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[1980] SLR (HC) 11High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

OPPONG vs. ADVANCE PRESS CO., LTD. [1980] GLR 842

25 February 1980 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 11
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OSCOLAOPPONG v ADVANCE PRESS CO., LTD. [1980] GLR 842 [1980] SLR (HC) 11
APAOPPONG v ADVANCE PRESS CO., LTD. [1980] GLR 842, [1980] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookOPPONG v ADVANCE PRESS CO., LTD. [1980] GLR 842, [1980] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Hulton (E.) & Co. v. Jones [1910] A.C. 20; 79 L.J.K.B. 198; 101 L.T. 831; 26 T.L.R. 128; sub nom. Jones v. Hulton (E.) & Co., Ltd. 54 S.J. 116, H.L.

(2) Eastwood v. Holmes (1858) 1 F. & F. 347.

(3) Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd. [1944] A.C. 116; [1944] 1 All E.R. 495; 113 L.J.K.B. 251; 170 L.T. 362; 60 T.L.R. 310; 88 S.J. 143, H.L.

(4) Byers v. Martin (1875) 25 Armer R. 755.

(5) Le Fanu v. Malcomson (1848) 1 H.L. Cas. 637; 13 L.T. (o.s.) 61; 9 E.R. 910.

(7) Anthony v. University College of Cape Coast [1973] 1 G.L.R. 299.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiffs claiming damages for defamation. The facts are set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Peter Ala Adjetey for the plaintiffs.

A. Q. A. Archampong for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

On or about 22 May 1973, the plaintiffs issued out of this court a writ of summons against the defendants with the following indorsement:

“¢20,000 damages for libel published of an concerning their grand and great-grandparent one Kai Nka now deceased which said libel is defamatory of the plaintiffs and appeared in a pamphlet entitled ‘Observance of Funeral Rites of the late Otublohum Chiefs and Elders’ as follows: ‘However, Kai Nka claimed that, being a queenmother, her son was the rightful heir and one night in December 1930, she burgled the stoolroom, broke the door and stole the stool, carrying if off to Ankra’s house.”

On September 5 that same year a five-paragraph statement of claim on behalf of the plaintiffs was filed which also read:

“(1) The first and the third plaintiffs are grandchildren of the late Kai Nka, deceased, stool mother of Otuoblohum, and direct descendants of Otu Brafo the founder of Otublohum. The second plaintiff is the daughter of the first plaintiff.

(2) The defendants are a limited liability company which printed and published a pamphlet entitled ‘Observance of Funeral Rites of the late Otuoblohum Chiefs and Elders.’ (3) In the said pamphlet appeared the following words concerning the said late Kai Nka, the ancestress of the plaintiffs:

‘In this way it happened that a woman, Kai NKa, of the Ankra house, was a stool washer, or stood mother, of the Otublohum stool. This woman started calling herself, in

[p.843] of [1980] GLR 842

English, ‘queenmother,’ trading on the general ignorance of Ga custom and the widespread knowledge of the Ashanti custom (popularized by the work of Captain Rattray) whereby a

‘queenmother’ is the mother of the stool heir. There no such queenmother among the Ga.

However, Kai Nka claimed that, being a queenmother, her son was the rightful heir; and one night in December 1930, she burgled the stoolroom, broke the door and stole the stool, carrying it off to Ankra’s house.

The officials and electors of Otublohum, who had not then — and still have not — nominated a candidate, summoned her for criminal burglary; but on the advice of British officials, had the case transferred from the police court to the Ga State Council, on the grounds that it was a ‘stool affair’ and police cases, around stool affairs were undesirable.’ (4) The plaintiffs will contend that the above extract and particularly the portion beginning with ‘and one night in December 1930’ and ending with ‘to Ankra’s house ‘ is grossly defamatory of the said Kai Nka and is also defamatory of the plaintiffs in the sense that the publication has besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs since by reason thereof, the plaintiffs will be considered to be the descendants of a thief or a burglar.

(5) The plaintiffs contend that by the publication of the said words they have been much injured in their credit and reputation and have suffered damage.

WHEREFORE the plaintiffs’ claim as per the writ of summons.”

The defendants on 18 February 1974 filed the following statement of defence:

“(1) The defendants were not in a position to admit or deny paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim.

(2) Paragraph 2 of the statement of claim is admitted.

(3) In answer to paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, the defendants say that the publication complained of was a lithographical reproduction of historical facts as contained in a volume entitled ‘Social Organisation of the Ga People’ written by M. J. Field, B. S., Ph. D. (London), a social anthropologist to the Gold Coast Government, and published by the Crown Agents for the Colonies on behalf of the Gold Coast Government in 1940, and in which said volume the passage complained of appears at page 191.

[p.845] of [1980] GLR 842

(4) The defendants further say that the said volume, published in 1940, on behalf of the Government of the Gold Coast, is an accepted standard historical work, and an ancient document, the contents whereof have remained unchallenged for the past 33 years.

(5) In answer to paragraph 4 of the statement of claim, the defendants say that the words complained of do not point to the plaintiffs personally, which is the true test of actionability, and cannot be referable to the plaintiffs.

(6) Accordingly, the defendants deny that the plaintiffs have suffered any damage, and are therefore not entitled to recover the damages claimed or at all.

(7) Save and excepting as hereinbefore expressly or tacitly admitted, the defendants deny each and every of the plaintiffs’ allegations of fact, as if the same were set out in extenso and traversed seriatim.”

And on 13 March 1974 the following issues were set down and agreed for the trial of the case:

“(a) whether or not the first and the third plaintiffs are grandchildren of the late Kai Nka, deceased, stool

mother of Otublohum, and direct descendants of Otu Brafo, the founder of Otublohum;

(b) whether or not the second plaintiff is the daughter of the first plaintiff;

(c) whether or not the words complained of in this action are contained in the book referred to at paragraph 3 of the statement of claim;

(d) whether or not the said book mentioned at paragraph 3 of the statement of claim is “accepted standard historical work”;

(e) whether or not the said book is an ancient document;

(f) whether or not the contents of the said book “have remained unchallenged for the past 33 years; and (g) whether or not the words complained of are actionable at the instance of the plaintiff”.

The facts thereafter show a number of adjournments until the case came before me on 2 February 1980 for hearing. On that day, I invited learned counsel for the plaintiffs to satisfy the court whether on the face of the pleadings and the issue as set down as (g) in the plaintiffs’ summons for directions, the plaintiffs could maintain their action in its present form. Mr. S.N. Asante who held the brief for Mr. Peter Adjetey for the plaintiffs asked and was given an

[p.846] of [1980] GLR 842

adjournment to enable Mr. Adjetey himself to come and argue the point. On 11 February 1980, Mr. Adjetey appeared and argued that on the face of the pleadings the plaintiffs could maintain their action in its present form.

Learned counsel argued that the publication complained of, on its face was defamatory of the late Kai Nka a great-grandparent of the plaintiffs. Continuing learned counsel submitted that the defendant do not deny the publication of the matter of and concerning the deceased and that they knew at the time of the publication that Kai Nka was dead. According to counsel what the plaintiffs were complaining about was that the publication touched and concerned them. Counsel further argued that evidence would be brought to show that all who read the publication understood it to concern the plaintiffs and that this had lowered the image of the plaintiffs in the estimation of right thinking members of the society.

Learned counsel submitted that it was true the publication did not mention the names of the plaintiffs; he however contended that if it was established that the words published touched and concerned them it was not open to the defendants to say that they did not intend to refer to the plaintiffs. Counsel argued that where the publication was ex facie defamatory the questions of law that followed were: (a) whether the publication touched and concerned the plaintiffs, and (b) whether the publication was privileged absolutely or qualifiedly. Counsel therefore submitted that the pleadings provided sufficient material on the face upon which the plaintiffs by their relationship with the late Kai Nka could maintain their action in its present form.

One of the cardinal and established principles of the law of defamation is that the events complained of must be published “of the plaintiff.” To succeed therefore in an action of defamation, the plaintiffs must not only prove that the defendant published the words and that they were defamatory. He must also identify himself as the person defamed. It is an essential element of the cause of action that the words complained of should be published of the plaintiff.

There is no doubt that on the face of the publication about which the plaintiffs are complaining in this action that the words ex facie impute criminality to the deceased Kai Nka and therefore prima facie defamatory of her. There is also no doubt that on the face of the pleadings that the plaintiffs claim to be descendants of the late Kai Nka. But the question to answer is whether the libel designates the plaintiffs in such a way as to let those who know them

[p.847] of [1980] GLR 842

understand that they were the persons meant. It is now settled law that it is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person defamed, per Lord Shaw in Hulton (E.) & Co. v. Jones [1910] A.C. 20 at p. 26, H.L.

It is not in dispute that the publication in issue in this action was made at a time the defendants very well knew that Kai Nka was dead and therefore the persons likely to complain about any defamatory remarks published of and concerning the deceased are the members of her family including her descendants like the plaintiffs. Such persons being members of the family of the deceased are considered as a class or group of persons of which the plaintiffs merely form a part. This brings us to the law relating to defamation of a class. The law here is that where the words complained of reflect on a body of class of persons generally, no particular member of that body or class or family can maintain an action.

Willes J. said in Eastwood v. Holmes (1958) 1 F. & F. 347 at p. 349 that, “if a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual.” The test here is “whether on their true construction the defamatory words were published of and concerning the individual plaintiff. Unless this can be answered in the affirmative he has no cause of action”: see Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd. [1944] A.C. 116 at p. 123, H.L. per Lord Russell of Killowen.

So where the plaintiff was a member of a jury and the defendant in a newspaper article pronounced the verdict of the jury to be “infamous” and added that “we cannot express the contempt which should be felt for these twelve men who have thus not only offended public opinion, but have done injustice to their oaths.” It was held that the plaintiff could maintain a separate action: Byers v. Martin (1875) 25 Armer R. 755. And so also will an action lie where a defamatory matter appears only to reflect on a class of individuals but the words are capable of being shown to point to any one individual at the suit of such individual: see le Fanu v. Malcomson (1848) 1 H.L. Cas. 637.

A critical examination of the publication complained of, does not in any way show how the present plaintiffs as individual members of the family of the late Kai Nka have been singled out and identified as having been individually defamed in addition to the late Kai Nka herself to satisfy the test enunciated in the knupffer case (supra). No innuendo has been pleaded nor has any special circumstance been pleaded under which the publication was made so as to show that persons who know the plaintiffs would make out that they are the persons defamed: see Eastwood v. Holmes (supra).

Paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim which seems to connect the plaintiffs’ relationship with the deceased does not go beyond merely establishing that the plaintiffs are descendants of the deceased. This status of the plaintiffs in relation to the deceased is of a kind enjoyed not only by the plaintiffs but one they have enjoyed in common with all the other descendants of the late Kai Nka. The plaintiffs have not by their pleadings shown how they alone of all the descendants have been defamed.

To permit the plaintiffs’ action as it stands now, would mean that each individual member of the late Kai Nka’s family including even the infant members would be entitled to maintain an action on the said publication so long as they can claim the defence of disability to defeat the limitation of action. This is exactly what the law does not allow. Had the plaintiffs gone beyond merely stating that they are descendants of the deceased and pleaded matters showing the circumstances surrounding the publication complained of from which they could be identified by people who know them, the situation would have been different.

I have not found it necessary to consider the customary law aspect of this case because libel is held to be unknown to customary law: see my decision in Anthony v. University College of Cape Coast [1973] 1 G.L.R. 299.

In the result, the plaintiffs having failed to show that on their true construction the words complained of were published of and concerned them, on their pleadings, cannot as individual members of the late Kai Nka’s family maintain their action which is hereby dismissed.

DECISION

Judgment for the defendants.

D. F. L.

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