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[1980] SLR (HC) 32High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

KOTOKOLI AND ANOTHER vs. SARBAH [1981] GLR 496

22 May 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 32
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OSCOLAKOTOKOLI AND ANOTHER v SARBAH [1981] GLR 496 [1980] SLR (HC) 32
APAKOTOKOLI AND ANOTHER v SARBAH [1981] GLR 496, [1980] SLR (HC) 32 (Ghana).
BluebookKOTOKOLI AND ANOTHER v SARBAH [1981] GLR 496, [1980] SLR (HC) 32 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Waya v. Byrouthy (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 413.

(2) Dadzie and Boateng v. Kokofu [1961] G.L.R. 90.

(3) Youhana v. Abboud [1973] 1 G.L.R. 258.

(4) Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 1 G.L.R. 375, C.A.

(5) Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.

(6) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

(7) Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of a district court finding for the respondent in an action for recovery of possession of a house bought from the appellant. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Goodhead for the appellant.

Oppong for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

The issues for determination in this case are: firstly whether the first appellant had title in the house to transfer to the respondent, and secondly, whether or not the contract for the sale of house No. E 44/15 by the first appellant to the respondent was rescinded, and if not whether it should be set aside. The trial court resolved these issues in favour of the respondent and the appellants have appealed to this court on the main [p.498] of [1981] GLR 496 ground that the case of the appellant was not considered by the trial court.

Some time in May 1970 the first defendant-appellant (hereinafter called the defendant) offered house No. E44/15 at Nima, Accra, to the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called the plaintiff) for sale at a price of ¢600. The plaintiff agreed to buy and paid the full purchase price for which a receipt dated 31 May 1970 was issued by the defendant. The defendant asked to be allowed to occupy two rooms in the house (which would have been let for ¢3 per room) rent-free for three months from 1 June 1970 to enable the defendant to look for an alternative accommodation. At the end of the three months’ grace period, the defendant sold the house to another person for ¢1,200, double the price paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff felt this was a double-cross and made a complaint of fraud against the defendant to the police. The matter was settled and the defendant was advised to refund the money to the second purchaser. Subsequently, the plaintiff took this action for ejectment and recovery of possession of the two rooms occupied by the defendant.

The father of the defendant applied and joined in the action as a co-defendant claiming title to the whole premises, and in a counterclaim he asked for the sale by his son, the defendant, to be set aside. The defendant conceded to the sale agreement, but he said he had no authority to sell. He said the house belonged to his father, the co-defendant, who is a Togolese. On the coming into force of the Aliens Compliance Order, his father left Ghana for Togo, so he sold the house for fear that the government might pull it down or seize it. Subsequently, when the father was allegedly informed about the step he had taken, the father ordered that he should refund the purchase price to the purchaser, because he had no intention to sell.

On the evidence presented to the court, the learned magistrate accepted the plaintiff’s case; he found that the defendant was the owner of the property and that he had sold it as his own property to the plaintiff. He accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiff and ordered recovery of possession in his favour.

Mr. Goodhead, counsel for the appellant, has assailed the reasons which the learned magistrate gave for preferring the plaintiff’s case to that of the defendant. Counsel argued the additional grounds of appeal. The first reads, “That the trial magistrate erred in holding that the non-production of a site plan to a land in Nima is fatal to the defendant’s and co-defendant’s case.” He contended that there was evidence from the land owner who sold the land on which the house in question was built. This witness was Bede.

[p.499] of [1981] GLR 496

Counsel submitted that in view of Bede’s evidence, a finding of fact should have been made that the co-defendant was the owner of the land, and also the house on it. Counsel for the plaintiff argued contra. Bede’s evidence was that he was an agent for the landowner and that he sold the land to the co-defendant and no receipt or memorandum was issued in evidence of the sale. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff on this issue was given by Yaya Kotokoli, whose niece was married to the defendant. He said he accompanied the defendant and introduced him to Bede for the sale of the land to the defendant. This man had lived in Nima for 27 years, and be said he was actually present when the land was demarcated for the defendant fifteen years to the time he gave evidence in 1972 and he actually saw the defendant construct the house. He said the defendant’s father was at the time in Togo. Pitched against Bede’s evidence, the magistrate preferred Yaya’s evidence; he said the defendants failed to produce a site plan or any evidence of ownership by the co-defendant. He found it inconceivable that Bede would sell a plot of land on which stands an eight-roomed house at Nima without a receipt. The magistrate did not say so in so many words, but the implication was that a receipt must have been issued, and if it had been issued to the co-defendant, he would have produced it. In other words, documents on the house must have been in the name of the defendant and that was why none was produced. Reading through the record, I find no concrete evidence of ownership residing in the co-defendant apart from the word of the defendant and co-defendant.

At the time when this land was alleged to have been bought by the co-defendant and the house built, the co-defendant admitted he was living at Koforidua. He said he wanted a house in Accra and so he came to Accra and bought the land and started building on it but he continued to live at Koforidua. He said the house was built step by step, he sent the money to the defendant to buy the building materials, and it took seven to eight years to complete the house of ten rooms. From the evidence the co-defendant never lived in Accra during the whole period of construction. There is no evidence he has ever lived in that house. When he left Koforidua, he moved to Kade where he said he built his own house. It is highly improbable that in 1948, the co-defendant then resident in Koforidua, would conceive the idea of building in Accra and would start building at Nima, just for the sake of acquiring property in Accra. At that time a house at Nima would have very little, if any, commercial value, and the co-defendant never had plans to live in it himself so the magistrate was right in rejecting his evidence of ownership as improbable. Even in 1972 when this matter came on

[p.500] of [1981] GLR 496

for trial at the court below, the rent per room in that house was between ¢2 and ¢3, so there would be nothing to induce the co-defendant in 1948 to build at the site he alleges he did. It is worthy to note that even though Bede said that the land was bought in 1948 when the defendant was a small boy, the co-defendant said he entrusted the construction and care of the house to this same person when he bought the land. I did not see the parties so I have no idea about their ages. But Yaya Kotokoli’s evidence gives an inkling about the defendant’s age. The defendant’s wife had died about seven years to the time Yaya gave evidence in 1972, so she must have died in 1965. The deceased wife had born him five children before her demise, so even in 1948 he would not have been a small boy. Yaya’s estimation of the date of purchase was 1957. That seems a more likely date of purchase. In 1948, Nima would have been a deep forest so to speak ⎯ for any one to wish to buy a land there. The evidence on the side of the defendant and co-defendant was not consistent. For the whole period that the house was built, the co-defendant had received only ¢9 as rent and though the rooms were let, he said he sent money to the defendant to pay the property rate. The evidence of the co-defendant was inconsistent with his ownership in the property, and the magistrate was right to ask for a more concrete proof, like a site plan.

The second additional ground of appeal argued was:

“That the trial magistrate erred in holding that non-registration of the co-defendant’s name at the Accra-Tema City Council means by implication that the co-defendant is not the owner of the building.”

On the state of the pleadings, and from the concessions and admissions made, the burden shifted onto the defendant to show that the co-defendant was the owner of the house which he sold to the plaintiff. The plaintiff led evidence to establish the sale and this was admitted. There was also evidence from which, if believed, the court could draw the inference that the defendant was the owner of the house sold. It was therefore for the defendant and co-defendant to adduce evidence to rebut this inference. It was part of the plaintiff’s evidence that a search he conducted at the Accra-Tema City Council Offices showed the defendant as owner of the premises. The co-defendant himself said he did not know that the house was registered at the Accra-Tema City Council in the name of the defendant. If anybody should produce documentary evidence to show that the co-defendant’s name is registered, then it was the co-defendant. But neither the defendant nor the co-defendant led evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s evidence that

[p.501] of [1981] GLR 496

the defendant was registered as the owner. The co-defendant conceded that rates are payable and that the defendant paid on his behalf. This is evidence that the house is registered in the records of the city council, and if it were registered in the name of the co-defendant, I fail to see why no such evidence was forthcoming from the defendant or the co-defendant. Houses are registered for the purposes of property tax, in the names of the house owners. If the defendant’s name was registered, then the presumption was that he was the owner. There was no evidence to contradict or rebut the evidence that the house was registered in the name of the defendant, albeit the evidence of registration was only oral.

The last ground of appeal argued was that the magistrate erred in holding that because the co-defendant had received only ¢9 out of the total rent collected, he was not the owner. Counsel submitted that this conclusion is erroneous because the evidence was that the rent was used to make extensions on the house. In his judgment, the magistrate did not make any inference on the significance of the ¢9 which the co-defendant said represented the total amount he had received as rent from the house since its construction. All he said was, “Even though the house contains eight rooms, the defendant has given him (co-defendant) only ¢9 out of the rents he collected since the building was constructed.” The co-defendant’s evidence was that he bought the land in 1948 and it took about seven to eight years to construct the house of ten rooms. By his calculation therefore, the house would have been completed in 1957, and if it were let out even at 50 pesewas per room for all these years, the houseowner would have demanded and received more than ¢9 as rent. The submission by counsel has no basis on the evidence.

Another matter which was not raised in the grounds of appeal filed but which counsel raised in this court is that the receipt on which the plaintiff relied, was a document which was issued by one illiterate to another, but it did not contain a jurat and therefore was not binding. He also submitted it was a document affecting land and therefore registrable but it was not registered, so it is not binding on the co-defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff replied that the document was admitted in evidence without an objection so it should be deemed to have been admitted by the defendant.

The general rule of evidence is that where an illiterate executes a document, any other party to the document who relies upon it must prove that it was read over, and if necessary interpreted to the illiterate: see Waya v. Byrouthy (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 413; Dadzie and Boateng v. Kokofu

[1961] of [1981] GLR 496

G.L.R. 90 and Youhana v. Abboud

[p.502] of [1981] GLR 496

[1973] 1 G.L.R. 258. This is a rule which is mainly based on commonsense. Evidence should be preserved of the fact that illiterate natives who are parties to conveyances had the contents of the conveyances clearly interpreted to them in their own native language, and that they fully appear to comprehend the nature and effect of the transactions evidenced by the document. However, where the document does not bear a jurat on the face of it, but the party who executed it does not object either to it or the transaction which it seeks to evidence, this general rule should not be allowed to defeat the document on the mere technical ground of lack of a jurat. The defendant in this case does not dispute he sold the house in question; he does not dispute he issued a receipt for the payment of the purchase price. The defendant’s evidence on this aspect of the matter reads:

“The plaintiff then agreed to buy the house and I sold it to him for ¢600. Yaya and I went, got a receipt prepared later gave the receipt to the plaintiff [sic) when I was giving the receipt to the plaintiff, the first plaintiff witness and one Alhaji Sharibu were present.”

This is the receipt which counsel now seeks to avoid because it was issued by one illiterate to another and it bears no jurat. It may be inferred from the evidence that the defendant understood and fully appreciated its meaning and effects, and he is bound by the contents. The argument advanced by counsel is irrelevant in this case, and the general principle cannot be applied in this case.

With regard to the argument based on non-registration, the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), s. 24 makes registration of an instrument affecting land compulsory. A document affecting land in Ghana which is not registered in compliance with the Act has no legal effect. Section 36 defines an instrument as “any writing, affecting land situate in Ghana.” Therefore if the document referred to in this case were an instrument under section 36 of the Act, then non-registration would have rendered it ineffective to convey any title on the plaintiff, nor impose any obligations on the defendant or co-defendant, irrespective of whether or not the latter did not object to it being tendered in evidence: see Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 1 G.L.R. 375, C.A.; Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R.331, C.A. and Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

The question is, what is the nature of this document? The whole document reads:

[p.503] of [1981] GLR 496

“RECEIPTS IN RESPECT OF SALE AND TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF HOUSE NO. E.44/15, NIMA, ACCRA, BY SAKARI KOTOKOLI⎯LANDLORD TO BARBER CHAMBA FOR ¢600 This is to certify that I, the undersigned, Sakari Kotokoli, landlord of House No. E. 44/15, Nima, Accra, have this day, the 31st day of May, 1970, sold and transferred the ownership of my House No. E. 44/15, Nima, Accra, to one Mr. Barber Chamba of Nima, Accra, for an amount of £300 (Three Hundred Pounds) or ¢600 (Six Hundred New Cedis) which amount he has paid to me in full settlement thereof, in respect of the above-mentioned house, and that, by virtue of this receipt, he has therefore henceforth become the bona fide owner of the house by right of purchase from me with effect from today’s date 31.5.70.

2. Dated at Nima, Accra, this 31st day of May (Sgd.) Sakari Kotokoli (The Seller)

Witness 1. Yaya Kotokoli.

2. (Sgd.) Abudu Chamba.”

The plaintiff did not sign it. It cannot be a deed of conveyance, or an instrument affecting land. It is a receipt for the payment of the purchase price of the house, and showing the purpose for which the payment was made. It may pass as a memorandum of the agreement but it is not an instrument affecting land. It is a memorandum of the agreement conveying the house to the plaintiff. It is therefore not registrable; but it should have been stamped.

In any case the sale of the house is not disputed. The only question is whether it can be set aside. The ground upon which the defendants sought to set it aside was that the defendant was not the owner and he had no authority to sell. The onus probandi therefore lay on the defendants; it was not for the plaintiff to show the defendant was not the owner. He was to establish that the defendant was the owner. He led evidence by himself and his witnesses and the preponderance of probability of that evidence was that the defendant was the owner of the house in question. One of the reasons the magistrate gave for rejecting the case of the defendant and codefendant was that it was not consistent.

[p.504] of [1981] GLR 496

According to the evidence of the defendant, when the defendant sold the house, he left the money with his brother Yakubu and he travelled to Togo to tell his father of the sale. He said that his father told him to return the money because he did not want to sell the house. But in their statement of defence, both the defendant and the co-defendant averred that the defendant wrote to the co-defendant to inform him of the sale. This is evidence of inconsistency between the pleading and the evidence. The magistrate found that the defendant, co-defendant and their witnesses were not witnesses of truth and disbelieved them. The introduction of the co-defendant in the matter appears to be a concerted plan to assist the defendant to abrogate the sale. There is evidence from which the magistrate could come to the conclusions arrived at. The defendant had the right to convey and the sale was legal and binding on him. He did not need any authority or consent to sell. The house was his own self-acquired property. The judgment cannot be assailed. The appeal is disallowed.

Even though the plaintiff sued for recovery of possession simpliciter, what was at issue and what was decided was title and whether it was conveyed. There is evidence that the defendant had title and that he conveyed it by sale to the plaintiff. The sale is sufficiently evidenced by the receipt. In order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, I will exercise my power under Order 28, r. 12 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and amend the endorsement of the writ: see Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C. I do so by adding a claim for declaration of title, so that the endorsement will read, “The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for an order for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of house No. E.44/15, Nima, Accra.” Since the evidence established that the defendant was the owner, and that he conveyed it by sale to the plaintiff, I give judgment to the plaintiff for declaration of his title. I order recovery of possession. I discharge the injunction order made by the trial court on 22 December 1971. The sums in the hands of the receiver and manager should be released to the plaintiff. Costs in this court are assessed at ¢200.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. F. L.

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