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[1980] SLR (HC) 51High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

BUACHIE vs. SAMMAN [1982-83] GLR 797

18 July 1980 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 23 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 51
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OSCOLABUACHIE v SAMMAN [1982-83] GLR 797 [1980] SLR (HC) 51
APABUACHIE v SAMMAN [1982-83] GLR 797, [1980] SLR (HC) 51 (Ghana).
BluebookBUACHIE v SAMMAN [1982-83] GLR 797, [1980] SLR (HC) 51 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kerr v. Force (1826) 3 Cranch C.C. 8.

(2) Dunnet v. Nelson (1926) S.C. 764; (1926) S.L.T. 493, Ct of Sess.

(3) Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333; 50 L.J.Q.B. 305; 44 L.T. 75; 45 J.P. 373.

(4) Harrison v. Bush [1855] 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L.J.Q.B. 25, 99; 25 L.T. (O.S.) 194. (5) Proctor v. Webster (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 112; 55 L.J.Q.B. 150; 53 L.T. 765; 2 T.L.R. 103. (6) Horrocks v. Lowe [1975] A.C. 135; [1974] 2 W.L.R. 282; 118 S.J. 149; [1974] 1 All E.R. 662; 72 L.G.R. 251, H.L.; [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1625: [1972] 3 All E.R. 1098; 71 L.G.R. 96, C.A. affirmed. (7) Pape v. O’Driscoll, The Times, May 28, 1909.

(8) Clark v. Molyneux (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 237; 47 L.J.Q.B. 230; 37 L.T. 694; 42 J.P. 277; 26 W.R. 104. (9) Oddy v. Paulet (1865) 4 F. & F. 1009; 176 E.R. 886.

(10) Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 449; 66 (Pt. 1) T.L.R. 342; 94 S.J. 145, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for damages for defamation wherein the defendant counterclaimed for damages for sexual intercourse with his wife. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

W. Y. Oppong for the plaintiff.

Pobee for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.

In this action, the plaintiff claims from the defendant general damages for defamation. The defendant resists the claim and in turn counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages for unlawful sexual intercourse with his wife.

The plaintiff is an assistant director of the Ghana Education Service and the defendant is a general contractor. Both are stationed at Sunyani. The wife of the defendant, Miss Ackerson, around whom the case pivots is the headmistress of the Roman Catholic School, Sunyani. Both the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the Odd-fellows Lodge, a secret society, Miss Mary Ackerson belongs to the female section of this society. Until the dissolution of their marriage in or about June 1977 the defendant and Miss Mary Ackerson lived together as man and wife.

[p.800] of [1982-83] GLR 797 According to the plaintiff, in October 1977 or thereabout, the defendant falsely and maliciously published in a letter to Mr. G. R. Bray, the Regional Director of the Ghana Education Service, Sunyani, a statement about and concerning him. The said statement alleged that he, through his position as assistant director, had had sexual intercourse with the defendant’s wife, Mary Ackerson. This statement was also made to the parents of the defendant’s wife as well as other persons. The plaintiff contends that this statement is defamatory and has greatly affected his reputation and seriously prejudiced his chances of promotion. He therefore claims damages for defamation.

The defendant does not deny writing the letter and making the statement complained of. He contends that he was justified in writing the statement because it was true. He further contends that even if the statement was not true, he made it on a privileged occasion without any malice.

To say or write of a married man that he has had sexual intercourse with another man’s wife is clearly defamatory unless the statement is either true or is made on a privileged occasion. Since the defendant admits publishing the said statement about the plaintiff, the onus is on him to establish that the statement was true or that it was made on an occasion which was privileged.

The defendant gave evidence himself and depended upon this to establish his defence; he called no further evidence. It was his case that some time in July 1976, his wife, Miss Mary Ackerson, also referred to as Mrs. Mary Ackerson Samman and more popularly known within the lodge society as Sister Samman, told him she had been requested by the assistant director of schools to collect her teachers’ certificate from her former principal at the Women’s Training College, Tamale. He asked why her certificate should be asked for at this time when she had since completing her training taught for some years without it. Her reply was that other teachers had been asked to produce theirs. He further asked whether it would not be possible to have the certificate sent to her by telephoning the principal. She answered that that could not be done; besides, she had been invited by the Chairman of the Schools and Colleges Sports Association to help officiate at a sports meeting at Tamale during that period. Asked who would be footing the expenses, her wife told him that the expenses would be refunded by the Ghana Education Service later. She was to lodge at the Catering Rest House at Tamale. He said that even though he did not know who the chairman of the sports association was, he knew the assistant director of schools in the region to be the plaintiff. He gave the wife ¢143 and as he himself was travelling to Accra on the same date, he accompanied her to the Sunyani Airport to board a plane for Accra en’route Kumasi. It was however strange to him when

[p.801] of [1982-83] GLR 797 at the airport he found the plaintiff also ready to embark on the same plane for Tamale.

As he knew the plaintiff already as his lodge brother, he went to him with his wife, greeted him and asked where he, the plaintiff, was travelling to. He told him (the defendant), that he was travelling to Tamale. He later introduced his wife to him and told him that she was travelling to Tamale also. He later asked the wife how came it that the very person who had asked her to go for her certificate was also travelling to the same place. The wife did not say anything but she blushed; the wife is copper-coloured. They all boarded the plane and when they got to Kumasi, his wife and the plaintiff disembarked while he continued his journey to Accra. He returned on Friday to find that his wife had returned on the Thursday, i.e. the previous day. She did not show him any certificate but said she would be going to the office of the Ghana Education Service to collect the refund of her expenses.

After a year when the wife had not refunded the amount, his suspicion was aroused; he suspected that the wife might not have been invited to Tamale at all and that she might not also have been asked for any certificate at all as she had not brought any certificate to show him; he felt the wife might have gone to Tamale for some other purpose. He questioned her; whereupon she became offended and told him he could not enslave her love, and that her vagina was her own and that she could use it whenever she liked. According to the defendant, he was taken aback; he told her he had no love for her any longer and that they should call it quits. She eventually broke down and told him that she had been invited by the plaintiff to Tamale for immoral purposes. She begged for forgiveness. She further told him that this illicit relationship had existed for some time and that she had met the plaintiff at various places often after teachers’ or lodge meetings. She asked for forgiveness. He insisted on informing her parents about her conduct. He tendered in evidence exhibit 2, a letter allegedly written by the wife apologising and asking for peaceful settlement of the matter.

He returned from Accra some time later to meet the father of his wife. He narrated what had happened and after the wife had confessed also to the father, the latter begged him and told him (the defendant) he would pacify him with a sheep and that he would inform the mother of the wife. Later, he received a letter from the mother-in -law apologising for the daughter’s conduct and expressing her inability to come for a peaceful settlement of the matter as she was indisposed. This letter was tendered in evidence as exhibit 3 without objection. Later, an uncle of the wife, one Annan, came with the father to see him with a view to settle the matter, but owing to the attitude of those persons, he drove them away. He also decided to write to the head of the Ghana Education Service in the region, one

[p.802] of [1982-83] GLR 797

Mr. Bray, to report the conduct of the plaintiff; he wrote exhibit A. The said Mr. Bray also wrote in reply — exhibit A1— acknowledging receipt of his letter and asking for a comment from the plaintiff. Later, one Mrs Elizabeth Boateng, the head of the women’s section of the lodge society, referred to as the District Most Noble Governor of the women’s section of the Oddfellows Lodge, came to see him and inquired about his wife. Whereupon he had told her he had divorced her; he explained the circumstances leading to it. Subsequently, two other lodge members, Messrs. Dattey and Adoma had intervened to settle the matter but he had refused to have the matter settled by them as the matter was then already in court. He had also refused to attend to a call by the district executive of the lodge for settlement because he felt the executive was already prejudiced. He was later suspended by the district lodge, but the suspension was subsequently lifted.

The defendant persisted in his averment that the plaintiff had had adulterous relationship with his wife. The wife had confessed to him and from the surrounding circumstances, namely the statement to him by the wife about the certificate and the sports meeting at Tamale, which turned out to be untrue, and the coincidence of the travel to Tamale by the wife and the plaintiff who is also the assistant regional director of education, he honestly believed what he had been told. He also recollected that on one occasion he had seen the plaintiff leaning against his car at a lodge meeting, and had assumed, after the close of that meeting, that his wife had already gone home to bed; she had told him subsequently that it was one of the lodge brothers who had taken her home.

He insisted that the wife had confessed to him and that both exhibits 2 and 3 supported the confession by the wife. He said that the parents of the wife had come to apologise to him and to reconcile the couple. He had reported the matter to the parents because they had a common interest in the matter. He reported the matter to the regional director, because he had an interest in the matter and was in a position to reprimand the plaintiff for his conduct, if the allegation was found to be true. As all the persons involved were lodge members – the plaintiff, the wife and himself – he had a duty also to report to the lodge and particularly the women’s section, as Mrs. Boateng, the head, was in a position to settle the matter.

A man cannot complain that his character or reputation has been injured if what is said about him is true or substantially true. If the statement is found to be true or substantially true, then a defendant against whom an action for defamation is brought can raise the plea of justification in defence. To make good the plea, however, the defendant must prove that the imputation is true, not merely that he believed it to be true: see the case of Kerr v. Force (1826) 3 Cranch 8. The defendant sought to prove his plea of justification on an alleged

[p.803] of [1982-83] GLR 797 confession made to him by his wife. The wife however did not testify in this case. In the of [1982-83] GLR 797-809 particular circumstances of the case, I think it would have been suicidal for the defendant to have called this witness. Exhibit 2 was tendered to show that subsequent to the alleged confession, the wife had written to apologise and ask for peaceful settlement of the matter. Although counsel for the plaintiff had contended that this letter could not have come from the wife or that if it had, it could have referred to a different matter, there is no other evidence in rebuttal of defendant’s evidence on that.

The defendant knew the handwriting of his wife; the contents of the letter have some reference to a misunderstanding which, according to the defendant, was this issue of adultery and the confession and apology by his wife. An attempt had been made to settle the misunderstanding; the settlement had broken down and the defendant had eventually divorced the wife. The defendant should not be expected to receive any favourable evidence from this divorced wife who in the circumstances of the case, might feel disgraced. On the other hand, the wife had willingly accompanied the parents to the plaintiff’s house and even though it is alleged she had already denied the relationship, she had been asked about it and she had denied it again. Nothing prevented her therefore from coming to court to deny the allegation of confession, or the writing of the letter, or for that matter, all that has been said of her by the defendant. In the absence of any other evidence to the contrary. I am inclined to believe that she did write exhibit 2 about and concerning the allegation of her relationship with the plaintiff.

Exhibit 2 may not establish the truth of the allegation, but it may afford sufficient ground for the defendant’s honest belief that what had been told him was true. Exhibit 3 is supposed to have come from the mother of the wife. It did not establish that the plaintiff had had sexual intercourse with the defendant’s wife but it affords surrounding circumstances which may tend to show that certain facts could be true.

I do not believe the evidence of the first plaintiff witness – I will comment on that later — but I am inclined to believe the evidence of the second and third plaintiff witnesses that the plaintiff denied the allegation and that the wife also denied it when they went to the plaintiff’s house. The denial was obvious and a natural reaction to the confrontation. Afterall, the marriage was at an end. If the defendant had agreed to have the matter settled, she might have acted differently but at that time it did not matter. So that, if she had originally confessed as alleged, there was no reason why she could not deny it now. The plaintiff was aware that by the ethics of the service to which he belonged, the admission of such a relationship was bound to have adverse effects on his position and his employment. He also knew that such immoral relationship was forbidden by his secret society.

[p.804] of [1982-83] GLR 797

Further, he knew the customary effect of any such admission. With persons capable of acting to affect his position and employment around, the only reasonable thing to do, even if the allegation were true, was to deny it. The father, the second plaintiff witness, because of the attitude of the defendant, was most likely to deny the alleged confession. It could be said that after the defendant had refused to have the matter settled, the father had become hurt. Here was a man who had promised to wed his daughter but had not done so; he had not agreed to a peaceful settlement of the matter but had continued to disgrace the daughter in particular, and the family as a whole. So that even if his daughter had initially admitted the relationship, it was most likely that he, the second plaintiff witness, would later have denied any knowledge of such confession.

No wonder, he had insisted that the plaintiff should take action and that he was prepared to give evidence on his behalf. If indeed the daughter had denied the allegation it would not have been necessary to take her along to the plaintiff’s house and it would not have been necessary to ask her again to comment on what the plaintiff had said. The probability is that his daughter might have made a statement, even if not a confession, which might have occurred to him that there was some illicit association between the plaintiff and the said daughter and that she had been taken along to find out what the plaintiff would say. It is a further probability that after his failure to reconcile the daughter with the defendant resulting eventually in the divorce, there was an attempt to efface his disgrace by the collection of some evidence of denial.

However, these pieces of evidence only go to establish an honest belief in the truth of an alleged confession made to the defendant, but did not establish that there was any such immoral relationship. I am not satisfied that a plea of justification has been established. I hold therefore that there was no justification in the publication of the defamatory matter.

On certain occasions a man is protected in stating what he believes to be the truth about another; so long as he makes the statement honestly and without any indirect or improper motive. It may be unfortunate that a person against whom a charge that is not true is made should have no redress, but it would be contrary to public policy and the general interests of business and society that a person should be hampered in the discharge of his duty or the exercise of his rights by constant fear of actions for slander: see Dunnet v. Nelson (1926) S.C. 164 at p. 193. And in Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333 at p. 343, it was stated:

“. . . it is better for the general good that individuals should occasionally suffer than that freedom of communication between

[p.805] of [1982-83] GLR 797 persons in certain relations should be in any way impeded. But the freedom of communication which it is desirous to protect is honest and kindly freedom. It is not expedient that liberty should be made the cloke of maliciousness . . .”

The defendant in this case pleaded the defence of qualified privilege. It is the case of the plaintiff that the publication of the defamatory statement to Mr. Bray, the Regional Director of the Ghana Education Service and to the parents of Miss Mary Ackerson was unwarranted and was a malicious attempt to disgrace him. On the evidence and in the plaintiff’s counsel’s submission, there does not appear to be any strong denial of a privileged occasion between the defendant and all these persons to whom the statement was made. It is in the common interest of parents of spouses and the spouses themselves that matters affecting the marriage should be brought to their notice.

Under customary law, there exists a moral as well as a legal duty to report the conduct of one of the spouses to their respective parents for investigation and settlement. I hold therefore that the report of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant’s wife to the second plaintiff witness and subsequently to Annan was privileged. The plaintiff admitted that by the ethics of the Ghana Education Service any immoral relationship between a director and any member of staff of a school, especially a married person under his supervision, was reprehensible. In fact, one of the functions of the service is: “to maintain a code of ethics and good conduct among its members” vide paragraph 3 (h) of the Ghana Teaching Service Decree, 1974 (NRCD 247).

The plaintiff further admitted that Mr. Bray to whom the letter, exhibit A, was addressed, was his immediate boss and could receive reports of misconduct about him. Although the plaintiff did not accept that Miss Mary Ackerson was directly under his supervision, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that his jurisdiction covered the activities of Miss Mary Ackerson, the headmistress of the Roman Catholic School, Sunyani. The defendant was the husband of Miss Ackerson at the material time and therefore there existed a common interest between him and the regional director concerning the activities or relationship between a member of staff of a school and the assistant regional director. Besides, it is the duty of every one to bring any incident or neglect of duty on the part of a public officer or an employee or any public abuse, to the notice of the proper authority for investigation. Any such complaint or information is privileged, provided it is made in good faith to the person or body with the power or duty to remove, punish or reprimand the offender or merely to inquire into the subject-matter of the complaint: see Harrison v. Bush (1855) 5 E. & B. 344 and Proctor v. Webster (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 112 at p. 114.

[p.806] of [1982-83] GLR 797

The plaintiff is a public officer and Mr. Bray is the regional director of the Ghana Education Service and the man immediately in control of the members of the Ghana Education Service in the region. I hold therefore that the communication to him of the defamatory statement was privileged.

Although, the plaintiff did not particularise the other persons to whom the defamatory statement was published, the evidence shows that the statement was published also to Mrs. Elizabeth Boateng, the first plaintiff witness. Apart from the first plaintiff witness, I do not find that any publication was made to any other person. Since the communication of the contents of exhibit A to the plaintiff was made by Mr. Bray, the privilege that covered this communication between Mr. Bray and the defendant also covered this publication. Also, the communication to counsel of the plaintiff by the defendant in exhibit C was communicated to the plaintiff himself as it was in answer to a letter written by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff.

And, communication to the plaintiff himself could not amount to defamation as a man’s reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself but the estimation in which others hold him. The publication of the statement to the plaintiff by the parents of Miss Mary Ackerson could not be publication by the defendant as it had not been intended that this should be communicated to the plaintiff. The defendant honestly believed what he had been told and did .put an end to the marriage. What the parents did later was no concern of his; even if I am wrong, since the communication to the parents was privileged, he was sufficiently protected.

Regarding the communication to the first plaintiff witness, I do not think that the defendant without any inquiry made the statement to the first plaintiff witness, I believe and accept the evidence that the first plaintiff witness had had information of this matter and as head of the women’s section of the lodge to which the wife of the defendant belonged, it was in the interest of all, in fact, all sections of the lodge, to settle this matter amicably. She had therefore sought verification of the matter from the defendant with a view to having this matter settled. In fact, exhibits 1, 4A, 4B and 5 all go to show the attempt by the society to settle the matter. The first plaintiff witness was not very truthful in her evidence. Although she told the court that she had not told anybody about what the defendant was alleged to have told her, the plaintiff admitted in his cross-examination that she did tell him about the matter before Miss Ackerson’s parents came to see him. Although she said she was at the third plaintiff witness’ house when the parents came and they all left for the plaintiff’s house, the evidence shows that they had met at Rev. Kittoe’s house from where they had proceeded to the plaintiff’s house. Even the second plaintiff witness did not mention her name as being at the meeting in the

[p.807] of [1982-83] GLR 797 plaintiff’s house. There could therefore not have been publication properly so-called to her. Even if I am wrong, I find that there existed a common interest between her and the defendant and that any communication to her was privileged. So that, provided the defendant had honest belief in the statement he made and there was no improper motive, the communication would be privileged. There is nothing to rebut what the defendant told the court the wife had told him. the conduct of the wife made the defendant to believe that what he had been told was true.

The plaintiff denied the allegation; he even denied knowing the defendant’s wife before the incident. On the evidence, I find it hard to believe this. in cross-examination, after the first and second plaintiff witnesses had given evidence, the plaintiff admitted knowing the defendant’s wife before the meeting at the airport. The general conduct of the plaintiff as evidence in this case made me believe that he was hiding some truth from the court. Under these suspicious circumstances, the defendant was entitled to believe that what his wife had told him was correct. On the evidence as a whole, I find that the defendant had an honest belief in what the wife told him, even though it appears she was lying to him.

Having thus established privilege, the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish malice. It is required by the rules that particulars of express malice should be established in order to defeat the privilege claimed. In Horrocks v. Lowe [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1625 at p. 1630, C.A., Lord Denning M.R. had this to say on the issue of malice:

“Malice is usually to be found when there is personal spite or ill-will or when the defendant does not honestly believe what he says to be true. The judge did not find any of these. But he found that Mr. Lowe was actuated by gross unreasoning prejudice and that on this ground malice was established. In this respect I think the judge was misled — as well he might be on circuit — by a passage in Gatley on Libel and Slander;

6th ed. (1967), paragraph 770:

`There is a state of mind which will destroy privilege even though the defendant may have made the statement honestly believing it to be true, or, in fact, with an excess of honesty. If a man, through anger, or gross and unreasoning prejudice, has allowed his mind to get into such a state — to become so obsessed — as to cast reckless aspersions on other people which but for such state of mind he could not have honestly believed to be true, the jury may properly find that he has abused the occasion, and in that sense has acted maliciously.’

I must say that, in my opinion, that passage is not correct. I find it difficult to reconcile it with paragraph 774, a little later, which says:

[p.808] of [1982-83] GLR 797

`If the defendant honestly believed his statement to be true, he is not to be held malicious merely because such belief was not based on any reasonable grounds; or because he was hasty, credulous, or foolish in jumping to a conclusion, irrational, indiscreet, stupid, pig-headed or obstinate in his belief.’

To that string of adjectives, I would add that he is not to be held malicious merely because he was angry or prejudiced, even unreasonably prejudiced, against the plaintiff, so long as he honestly believed what he said to be true. Such is the law as I have always understood it to be.”

Although the plaintiff did not set out the particulars of the facts upon which he intended to rely to prove malice, he did give evidence of matters which are capable of establishing malice. Since this evidence was not objected to, this court is bound to consider it. The plaintiff alleged that since the defendant’s wife denied the immoral relationship both to him and to the parents, it was unnecessary for him to have written to Mr. Bray. I find that even if the marriage had been dissolved, there was a duty on the defendant to report this immoral conduct as alleged to him by Miss Ackerson to the regional director, in the interest of the public. And, in so reporting, he did not, I find, state any other facts than that the plaintiff had had sexual intercourse with his wife. The publication to Mr. Bray, in fact, could not be malicious or improper.

Further, I do not find the conduct of the defendant in refusing to have the matter settled either by the parents or the lodge society to amount to malice or improper motive. The evidence shows that the lodge was already prejudiced against him. Besides, the matter was in court. Such conduct by him therefore was consistent with his stand and honest belief in what he had been told. There is nothing to show that the defendant had done anything to make the settlement between him and the parents of his wife impossible. Besides, since according to him the wife had confessed and the parents had agreed to pacify him there was no need for further going into the case; if subsequently, the parents had retracted this intention he was perfectly entitled to report for redress or investigation to the proper authority.

I do not also think that the failure to establish the plea of justification could be taken as evidence of malice. In fact, the authorities have positively held that, that should not be the case: see Pape v. O’Driscoll, The Times, May 28, 1909. As a general rule it is not right to make defamatory statements unless they are believed to be true, and a defendant will not lose his privilege if he honestly believes his statement is true though he has no reasonable grounds for his belief: see Clark v. Molyneux (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 237.

[p.809] of [1982-83] GLR 797

In fact, there is no evidence of previous ill-feeling between the parties. According to the evidence the parties were on good terms and had been attending lodge meetings together. It could not therefore be said that the statement had been motivated by spite or ill-feeling. I do not find any violence in the language used. Even if this had been so, this would not necessarily be evidence of malice: see Oddy v. Paulet (1865) 4 F. & F. 1009, also Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 449, H.L.

I find that the plaintiff has not been able to establish any malice capable of destroying the privilege claimed. I hold that the occasion was privileged; the defendant is therefore entitled to succeed in his defence of qualified privilege. Accordingly, I would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.

On the defendant’s counterclaim, since he was not able to establish the truth of the alleged sexual relationship, I am unable to find any evidence in support of his claim. I will also therefore dismiss his counterclaim.

Parties are to bear their costs in both claims.

DECISION

Claim and counterclaim dismissed.

M. C. N. -N.

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