whether there is a prima facie case. And the courts of this country have repeatedly adhered to that practice for so long that I would have thought that any departure from the accustomed practice or change in outlook must be grounded on some fundamental and justifiable reason rather than a mere adherence or respect for English authority.

In Fellowes v. Fisher [1975] 2 All E.R. 829 at p. 834, C.A. Lord Denning M.R. said of this new approach to the granting of injunctions:

“The American Cyanamid case was only reported a little while ago, but we have already had two cases in which its effect has been canvassed in this court. It has perplexed the profession. It has been criticised in the New Law Journal. So much that counsel have appealed to us for guidance.”

He then went on to contrast the old with the new approach. He pointed out that the statements made in the American Cyanamid

[p.115] of [1980] GLR 108 case were irreconcilable with statements made in the House of Lords ten years ago in Stratford (J.T.) & Son, Ltd. v. Lindley [1964] 3 All E.R. 102, H.L. Furthermore, the view taken in the American Cyanamid case was that it is not proper to have regard to the relative strength of each party’s case save as a last resort. Lord Diplock in that case said at p. 511:

“. . . where it is apparent on the facts disclosed by evidence as to which there is no credible dispute that the strength of one party’s case is disproportionate to that of the other party. The court is not justified in embarking on anything resembling a trial of the action on conflicting affidavits in order to evaluate the strength of either party’s case.”

The House of Lords per Lord Diplock further stated in their judgment in the American Cyanamid case at p. 511 that, “… there may be many other special factors to be taken into consideration in the particular circumstances of individual cases.” And Lord Denning in Fellowes v. Fisher (supra) is of the opinion, and in which opinion I most humbly concur, that that sentence points a way out of the morass created by the new approach which has been adopted by our Court of Appeal in Vanderpuye v. Nartey (supra). In Fellowes v. Fisher (supra) Lord Denning M.R. stated at p. 836 that:

“These individual cases are numerous and important. They are all cases where it is urgent and imperative to come to a decision. The affidavits may be conflicting. The questions of law may be difficult and call for detailed consideration. Nevertheless, the need for immediate decision is such that the court has to make an estimate of the relative strength of each party’s case. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the court may grant an injunction. If it is a weak case, or is met by a strong defence, the court may refuse an injunction.”

Lord Diplock also stated in the American Cyanamid case at p. 511 that:

“…if the extent of the uncompensatable disadvantage to each party would not differ widely, it may not be improper to take into account in tipping the balance the relative strength of each party’s case. . .”

And Lord Denning M.R. in the Fellowes v. Fisher case at p. 838 is of the opinion, and here again I agree with him that:

“There are many cases in which either party could suffer great disadvantages which could not be adequately compensated in

[p.116] of [1980] GLR 108 damages. In all these it is permissible to consider the relative strength of each party’s case.”

Thus under the old practice, as indeed under the new approach, the balance of convenience has to be considered. And I do so now. But before I proceed further, let me say that in my view, the applicant herein has made out a strong prima facie case and it follows, therefore, that this application is not being made frivolously or vexatiously. It stands to reason that where no prima facie case is made out there will be no serious question for trial by the court. Is there then any real difference between the old and the new approach?

I ask myself: in the event of the applicant’s action succeeding would damages be adequate compensation if this application for interim injunction were refused? It is true that the applicant has not shown by his affidavit that the property in dispute possesses any special quality other than being situated at Ahenfie Street in Bekwai. But the applicant hails from Bekwai and it is reasonable to suppose that he wanted a house of a certain character in Bekwai. Nobody buys a house just because the house is for sale. A house is purchased because it answers certain needs of the purchaser. It may have four bedrooms instead of two. It may be situated at the Accra Airport Residential Area instead of James Town, Accra. There are a host of considerations which may make a particular house desirable to a purchaser, and for which he may not be adequately compensated in damages. As far as the vendor is concerned, all that he is interested in is the purchase price. It does not matter by whom it is paid so long as it is paid as directed and in the appropriate legal tender. On the balance of convenience then, granting this application would not result in serious inconvenience to the respondent, save that he has obtained a higher offer for his property.

Counsel for the respondent has also maintained that in Ghana unless there is approval by the superior landlord to an assignment of land, there can be no date of completion and any agreement prior to that is void. In support of this contention he cites the case of Schandorf v. Zeini [1976] 2 G. L.R. 418 at p. 441, C.A. Counsel for the respondent, however, failed to demonstrate that the consent of the superior landlord was a condition precedent to the disposition of land. In fact by paragraph (4) of the respondent’s supplementary affidavit he says, “I aver that after J. P. Cobbina had paid ¢30,000 out of the purchase price, an application was made to the Bekwaihene for his consent to the assignment.” This is conclusive proof that the consent of the superior landlord is not a condition precedent to transactions in land in this country. This is in accord with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in the judgment of Amissah J.A.

[p.117] of [1980] GLR 108 in Schandorf v. Zeini (supra). He said at pp. 440-441:

“It is common practice that these transactions requiring the Minister’s concurrence are entered into before the conveyance is submitted to the Lands Department for the necessary concurrence. The disposition remains of no effect until the concurrence is given. Without the concurrence it is not void in the sense that it cannot ever be activated thereafter.”

Alternatively, if the assertion that unless there is approval by the superior landlord there can be no date of completion be correct, then there could have been no delay on the part of the applicant since the date of completion could be set only upon obtaining the approval of the superior landlord. In any case, in practice, the superior landlord seldom refuses his consent and where his consent is unreasonably withheld, I see no reason why a court of law cannot order that the agreement be, nonetheless, executed.

Finally, although the respondent was served with the writ of summons together with notice of this application for interim injunction on 7 February 1978, he went on to conclude the sale between him and J. P. Cobbina on 21 February 1978, as evidenced by exhibit X2 attached to his affidavit. This exhibit provides that:

“This is to certify that I the undersigned William Kwasi Donkor of Bekwai-Ashanti have received cash the sum of ten thousand cedis (¢10,000) from Mr. Joseph Peter Cobbina of house No. N.A. 120, Asafo, Kumasi, being full and final payment of the purchase price of my building situate on plot No. A.F. 5, Bekwai-Ashanti sold and delivered by me to him outright. Dated at Kumasi this 21st day of February 1978.”

Thus the very evil that this application sought to avoid appears already to have been accomplished. If I were to order specific performance of this agreement between the parties herein, it would most probably involve the defendant in litigation again with J. P. Cobbina and this would inflict great hardship on him. As the remedy of specific performance is equitable and discretionary, the court will not grant it where it would inflict great hardship on the defendant.

It has been held that where a vendor cannot perform his contract unless he litigates, then except in clear cases, the court is slow to decree specific performance against him, particularly if the proceedings would be against his wife: see Wroth v. Tyler [1973] 2 W.L.R. 405. But to constitute a defence, the hardship envisaged must have existed at the date of the contract. At the date of the contract between the parties herein, there was no other agreement between the defendant and Mr. J. P. Cobbina. And had the defendant not rushed to conclude

[p.118] of [1980] GLR 108 the agreement with J. P. Cobbina while this application was pending the hardship would not have been so acute. Specific performance, therefore, ought not to be refused merely because, owing to events which have happened since the contract was made, the completion of the contract would cause hardship to the defendant: see Adams v. Weare (1784) 1 Bro.C.C. 567. Thus, it would not be unjust to grant an injunction to preserve the status quo pending the hearing and final determination of this suit, especially as the respondent’s conduct, in disregarding the pendency of this application and concluding an agreement with the said J. P. Cobbina, is so reprehensible.

Mr. Pobee for the respondent has also contended that since the applicant heard of the negotiations for sale of the property to the respondent in November 1977, and took action in February 1978, he had been guilty of delay. He quotes the case of Selbit v. Goldwyn Ltd. (1923) 58 L.J. News. 305 to illustrate that less than a month’s delay between the assertion of a right and the issue of a writ may debar the plaintiff if in the meantime the defendant has contracted to let the subject-matter to third parties. It is true that an interlocutory injunction is a relief which is usually granted where there is some urgency and delay by the applicant may defeat the purpose for which it was sought. In the instant case, however, at the time the respondent had notice of this application, he had proceeded no further in his negotiations with J. P. Cobbina than he had with the applicant. It seems that he merely rushed through the agreement, when he received notice of this application, in order to make sure of receiving the higher purchase price.

The circumstances of this case reveal that the applicant first warned the respondent to desist from disposing of the property in breach of the agreement between them. When he found that his warning was not being heeded, he commenced these proceedings. I am of the view that there has not been any delay on the part of the applicant, and if there had been, the conduct of the respondent has been such that he ought not to be heard to quote equitable maxims at the applicant.

In the result I will grant the plaintiff’s application to restrain the respondent from selling the property in dispute to J. P. Cobbina or any other person pending the hearing and final determination of this suit. I also order that this case be set down for hearing immediately after pleadings have been concluded.

I make no order as to costs.

DECISION

Interim injunction granted.

S. O.

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