SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (HC) 42High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. JEHU-APPIAH AND OTHERS; EX PARTE FORSON [1981] GLR 398

27 March 1980 · OKUNOR J · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 42
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v JEHU-APPIAH AND OTHERS; ex parte FORSON [1981] GLR 398 [1980] SLR (HC) 42
APAREPUBLIC v JEHU-APPIAH AND OTHERS; ex parte FORSON [1981] GLR 398, [1980] SLR (HC) 42 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v JEHU-APPIAH AND OTHERS; ex parte FORSON [1981] GLR 398, [1980] SLR (HC) 42 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Antwi v. Amponsah [1961] 2 G.L.R. 751.

(2) Helmore v. Smith (1887) 35 Ch. D. 449; 56 L.J. 72; 35 W.R. 157, C.A.

(3) William Thomas Shipping Co., Ltd., In re; Dillon (H.W.) & Sons Ltd. v. The Company [1930] 2 Ch.D. 368; 99 L.J.Ch. 560; 144 L.T. 104.

(4) Balogun v. Edusei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 547.

(5) Narh v. Dombo, Court of Appeal, 23 March 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 68. (6) R. v. Hutchison; Ex parte McMahon [1936] 2 All E.R. 1514; 155 L.T. 455; 80 S.J. 723. (7) Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391.

(8) Littler v. Thomson (1839) 2 Beav. 129.

(9) Read & Huggonson, Re (1742) 26 E.R. 683; (1742) 2 Atk. 469.

(10) Turner v. Naval, Military and Civil Service Co-operative Society of South Africa, The Times, 21 January 1907.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION under L.N. 140A, Order 59, r. 21 calling on the respondents to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt of court.

COUNSEL

A. H. Sackeyfio for the applicant.

Asumadu-Sekyi with him Ennin for the respondents.

[p.400] of [1981] GLR 398

JUDGMENT OF OKUNOR J.

This is an application brought under Order 59, r. 21 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), calling upon the respondents to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt of court. The said rule provides:

“21. (1) The procedure in applications for attachment for contempt of court in the cases to which this rule applies shall be the same as in applications for an order of mandamus and rules 2, 4, 5 and 6 of this Order shall apply accordingly to applications for attachment, so far as they are applicable:

Provided that the issue of the writ of attachment shall not be ordered by a Judge in Chambers, and the notice of motion shall be personally served unless the Court or a Judge dispenses with such service.”

The cases to which this rule applies are listed in sub-rule (2) which reads:

“(2) This rule applies to cases where the contempt is committed— (a) in connection with proceedings to which this Order relates;

(b) in connection with any proceedings in Court, except where the contempt is committed in facie curiae or consists of disobedience to an order of the Court;

(c) in connection with proceedings in an inferior court.”

The material facts as disclosed by the affidavit supporting the application for the order of attachment and indeed confirmed by material in the court docket are that on 14 August 1979, the applicant sealed a writ of summons in this court in which the following claims were indorsed:

“(a) A declaration that as between the plaintiff and the second defendant, the plaintiff is the proper person according to custom and the regulations of the church of the Musama Disco Christo Church (M.D.C.C.) to succeed Prophetess Matholmua Jehu Appiah;

(b) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from performing any functions or duties performed by the national queenmother of the said church.”

Two days later, she followed up the writ with a motion on notice:

“for an order of interim injunction restraining the defendants herein from having anything to do with regards to the succession case herein on the grounds set out in the supporting

[p.401] of [1981] GLR 398 affidavit attached pending the hearing and the final determination of this case.”

The applicant then filed her statement of claim and then on 24 August 1979 after all the processes mentioned above had been served on the respondents and they had entered appearance in the main suit, the motion for interim injunction came up for determination but counsel for the respondents did not turn up, and his brief was held by another counsel who persuaded the court not to make the order on an undertaking that he would advise the respondents “not to do anything in the interim period to forestall the result of a possible order in this matter.” The court, as constituted during the vacation, made the following order, “This court will upon counsel’s undertaking, adjourn the application to 7 September 1979 for hearing.”

The motion was heard on 7 September 1979 and ruling was reserved for 27 September. Whilst this ruling together with the main suit were still pending, the applicant received a letter dated 10 September 1979 and signed by the general secretary of the church, a Reverend Imbeah, addressed to her and copied to the Akaboha III, i.e. the first defendant in the main suit and also to a Senior Prophet Hindru Fuah. This letter suspended the applicant indefinitely from office as prophetess with effect from 1 September 1979. It was marked exhibit A and annexed to this application—it reads:

“Dear Sister in Christ, SUSPENSION By the Grace, I am directed by the executive board and our (7) seven Musama Chiefs to inform you that during our recent Peace Festival Celebrations, a joint meeting was held, and it came to light that you have summoned the General Head of the Musama Church, Pro. M. Jonah Jehu-Appiah, the Akaboha III, who is your employer, at the Cape Coast High Court.

On hearing this you were requested to appear before them for consultations, but you turned this down and failed to attend the call, which is contrary to the regulations of the Church Constitution, p. 24, section 14, paragraphs 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9. By this action, the meeting deputised the Twafuhene Opanyin Koomson, and the Deputy Senior Priest, Rev. J. C. Selby, to inform the Senior Prophet Jimiru Fuah for onward transmission to you, by virtue of his office as senior prophet, who was absent from the meeting, and you as prophetess under him, that you have contravened the rules of the church by taking

[p.402] of [1981] GLR 398 court action against the General Head of the Church, the Akaboha III, and refusing to appear before the elders, when you were called for consultations; and as your such behaviour is contrary to the rules of the church, you are suspended indefinitely, with effect from 1 September 1979, as a prophetess of the church.

You are further asked to surrender your regalia and any other church property in your possession to the Senior Pro. Jimiru Fuah on the receipt of this letter.

Yours in Christ (Sgd.) Rev. S. O. Imbeah (GENERAL SECRETARY)”

It is the contention of the applicant that this act of suspension whilst her case was pending in court:

“amounts to conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrepute and ridicule, disrespect and disregard, and interferes with and or prejudices parties and or their witnesses in the pending litigation and consequently amounts to contempt of this court.”

And has consequently brought this application for attachment.

At the hearing of the application, it was brought to the notice of the court that it had not been possible to serve four of the respondents—Mr. Myers, Mr. Jehu-Appiah, Nana Obiri and Mr. Asumadu-Sekyi. Mr. Sackeyfio, counsel for the applicant then applied to the court to withdraw against these people and leave was granted him so to do.

The defendants’ main answer to this accusation of criminal contempt is that the issues to be determined in the pending suit have not in any way been tampered with by the act of suspension and consequently the court has not been prevented from going into the matter; consequently no contempt has been committed. Counsel readily cited the case of Antwi v. Amponsah [1961] G.L.R. 751 in which Ollennu J. (as he then was) quoted at p. 754 the following extract from the judgment of Bowen L.J. in the case of Helmore v. Smith (1887) 35 Ch.D. 449, C.A. as the test to be applied:

“The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of Court is not to vindicate the dignity of Court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. The question, therefore, here is whether there has been an interference with the administration of justice.”

[p.403] of [1981] GLR 398

The learned judge then went on at p. 754 to comment on the meaning and scope of that quotation in the following terms:

“I interprete the principle laid down in that case to mean that improper conduct by itself is not enough to constitute contempt. The act or conduct must be of such a nature as would unduly interfere with the administration of justice, i.e. prevent the court from, or make it impossible for it to exercise jurisdiction in a case, or if it exercises the jurisdiction it leads to miscarriage of justice.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Whatever the learned judge found unnecessary to state due to the nature of the facts in that particular case before him he made it clear in his interpretation of Bowen L.J.’s test that contempt is not confined to cases where “the court cannot go into the matter.” The last sentence of that extract makes it quite clear that it is still contempt even when the court can go into the matter but the end product of the exercise of that jurisdiction would be marred by some act of interference done during the pendency of the action.

The expression “jurisdiction” is not confined to the physical inability of the court to inquire into the matters before it—it extends to the effect of its orders or judgments on the parties litigant and beyond. In William Thomas Shipping Co., Ltd., In re; Dillon (H.W.) & Sons Ltd. v. The Company [1930] 2 Ch.D. 368, the court was not prevented from going into the matter before it. On 26 March 1930, H. W. Dillon who held a substantial holding in a shipping business of which Sir Robert Thomas was one of the governing directors, which business was in gross financial difficulties, took out a writ in a debenture holders’ action. Whilst that action was pending, he applied for, and obtained an order for the appointment of a receiver and manager. On 15 May 1930, whilst the main suit was still pending, Sir Robert caused to be published in the Liverpool Echo an interview he had had with a reporter of that paper in which he had suggested that the action of the plaintiff in obtaining the interim order was “oppressive, improper and spiteful.” Maugham J. held that Sir Robert was in contempt. It was Maugham J.’s view at p. 376 that if the plaintiff could be treated the way he was treated:

“…his conduct in such an action is very likely to be affected, and he may, for all I know, in such a case be tempted, being dominus litis, to take a course which is not in the interests of the other debenture holders whom he is there to represent.”

[p.404] of [1981] GLR 398

Maugham J. continued at pp. 376-377, “My opinion is that such an attack may interfere with the course of justice and ought not to be allowed.” I shall examine more fully the stated reasons for holding Sir Robert in contempt but for the moment the point I wish to make is that Sir Robert’s conduct, i.e. the publication of the noxious matter made no reference whatsoever to the issues on which the main suit was to be fought and did not prevent the court in any way from inquiring into the matters before it but that did not held Sir Robert. It was also decided that the attack on the plaintiff’s action whilst the substantive action subsisted amounted to interference with the course of justice.

In his judgment in the case Maugham J. at p. 376 had occasion to comment on “jurisdiction” in relation to contempt, and he said.:

“. . . I must express my opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court is not confined to cases where the order of the Court or the future orders of the Court are likely to be directly affected in some way.”

Whatever Maugham J. is not saying in that extract, he is saying, at least, that where the future orders of the court (after the court has successfully inquired into the matters before it, i.e. has not been prevented from inquiring into the matters before it, as suggested by counsel for the respondents) are likely to be affected by some conduct of some person, a situation arises in which the jurisdiction of the court has been tampered with, and a contempt committed.

In the Antwi case, reference was not unnaturally, made to Balogun v. Edusei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 547. Perhaps it maybe helpful to emphasise that cases like the Balogun case and Narh v. Dombo, Court of Appeal, 23 March 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 68 where the applicants were bodily air-lifted out of the jurisdiction of the court are instances of outrageous contempt, and anyone who expects the circumstances of these cases to be used as a yardstick by which his conduct should be examined in a case of contempt is leaving a wide area dangerously unprotected. He is skating on very thin ice.

I am unable to accept the argument that because the conduct of the respondents did not prevent the court from inquiring into the specific matters raised in the pleadings in the pending suit before it, such conduct cannot amount to contempt. To constitute contempt, writing which reflects adversely on a party need not refer to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings. It is sufficient if it is clear that the comment tends to prejudice the trial of the action

[p.405] of [1981] GLR 398 in any way whatsoever: see R. v. Hutchison; Ex parte McMahon [1936] 2 All E.R. 1514.

Next learned counsel for the respondents argued that the applicant was not, by exhibit A, dismissed from the church. She was only suspended from her office as prophetess and that would not in any way affect any orders that the court might make, and he cited the instance of the Akaboha, the spiritual leader of the church, who became head of the church, when he had not even been ordained a priest. I did order the production of the written constitution of the church and the minutes of the meeting at which the suspension of the applicant was agreed upon, and the answer to counsel’s submission is in the constitution itself, which has been referred to in exhibit A and which counsel relied on. Section IV of the constitution of the church provides, under the heading.

“The Church Officers and Officers” as follows:

“1. In order to fulfil the mission of evangelism and to maintain her good name and discipline the church has a form of government and executive officials.

2. The General and Spiritual Head of the Church is the Akaboha (and the Akatitibi) successors of the

Prophet Jeminisimham Jehu-Appiah the Founder of the Musama Disco Christo Church.

3. The Akaboha is the life Chairman of the I’Odormy Conference and the executive board.

4. He is also the Chief (Head) of Muzano. He holds the highest office in the church in matter of organisation and administration.

5. The Akaboha’s son is entitled to hold this line of succession as a divine right as ordered by the Holy Spirit.”

Consequently, the present Akaboha, i.e. Prophet Miritaiah Jonah Jehu-Appiah, is the direct lineal descendant of the Founder of the Church—Prophet Jeminisimham Jehu-Appiah and he holds that position by divine right. His son will automatically step in his shoes also by divine right.

Nowhere else is it provided in the constitution that any ordinary member of the church can attain the office to which the applicant, by the main action pending before the court, seeks to assert her right without having passed through the ranks.

The applicant in this application was suspended indefinitely for having violated paragraphs 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of section 14 at p. 24 of the constitution. The said paragraphs 1 and 6 provide:

“1. Members shall be advised to submit their complaints, disputes and other misunderstandings to the honorary

[p.406] of [1981] GLR 398 church arbitrators for amicable settlement rather than to contend to law courts …

6. If the accused fails or refuses to appear before arbitrators, the trial may proceed in his absence.”

Is it not contrary to the constitution then, that when the applicant failed to appear before the arbitrators the trial did not proceed in her absence? She was suspended indefinitely for not appearing before the arbitrators without any “trial” as prescribed in paragraph 6. Neither the minutes of the meeting nor exhibit A itself showed that there was a trial in absentia.

The only paragraph in section 24 which provides for suspension is paragraph 12 under which the applicant was not charged and it reads:

“12. If any of the contenders show any sign of disrespect to the arbitrators during the trial of a case, that party or parties shall be liable to suspension or expulsion.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Of course, since there was no trial, and the applicant was absent, anyway, the situation of her being disrespectful “during the trial” of a case could not possibly have arisen, and consequently the sanction of suspension could not possibly have been invoked.

The reason for the applicant’s hasty even though unconstitutional suspension, is not too far to seek. The general section which deals with suspension of members and governs the status of such suspended members is section X, subsections D and E which reads:

“D. Suspension of Members 1. Any member found to have violated any of the rules as set down on section XXIV shall be liable to suspension ranging from 3 to 12 months or expulsion from membership according to the nature of the offence.

2. A member shall be suspended or be deprived of his membership if he refuses to obey an order or orders of the I’Odormy Conference.

3. If the violator holds some offices in the church he/she shall, on reinstatement to membership, not be allowed at once to resume office.

E. Suspended Members 1. A suspended member shall be deprived of all church privileges, except attendance of chapel.

2. A suspended member shall continue to pay the funeral dues, give tithes and offerings.”

[p.407] of [1981] GLR 398

It is clear from sub-paragraph 3 above that these two sub-divisions refer both to members who hold no office in the church and those who, like the applicant, do hold some office in the church. Such a member shall be deprived of all church privileges, except attendance of chapel.

The effect of this is that for as long as the applicant remains suspended, even if the court shall decree that she, and not the Akaboha’s mother, is the proper person to succeed Prophetess Natholomia Jehu-Appiah she would never be able to take advantage of the court’s decision to her advantage. Someone else—I do not want to speculate—gets it in spite of the court’s decision, and the course of justice shall have been perverted or as Abban J. observed in Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391 the work of the court shall have been frustrated and the authority with which the courts are endowed and which they exercise through decisions and orders shall have been completely stultified. The court’s decision shall be a dead letter and the court itself shall have been ridiculed and disregarded. Any act done or writing published which is calculated to lower the authority of the court is contempt, and this was precisely what the members of the executive committee and the chiefs did when they authorised the publication of exhibit A, i.e. suspended the plaintiff-applicant.

At p. 91 of Oswald on Contempt (1910) (3rd ed.) the learned author states:

“All publications which offend against the dignity of the court or are calculated to prejudice the course of justice will constitute contempt. Offences of this nature are of three kinds—namely those which (1) scandalise the court, or (2) abuse the parties in causes there, or (3) prejudice mankind against persons before the cause is heard.”

And under the second heading, i.e. abusing parties in cases in court, he says that, “anything which tends to excite prejudice against the parties in the litigation whilst it is pending is contempt.” The reasons given for this is that such conduct may have the effect not only of deterring persons from coming forward to give evidence on one side but also to induce witnesses to give evidence on the other side alone and thus pervert the course of justice: see as per Lord Langdale M.R. in Littler v. Thomson (1839) 2 Beav. 129.

The applicant is a member of the Musama Disco Christo Church who has taken court action against the general and highest spiritual head of the church, the “Life Chairman of the I’Odormy Conference” which is the governing body of the church and the executive committee which is “the highest governing body of the

[p.408] of [1981] GLR 398 church” together with her mother, who is the mother-in-law of the Akatitibi, the Queen of Muzano. Whilst the case was pending in court, the applicant was severely reprimanded and suspended from office for an indefinite period.

How many in Muzano can swear they are not prejudiced? Who in Muzano would be willing to give evidence on the applicant’s behalf and feel safe both in his character and possibly in his person? And who in Muzano, will not give his or her right hand to have the opportunity of testifying on behalf of the Akaboha and the Akatitibi’s mother-in-law? For myself, I find it extremely difficult to imagine a more subtle, but highly effective way of turning the tide against the applicant in her pending suit and thus perverting the course of justice.

In the case of Re, Read & Huggonson (1742) 26 E.R. 683, Lord Hardwicke L.C. remarked at p. 685:

“Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice, than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes, before the cause is finally heard …

There cannot be anything of greater consequence, than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.”

(The emphasis is mine.) And Maugham J. in analysing how a common law judge’s mind works in a case of contempt states in the William Thomas Shipping case (supra) at p. 373. “I think, he has to consider the effect or the possible effect of the alleged contempt in preventing witnesses from coming forward to give evidence.” Prejudicing the minds of the public against or in favour of parties litigant is particularly deprecated since it may have the tendency to cause the parties to discontinue or compromise or to deter other persons with good causes of action coming to court. It takes very casual reading of exhibit A to realise that it was calculated to coerce the applicant into discontinuing her pending suit, after friendly persuasion had failed, and let it not be argued that exhibit A was not published. It was copied to at least two people. That apart, where, as in this case, the writing is calculated to coerce a party into discontinuing his or her action it is still contempt even if it is contained in a letter marked “private”: see the William Thomas Shipping case (supra).

The sin committed by the applicant for which she lost her exalted position as prophetess was that she had taken her case to court instead of to arbitrators when she felt she had a right to

[p.409] of [1981] GLR 398 defend. Arbitrators are provided for under paragraph 2 of section XIV of the constitution. The said section reads:

“2. The most recognised Bodies for Arbitration are the Leaders Meeting Board, the Quarterly Meeting Board, the I’Odormy Conference and the Executive Committee.”

It would appear from reading section XVI headed “The Church Government” that “Leaders Meeting” are governing bodies for what has been called “stations” and the “Quarterly Meeting Board” governs “circuits” or clusters of “stations.”

Since both the Akaboha and his mother on one side and the applicant on the other are at the headquarters, the recognised bodies for arbitration would be the I’Odormy Conference, and the executive committee, and the Akaboha is the life chairman of both bodies. The applicant’s suit was against the Akaboha who is described also as her employer, and his mother. What are her chances of getting justice “clear and pure?” Is the Akaboha the judge in his own cause? How many of the citizens of Muzano who are all members of the church would be willing to risk similar treatment by coming forward to testify on the applicant’s behalf in a cause against their employer and spiritual head before a body of which such head is the life chairman?

The next point taken by learned counsel for the respondents was that counsel who appeared in court and gave the undertaking that nothing would be done to prejudice the determination of the suit was not, in fact, briefed by the respondents and only appeared to ask for an adjournment and had no instructions on the matter of an undertaking. For my part, I do not see how Mr. Acquah would hand Mr. Ennin’s brief back to him without telling him what happened in court for onward transmission to the respondents. Be that as it may, since this kind of contempt is criminal, and the evidence of the respondents’ knowledge of the undertaking is not of the standard I would require, I resolve the matter in favour of the respondents. An undertaking given in court on behalf of a person without his knowledge and not communicated to him will not be enforced by process of contempt: see Turner v. Naval, Military and Civil Service Co-operative Society of South Africa, The Times, 21 January 1907.

The final point taken on behalf of the respondents is that the reprehensible conduct of each contemnor should have been set out separately in the affidavit supporting the application but I think this is amply catered for by paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit. I do not see how the applicant could tell the court what

[p.410] of [1981] GLR 398 each person did at a meeting at which she was not present. In any case Order 38, r. 1 of L.N. 140A provides:

“1. Upon any motion, petition, or summons evidence may be given by affidavit; but the Court or a Judge may, on the application of either party, order the attendance for cross-examination of the person making any such affidavit.”

Counsel for the respondents did not avail himself of this opportunity.

In the circumstances and for the reasons given above I find that the conduct of the respondents with the exception of those withdrawn against and the two not present at the meeting was calculated to prejudice the parties litigant in a pending action and lower the authority of the court and pervert the course of justice, and I make the order of committal sought.

I, however, order that execution be stayed for 48 hours, i.e. till 9 a.m. on 19 December 1979. Any order or orders to be made at the expiration of that period shall depend upon what efforts are made by the respondents to purge their contempt taking into account that the two acts upon which this contempt is based are: the continued suspension on the applicant whilst the case is pending and the consequent affront to the court itself.

DECISION

Respondents adjudged in contempt but execution of the order stayed pending efforts by the respondents to purge their contempt.

D. F. L.

Scroll to Top