SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (CA) 8Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

AGBEDOR AND ANOTHER vs. YEBOA [1981] GLR 769

28 July 1980 · CHARLES CRABBE JA · ≈ 14 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 8
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAAGBEDOR AND ANOTHER v YEBOA [1981] GLR 769 [1980] SLR (CA) 8
APAAGBEDOR AND ANOTHER v YEBOA [1981] GLR 769, [1980] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookAGBEDOR AND ANOTHER v YEBOA [1981] GLR 769, [1980] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Barnett v. Cohen [1921] 2 K.B. 461; 90 L.J.K.B. 1307; 125 L.T. 733; 37 T.L.R. 629; 19 L.G.R.

623.

(2) Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Jenkins [1913] A.C. 1; 82 L.J.K.B. 49; 107 L.T. 564; 29 T.L.R. 19; 57 S.J. 27, H.L.

(3) Dalton v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 296; 27 L.J.C.P. 227; 31 L.T. (O.S.) 152; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 711; 6 W.R. 574; 140 E.R. 1098.

(4) Alimatu v. Boameh [1961] 2 G.L.R. 798.

(5) Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341; 23 L.J. Ex. 179; 23 L.T. (O.S.) 69; 18 Jur. 358; 2 W.R.

302.

(6) Heron II, Koufos v. Czarnikow, Ltd. [1967] 3 All E.R. 686; [1967] 1 A.C. 350; [1967] 3 W.L.R.

1491; [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 457, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court dismissing the claim of the appellants for damages for the loss of prospective dependency in a fatal accident suit. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Charles Crabbe J.A.

COUNSEL

Kwame Tetteh for the appellants.

No appearance for or on behalf of the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.

The plaintiffs-appellants (hereafter referred to as the appellants) claimed general damages against the defendant-respondent (hereafter referred to as the respondent) for the negligence of one Gariba Abudulai, a driver of a vehicle allegedly belonging to the respondent. The basis of the claim was that, on or about 8 December 1974, one Simon Moses Modzaka was a passenger on that vehicle. On reaching a place called Kyekyewere Village, the vehicle skidded off its lane into an off-side lane. Simon

[p.771] of [1981] GLR 769

Modzaka, a lad of twenty years met with his death on the spot. The claim was thus for loss of expectation of life and loss of prospective dependency.

The learned trial judge gave judgment for the appellants as the administrators of the estate of Simon Moses Modzaka for a total sum of ¢2,200. This was made up of ¢600 for mental distress and ¢1,500 for loss of expectation of life. Costs of ¢100 were also awarded. The substance of the appeal before this court is that the learned trial judge erred in dismissing the claim for prospective dependency. The learned trial judge in her judgment stated:

“In this case, it is the life of a twenty-year old youngman who had the whole of his life ahead of him; he was on the threshold of making his life. He had not reached the age to have settled prospects. It is not known whether he would have married or what he intended to do with his life. As he had just obtained . . . qualifications . . . one may safely say that he might have become a technician and would. have enjoyed a reasonable life. But it is not by any means a case where the maximum award should be given, because his future had not become definite and it cannot be said with certainty that a twenty-year old boy who had just obtained these two certificates had good prospects of a happy and contented life. A moderate figure should therefore be awarded. I think ¢1,500 is a moderate figure to award for loss of expectation of life.”

With this assessment, I agree. But to an extent. Indeed, counsel for the appellants did not wish to belabour any arguments as to the adequacy of that award. I would thus not press the point. His quarrel, however, was with the dismissal by the learned trial judge of the claim for prospective dependency.

Nor were any arguments raised as to the statutory validity of the award of ¢600 for mental distress. The respondent was not present in court. He was not represented by counsel either. The provisions of section 18 (4) of the Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), limit awards in respect of mental distress to deaths occurring within three years after the coming into force of the Act. Simon died as a result of the accident on 8 December 1974, that is to say, some eight years afterwards. The award of ¢600 is thus wrong in law.

On the evidence, the learned trial judge found that Simon was survived by his father, an uncle, two infant sisters and two infant brothers. They all claimed as dependants. They all fell within the definition of “member of family“ under Act 176. The learned trial judge, however, contended that by virtue of sections 15 and 18 of Act 176 damages could “only be recovered on behalf of or for

[p.772] of [1981] GLR 769 the benefit of those who had actually suffered loss.” The rationale, I presume, being that “there must be evidence by which the court [could] determine the loss sustained by each dependent as a result of the death.” The evidence “must be evidence of [the] pecuniary benefit [which] would have accrued to each dependant during the period of dependency had the deceased not been killed untimely in the accident.”

There was no evidence that Simon had earned a living. There was no evidence that Simon had supported any of the dependants referred to in the evidence. What the evidence reveals was that, before he met with his death, Simon had obtained his City and Guilds Certificate for telecommunications in practical mathematics and in engineering science. He obtained these certificates with distinction in each subject. The evidence was silent on the ambitions of Simon. There was evidence, however, regarding the prospects of a person with the qualifications which Simon had obtained when working with the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation.

On that piece of evidence, the learned trial judge concluded that the “dependency was merely prospective,” relying on the principle of Barnett v. Cohen [1921] 2 K.B. 461 that compensation must depend upon the loss of a breadwinner, that is to say—according to the headnote of that case:

“. . . it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that he has lost by the death of the deceased a mere speculative possibility of pecuniary benefit; in order to succeed it is necessary for him to show that he has lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage.”

In Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Jenkins [1913] A.C. 1, H.L., Viscount Haldane L.C. said at pp. 4-6:

“The basis is not what has been called solatium, that is to say, damages given for injured feelings or on the ground of sentiment, but damages based on compensation for a pecuniary loss. But then loss may be prospective, and it is quite clear that prospective loss may be taken into account. It has been said that this is qualified by the proposition that the child must be shown to have been earning something before any damages can be assessed. I know of no foundation in principle for that proposition either in the statute or in any doctrine of law which is applicable; nor do I think it is really established by the authorities when you examine them . . . I have already indicated that in my view the real question is that which Willes J. defines in one of the cases quoted to us, Dalton v. South

[p.773] of [1981] GLR 769

Eastern Ry. Co. (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 296: ‘Aye or No, was there a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage’?”

McCardie J. explained in Barnett v. Cohen (supra) that the question of reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage was a mixed question of law and fact. He did not think that mere difficulty in assessing damages should be a bar to a plaintiff from recovering damages. He was of the view that a plaintiff should “adduce such evidence as affords a reasonable basis on which to infer that pecuniary damages has been inflicted on the plaintiff.” He then considered a number of decided cases and continued at p. 471:

“I think that the only way to distinguish between the cases where the plaintiff has failed from the cases where he has succeeded is to say that in the former there is a mere speculative possibility of benefit, whereas in the latter there is a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage.”

The learned trial judge, in the instant case, came to the conclusion, relying on Alimatu v. Boameh [1961] 2 G.L.R. 798, that the appellants had merely established, “a speculative probability of some pecuniary benefit which might accrue . . . at some future date.”

On reading the evidence as a whole. I would come to the conclusion that there is evidence upon which to base an assessment of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage, as advanced by Willes J. in Dalton v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 296 and approved by Viscount Haldane L.C. in Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Jenkins (supra). Law does not operate in a vacuum. In such matters as appear on the facts of this case, we cannot—indeed we must not—lose sight of our own social conditions when dealing with questions of dependency. Our family structure, the relationships that normally exist between sons and fathers and between daughters and mothers in this country demand some consideration in matters such as the present.

The law, whether statutory, common law or customary, is the product of social conditions. Account therefore needs to be taken of the characteristics of the systems of our social conditions. The constraints of our social conditions demand cognisance by our legal ideas, especially in such cases as the instant one. From whatever area one comes from in Ghana, to whatever community one belongs, the facts of our social life cannot be ignored.

In situations like ours, where uncles and aunts expect a return from us because they had, in some small measure—perhaps an infinitesimal measure—contributed to our being, where our relations expect that once we are grown up we would be a bit “sensible,” we cannot divorce such practical realities from considerations

[p.774] of [1981] GLR 769 which give rise to claims to dependency. More so with our own fathers and mothers. There may be deviations; but by and large, what I have stated is the norm of our society in such matters.

They have nursed and nurtured us from the cradle. They have provided us with education and other comforts of life. In many cases, they have denied themselves simple comforts in order to provide us with education and the little comforts of our existence. Where they did not have education, they have done everything in their power to give us education. Illiterate as they are, they have sought to make us literate. I do not think that naturally they do not expect some return from us. They know that the contributions that they had made towards our growing up would be compensated for at some stage, and when we are able to earn a living. Knowing the conditions in this country, I do not think I can say that such expectations are not reasonable.

In Barnett v. Cohen (supra) McCardie J. had stated that it is necessary to show “a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit.” This is based on Lord Haldane’s judgment in Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Jenkins (supra) in which Lord Haldane had referred to Willes J’s. statement of “reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage.” But in the view of the learned trial judge, Alimatu v. Boameh (supra) had reduced these to the mere possibility, at some future date, of a speculative probability of some pecuniary benefit which might accrue. I do not think Alimatu v. Boameh went all that far.

Alimatu v. Boameh was decided on the basis of section 2 of the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. By section 2 of that Act, a mother was one of the persons for whose benefit an action could be brought. Brothers and sisters did not come within the category of persons on whose behalf an action could be maintained. Alimatu v. Boameh was an action for the benefit of the brother and sisters of the deceased. The court thus held that the action must fail. It was also held that as there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the first defendant was the driver of the vehicle on the material day, the action against him must fail. It was held, in addition, that the claim against the second defendant-company must also fail: there was no proof that they were the owners of the vehicle at the date of the accident or that they had any interest in it whatever; and even if they had been proved to be the owners of the vehicle, there was no evidence that whoever drove the vehicle on that day, was a servant of the company and was acting in the normal course of his employment. The court, however, did state that to be entitled to damages in an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846-1864—upon which our Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176) is based

[p.775] of [1981] GLR 769 there must be proof of the loss of a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage and that a mere speculative possibility of pecuniary benefit was not enough. Applying those tests to that case, the court came to the conclusion that on the evidence before it, the plaintiff and the houseboy were being supported not by the deceased but by his father and that the deceased, when he contributed to the household expenses, did so for his own benefit.

In the instant case, we are dealing with the issue of prospective dependency. The failures of the plaintiff in Alimatu v. Boameh are not the failures of the appellants in the present case. Where Alimatu failed on the facts, the appellants in the present case had succeeded on the facts. The legal considerations are thus not the same. And because the plaintiff in that case failed on the facts, the court’s dicta based on Barnett v. Cohen were not really germane to the issue before it. They did not form the ratio decidendi of that case.

I would therefore prefer the more reasonable approach of Dalton v. South Eastern Ry. Co. as approved in Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Jenkins. In these cases, such as the present one, what we are dealing with is no speculation at all. We are dealing with the theory of probabilities. The probabilities that Simon would become Peter—the support of the declining years of his father. The majority of the citizens of Ghana—as indeed the majority of all other human beings in the world—do not meet with their death at the age of 20 as did Simon through the negligence of some other person or persons. In other words, what were the chances of the father being looked after by the deceased, had not the accident occurred and Simon had met with this death? In Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341 a rule was stated that:

“Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”

I have quoted this passage because of the use of the word “probable” in the phrase “as the probable result of the breach . . .” The word “probable” is the operative word in the passage quoted. In respect of this, Lord Hodson in Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd. [1967] 3 All E.R. 686 at pp. 707-708, H.L. said;

[p.776] of [1981] GLR 769

“The word ‘probable’ in Hadley v. Baxendale ([1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 461) covers both parts of the rule, and it is of vital importance in applying the rule to consider what the court meant by using this word in its context. The common use of this word is no doubt to imply that something is more likely to happen than not.

In conversation, if one says to another. ‘If you go out in this weather you will probably catch a cold’ is, I think, equivalent to this saying that one believes there is an odds on chance that the other will catch a cold.

The word ‘probable’ need not, however, bear this narrow meaning . . .

A close study of the rule was made by the Court of Appeal in the case of Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v.

Newman Industries Ltd. ([1949] 1 All E.R. 997). The judgment of the court, . . . was delivered by Asquith, L.J., who . . . suggested the phrase ‘liable to result’ as appropriate to describe the degree of probability required. This may be a colourless expression, but I do not find it possible to improve on it.”

The damages recoverable by virtue of the provisions of section 18 (1) (a) of the Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), for our present purposes, are:

“(a) the total of such amounts . . . as the court considers proportionate to the loss resulting from the death to each of the dependants, respectively, for whom or on whose behalf the action is brought, . . .”

And section 18 (5) also states:

“(5) In addition, damages may be awarded in respect of expenses actually incurred by the deceased before his death and in respect of funeral and other expenses incurred by the dependants or the personal representative by reason of the wrongful act.”

In the present case, the learned trial judge awarded ¢600 for mental distress under the provisions of section 18 (1) (b) of the Act, and ¢1,500 for the loss of expectation of life. No claim was made for the “funeral and other expenses incurred by the dependants or the personal representative.” It is without doubt that in this country, fathers do incur expenses as the result of the death of their children. This again is a notorious fact. The provisions of section 18 (5) of the Act confer a discretion on the trial judge to award or not to award damages. The matter was not raised at the trial. But sitting as an appellate court and possessed of the powers

[p.777] of [1981] GLR 769 of the trial court, I would award ¢1,000 damages in respect of funeral expenses.

The real issue for this appeal, however, is the dismissal by the learned trial judge of the claim for prospective dependency. Reading section 18 (1) (a) of the Act, it is clear that damages for prospective dependency could be awarded. And, as already demonstrated by reference to the decided cases, the claim for loss of prospective dependency ought not to have been dismissed. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.

Of the dependants in respect of whom the action was brought, the father was 56 at the time the action was brought in 1975. The two infant sisters were 16 and 12 respectively. The two infant brothers were 10 and 8 respectively. By age 21—and even before that—these minors could be earning a living and the two sisters could even have married. That would diminish or decrease the probable financial dependency of each of them on Simon. In all the circumstances, therefore, I would award a sum of ¢3,000 for loss of prospective dependency. I would also award costs of ¢150 against the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

J. K. E. E.

Scroll to Top