ARMAH vs. GHANA WATER AND SEWERAGE CORPORATION [1981] GLR 813
5 June 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 10 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 19Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Action by plaintiff-landlord for recovery of possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits on the ground that the tenants had fai1ed to pay the agreed rent in full and wherein the tenants contended, inter alia, that they were enjoined by an executive act of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to reduce the agreed rent by half.
COUNSEL
Mensah for the plaintiff-landlord.
I. D. Duose for the defendant-tenants
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
The plaintiff, an Accra legal practitioner, is the landlord of a block of flats described as house No. 3 Block 9, North Odorkor Residential Area. By a tenancy agreement dated 20 November 1978, he let these premises to the defendants, the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, at an annual rent of ¢27,000 for two years certain with an option to renew. The notice of intention to renew should be given three months prior to the expiry of the term. The lease commenced on 1 September 1978, and the yearly rent was payable in advance at the commencement of each term. From 1 September 1979, the defendants failed to pay the agreed rent of ¢27,000. The plaintiff therefore took out this summons for recovery of possession; ¢13,500 arrears of rent for six unspecified months, and mesne profits.
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By their amended statement of defence, the defendants pleaded and relied on two documents, namely, a circular No. 16/Vol. 3/143, dated 21 August 1979, issued from the office of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and signed by E. K. Minta, Secretary to the Council at the time; and circular No. SCR — 01/2 dated 19 July 1979, issued from the same office. Those circulars issued directives to all government organisations, statutory boards and corporations to reduce rents paid from public funds, in respect of public officers occupying private houses by fifty per centum.
The defendants contend that by virtue of these directives, they were enjoined to pay the plaintiff half of the rent agreed upon between them in the agreement. They contend further that the plaintiff’s action is misconceived because it is contrary to the basic law of the land. They pleaded the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, and maintain that the directive, being a decision of the A.F.R.C. cannot be challenged or questioned by any “proceedings whatsoever.”
Counsel on both sides agreed that from the pleadings, no issue needed to be resolved on the facts; the only issue that falls to be decided is one of question of law, namely, whether the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s directive was an executive action within the context of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. They agreed that the matter could be disposed of by legal argument.
I decided that the burden in this issue was thrown on the defendants, so they had the right to begin. Mr. Duose, arguing on behalf of the defendants, submitted that the defendant-corporation is a quasi-government organisation completely under the control of the government and therefore subject to the directives which are issued by the government from time to time. He continued that the circular, exhibit A, was issued by the government of the time, and that this circular enjoined the defendants to slash down all rent paid from public funds in respect of public officers occupying private houses by half. Referring to the Rent (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 5), he submitted that the Decree was enacted to buttress the directive contained in the circulars. He argued that the relationship between the parties should be governed by the provisions of A.F.R.C.D. 5 which he submitted had abrogated the tenancy agreement. Counsel also argued that by virtue of section 15 of the transitional provisions, the plaintiff cannot challenge the defendants’ conduct in these proceedings. Mr. Duose further contended that by virtue of section 8 (3) of A.F.R.C.D. 5 the rent payable to the plaintiff should be ¢200 per flat or 34 pesewas per square foot whichever is lower.
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In reply, Mr. Mensah, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the circular relied on by the defendant has no force of law and it cannot derogate from the contract which the defendants had concluded with a private citizen. He conceded that the current law applicable is the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) and A.F.R.C.D. 5, but he submitted that section 8 (3) of A.F.R.C.D. 5, is not applicable to the plaintiff’s case because that section regulates three-roomed self-contained flats whilst the plaintiff’s flats have more than tree rooms each. The applicable provision therefore, he argued, should be section 8 (4) of A.F.R.C.D. 5. Counsel further submitted that on the pleadings and argument, the plaintiff should be entitled to judgment.
I confess that the argument which counsel for the defendants advanced in this case is not very comprehensible to me. So far as I understand their pleadings, the defendants’ stand has been that they were enjoined by an executive act to reduce the rent, and this act cannot by virtue of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, be questioned in these proceedings. I do not agree with the contention. But in his argument, counsel for the defendants went further and argued that the agreement in respect of the premises should be governed by A.F.R.C.D. 5. Even though the policy of the government in the directive contained in exhibit A and the purport of A.F.R.C.D. 5 are the same, i.e. they both seek to control rent, they are different in their mode of operation. The defendants cannot therefore rely on both at the same time. It is clear that what they are seeking to do is to reduce the rent by half. This no doubt is in accordance with the directive contained in the circular, exhibit A. It is clear that they are not acting under A.F.R.C.D. 5. That Decree could not have been enacted to buttress the contents of the circular as counsel argued. To show its full force and effect, it is pertinent to quote the circular here:
“OFFICE OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, P.O. BOX 1627, ACCRA 6th August, 1979 SCR-01/2 RENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OCCUPYING NON-GOVERNMENT BUNGALOWS Further to this office circular letter No. SCR-01/2 dated 19 July 1979 on the above-mentioned subject, I am to state that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s directive that all rents paid
[p.818] of [1981] GLR 813
from public funds in respect of public officers occupying private houses should be reduced by 50 per centum with immediate effect applies to ministries, government departments and all public boards and corporations irrespective of whether they rely on central government funds for their recurrent and capital expenditure or not.
2. I should be grateful if you would take note of the A.F.R.C.’s directive with particular reference to the words underlined above for strict compliance.
(Sgd.) E. K. Minta.
Secretary to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ALL SENIOR PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES ALL PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES ALL REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL THE AUDITOR-GENERAL ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS ALL HEADS OF PUBLIC BOARDS, CORPORATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS ALL HEADS OF UNIVERSITIES C.S.I.R. AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Copy to: Lt-Cdr. (GN) H. C. Apaloo Member of the A.F.R.C.
Office of the Chairman/A.F.R.C.
Arakan Barracks Burma Camp, Accra.”
The circular speaks for itself. It is a directive issuing from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council office to all government departments, including corporations, which pay rent from public funds in respect of public officers occupying private houses. It does not contain any instructions to any private citizen of this country. It did not for instance command any ordinary citizen to accept or receive such and such an amount as rent in respect of premises let out by him. It has no force of law which can affect the rights which the plaintiff has acquired under the tenancy agreement with the defendants. By the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation Decree, 1979, the council itself laid it down that it would rule by Decrees. But this directive is not
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one of such Decrees. The statement contained in the circulars giving directive about rent paid from public funds, can only be regarded as laying down the future government policy on the subject. Rents which have been duly fixed could not be slashed down by it. It is true that the government at the time had wide powers and discretion, but every power, no matter how wide, should be exercised fairly. Giving directives of this kind which in effect give licence to the government departments and other institutions to break their contracts with private individuals was not a fair exercise of the power. The directive contained in the circular has no force binding on the plaintiff.
The defendants also rely on the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. He argued with some conviction that the directives contained in the circulars cannot be challenged in any proceedings whatsoever. Counsel relied on section 15 of the transitional provisions. The relevant subsections of section 15 read:
“(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.
(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.
(4) It shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to entertain any action instituted in respect of any act or omission against any person acting or omitting to act, on the instructions or authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or any member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and alleged to be in contravention of any law, whether substantive or procedural, in existence before or during the administration of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”
Counsel for the defendants’ argument is that the directive contained in the circulars dated 19 July and 6 August 1979, being an executive action by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, cannot be “questioned” in any court of law.
It is not my view that the contents of these circulars amount to an executive act. To my mind, they are rather a mere directive on government policy of hiring accommodation for public servants.
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But even if they should be regarded in any sense as an “action taken” the present suit is not an action taken for the purpose of questioning that action—as contemplated by the transitional provisions. It would therefore not fall within the “actions” in respect of which “it shall not be lawful” for a court “to make any order or grant any remedy or relief.” The submission on this point cannot sustain.
The matter should be considered in the light of the current law on the subject. This is contained in A.F.R.C.D. 5. Section 8 of that Decree suggests chargeable rents for premises comparable to certain types of houses described in the provisions. The plaintiff’s flats contain four rooms each. Section 8 (3), which counsel for the defendants submitted should be taken as the yardstick to determine the rent payable in respect of the plaintiff’s flat, reads:
“8. (3) For a three-roomed self-contained detached house like the State Housing Corporation house type S.H. (3) the rent shall be ¢200.00 per month or 34 pesewas per square foot whichever is lower.
(4) For any other self-contained house of more than three rooms the rent shall be negotiated between the landlord and tenant.”
It was agreed by both counsel that the self-contained flat which is described as S.H. (3) has three rooms, viz, two bedrooms and a living room; they are therefore three-roomed self-contained flats. Section 8 (4) therefore takes premises like the plaintiff’s out of the application of the Decree. The rent of such flats cannot be regulated by the standard laid down in the Decree but by negotiation between the parties. It is clear that even the Decree does not justify the defendants’ conduct in reducing the rent by half. The Decree does not enjoin government departments or statutory corporations to abrogate their agreements which had been entered into in respect of premises falling outside its provisions. The defendants had no justification in paying rent contrary to the terms of the agreement. They are therefore liable to the plaintiff for the balance. From the pleadings, it is conceded that the flat was let for two years certain. The defendants paid the full rent for the first year, and paid half the rent agreed upon for the second year. What is left unpaid therefore is ¢13,500. This is the balance left unpaid on the second term which should expire on 31 August 1980. I enter judgment for the plaintiff for that sum, i.e. ¢13,500.
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I take the hint from these circulars issued on the hiring of accommodation for public servants that the government wants to discourage the hiring of expensive accommodation by its departments, corporations and institutions. Therefore when this current term expires on 31 August 1980, as the defendants are not permitted to continue keeping these premises at the current rate, they should quit. I assess the plaintiff’s costs at ¢1,000.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff. J. K. E. E.
