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[1980] SLR (HC) 13High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE FORSON [1980] GLR 529

19 May 1980 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 63 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte FORSON [1980] GLR 529 [1980] SLR (HC) 13
APAREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte FORSON [1980] GLR 529, [1980] SLR (HC) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte FORSON [1980] GLR 529, [1980] SLR (HC) 13 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1978] G.L.R. 212, C.A.

(2) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 223 reversed [1968] 2 Q.B.

862; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382; [1967] 2 All E.R. 986, C.A. restored [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163; [1969] 1 All E.R. 208, H.L.

(3) Republic v. Special Tribunal, Ex parte Akosah, High Court, Accra, 17 March 1980, unreported; reversed Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592, C.A.

(4) R. v. Brisbane; Ex parte Treasurer of Queensland 11 Q.L.J. 77.

(5) Rieken v. Justices for the Yoke Peninsula District [1908] A.C. 454; 78 L.J.P.C. 45; 99 L.T. 529; 24 T.L.R. 821, P.C.

(6) Bradlaugh; Ex parte (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509; 47 L.J.M.C. 105; 38 L.T. 680; 42 J.P. 583; 26 W.R. 758, D.C.

(7) Republic v. Director-General of Prisons; Ex parte Nti [1980] G.L.R. 527, C.A.

(8) Campell v. Brown (1829) 3 Wils & Sh. 441, H.L. (SC.)

(9) R. v. Gosse (1860) 3 El. & El.277; 121 E.R.446.

(10) Evans v. McLoughlan (1861) 4 L.T. 31; 25 J.P. 211; 7 Jur. (N.S.) (1253); 4 Macq. 89, H.L.

(11) Andrews v. Mitchell [1905] A.C. 78; 74 L.J.K.B. 333; 91 L.T. 537, H.L.

(12) Wayman v. Perserverance Lodge of Cambridgeshire Order of United Brethren Friendly Society [1917] 1 K.B. 677; 86 L.J.K.B. 243; 116 L.T. 14; 33 T.L.R. 90.

(13) Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. [1955] 1 W.L.R. 380; [1956] A.C. 736; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 888; [1956] 1 All E.R. 855, H.L.

(14) R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574; [1957] 2 W.L.R. 498; 101 S.J.

248; sub nom. Re Gilmore’s Application [1957] 1 All E.R. 796, C.A.

[p.533] of [1980] GLR 529 (15) R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 961; [1960] 2 All E.R. 385; 104 S.J. 464; 58 L.G.R. 348, D.C.

(16) Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473, S.C.

(17) Fosters Case (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 56; 77 E.R. 1222.

(18) R. v. Smith (1670) 1 Mod. 44.

(19) R. v. Plowright (1686) 3 Mod. Rep. 94; 2 Show 458; 87 E.R. 60.

(20) Groenvelt v. Burrell (1679) 1 Ld. Raym. 454; 91 E.R. 1202.

(21) R. v. Moreley (1760) 2 Burr. 1040; 97 E.R. 696.

(22) R. v. Jukes (1800) 8 Term. Rep. 542; 101 E.R. 1536.

(23) R. v. Cashiobury Hundred Justices (1823) 3 Dow. Ry. 35; 26 Rev. R. 604.

(24) Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench).

(25) R. v. Gillyard (1848) 12 Q.B. 527.

(26) R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) 1 Q.B. 467.

(27) R. v. Oxford Electoral Registration Officer; Ex parte Smith; see R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith (supra).

(28) R. v. Worthington-Evans, Ex parte Madan [1959] 2 Q.B. 145; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 908; [1959] 2 All E.R. 457.

(29) Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, C.A. (30) R. v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859; 80 L.J.K.B. 185; 103 L.T. 262; 74 J.P. 361; 26 T.L.R. 663; 8 L.G.R. 744.

(31) R. v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313. (32) Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd. v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308.

(33) Agbleta v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 445, C.A.

(34) Republic v. District Magistrate, Keta; Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459.

(35) Forson v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 138.

(36) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394. (37) R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Armah [1968] A.C. 192; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 828; [1966] 3 All E.R. 177, H.L.

(38) Kwakye v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 647, S.C.

(39) R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128; 91 L.J.P.C. 146; 127 L.T. 437; 38 T.L.R. 541; 27 Cox C.C. 253, P.C.

[p.534] of [1980] GLR 529 (40) Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223; [1947] 2 All E.R. 680; [1948] L.J.R. 190; 177 L.T. 641; 122 J.P. 55; 63 T.L.R. 623; 92 S.J. 26; 45 L.G.R.

635, C.A.

(41) Umodu v. Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 101.

(42) Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] A.C. 315; [1944] 2 All E.R. 13, 113 L.J.K.B.

394; 171 L.T. 78; 109 J.P. 1; 60 T.L.R. 461; 88 S.J. 255; sub nom. R. v. Stirland (1945) 30 Cr.

App. R. 40, H.L.

(43) Sey v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal. Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, p. 8. (44) Tormekpey v. Ahiable [1975] 2 G.L.R. 432, C.A.

(45) Togbe Fiti IV v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 33.

(46) Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193, C.A.

(47) R. v. Clewer (1953) 37 Cr. App.R.37, C.C.A.

(48) R. v. Bolton [1841] 1 Q.B. 66; Arn.; & H. 261; 4 Per. & Dav. 679; 10 L.J.M.C. 49; 5 J.P. 370; 5 Jur . 1154.

(49) Cave v. Mountain (1840) 1 Man. & G. 257; 1 Scott N.R. 132; 9 L.J.M.C. 90, 4 J.P. 572. (50) R. v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232; [1938] 4 All E.R. 32; 108 L.J.K.B. 27; 159 L.T. 508;

102 J.P. 497; 55 T.L.R. 4; 82 S.J. 869; 37 L.G.R. 1, C.A.

(51) R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 161; 116 J.P.54; 96 S.J. 29; 2 P & C.R. 261; 50 L.G.R. 193, C.A. (52) Russel v. Norfolk (Duke of) [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, 65 T.L.R. 225; 93 S.J. 132, C.A. (53) Company (In re A) [1980] 2 W.L.R. 241; [1980] 1 All E.R. 284, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for certiorari to quash a judgment delivered by the special tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under A.F.R.C.D 23, s. 3. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

E. N. Moore for the applicant.

J. E. K. Appiah, Special Prosecutor (with him B. Akwetey and Naval-Lt. Assassie Gyimah, for the respondent.

Kaleo-Bio, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

On 24 March 1980, Mr. E. N. Moore, a one-time Attorney-General and Commissioner of Justice in this Republic, made an ex parte application for and on behalf of the applicant herein “praying for leave for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment of the special tribunal and for such further order or orders as to this honourable court may seem fit.” The judgment of the special tribunal established by section 1 of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 23), sought to be questioned was a judgment given against the applicant in a case entitled the Republic v. Bernard Aidoo Forson.

It was a judgment founded on two counts of criminal charges preferred against the applicant. The charges in the counts said to arise from the Archer Report on the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board Committee of Inquiry are:

(1) Obtaining an advantage by using his official position in the public service contrary to section 3 (1)

(a) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 3), and

(2) Doing acts with intent to sabotage the economy of Ghana contrary to section 3 (1) (h) of A.F.R.C.D 3.

After what to all intents and purposes looked like a summary trial, the tribunal delivered its judgment on 4 February 1980 and in the said judgment after reviewing the case against the applicant, it found him guilty, convicted him accordingly and sentenced him to a term of three years penal labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. It is the said judgment of the special tribunal which the applicant by his counsel is seeking to have quashed by praying in aid the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by means of the remedy of certiorari.

As I said at the commencement of this ruling, the ex parte application was made on 24 March 1980 and in granting leave, I intimated to counsel that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1978] G.L.R. 212 may create some difficulties and I would wish to hear arguments at the proper time.

The single argument advanced at the hearing of the application for leave was that the special tribunal did not at any stage of its proceedings follow the procedure for criminal trials specifically laid down for it in the enabling enactment creating the tribunal, namely, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23). The relevant provision said to be violated is section 5 (1) thereof and it is in the following terms:

“The Special Tribunal shall in criminal trials before it, adopt the procedure for summary trials.” I almost refused to give leave but on second thoughts I gave leave in view of the illuminating decision of Browne J. in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission delivered on 29 July 1966 and reported in [1969] 2 A.C. 223 which was reversed by the Court of Appeal but restored by the House of Lords and reported in [1969] 2 A.C. 147.

[p.536] of [1980] GLR 529

On 18 April 1980, pursuant to the order of this court granting leave, Mr. E. N. Moore sought to move the court on notice to the registrar of the special tribunal for an order for certiorari to quash the said decision of the said special tribunal given as I have already indicated on 4 February 1980. In the meantime, on 16 April 1980, Mr. J. E. K. Appiah, the Special prosecutor, who announced himself as counsel for the special tribunal, filed a notice of intention to raise preliminary points of law. The preliminary points of law filed are:

“(1) That in view of the provisions of section 7(2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 which have been incorporated in the 1979 Constitution by virtue of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the said Constitution, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application;

(2) That in the alternative, the application raises a matter of question of law (namely, whether in view of the provisions referred to above the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application) and that in the event, the High Court should stay the present proceedings and refer the said question of law to the Supreme Court for determination under article 118 (2) of the Constitution.”

I notice that in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah, High Court, Accra, 17 March 1980, unreported, preliminary points of law worded in the same language as these preliminary points with no change in phraseology whatsoever, were also filed before the High Court presided over by my learned brother Agyepong J. I shall in the course of this decision consider the approach adopted by Agyepong J. in dealing with these so-called preliminary points. Suffice it to say at this juncture that, on hearing the argument of counsel, I peremptorily overruled the objections to the jurisdiction of this court and remarked that I would give full reasons for this refusal to surrender jurisdiction after the substantial application for certiorari has been fully argued before me.

I also adjourned further hearing of the motion, on application of the counsel for the special tribunal to 2 April 1980 and ordered that the Attorney-General be served with all documents so far filed in the case to enable him to appear on the adjourned date to consider in what manner he could advance and protect the interests of the Republic. In making the order for the Attorney-General to be served, I was thinking of the views expressed by Griffiths C.J. in R. v. Brisbane; Ex parte Treasurer of Queensland 11 Q.L.J. 77. On the right of the British Crown to participate so to speak in proceedings for certiorari when he said:

[p.537] of [1980] GLR 529

“. . . the Crown is entitled at any moment to invoke the aid of the superior court in the assertion of a pretended jurisdiction. That right was co-extensive with the right of the Crown to ask for a writ of certiorari.”

Mr. J. E. K. Appiah, of course, appeared as he was entitled to so appear for the special tribunal. Clearly as Lord Collins reading the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rieken v. Justices for the Yorke Peninsula District [1908] A.C. 454 at p. 457, conceded, members of inferior tribunals (as the special tribunal in this case) are entitled to discharge “their duty in instructing counsel” to appear for them.

The preliminary argument directed at impugning the jurisdiction of this court took place in the absence of the Attorney-General or his representative and it is because I was anxious to avoid a repetition of that at the adjourned hearing, that I ordered the Attorney-General to be served. The argument on the preliminary objection proceeded in an unhappy atmosphere.

I must remark (in fairness to counsel for the special tribunal, Mr. J. E. K. Appiah) that when he commenced his argument, I interrupted to observe that in the light of modern authorities I did not think much of the preliminary points filed but that I was nevertheless willing to be convinced by argument that these points have substance. I made these remarks with, inter alia, the Anisminic case (supra) in mind as well as the leading English case Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509, D.C. and I said so. Counsel was visibly shaken and incensed and he censured me for apparently taking a point of view when he was as yet to develop his argument.

With the experience of hindsight, I think learned counsel’s point is probably not untenable and frankly, I am not sure I can justifiably say it was well taken. I must confess, though, that I was uneasy and a little unhappy at the time at counsel’s retort, nevertheless, I accept the position that although the temptation to do so must be avoided, human nature being what it is, an emotional element cannot always and at all times be totally excluded in the judicial endeavour in search of justice. But as long as the situation does not degenerate to deflect the attention of the court and counsel from the task in hand, I think the judicial process will not suffer.

Be that as it may, I have a duty to indicate now the reasons why I overruled the apparently carefully drafted preliminary points filed on behalf of the respondent tribunal. To do so, it is necessary to consider the arguments very vigorously but with respect tendentiously advanced by counsel in support of the preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this court. Counsel first referred me to the case of

[p.538] of [1980] GLR 529

Republic v. Director-General of Prisons; Ex parte Nti reported in [1980] G.L.R. 527, a decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on 21 November 1979. He drew my attention to the wording of A.F.R.C.D 23, s. 7(2) which reads:

“(2) It shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any action or proceedings whatsoever for the purpose of questioning any decision, judgment, finding, ruling, order or proceeding of the Special Tribunal; and for the removal of doubt, it shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any application for an order or writ in the nature, of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, injunction or declaration in respect of any decision, judgment, finding, ruling, order or proceeding of the Special Tribunal.”

(The emphasis is mine.) He also referred me to section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979 which provides:

“(7) The provisions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters)

Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 23) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary.”

In the light of these provisions, counsel made the startling submission that section 17 (7) of the said transitional provisions gives the special tribunal a constitutional status which is not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. The submission did not end there. With the purported support of the Court of Appeal decision in Ex parte Nti (supra) an amazing and rather extravagant claim was urged on me. With unbridled vehemence counsel exclaimed and in its unadulterated form I sat down hereunder counsel’s ipsissima verba as follows:

“No court has supervisory jurisdiction over the special court”! A.F.R.C.D 23 overrides the Constitution! In view of the provisions of section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D 23, no court, not even the Supreme Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the decision of the special tribunal.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The status claimed here for the special tribunal must indeed conjure up in the mind’s eye the spectre of the chilling absolutism of an ancient monarchical despot. This “No court! No court! rhapsody, awakening (as it must) embarrassing memories of yesteryears; pitiful memories that do no justice to an unfortunate era of bygone days, must, I think, be left alone in the limbo of a past that is better forgotten. On a political forum past or present, it must grate on the

[p.539] of [1980] GLR 529 ears and cannot advance the forging of a healthy legal system but in a court of law it must surely be intolerable, for it ignores the great learning which countless generations of common law judges have successively and successfully built over the years painstaking in vindication of justice and the rule of law.

Certainly these specious submissions which were not supported by any authorities must be considered to be insensitive to a stream, nay, a deluge of common law authorities traceable at least in Britain from the beginning of the seventeenth century in unbroken succession to modern times.

In this respect, I am remindful of the Scottish case which went to the House of Lords and the impeccable statement of the principle by Lord Lyndhurst L.C. in Campbell v. Brown (1829) 3 Wils & Sh. 441 at p. 445 and I recall the classic statement of Cockburn C.J. in R. v. Gosse (1860) 3 E1. & El. 277 at p. 281 and the decision of the House of Lords in Evans v. Mcloughlan (1861) 4 L.T. 31. I speak of the judgment of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Andrews v. Mitchell [1905] A.C. 78 at pp. 81-82, H.L. and the speeches of Lord Davey and Lord Robertson at pp. 82 and 83 respectively in that case. These were judgments which were quoted with approval and faithfully followed in Wayman v. Perserverance Lodge of Cambridgeshire Order of United Brethren Friendly Society [1917] 1 K.B. 677. I refer to the leading case of Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509, a landmark in the history of certiorari, and the epoch-making judgment of Cockburn C.J. in that case which has been followed times without number and consistently quoted as the locus classicus. I am not forgetful of the dissenting judgment of the lucid Lord Reid in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] A.C. 736 at pp. 764-766, H.L. as well as the dissenting judgment of Lord Somervell of Harrow at pp. 772-773 of that case. I am thinking of the views of the inimitable Denning L.J. (as he then was) expressed so admirably in his decision in R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574 at p. 586, C.A. and the opinion of Lord Parker in R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133 at p. 142, D.C. And finally I think the majority judgment of the House of Lords per Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Pearce (with Lords Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Pearson dissenting) as well as the brilliant decision at first instance of Browne J. in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147 are respectful authority for the proposition best stated curiously in the dissenting opinion of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at p. 182 in the Anisminic case. There the noble lord said:

“The control which is exercised by the High Court over inferior tribunals (a categorising but not a derogatory description) is of a supervisory but not of an appellate nature. It enables

[p.540] of [1980] GLR 529 the High Court to correct errors of law if they are revealed on the face of the record. The control cannot, however, be exercised if there is some provision (such as a ‘no certiorari’ clause) which prohibits removal to the High Court. But it is well settled that even such a clause is of no avail if the inferior tribunal acts without jurisdiction or exceeds the limits of its jurisdiction.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In spite of this settled legal position it is now said that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (the sovereign legislature, that existed in this unhappy Republic from 4 June to 24 September 1979) has promulgated a Decree (A.F.R.C.D 23) which has succeeded in laying down in its section 7 (2) a formula by which a court is given limited jurisdiction which cannot be called in question under a constitutional government when the limited jurisdiction is exceeded. I will not say that it is impossible to devise such a formula. But I think that it is clearly an abuse of the legislative power and an irresponsible exercise of their functions if legislators indulge in a search for such a formula without appreciating and providing for its inherent dangers or taking account of the considerations which for centuries have guided the courts in their didactic exposition and criticism of the harmful consequences of such pernicious formula. In R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore (supra), Romer L.J. said at p.587:

“I therefore think (and I have said as much before) that it is not in the public interest that inferior tribunals of any kind should be ultimate arbiters on questions of law.” Whatever the irresponsible conduct may be (which observers may feel compelled to level at the legislature that enacted A.F.R.C.D 23) I have no doubt, speaking for myself, that they are not guilty of propounding any such pernicious legislation.

I am still dealing with the preliminary objection. Like Agyepong J. in Republic v. Special Tribunal: Ex parte Akosah (supra) I found no difficulty at all in rejecting as misconceived the second preliminary objection filed. Commenting on how he dealt with the second ground of objection, Agyepong J. quoted the well-known dictum of Bannerman C.J. in the Supreme Court case of Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473 at p.478 where the learned Chief justice had indicated that it was not “every submission alleging as an issue the determination of a question of interpretation of the Constitution“ that must be referred to the Supreme Court. And this is what Agyepong J. then said:

“I summarily dismissed the second ground of objection as misconceived. What I am being called upon to interprete is A.F.R.C.D 23, that is a piece of legislation and not an article

[p.541] of [1980] GLR 529 of the 1979 Constitution . . . Apart from that, it is not every question of interpretation of an article of the Constitution, 1979, that should be referred to the Supreme Court under article 118 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. Where no difficulty of interpretation exists, there is no need for the High Court to refer the article or any matter contained therein to the Supreme Court for interpretation.”

I am in entire agreement with these views of Agyepong J.A. contrary view is bristled with insurmountable difficulties and problems. This country operates now under a constitution. A question affecting the Constitution can in theory be raised in almost all cases given the ingenuity of lawyers and the subtlety of the law. Consider a simple case of stealing or assault before a district court grade II. This is a court existing in the legal system before the Constitution, 1979, was promulgated.

Whereas the High Court and the Court of Appeal existing immediately before the Constitution, 1979, came into force, the Constitution left the establishment of inferior courts to Parliament in the future. So far Parliament has not yet established any. It is easy therefore to argue that the existing district courts grade I and grade II are not known to the present Constitution and it is therefore unconstitutional for these courts to sit. Admittedly an argument can also be advanced to support the constitutional propriety of these courts. Again take any cause of action, for instance, a simple case founded in negligence in the High Court. Suppose the defendant after pleadings are closed, challenges the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the case by referring the court to article 26 (12) of the Constitution, 1979. The article provides:

“(12) An adjudicating authority for the determination of the existence or extent of a civil right or obligation shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be established by law and shall be independent and impartial; and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by a person before any such adjudicating authority the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.”

Suppose, he the defendant, argues that he wants the extent or existence of the right to damages claimed against him to be determined by an adjudicating authority established under article 26 (12). The plaintiff submits that the argument, is specious, but the defendant wants the matter referred to the Supreme Court for determination. The point is that rival arguments are being advanced based on the interpretation of the Constitution and if Mr. J. E. K. Appiah is right or Agyepong J.

[p.542] of [1980] GLR 529 is wrong, then the negligence case and simple assault or stealing cases should be referred to the Supreme Court for a decision and while awaiting the result the district courts and the High Courts, I suppose, are not to function. So outrageous a proposition can hardly be the intention of the framers of the Constitution.

In my view it is plausible in every court case to raise a constitutional issue of a sort and if the utilitarian principle so ably enunciated by Bannerman C.J. in the Maikankan case is not constantly kept in mind, the Supreme Court will be inundated with problems which it can never conveniently handle. On the authority of the Maikankan case, I summarily dismissed the second preliminary objection. It was, in fact, never seriously canvassed before me.

Preliminary ground (1) is the pillar of counsel’s main objection to the jurisdiction of this court. As formulated and argued, it is easy to understand: This is a simple application for certiorari. And then the argument proceeds: Section 7 (2) of AFRCD 23, says in plain language that it shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any action or proceedings whatsoever for the purpose of questioning any decision, etc. of the special tribunal and for the removal of doubt recourse to the prerogative writs or orders including certiorari were also discouraged in rather very plain language. This has been called an “ouster clause” in the books and its application is not new to the common law. In the course of the arguments before me the following dialogue took place:

“By court: Mr. Appiah, if the special tribunal were to cause someone to be arrested for assault, a misdemeanour and to try him and convict him and sentence him to a prison term of twenty years instead of the term not exceeding three years provided by law, is it your submission that no court in this realm has jurisdiction to question that decision when assault is not a matter on which the special tribunal has been given jurisdiction?

Mr. Appiah: You cannot posit a hypothetical situation to assume jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and it can be taken away by law. So if the law has taken away jurisdiction not even the worst hypothetical situation can confer jurisdiction.”

I did not understand this answer and so the dialogue continued:

“By court: Do you mean by that, that in the hypothetical case I have given, no court, not even the Supreme Court, can interfere? Mr. Appiah: Yes that is what I mean.”

I believe it will be worthwhile in view of counsel’s answers to make a brief survey of the history of the “ouster clause” in the British legal system, the system which we inherited.

[p.543] of [1980] GLR 529

The principle of the certiorari is very old indeed in English law. Cases of certiorari were not frequent in the Year Books until the latter half of the reign of Henry VI but in any event from the beginning of the fifteenth century the remedy was recognised. In 1414 for instance, during the reign of Henry V a statute was passed directed at the practice then prevailing of condemned prisoners procuring the writ and getting released on bail: see 2 Hen. V., Stat.I, c.2: “Writs of certiorari and corpus cum causa.”

It was always obtained as of right by the Crown but the subject only obtained it on cause shown. The jurisdiction of the courts to grant it was never doubted. With the passage of time the desire of the legislature to attain finality in some types of litigation led to the introduction of the ouster clauses in some legislation. Lord Denning L.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574, C.A. made a praiseworthy effort to trace the history of these ouster clauses. I have profited from his labours. He demonstrated that the seed of the applicable principle which was to be used in interpreting these clauses was apparently sown albeit inadvertently by Lord Coke in Fosters Case (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 56 and nurtured by Kelynge C.J. in 1670 in the case of R. v. Smith (1670) 1 Mod. 44 when an order of the Commissioners of Sewers was brought before him. And in this case, the Chief Justice said:

“you cannot oust the jurisdiction of this court without particular words in Acts of Parliament. There is no jurisdiction that is uncontrollable by this court.”

Sixteen years after this in R. v. Plowright (1686) 3 Mod. 94, when a statute provided that a matter “shall be heard and finally decided by one or more justices,” the King’s Bench held that as certiorari was not mentioned, the ouster clause did not take away certiorari. And in the well-known case of the College of Physicians reported in Lord Raymond, the case of Groenvelt v. Burrell (1697) 1 Ld. Raym. 454 Lord Holt supported this ratio decidendi which was subsequently to receive the respectable blessing of the great Lord Mansfield in R. v. Moreley (1760) 2 Bur. 1040. In that case an ouster clause in an Act provided: “no other Court whatsoever shall intermeddle with any cause or causes of appeal upon this Act: but they shall be finally determined in Quarter-Sessions only.” In spite of this apparently clear ouster of jurisdiction Lord Mansfield granted certiorari and said at p. 1042: “The jurisdiction of this Court is not taken away, unless there be express words to take it away: this is a point settled.” To the same effect are the views of Lord Kanyon in 1800 in R. v. Jukes (1800) 8 Term. Rep. 542 at p. 544 and those of Abbott C.J. in R. v. Cashiobury Hundred Justices (1823) 3 Dow. & Ry. 35.

[p.544] of [1980] GLR 529

Six years after the decision of Abbott C.J. in the Cashiobury case in the Scottish case of Campbell v. Brown (1829) 3 Wils & Sh. 441, the House of Lords approved this line of reasoning. By the ouster clause in that case it was provided that the judgment of the Court of Presbytery shall be final without appeal or review by any court civil or ecclesiastical. In spite of this an appeal was lodged at the Court of Session. In dealing with the ouster clause when the case came to the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst L.C. explained from the woolsack the rationale of the Court of Sessions interference:

“I apprehend that (particularly from the circumstance of the appeal being taken away) a jurisdiction is given in this case to the Court of Session not to review the judgment on the merits but to take care that the Court of Presbytery shall keep within the line of its duty, and conform to the provisions of the Act of Parliament.

There is in the Court of Session in Scotland, that superintending authority over inferior jurisdictions which is requisite in all countries for the purpose of confining those inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their duty; and the only question here is whether this case is of such a nature and description as to justify the calling into action that authority of the Superior court.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Although in this case the words used were: “shall be final without appeal or review” the authorities by this date had held firmly that “shall be final” excludes an appeal but not certiorari and the reason given was that certiorari was not mentioned.

There is of course, if I may say so, a logical difficulty inherent in the proposition that as certiorari was not mentioned in the ouster clauses, it will be presumed to be available but an appeal is unavailable. With utmost respect to the English judges, with or without a “shall be final” clause, an appeal can only be invoked if a statute specifically gives it because an appeal is a creature of statute.

Therefore one would think that a “shall be final” clause means precisely what it says and is not directed at discouraging appeals but rather at frowning on certiorari, etc. except perhaps in cases where a general right of appeal in relation to the measure sought to be excluded from appeal is already existing in another legislation. Where there is no such existing right of appeal, it is difficult to understand what can possibly be meant by “shall be final” except what the words in their ordinary meaning connote which would then exclude certiorari. This view would seem to be shared by Lord Parker in the Ex parte Gilmore case (supra) at p. 589. Clearly this preposition which the courts accepted to justify recourse to certiorari in spite of ouster clauses is at this stage of the development of the principle “vulnerable to logical analysis” to borrow a phrase used by Lord Wilberforce at p. 208 of the Anisminic case, but as I said in Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179 at p. 214, C.A. (full bench):

The law . . . does not always and at all times deal with logic and common sense. The words of a great American judge and jurist, is here very pertinent: ‘The life of the law’ wrote Holmes J. in The Common Law at p. 1 ‘has not been logic: it has been experience’.”

Clearly the approach of the courts that let in certiorari in spite of, “shall be final” clauses, is a vindication of Holmes J.’s observation and the further study of the development of the principle shows that it is founded not so much on formal logic as on the experience of the courts and the demands of justice. And it is in this light that the new ouster clauses purporting to specifically exclude certiorari should be examined. Lord Denning in the Ex parte Gilmore case [1957] 1 Q.B. 574 set these cases in their proper historical perspective and in the process justified their apparent claim as reactions to needs for justice. He said at p. 586:

“In contrast to the word ‘final’ I would like to say a word about the old statutes which used in express words to take away the remedy by certiorari by saying that the decision of the tribunal ‘shall not be removed by certiorari.’ Those statutes were passed chiefly between 1680 and 1848, in the days when the courts used certiorari too freely and quashed decisions for technical defects of form. In stopping this abuse the statutes proved very beneficial, but the courts never allowed those statutes to be used as a cover for wrong doing by tribunals. If tribunals were to be at liberty to exceed their jurisdiction without any check by the courts, the rule of law would be at an end. Despite express words taking away certiorari, therefore, it was held that certiorari would still lie if some of the members of the tribunal were disqualified from acting . . . So, also, if the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction . . . or if its decision was obtained by fraud . . . the courts would still grant certiorari.”

In support of the instances he gave, Lord Denning L.J. cited R. v. Gillyard (1848) 12 Q.B. 527; Ex parte Bradlaugh (supra) and R. v. The Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) 1 Q.B. 467 where an Act empowered commissioners to levy rates giving to parties aggrieved on appeal to quarter sessions whose order was to be final and “no order rate, etc. was to be removed by certiorari.” Three of the fifteen members of the

[p.546] of [1980] GLR 529 panel who took part in the proceedings of the quarter sessions were disqualified from acting. On the effect of an ouster clause in the circumstance Lord Denman C.J. said:

“We have already stated our opinion that the clause which takes away certiorari does not preclude our exercising a superintendence over the proceedings so far as to see that what is done shall be in pursuance of the statute. The statute cannot affect our right and duty to see justice executed: and here I am clearly of opinion that justice has not been executed.”

In R. v. Gosse (1860) 3 E1. & E1. 277 the holding reads: “An order of justices not warranted by the provisions of an Act of Parliament, may be removed into … Court by certiorari, though the Act contains a section taking away the certiorari.” In that case section 39 of the English Nuisances Removal Act, 1855 provided that “no order nor any other proceeding, matter or thing done or transacted in relation to the execution of the Act shall be removed or removable by certiorari into any of the superior courts,” Commenting on section 39, the said ouster clause, Cookburn C.J. said at pp. 281-282:

“It is . . . said that section 39 takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the certiorari; but that section can apply only to cases in which the justices have jurisdiction. It cannot be said that they have jurisdiction to make an order clearly contrary to the provisions of the Act; or that section 39 protects such an order when made.”

In 1861 in Evans v. McLoughlan (1861) 4 L.T. 31 the ouster clause contained in section 79 of the Excise Act (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53), stated:

“ . . . no writ of certiorari or other writ or process shall be issued at the suit of any def. out of any of his Majesty’s courts of record in England, Scotland, or Ireland . . . to supersede, sist, stay, remove, or in anywise affect any information or judicial proceeding before the Commissioners of Excise or Commissioners of Appeal . . . or before any justice or justices of the peace in the United Kingdom in pursuance of this Act . . .”

In spite of this clear ouster clause, Lord Cranworth said of the decision of a justice of the peace on a certiorari application which reached the House of Lords at p. 34:

“That the court had jurisdiction to inquire into such matter if it had appeared on the face of the proceedings that the justice was acting without jurisdiction, I have no doubt. I do not think that the statute meant to give exclusive jurisdiction to any justice of the peace, or to any tribunal, to imprison any of his Majesty’s subjects, without it being distinctly shown on what

[p.547] of [1980] GLR 529 ground he was imprisoned, and that he was lawfully imprisoned . . .”

The importance of this case, is that the superior court’s jurisdiction was not impugned although its order granting certiorari was vacated on the ground that the justice of the peace in the case did not exceed his jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is a decision of the House of Lords and so the legal significance of the ouster clauses was considered settled by the highest court within the hierarchy of the British court system.

Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509, an oft-quoted decision, decided by the Queen’s Bench Division on 6 June 1878 contains a very lucid exposition of the modern principle. It virtually justified the rationale of the court’s interference in spite of ouster clauses. The ouster clause in that case contained in section 49 of the Police Courts Act (2 & 3 Vict., c. 71), provided that no information, conviction, or other proceeding before or by any of the said magistrates, shall be quashed or set aside, or adjudged void or insufficient for want of form, or be removed by certiorari into Her Majesty’s Court of Queen’s Bench. On an order of a magistrate being challenged by certiorari for want of jurisdiction, counsel submitted that certiorari was taken away by section 49. At the Queen’s Bench Division Cockburn C.J. in his judgment answered this suggestion at pp. 512-513:

“It was contended that the certiorari is taken away by 2 & 3 Vict., c. 71, s. 49 … This is an objection founded upon an absence of jurisdiction appearing on the face of the order; and I am clearly of opinion that the section does not apply when the application for the certiorari is on the ground that the inferior tribunal has exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction.”

And Mellor J. at p. 513 stated succintly:

“It is well established that the provision taking away the certiorari does not apply where there was an absence of jurisdiction. The consequence of holding otherwise would be that a metropolitan magistrate could make any order he pleased without question.”

One last case and I am done with delineating through the cases the course of the development of the principle from the seventeenth century to modern times. I have already dealt with the present century case of R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal: Ex parte Gilmore (supra), the Denning decision that has given me so much assistance. One more for this century: On 5 May 1960, the Queen’s Bench Division decided two cases: R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith (supra) and R. v. Oxford Electoral Registration Officer; Ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133. It would seem that the two cases were consolidated. In these

[p.548] of [1980] GLR 529 cases the issue that called for determination is the effect of section 107 of the county courts Act, 1957 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2, C, 22). The section provides:

“. . . no judgment or order of any judge of county courts, nor any proceedings brought before him or pending in his court, shall be removed by appeal, motion, certiorari or otherwise into any court whatever, except in the manner and according to the provisions of this Act mentioned.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Section 115 (1) of the Act also provided:

“(1) The High Court or a judge thereof may order the removal into the High Court, by order of certiorari or otherwise, of any proceedings commenced in the county court, if the High Court or judge thereof thinks it desirable that the proceedings should be heard and determined in the High Court.”

There was in the cases, no question of the High Court or judge, thinking that the proceedings should be heard and determined in the High Court and so section 115(1) became inapplicable. On a certiorari application to remove to the High Court for the purpose of quashing a decision of the county court judge in the proceedings, the effect of sections 107 and 115 (1) fell for decision and Lord Parker C.J. (with whom Gorman J. and Ashword J. agreed) relied on R. v. Worthington-Evans; Ex parte Madan [1959] 2 Q.B. 145; Ex parte Bradlaugh (supra) and Ex parte Gilmore (supra) and expressed his opinion at p. 142 thus:

“Looking at those two sections, it is to be observed that the only remedy by way of certiorari dealt with is in regard to the removal of the proceedings from one court into another, and not for the purposes of quashing.

Notwithstanding that, I am quite satisfied that certiorari will lie in this case.”

Having said that much he accepted the enunciation of the principle by Mellor J. already referred to herein in the Ex parte Gilmore case (supra) and he concluded, indicating the rationale foundation of the principle: see [1960] 2 Q.B. 133 at p. 143:

“I am quite satisfied that certiorari will lie against a county court judge if he has acted without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provision of the County Courts Act, 1959 … Accordingly, it seems to me that in this case it would be right for the court to grant the order to quash the directions given by the judge . . .”

(The emphasis is mine.)

[p.549] of [1980] GLR 529

Quite recently on 14 July 1978 R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith (supra) was followed by the Court of Appeal in Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736 at p. 743, C.A. where Lord Denning referring to jurisdictional error and the said section 107 of the 1959 Act said:

“But even if section 107 does apply to this case, it only excludes certiorari for error of law on the face of the record. It does not exclude the power of the High Court to issue certiorari for absence of jurisdiction.”

I do not think it is necessary for me to continue this catechism except to observe that the principle is firmly entrenched and there is in the books not a single modern decision that casts any doubt on the proposition that a decision of a judge, magistrate or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction is liable to be quashed in certiorari proceedings before a superintending superior court, if the judge, magistrate or tribunal acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction even when by legislation such as A.F.R.C.D 23, s. 7 (2) certiorari proceedings are not permitted in the said superior court.

In the circumstances, it is clear to me looking at the stream of authorities, that Mr. J. E. K. Appiah, counsel for the tribunal, has taken an outrageous view of the law, when he argued that in the hypothetical case, I posed for him, the decision of the tribunal cannot be impugned by any court in this Republic. In the ex parte application before me, Mr. Moore had argued that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by disregarding the provisions of the Decree which gave it birth; prima facie, if this act of the tribunal is proved, then their decision is per incuriam and a nullity and certiorari will lie.

It was for this reason that I granted leave for the applicant to apply for certiorari and it is for this same reason that I overruled the objections of counsel for the tribunal. Whether at the actual hearing of the motion counsel for the applicant can make out a case or not is immaterial, the court has jurisdiction. This point is amply illustrated by the House of Lord’s case of Evans v. McLoughlan (1861) 4 L.T. 31. This was a case where it was held that contrary to the opinion of the court of session, the justice in the case had not acted in excess of his jurisdiction and that therefore certiorari should have been refused. Its jurisdiction, however, to entertain certiorari proceedings notwithstanding an ouster clause in the circumstance was not doubted and at the very commencement of his opinion the Lord Chancellor said at p. 33:

“My Lords, notwithstanding the able argument which we have heard at your Lordships’ bar from the counsel for the resp., I must say that I entertain a clear opinion that the decree

[p.550] of [1980] GLR 529 appealed against, which was pronounced in the court below, ought to be reversed, but not at all on the ground that the Court of Session has no jurisdiction over such matters. The Court of Session had jurisdiction over such matters …”

Lord Cranworth agreed with this opinion from the woolsack and Lord Chelmsford in concurring did not mince his words; he added his view at p. 35:

“My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend upon the woolsack, that the general jurisdiction of the Court of Session is not taken away by any of the provisions of the Acts to which reference has been made.”

The case needs to be closely read. It drew a sharp distinction between the general jurisdiction of the superior court to entertain certiorari proceedings and the jurisdiction of the court to make an order which it is incompetent to make because of statutory prohibition.

The only other argument which Mr. J. E. K. Appiah pressed upon me in a bid to prevail on me to decline jurisdiction is that the special tribunal is not an inferior tribunal. He submitted that it is a superior tribunal and therefore certiorari does not lie. I am afraid I am unable to accept this proposition. This proposition utterly misconceives the meaning that the courts have attached to “inferior tribunal.” In the Anisminic case [1969] 2 A.C. 223 Browne J. at first instance endeavoured to explain the phrase. He said at p. 233:

“It is beyond question that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to supervise and control all inferior tribunals. The phrase ‘inferior tribunal’ is not used in any offensive sense, but merely means that the tribunal has a limited jurisdiction, usually in modern times defined by the statute which sets up the tribunal.”

I respectfully agree with this view. The jurisdiction of the special tribunal is spelt out in section 3 (1) of A.F.R.C.D 23 and substantially repeated in section 17(1), (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. Section 3 (1) of A.F.R.C.D 23 provides:

“3. (1) The Special Tribunal— (a) shall take over and complete the trial of all cases pending before all the special courts immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana in respect of all the offences charged or which could have been charged, and may impose in relation thereto, any penalty which could have been imposed by a special court or by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, under the Armed

[p.551] of [1980] GLR 529

Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 3) as amended by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment)

Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 19);

(b) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports of the committees of inquiry described in subsection (2) of this section; and (c) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the adverse findings of any such committee of inquiry, on the application of any person aggrieved by any such finding.”

By the definition of Browne J. in the Anisminic case (supra) it is clear that the special tribunal is an inferior tribunal and the argument to the contrary put forward by Mr. Appiah is misconceived. As Farwell L.J. said in R v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859 at p. 880:

“it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure—such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited . . .”

In my view once a statute has spelt out the limits of the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, then that court or tribunal is inferior. It must keep within the said limits or its acts will be ultra vires. This view has been earlier succinctly endorsed by Lord Esher M.R. in R. v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 Q. B.D.313 at p. 319 in these words:

“When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shewn to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction.”

Both. Mr Appiah and Mr. Moore referred to article 126 of the Constitution which provides:

[p.552] of [1980] GLR 529

“126. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Mr. Appiah argued that A.F.R.C.D. 23 overrides article 126. He says the two are in conflict, and so A.F.R.C.D. 23 prevails and article 126 becomes inoperative as far as the special tribunal is concerned. I am afraid I am unable to see the point. Granted that the special tribunal is an inferior tribunal, and that its powers are limited, how can the limit which the Constitution itself has prescribed, be exceeded with no court in the realm given power to ensure that the limit is not so exceeded? Surely since the Constitution has definitely limited the powers of the special tribunal, the existence of the machinery contained in article 126 to ensure that it confines itself within the limit, cannot be said to be a contradiction or create conflict.

Once again I hold that Mr. Appiah’s point is misconceived. Quite apart from article 126, it seems to me also that I have inherent jurisdiction to inquire into the decision of the special tribunal. The ex parte application before me and the motion on notice do not indicate whether the application is founded on article 126 or the inherent jurisdiction. Because, the matter involves excess of jurisdiction, even if Mr. Appiah’s point were by some form of argument, to be sustained, I ensure that inferior tribunals do not take in more powers or exercise jurisdiction which they do not have.

In the result these are the reasons why I dismissed the preliminary objections peremptorily. I have had to give elaborate reasons for so dismissing the objections because of unfortunate developments which followed the dismissal – developments which must be avoided if we are to build in this infant Republic a healthy legal system for the generations that are to come after us.

The preliminary objections were raised on application before me when the substantial motion was about to be argued. Having heard the arguments of Mr. Appiah and Mr. Moore, I there and then dismissed the application and called for arguments on the motion. Mr. Moore was prepared to argue, but Mr. Appiah was unwilling to go on, and asked for an adjournment. Although this was substantially an application involving the liberty of the subject and deserved

[p.553] of [1980] GLR 529 to be dealt with expeditiously, I nevertheless granted a long adjournment to 2 May 1980 for arguments and to enable counsel for the special tribunal and the Attorney-General to prepare. On 2 May 1980 the special tribunal was represented by Mr. Akwetey and Naval-Lt. Assassie Gyimah with Mr. Moore representing the applicant.

On behalf of the special tribunal Mr. Akwetey asked for adjournment. Although I had ordered that the Attorney-General be served, there was still no representation from the Attorney-General’s office. The request for adjournment was based on two grounds: The first was that the special prosecutor who had the documents in the case was ill and secondly the special tribunal had lodged an appeal and wanted the proceedings adjourned.

Initially the request was for an adjournment sine die, but as I was not prepared to countenance that, the applicant for the adjournment asked for 9 May 1980. I granted the application and indicated that I would not be disposed to grant further adjournment and was anxious to hear the arguments. On 9 May 1980, the special prosecutor was absent, presumably he was still ill, but Mr. Kaleo-Bio, Principal State Attorney, announced himself as appearing for the Republic with Mr. Akwetey and Naval-Lt. Assassie Gyimah, assistant to the special prosecutor, appearing for the special tribunal. Mr. Moore was for the applicant. I think the presence of the representative of the Attorney-General must be welcomed as that office has a traditional role of defending the public interest.

When I called for argument, I realized that an interlocutory motion had been filed by counsel for the special tribunal but instead of the counsel for the special tribunal arguing the said motion, Mr. Kaleo-Bio for the Republic identified the Republic’s interest with that of the special tribunal and chose to argue it. The motion was for a stay of proceedings pending appeal. It was said to be founded on rule 27 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002). The rule reads:

“27. (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed from except where the Court below or the Court otherwise orders –

(a) in the case of the Court below, upon application made orally or by motion on notice to it, and (b) in the case of the Court, upon application made to it by motion on notice, and except as aforesaid no intermediate act or proceeding shall be invalidated.

(2) During any period while any application is pending

[p.554] of [1980] GLR 529 for determination under sub-rule (1) of this rule any proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision to which the application relates shall be stayed.

(3) There shall, in any case, be a stay of proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision appealed from— (a) for a period of seven days immediately following the giving of such judgment or decision; and (b) for a period of seven days immediately following the determination by the Court below of any application under sub-rule (1) (a) of this rule where the application was refused by the court below.”

The argument of counsel is that, the respondent special tribunal had appealed from my decision overruling the preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this court, and therefore the motion should be adjourned sine die to await the decision of the Court of Appeal. In any case he submitted that it is mandatory of this court to adjourn having regard to the said rule 27.

It seems to me that the argument of counsel that it is mandatory for this court to grant adjournment is totally and utterly misconceived. The argument that adjournment is mandatory is said to be founded on rule 27(3) of L.I. 218 as amended. The relevant portion is: “There shall, in any case, be a stay of proceedings for the execution of the judgment or decision appealed from.”

What is it that is to be stayed? The respondent tribunal challenged the jurisdiction of the court. I ruled that I have jurisdiction and in effect I refused to abandon and decline jurisdiction. Is there any proceedings for execution of my refusal to abandon jurisdiction? I once had occasion to consider a somewhat similar question in Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd. v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308 at p. 313 and I recall saying:

“Now to talk of a stay of execution under the decision in the circumstance of this case necessarily implies that the decision is one in respect of which execution can issue. The respondent asked for a stay of execution and his request was refused … Is there any execution which could issue to give effect to this refusal. In my opinion there is none.”

I do not think there is any proceeding for the execution of my refusal to decline jurisdiction and it is for this reason that I refused the application for stay of execution without calling on counsel for the applicant. It was a totally misconceived application.

Thereafter counsel asked for adjournment on grounds that he wanted to advise himself. He had in the course of the argument

[p.555] of [1980] GLR 529 asking for a stay profferred an advice that the court should be guided by the Latin maxim festina lente (meaning the court should hasten slowly.)

Although counsel did not elaborate on what he meant I formed the impression, perhaps erroneously, that he was advising that it was not in the public interest to give a quick decision. Such a statement coming from the representative of the Republic deserves to be considered. This is a certiorari application but because it is in connection with a decision in a criminal matter in respect of which the applicant has been imprisoned, it is really and substantially habeas corpus application. Involving therefore as it does, the liberty of the citizen, the courts have a duty to expedite the process so that justice is not delayed.

Having regard to that, it is my opinion that the festina lente advice is ill-conceived and capable of doing damage to the rule of law and the liberty of the subject. For this reason I refused the application for adjournment. Counsel was undaunted, he renewed the application which had been refused. I once again ruled that argument must proceed. Counsel would not be put off. For a third time he renewed the application, this time he added that he was sick, although he had so far made vigorous applications to the court. For a third time I refused the application. In exasperation counsel gathered his books and walked out of court.

I am firmly of the view that the conduct of counsel for the Republic in walking out of court because he had presumably not prepared his case falls short of the standard associated with the best traditions of the legal profession. It is I think reprehensible. I was minded to commit him for contempt but the decision of the Court of Appeal in Agbleta v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 445 stayed my hand. I think the conduct is contempt of court but to be punishable it must amount to wilful contempt and I had doubts as to whether it was wilful.

Be that as it may, Mr. Moore argued the application on behalf of his client. In the course of his argument, Mr. Kaleo-Bio, counsel for the Republic, returned to the court. At the close of the argument of Mr. Moore I called on Mr. Kaleo-Bio for a reply. He declined to reply and asked for adjournment as he put it on medical grounds. The application for adjournment was refused. Mr. Kaleo-Bio then asked to be permitted to leave the court to enable him to go home to take his medicine and he left.

Mr. Akwetey, counsel for the special tribunal, submitted that he was in no position to argue. Naval-Lt. Assassie Gyimah also declined to argue. It is in these circumstances that I adjourned for a ruling to today.

Mr. Moore referred me to a host of authorities, but before I consider his authorities it is necessary to advert to the grounds under

[p.556] of [1980] GLR 529 which he seeks certiorari to quash the decision of the special tribunal.

These grounds are:

“(1) That the special tribunal acted without jurisdiction when it adopted a procedure contrary to section 5 (1) of A.F.R.C.D 23.

(2) That the special tribunal assumed jurisdiction under section 3 (1) (a) A.F.R.C.D. 23 when there was no evidence of the pendency of any case or matter against the applicant before the A.F.R.C. courts.

(3) That the special tribunal acted contrary to the rules of natural justice when it ignored the Government White Paper.

(4) That the special tribunal acted without jurisdiction when it tried the accused on count one when the offence was neither disclosed nor arose out of the Archer Committee otherwise known as the

Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board.”

In arguing ground (1), counsel referred me to these cases: Republic v. District Magistrate, Keta; Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459; Forson v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 138; Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Armah [1968] A.C. 192 at p. 234, H.L.; Kwakye v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 647, S.C.; R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] A.C. 128, P.C.; Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at p. 182, H.L.; Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 223 at p. 234, C.A.; Umodu v. Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 101; Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] A.C. 315, H.L.; Sey v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled judgments, January-June 1958, p. 8; Tormekpey v. Ahiable [1975] 2 G.L.R. 432, C.A.; Togbe Fiti IV v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 33 at p. 38; Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193, C.A.; R. v. Clewer (1953) 37 Cr.App.R. 37, C.C.A.

I have cited these cases to indicate the level of advocacy displayed by counsel. I have read all these cases and I am now in a position to appraise the argument. Although so many authorities were quoted, the central argument deals with section 5 (1) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 which provides: “The Special Tribunal shall in criminal trials before it, adopt the procedure for summary trials.”

Counsel argued that what the prosecution did was to call two witnesses, one tendered the Archer Report and the other tendered records concerning the applicant’s shareholding in Liner Agencies;

[p.557] of [1980] GLR 529 thereafter the applicant was called for his defence after an unsuccessful submission of no case. Counsel complains that the evidence against the applicant is hearsay and his conviction is therefore a nullity. Most of the authorities cited were directed at demonstrating the attitude of the courts to hearsay evidence, others also dealt with the court’s approach to proceedings which can be described as nullities. With the exception of the Anisminic case most of the authorities quoted offered me no assistance in deciding the issue.

The complaint of Mr. Moore is in effect that the special tribunal has admitted illegal evidence. The evidence led before the tribunal is not before me. I am in no position to say whether apart from any hearsay evidence, the special tribunal acted on other admissible evidence. Clearly if Mr. Moore is right, then in the ordinary court of law the conviction would definitely be set aside. I think he is probably right for I cannot see what the two witnesses who were the only witnesses called, can possibly know about the charges, except hearsay. I have used the word “probably” advisedly as I do not know what admission the applicant made before the Archer Committee. Counsel for the special tribunal chose not to reply and so I shall assume that Mr. Moore is right and that illegal evidence was admitted.

With regard to the allegation that the summary procedure provided for in section 5 (1) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 was breached, I fear the point is misconceived. Summary procedure in criminal trials as is known to our law is contained in sections 172, 173 and 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) which provide:

“172. (1) If the accused does not plead guilty to the charge, the Court shall proceed to hear such evidence as the prosecutor may adduce in support of the charge.

(2) The accused or his advocate may put questions to each witness produced against him.

(3) If the accused does not employ an advocate, the Court shall, at the close of the examination of each witness for the prosecution, ask the accused whether he wishes to put any questions to that witness and shall record his answer.

(4) If the accused instead of questioning the witness makes any statement regarding the evidence of that witness, the Magistrate shall, if he thinks it desirable in the interest of the accused, put the substance of such statement to the witness in the form of questions.

173. If at the close of the evidence in support of the charge, it appears to the Court that a case is not made out against the accused sufficiently to require him to make a defence, the Court shall, as to that particular charge, acquit him.

174. (1) At the close of the evidence in support of the

[p.558] of [1980] GLR 529 charge, if it appears to the Court that a case is made out against the accused sufficiently to require him to make a defence, the Court shall call upon him to enter into his defence and shall remind him of the charge and inform him that, if he so desires, he may give evidence himself on oath or may make a statement. The Court shall then hear the accused if he desires to be heard and any evidence he may adduce in his defence.

(2) If the accused states that he has witnesses to call but that they are not present in Court, and the Court is satisfied that the absence of such witnesses is not due to any fault or neglect of the accused, and that there is a likelihood that they could, if present, give material evidence on behalf of the accused, the Court may adjourn the trial and issue process, or take other steps, to compel the attendance of such witnesses.

(3) If the accused person has examined any witnesses or given any evidence other than as to his, the accused’s general character, the Court may grant leave to the prosecutor to give or adduce evidence in reply.”

Clearly all that these provision mean is that essentially on a plea of not guilty, evidence is taken from prosecution witnesses and if a prima facie case is made the accused is called upon; if not, he is acquitted and discharged. In this case that procedure was followed and so the complaint is merely on the reception of illegal evidence.

Indeed this was the reason why counsel referred me to Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] A.C. 315, H.L. So the issue for me to decide on the assumption that the special tribunal did indeed receive inadmissible evidence to found conviction, is what is the effect of this conduct of the special tribunal?

Mr. Moore has indicated that in such a case the judgment is a nullity and most of the authorities which he quoted dealt with nullity. I think the fact that illegal or insufficient evidence is utilised by a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction does not result in the conviction being a nullity and indeed the decision of the House of Lords in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions (supra) is ample authority for this proposition. I think such a decision is voidable but it is not a nullity.

On this aspect I am prepared to accept Mr. Moore’s point that insufficient or even inadmissible evidence was utilised by the special tribunal. What is the legal effect of this in certiorari proceedings to quash for insufficient or inadmissible evidence?

I think the problem is not new to the law. It is covered by authority: In R. v. Bolton [1841] 1 Q.B. 66 at p. 71 a similar argument was put before the court. In that case counsel for the applicant in certiorari proceedings argued that since in the application for certiorari, the evidence was before the court showing that there was no

[p.559] of [1980] GLR 529

“scintilla of evidence in favour of the order” of the justices the court should quash the order. It is on all fours with this case. Lord Denman C. J., delivering the judgment of the court rejecting counsel’s submission, accepted the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice in Cave v. Mountain (1840) 1 Man. & G. 257 where the Lord Chief Justice had said:

“If the charge be of an offence over which if the offence charged be true in fact, the Magistrate has jurisdiction, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend on the truth or falsehood of the facts or upon evidence being sufficient or insufficient to establish the corpus delicti brought under investigation.”

This view was supported almost a century later by Greer L.J. in R. v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B. 232, C.A. In that case Greer L.J. at p. 246 quoted with approval the following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. 9, para. 1493:

“Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ of certiorari on the ground that the court below has misconceived a point of law. When the court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence, or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or convicts without evidence.”

This was the reason why in R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Armah [1968] A.C. 192 at p. 234, H.L. Lord Reid said that a tribunal or magistrate, “does not destroy his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision. If he has jurisdiction to go right he has jurisdiction to go wrong. Neither an error in fact nor an error in law will destroy his jurisdiction.”

Annan J. A. also in the Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1978] G.L.R. 212 at p. 216, C.A. referred to the views of Denning L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 All E.R. 122 at p. 130, C.A., to show that on certiorari application to quash a decision of an inferior tribunal, the evidence founding the decision need not be looked at, if it is not apparent on the record. This was why at the very commencement of the ex parte application I referred counsel to the said decision of Annan J.A.

On a consideration of the whole matter, I have come to the conclusion that the special tribunal probably made a mistake in law by

[p.560] of [1980] GLR 529 convicting on hearsay evidence. That mistake of law is not apparent on the record, because the whole evidence led is not before me. A mistake of law which is not apparent on the record cannot be corrected by certiorari.

Indeed even if it is apparent on the record, but it does not go to jurisdiction, the ouster clause will apply and certiorari will not lie. This is the view of Lord Denning M.R. in Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736 at p. 734, C.A. already referred to in this judgment. The proper remedy for error of law in such circumstance is appeal. That certiorari is not available is supported further by the authority of Denning L.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338 at p. 346 where he said:

“No one has ever doubted that the Court of King’s Bench can intervene to prevent a statutory tribunal from exceeding the jurisdiction which Parliament has conferred on it; but it is quite another thing to say that the King’s Bench can intervene when a tribunal makes a mistake of law. A tribunal may often decide a point of law wrongly whilst keeping well within its jurisdiction.”

Having regard to the state of the authorities I think Mr. Moore’s arguments are misconceived. I am unable to accept them. The application based on ground (1) fails. But I must confess that as this matter involves the liberty of the subject and as a mistake would seem to have been made, it would have given me great pleasure to guash the conviction. Unfortunately, the authorities as I have discussed them herein do not favour such an approach in certiorari applications. That can only be done on appeal, and I regret it.

With regard to ground (2), counsel argued that the offence in count one is not an offence or a case pending before the special courts immediately before the coming into force of the constitution in terms of section 3 (1) (a) of A.F.R.C.D 23. He submitted that it ought to have been shown that the case disclosed in count one was pending before the said special court. In his affidavit the applicant deposed in paragraph (17):

“17. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe that the special tribunal was incompetent to try me since there was no scintilla of evidence that there was a case or matter pending against me before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council special courts.”

In answer to this paragraph the following affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the special tribunal by Mr. Akwetey, counsel for the special tribunal:

[p.561] of [1980] GLR 529

“19. That the case of the applicant was properly pending before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council special courts since it arose out of the Archer Report which was referred to the special tribunal for necessary action.”

Clearly this affidavit in opposition misconceives what “pending” means. A matter is obviously pending in court if it is actually before the court although the court has as yet to take a decision on it. To argue that the reason why it is said to be pending before the A.F.R.C. special court, is because it arose out of the Archer Report and was then referred to the special tribunals is to admit that it was not pending before the A.F.R.C special courts. I find support for this view of mine when I examine the record, which in this case is the judgment of 4 February 1980. In paragraph (5) of the judgment the tribunal observed:

“At this stage, we have to deal with two issues which learned counsel for the accused raised at the beginning of his address. He contended that count one is not justiciable by this tribunal, either under section 3 (1) (a) or (b) of A.F.R.C.D 23. He argued that the offence in count one was not pending before any of the special courts established during the regime of A.F.R.C. and that it was only offences which have been charged and were pending before those courts which can be tried by this tribunal under section 3 (1) (a) of A.F.R.C.D 23.

We think the submission is misconceived.

If the whole section 3 (1) (a) is read properly it will be found that the jurisdiction of this tribunal extends not only to offences which were charged and which were pending before the said special courts which could be taken over and tried by this tribunal, but that it also extends to the trial of offences which could have been charged and tried by those special courts established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 3), as amended by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 19). The offence involved in count one is an offence which could have been charged before any of those special courts and it is therefore justiciable under section 3 (1)

(a) of A.F.R.C.D 23).”

Clearly, the tribunal has not answered counsel’s objection. It would seem it has admitted that the offence was not pending in terms of section 3 (1) (a). A careful reading of section 3 (1) (a) of A.F.R.C.D 23 shows that offences “which could have been charged” and for which the tribunal has jurisdiction are in respect of “cases pending before” any of “the special courts immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution . . .” For the tribunal to have

[p.562] of [1980] GLR 529 jurisdiction in any case whatsoever under section 3 (1) (a) that case must be “pending”. It is certainly not disclosed that the offence in count one is pending and I rule therefore that Mr. Moore is right and if the tribunal had founded its jurisdiction only on section 3 (1) (a), I think it would have acted without jurisdiction and I would have granted certiorari to quash the decision.

The tribunal however indicated that the two charges were mounted as a result of the Archer Report on the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board Committee of Inquiry and the affidavit sworn for the tribunal does show that the said report was referred to the tribunal and a reading of the whole judgment shows that the offences arose out of the said Archer Report. Section 3 (1) (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 povides:

“3 (1) The Special Tribunal— . . .

(b) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports of the committees of inquiry described in subsection (2) of this section.”

Subsection (2) relates, inter alia, to all committees of inquiry established at any time whose reports were submitted by such committees to the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Paragraph (19) of the affidavit of the respondent special tribunal does show that the offences arose out of the Archer Report referred to the special tribunal. I think therefore that although Mr. Moore succeeds on ground 2, since jurisdiction was also assumed under both section 3 (1) (a) and (b), the success on section 3 (1) (a), since it leaves intact the jurisdiction under section 3 (1) (b), is not enough to enable me to grant certiorari and I will therefore refuse the application on the said ground 2.

Ground 3 is an argument based on failure to observe the rules of natural justice. It was urged on me that the defence of the applicant is that the Government White Paper did not mention the applicant in any way whatsoever and at his trial, that was the defence that he, inter alia, put up, but the special tribunal ignored this defence. I am afraid I do not see the relevance of the white paper in the proceedings before the special tribunal. This ground was argued very passionately and the views of Tucker L.J. in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at p. 118, C.A. was pressed on me with the submission that a total rejection of the defence based on the white paper is a denial of the right to natural justice. I am afraid, tried as I can, I did not succeed in grasping the point. If the offence arose from the Archer Report in circumstances clothing the special tribunal with jurisdiction, I cannot see what could possibly be in the Government White Paper, which merely represents government

[p.563] of [1980] GLR 529 views, which can be said to amount to a defence. The Government White Paper, like the Archer Report, is hearsay, if tendered before a tribunal as evidence of the truth of what someone says there except in cases of admissions by the applicant against interest which may very well constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, but which will not enure to his advantage. I fear this ground is totally unacceptable.

The fourth ground argued has already been disposed of when I considered ground two. It is said that the offence in count one never arose out of the Archer Report, because it was found necessary in the course of the trial to call a witness to tender certain documents, thus showing that without the document, an offence is not disclosed. The offence may very well not be disclosed, but substantial portion of its ingredients might be contained in the report as to enable the offence to be considered as arising from the report. Once again I am afraid I am unable to accept this ground.

It follows that the application fails. It is dismissed, but as I have regretfully had no help from both counsel for the tribunal and counsel for the Republic, I make no order as to costs.

Since writing this judgment, I have had the privilege of reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 15 May 1980 by Anin J.A. in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah (supra). I have studied the judgment very closely. When the case first came before the High Court my brother Agyepong J. (if I may say so with respect) made an able analysis of the legal position, when counsel for the special tribunal argued the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction which I have already referred to. He referred to the leading case of Ex parte Bradlaugh (supra); R. v. Hurst; Ex parte Smith (supra) and the Anisminic case (supra) all discussed in the judgment I have just read; and although these cases did demonstrate that the High Court had jurisdiction, my learned brother performed (what without meaning any disrespect) I call a volte face and declined jurisdiction. In the said Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah (supra) Agyepong J. made this very interesting statement in the course of his ruling: “The objection raised by Mr. Appiah was not that I could not in any circumstances entertain an application of certiorari but that I could not entertain the application before me.”

I find this rather extraordinary for before me the argument of counsel was that the High Court could not under any circumstance whatsoever entertain an application for certiorari to quash decisions of the special tribunal. I notice also that although Mr. Appiah argued very forcefully before me that the special tribunal is not an inferior tribunal and that it is, in fact, a superior tribunal yet at the Court of Appeal Anin J.A. makes this observation: “Mr. Appiah further conceded in this court that the respondent is in law an inferior tribunal.”

[p.564] of [1980] GLR 529

I do not understand this inconsistent advocacy and I can only conjecture that by the time counsel got to the Court of Appeal he had had a change of opinion. Why, however, he kept the benefit of this change of opinion from this court is difficult to understand.

When I first heard about the contemplated decision of the Court of Appeal I was anxious to find out in what way it would affect my judgment which I had already prepared in this case. I think that judgment justifies my approach in this case for Anin J.A. in a brilliant appraisal of the legal position, having regard to the state of the authorities rightly in my view, if I may say so with respect, said:

“In our considered view, once the learned judge agreed with appellant’s counsel that the respondent is an inferior tribunal and that the ouster clause in section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 is only partial and does not protect a decision of the respondent given without or in excess of jurisdiction or else in breach of the rules of natural justice or due process of law he should have proceeded to hear and determine the merits of the application.”

This advice is what I have been faithful to. I do not therefore feel inclined to examine the reasons why the Court of Appeal itself stated a case to the Supreme Court for the purpose of finding out if I am also obliged to do so. It looks as if Mr. J. E. K. Appiah made some application before the Court of Appeal and it is the application which gave rise to that reference. There is no such parallel situation in the application before me.

I also notice that the case of In re A Company [1980] 1 All E.R. 284, C.A. was referred to in the argument before the Court of Appeal. That case has nothing to do with certiorari. I have read the judgments of Lord Denning M.R. at p. 285 et seq., of Shaw L.J. at p. 287 and of Templeman L.J. at pp. 257 to 288. In the circumstance, I did not find that case useful.

In the result, I find that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah (supra) makes no difference whatsoever to the judgment I have just read.

The application is as I have already decided regretfully dismissed. As I have already said there will be no order as to costs, as I have no assistance whatsoever from counsel for the respondent. DECISION Preliminary objection overruled.

Application for certiorari dismissed.

S. Y. B. – B.

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