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[1980] SLR (HC) 46High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

ADJEWOCO LIMITED vs. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1982-83] GLR 847

2 December 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 46
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OSCOLAADJEWOCO LIMITED v GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1982-83] GLR 847 [1980] SLR (HC) 46
APAADJEWOCO LIMITED v GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1982-83] GLR 847, [1980] SLR (HC) 46 (Ghana).
BluebookADJEWOCO LIMITED v GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK [1982-83] GLR 847, [1980] SLR (HC) 46 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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[p.848] of [1982-83] GLR 847

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.

(2) Wilson v. Smith [1980] G.L.R. 152, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

OBJECTION to a grant of summary judgment on the ground of incompetence of solicitor’s clerk to swear to facts not within his knowledge. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the defendants-applicants.

Michael Atadika for the plaintiffs-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

This is a claim brought on a specially indorsed writ for the sum of ¢43,455.53 plus interest at the current bank rate calculated from 13 May 1980 until “date of final payment.” The writ was served on the defendants and they entered appearance through their solicitor. On 9 October 1980, the plaintiffs took out a summons for judgment under Order 14, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A). The summons was supported by an affidavit sworn to by the senior law clerk in the employment of the plaintiffs, and who deposed in the supporting affidavit that he was authorised to swear to the facts stated therein. He further deposed that in his belief the defendants have no defence to the action. He verified the facts upon which the claim is based by reference to the writ of summons and statement of claim. By the writ of summons, the plaintiffs’ claim is:

“. . . for the sum of ¢43,455.53 being principal and interest as at the close of business on 13 May 1980, representing the balance of bank facilities granted to the defendants at their own request as per the attached certified copy of the statement of account which balance is still due and owing despite repeated demands for due settlement.”

In paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, the plaintiffs averred:

“As a result of the said approach by the defendants, the plaintiffs acceded to the request of the defendants and granted them banking facilities in the normal course of business and on the bank’s usual terms attaching to the granting of such facilities.”

In paragraph 4 it is pleaded that as at 13 May 1980, the defendants were indebted to them in the said sum “which they had failed to repay in violation of the terms upon which the facilities were granted and despite repeated demands and requests.”

The defendants did not file any defence to the action nor did they file an affidavit in opposition to the summons. They opposed the

[p.849] of [1982-83] GLR 847 summons on legal grounds. Mr. Tsikata submitted that the application is not properly before the court because the supporting affidavit was sworn to by a legal clerk who does not disclose his source of information. He contends that neither the statement of claim nor the affidavit gives the basis of the debt nor the terms which the defendants have violated. Relying on Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289 and Wilson v. Smith [1980] G.L.R. 152, C.A. he submitted that summary judgment cannot be obtained in such a case.

Mr. Atadika replied that the person who swore to the affidavit is a senior clerk who is in the employment of the plaintiffs so he is seised with the facts of the claim, and the plaintiffs plead that the amount they claim is due and owing. In the absence of any defence or affidavit challenging or contradicting these averments and depositions, the plaintiffs must be entitled to judgment for the sum due and owing, since no cause is shown for granting the defendants leave to defend.

The cases referred to me by Mr. Tsikata were decisions based on the old rules of Order 14 of LN 140A. In Wilson v. Smith (supra) Apaloo C.J. expatiated upon the old rule. He said at p. 156:

“In an application under the old Order 14, r. 1 of LN 140A for summary judgment on a specially indorsed writ, it is provided that `the plaintiff may on affidavit made by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts, verifying the cause of action …’ This provision clearly requires that the plaintiff or some one with personal knowledge of the facts deposes to them. A solicitor’s instructions is not such a person since his statement in the affidavit would be hearsay.

The matter is really concluded by authority. In Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A. this court refused to accept a solicitor’s affidavit in support of an application for summary judgment. The court observed at p. 292 that the solicitor’… did not have any personal knowledge of the facts.’ He could only have come by it through information imparted to him by his clients. He was therefore in no position to swear positively to the facts.’ Accordingly, the court concluded at p. 292, `We think therefore that there was no jurisdiction to invoke the summary procedure laid down by Order 14, r. 1’.”

This is exactly the contention of Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata in this case.

The relevant part of the old Order 14, r. 1 of LN 140A on which those decisions were based reads as:

“1. Where the defendant appears to a writ of summons specially indorsed with or accompanied by a statement of claim

[p.850] of [1982-83] GLR 847 under Order 3, r. 6, the plaintiff may on affidavit made by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts . . .”

The clause “who can swear positively to the facts”, naturally shuts out any person who had no first hand information about the matter which is the cause of action. Under the old rule, hearsay evidence was clearly excluded.But by the recent amendment introduced by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), the affidavit supporting the summons may be made by any person on statement of belief. By rule 2 (1), the summons must be supported by “affidavit verifying the facts on which the relevant claim or part of a claim is based.” It must under rule 2 (2) state that “in the deponent’s belief there is no defence to that claim or part.” The two requirements which the affidavit must satisfy are that (1) it must verify the facts on which the claim or part thereof to which the application relates is based; and (2) it must state the deponents’ belief that there is no defence to that claim or part thereof.

The present application must be considered in the light of these new rules and not the old ones. Under the current rules the person who swears to the affidavit need not be the plaintiff nor a person who can swear positively to the facts of the case. It may be made by any person duly authorised by the plaintiffs to make it. In the 1974 Annual Practice at p. 130 commenting on the plaintiff’s affidavit, the White Book states:

“If not made by the plaintiffs, the affidavit must itself state that the person making it is duly authorised to do so (Chirgwin v. Russell (No. 1) (1910) 27 T.L.R. 27, C.A. The affidavit should, however, be made by some responsible person, e.g. a solicitor’s clerk. See Hallet v. Andrews (1898) 42 S.J. 68) or some competent person in the employment of a limited company (Pathe’ Freres Cinema Limited v. United Electric Theatres Ltd. [1914] 3 K.B. 253, C.A.).” think the person who swore to the affidavit in this case satisfied this test. It is no longer required that the deponent must have first hand knowledge of the facts on which the claim is based. If the deponent is in a position to verify those facts and state his belief that the defendant has no defence, then he is competent. The deponent verifies the facts by reference to the facts stated in the statement of claim. This was done in this case. He stated that in this belief the defendants have no defence to the claim.

I think the plaintiffs have done what is required to be entitled to judgment unless the defendants satisfy the court that they have a defence.

The English rule 2 (2) requires that unless the court otherwise directs, the affidavit may contain statements of information or belief

[p.851] of [1982-83] GLR 847 with sources and grounds thereof. But we have no such provision in our rules, therefore the deponent is not required to state or disclose the source of his statement or belief. Therefore Mr. Tsikata’s submission is not in consonance with our rules. What is required under our rules is the competency of the deponent to fulfil the requirement of the affidavit. The person who swore to the affidavit in this is not the clerk of the solicitor who prepared the brief in this case. But it would seem that under the new rules, such a clerk can.

At paragraph 1 of the affidavit, he deposed that he is the senior law clerk in the employment of the plaintiffs and that he was authorised to make the affidavit. He verified the facts by reference to those facts stated in the statement of claim and suit. In the writ and statement of claim, it was stated that the defendants were indebted to the plaintiffs as at 13 May 1980 in the sum of ¢43,455.53. It was pleaded that it arose as a result of facility granted in the normal course of banking business to the defendants. It was further pleaded that the amount is due and owing. Admittedly, neither the writ nor the statement of claim states when the amount was lent to the defendants but it states clearly that it became due for payment on 13 May 1980.

I do not find anything wanting in the statement of claim nor the affidavit. The deponent said he is employed by the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs authorised him to say what he deposed to. He said the amount has been due for payment since 13 May 1980, and it has not been paid, so he verily believed the defendants have no defence to the claim. With regard to the phrase “banking facilities in the normal course of business,” I think it is a matter of public notoriety as to what these facilities mean. Be it as it may, the plaintiffs simply state that the facility granted is due for repayment.

In the absence of anything contradicting these facts, I find that the plaintiffs’ claim is good in law. I find nothing wanting in the statement of claim. In my view, the affidavit is properly sworn to. The capacity of the deponent is unimpeachable. The objection is overruled. It is open to the defendants to use any method they choose to show cause against the application if they have any. They have chosen to do so on legal grounds which I find cannot be sustained. I find that the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements to entitle them to summary judgment. Accordingly, I enter judgment for them for the sum claimed plus interest calculated at eighteen per cent i.e. the current bank rate, from 13 May 1980 to date. There will be ¢2,000 costs.

DECISION

Objection overruled with ¢2,000 costs to the applicant.

J. A. A.

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