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[1980] SLR (HC) 26High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

FAWKES vs. ACCRA BREWERY LTD. [1981] GLR 489

19 May 1980 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 26
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OSCOLAFAWKES v ACCRA BREWERY LTD. [1981] GLR 489 [1980] SLR (HC) 26
APAFAWKES v ACCRA BREWERY LTD. [1981] GLR 489, [1980] SLR (HC) 26 (Ghana).
BluebookFAWKES v ACCRA BREWERY LTD. [1981] GLR 489, [1980] SLR (HC) 26 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an extension of time within which to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the adverse findings made against the applicants by the Opare-Addo Committee of Inquiry established

[p.491] of [1981] GLR 489 by E.I. 30 of 1979. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

De Paul for the applicants.

S. K. Boafo for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

This is an application brought under the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), s. 10 (4) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), for an extension of time within which to appeal against the findings of the Opare-Addo Committee of Inquiry into labour unrests at the breweries, i.e. Tata Brewery Limited, Kumasi Brewery Limited, Accra Brewery Limited and Guinness (Ghana) Limited. The said committee was established under the Committee of Inquiry (Labour Unrest at the Breweries) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 30).

The facts leading to the presentation of this application may be briefly stated as follows: On or about 2 May 1979, the erstwhile Supreme Military Council appointed a committee of inquiry into the circumstances leading to labour unrests in the country’s four breweries. This committee is what has come to be commonly referred to as the Opare-Addo Committee of Inquiry. The sole member of this committee was Mr. Opare-Addo, then a circuit court judge but now retired. Section 3 of E.I. 30 of 1979 provides:

“3. The terms of reference of the Committee shall be as follows:— (a) to investigate any complaints made by the managements of Tata Brewery Limited, Kumasi Brewery Limited, Accra Brewery Limited and Guinness (Ghana) Limited against their respective employees not to return to work after the recent strike;

(b) to investigate any complaints made by such employees against the decision of their employers;

(c) to state in respect of each such employee whether having regard to the evidence before the Committee and the conduct of such employee in connection with the said strike as approved before the Committee, the refusal by his employer to re-engage such employee was justified;

(d) to submit its findings to the Commissioner responsible for Labour giving reasons for such findings and making such recommendations as it considers necessary.”

The facts before the court show that the committee’s report and the Government’s White Paper on it were published on or about

[p.492] of [1981] GLR 489

16 November 1979. It appears that all the findings and recommendations of the committee were accepted by the government.

The applicants herein are 29 ex-employees of the respondents who claim that they had been dismissed because of adverse findings made by the committee against them. Their complaint is that:

“4. That we made persistent attempts to have the committee publish its findings but we failed until some time in November 1979, on or about 16 November 1979, the Government White Paper came out pronouncing the publication of, and acceptance by government of the committee’s findings.”

In support of the application, Mr. De Paul, counsel for the applicants, submitted that by article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, the proper forum to present the application was this court. Learned counsel referred to the affidavit in support of the application and submitted that it had been difficult for the applicants to come by copies of the report and the White Paper. He said this had accounted for the delay in lodging the appeal within the statutory three months’ period authorised. Learned counsel therefore invited the court to exercise its discretion in granting the application for extension of time to enable the rights of the applicants to be decided on appeal.

Opposition to the application was contained in an eight-paragraph affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. The relevant paragraphs of which are:

“3. That the instrument of appointment of the committee did not make any provision for appeal from its findings.

4. That the enabling enactment, that is section 26 of the National Redemption Council (Establishment)

Proclamation, 1972, did not make any provision for appeal and in any event the said Decree has been repealed.

5. That the right of appeal envisaged under article 199 (2) of the Constitution of the Third Republic only avails commissions of inquiry and not a committee of inquiry.

6. That the respondents will contend that having regard to the composition of the committee of inquiry appointed under E.I. 30, the said committee cannot be equated to a commission of inquiry as envisaged under chapter 23 of the Constitution of the Third Republic.

7. That further or in the alternative the procedure being followed by the applicants in bringing the present application is erroneous.

8. That the respondents will contend that the present application is without merit and should be dismissed.”

[p.493] of [1981] GLR 489

Opposing the application, Mr. Boafo, counsel for the respondents, referred to the affidavit in opposition and submitted that E.I. 30 of 1979 under which the Opare-Addo’s Committee of Inquiry was set up, made no provision for an appeal. Learned counsel contended that looking at that instrument by itself, the applicants were out of court. Continuing, learned counsel argued that the right of appeal envisaged under article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, existed only in relation to commissions of inquiry and not committees of inquiry. Counsel further contended that the sole member appointed under E.I. 30 of 1979 did not satisfy any of the qualifications spelt out under article 198 (3). He therefore submitted that the Opare-Addo Committee which had been the subject of the present application could not be considered as the type envisaged under chapter 23 of the Constitution so as to avail the applicants of the right of appeal conferred on commissions of inquiry under article 198 (2). Finally learned counsel attacked the procedure adopted by the applicants and submitted that he doubted its propriety. He therefore invited the court to dismiss the application. I will first deal with the procedural issue. The right of appeal against a decision of a commission of inquiry under our present law is provided by article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, which reads:

“(2) Where a commission of inquiry makes an adverse finding against any person, the report of the commission of inquiry shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be deemed to be a judgment of the High Court of Justice and accordingly an appeal shall lie as of right from the commission to the Court of Appeal.”

Prima facie therefore, the proper forum for the present application is the High Court. Under article 213 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, a commission of inquiry is defined to include a committee of inquiry. It follows therefore that up to this stage, the applicants are properly before this court.

I shall proceed at this stage to consider the law governing appeals from decisions of the High Court of Justice. The right of appeal from decisions and other orders of the High Court of Justice is provided by article 122 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, 1979, which states:

“122. (1) The Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction throughout Ghana to hear and determine, subject to the provisions of this article and of this Constitution, appeals from a judgment, decree or order of the High Court of Justice or a Justice thereof and such other appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by this Constitution or any other law.

[p.494] of [1981] GLR 489

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, an appeal shall lie as of right from a judgment, decree or order of the High Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal in any cause or matter determined by the High Court of Justice.”

The rules of procedure governing such appeals are provided by L.I. 218, r. 10. Rule 10 (4) of L.I. 218 as amended by L.I. 618 provides:

“(4) No application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the time prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be brought.

Every such application (whether made within the time prescribed within which an appeal may be brought or not) must be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application and by grounds of appeal which prima facie, show good cause for leave to be granted; and when time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”

The effect of L.I. 218, r. 10 (4) as amended by L.I. 618, as far as the present application is concerned, is that the applicants had three months from the date of the publication of the committee’s report to appeal against its findings as of right. After the expiration of the first three months, they had a further three months within which to apply to this court for an extension of time within which to appeal, subject of course, to satisfying the court within the language of rule 10 (4) of L.I. 618, the cause for the delay. It is therefore clear from the above analysis that the applicants had six months from 16 November 1979 to apply for an extension of time and if my arithmetical calculation is correct this will expire some time on 15 May 1980. The applicants having brought their application on 27 March 1980, are very well within the six months allowed. Their application is therefore held to be properly before the court and the contention of learned counsel for the respondents on the procedural issue of the application is hereby rejected as untenable.

Having dealt with this procedural matter, I shall proceed to examine the status of the Opare-Addo’s Committee of Inquiry in order to decide whether it satisfies the provisions of chapter 23 of the Constitution, 1979, which deal with commissions and committees of inquiry. Article 196 (3) which provides who shall be competent to be appointed as sole commissioner or chairman of a commission of inquiry reads:

[p.495] of [1981] GLR 489

“(3) No person shall be appointed a sole commissioner or the chairman of a commission of inquiry under this article unless:— (a) he is a Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature; or (b) he is a person qualified to be appointed a Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature; or (c) he is a person who has held office as a Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature; or (d) he is a person who possesses special qualifications or knowledge in respect of the matter forming the subject-matter of the investigation.”

If Mr. D. Opare-Addo, the sole member appointed under E.I. 30 of 1979, did not possess any of the qualifications set out under any of the sub-clauses of article 196 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, at the time of his appointment, and there does not exist either in the Constitution or elsewhere, a law giving a right of appeal to the applicants, then the respondents’ case is made out and the appellants would be justifiably held to be out of court. The facts before the court show that Mr. D. Opare-Addo at the time of his appointment, was a circuit court judge. He is so described in the instrument establishing the committee. There is nothing apparent on the face of E.I. 30 which shows that his appointment was based on his special qualification or knowledge in respect of the matter forming the subject-matter of the investigation by his committee. Prima facie therefore, he is considered incompetent to be appointed a sole commissioner within the language of article 196 (3) of the Constitution. However, section 11 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, Part IV provides:

“11. For the removal of doubt, the report and findings of a commission or committee of inquiry established before the coming into force of this Constitution under any enactment shall have the same effect as the report or findings of a commission of inquiry established under this Constitution.”

Section 11 above seeks to give to reports and findings of all committees of inquiry established prior to the coming into force of the Constitution the same status as a commission or committee established under the Constitution, notwithstanding the provisions of article 196 (3). This is of course subject to the reports and findings of committees of inquiry envisaged under section 17 (2) of the transitional provisions.

[p.496] of [1981] GLR 489

In view of section 11 above, I hold in my ruling that the report and findings of the Opare-Addo Committee are appealable against as if it was a committee appointed under article 196 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. It follows from my above holding that the applicants are entitled to appeal under article 198 (2) of the Constitution.

The application therefore succeeds and the same is hereby granted. The applicants are given an extension of time of 30 days from today to file their appeal.

DECISION Application for extension of time to appeal against committee’s findings allowed.

E. P.-T.

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