MUSICIANS UNION OF GHANA vs. ABRAHAM AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 337
20 June 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 13 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 62Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Clifford Davies Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R. 237; [1975] 1 W.L.R.
61; 118 S.J. 775, C.A.
(2) American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C 396; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316; [1975] 1 All E.R.
504; [1975] F.S.R. 101; [1975] R.P.C. 513; 119 S.J. 136; [1979] R.P.C. 215, HL reversing [1974] C.L.Y. 2784.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for, inter alia, an order of interim injunction to restrain the second defendants from making further releases of records and making further royalty payments to the first defendant. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
W. Amarfio for the plaintiffs.
Sey for the first defendant.
Amarteifio for the second defendants.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
In this application the plaintiffs are asking for an order of an interim injunction to restrain the second defendants from “(1) making any further releases of the plaintiffs’ records, and (2) from making any further royalty payments to the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs . . .” and (3) an order that any royalties held by the first defendant from the second defendants be deposited at the court pending the determination of this suit. Finally, they ask for an order for interim preservation of a set of musical instruments listed in the schedule attached to the application.
The writ of summons upon which this motion was brought, is indorsed with a claim for (1) ¢1,000,000 being composers’ and recording artistes’ royalties due from the defendants, in respect of the long playing albums, namely (a) “Adam and Eve” (b) “Kusum Beat” (c) “Spiritual Ghana” (d) “Meseafo nto nsa” (e) “Party time in Hollywood” and (f) “Sweet Talks”; (2) recovery of possession of the musical instruments; (3) damages for wrongful dismissal; (4) statement of account of all local and foreign sales of the albums named above; and (5) a perpetual injunction to restrain the second defendants from making any further payments to the plaintiffs through the first defendant.
[p.340] of [1982-83] GLR 337
In the affidavit in support of the motion, fifteen paragraphs of the entire sixteen paragraphed deposition were devoted to explaining the circumstances whereby the musical instruments were purchased. There is not one word about how the plaintiffs became entitled to the royalties they claim, nor the basis for stopping the release of the records listed at paragraph sixteen of the affidavit. Counsel for the plaintiffs in his argument relied extensively on an agreement concluded between the first and second defendants whereby the first defendant granted sole and exclusive right to the second defendants to publish the work of the band, “Sweet Talks” for which the plaintiffs played.
The facts of the case as gathered from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties are these: The plaintiffs are attorneys for A. B. Crentsil and eleven others who are bandsmen. The first defendant is the managing director of an establishment called Talk of the Town Ltd.; this company is the proprietor of the Sweet Talks Band of which the first defendant is the manager. The plaintiffs were engaged to play in this band. It is difficult to discern from the affidavit and pleadings who was the employer of the plaintiffs.
Was it the Talk of the Town Ltd. or the first defendant? It is evident that both establishments, that is, the Talk of the Town Ltd. and the Sweet Talks Band all revolve around this man, Jonathan Abraham. The date on which the plaintiffs were employed to play for the Sweet Talks is also not discernible from the affidavit and pleadings, but while they were thus employed, the first defendant as proprietor of the Talk of the Town Ltd. entered into a contract with the second defendants a recording company, and granted the company the sole and exclusive right to make recordings of the performance of the Sweet Talks Band otherwise described as “artists” in the agreement.
Under the agreement the first defendant undertook to have each member of the band sign a recording agreement to bind each member separately and collectively to all the obligations of the agreement. But this undertaking was never fulfilled. In consideration for being granted the exclusive recording rights, the company undertook to pay the first defendant royalties at the rate of fourteen per cent of the net retail price of ninety per cent of net sales of records. This fourteen per cent was to represent full payment for all the proprietor’s and artists’ services, copyright royalties payable to the composers and writers of the musical works contained in the recordings. In spite of this agreement dated 1 January 1978 the plaintiffs continued to play for the Sweet Talks and received their normal remunerations. It does not appear the plaintiffs ever made any demand for the royalties which they now claim, but the first defendant paid them part of the money received in royalties for incentives.
Some time in 1978, the band was invited to the United States to do a recording session. The plaintiffs maintain that US$130,000 was
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paid by the principals of the second defendants to the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs and that part of this money was utilised to buy the set of musical instruments which they claim in this action. The first defendant maintains that the US$130,000 was paid by the principals of the second defendants direct to the studios responsible for the recording sessions. He also maintains that the musical instruments were bought for him even before the plaintiffs’ engagement commenced in the United States.
Even though the plaintiffs emphatically plead that they were employed to play for the Sweet Talks, they also maintain that the first defendant was their agent or manager. It is correct that the first defendant was the manager of the Sweet Talks, but the plaintiffs as individuals or collectively did not own the band. They were mere employees. They did not register the name “Sweet Talks”; it was a band owned by the first defendant or the Talk of the Town Ltd. (The evidence will be determined in the trial). After the parties fell out, the plaintiffs formed a band which I am told they call “Super Brains,” but the “Sweet Talks” continues to play under the management of the first defendant.
Both defendants vehemently oppose the application. Mr. Sey, counsel for the first defendant, basing himself on the facts, argued that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to the reliefs sought. Mr. Amarteifio for the second defendants, rested his argument on legal points. In a very coherent and attractive argument, he contended that the copyright in the works complained of could not be in the plaintiffs. He argued that by the power of statute it could only vest in the first defendant who has by licence, authorised the second defendants the sole and exclusive right to publish the works. Therefore the plaintiffs who were mere employees could not control the release of those records, which by the power of the same statute their release should be controlled by the second defendants.
Gramophone records are eligible for copyright under section 1 of the Copyright Act, 1961 (Act 85). But the copyright in those albums, the subject of this case, cannot vest in the plaintiffs; as it would have been under section 2 or 3 of the Act. By section 9 (1) of Act 85, where the work was made in the course of the author’s employment, the copyright shall vest in the author’s employer. The copyright in the albums in this case therefore did not vest in the plaintiffs but in the Talk of the Town Ltd. or the first defendant, depending on who was their employer.
The first defendant commissioned the recording made in the United States so the copyright in those records should vest in the first defendant. Hence the first defendant and his company are entitled to the royalties from these copyrights. The agreement between the first defendant and the second defendants for the latter to publish the works of the band did not
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assign the copyright; a sole and exclusive licence was conferred on the second defendants as publisher.
The copyright remained in the employer of the plaintiffs, and therefore the employer is entitled to the royalties paid in consideration of the grant of licence to the publisher. Whatever remunerations the employer paid to the plaintiffs were paid for services rendered, and unless there was agreement to be paid part of the royalties, they would not be entitled under the contract between the first and the second defendants to be paid royalties which the first defendant was to derive from the publishing of the work. Mr. Amarfio, counsel for the plaintiffs, has urged that the plaintiffs are, by the Copyright Fee Regulations, 1969 (L.I. 620) entitled to five per cent of the royalties.
The regulation prescribes the fee which shall be payable to the owner of the copyright of a musical work on the distribution of sound recording of that work made by manufacturers of such sound recording. The fee is five per cent of the net selling price on each sound. But the plaintiffs in this case by their own showing have indicated that they were employed or commissioned to do the albums. They cannot therefore be owners of a copyright to entitle them to claim royalties, unless there was an agreement to that effect. But there was none shown on the pleadings or affidavit evidence.
I must say that whereas if the plaintiffs were not paid anything at all apart from their normal remunerations agreed upon in their contract of service, and the first defendant granted licence to the second defendants to publish their works, it would have been unfair for the first defendant to pocket all the royalties he derived from the publisher, the court would not make an agreement for the parties with regard to the disbursement of the royalties thus received by the first defendant.
The court will also not enforce any agreement in which the court finds there was inequality of bargaining power. Example of these will be a contract which is restrictive of trade. If, for instance, the second defendants had entered into separate contract under paragraph 4 (a) of the agreement with the plaintiffs and bonded each of them individually and collectively to render their services to him as publisher of their works, for say five years, and then the plaintiffs breached the agreement and the second defendants sued to enforce it:
The court would look into the provenance of such agreement and if it was shown that the publisher or the second defendants had used their superior bargaining power to exact terms which were most unfair and which cannot be reasonably performed except in an oppressive manner, the court may not enforce the contract. As Lord Denning stated in Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R. 237 at p. 240 “. . . as a matter of common fairness it was not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to the wall.” The court will do all this to protect the weak from the strong, but it will not make agreement for them where there is none.
[p.343] of [1982-83] GLR 337
Even though in the agreement between the first and second defendants the first defendant agreed to grant the second defendants the exclusive right to publish works produced by the plaintiffs, no benefit can be derived from the contract by the plaintiffs. The Contracts Act, 1960 (Act 25), allows third parties to enforce contracts to which they are not parties, but no such benefit can be discerned from the contract for the plaintiffs in this case. In the absence of any agreement, and since the plaintiffs had no copyright in the records, I must say (without presuming to give a final opinion) that I do not see the basis for the claim for royalties.
This is an interlocutory application for injunction; even though the courts have moved from the old stand of insisting on the applicant establishing a prima facie case, to a stand where the balance of convenience is now the factor which should in a large measure weigh with the court, it is necessary to be satisfied that the applicant’s case is not frivolous or vexatious.
The plaintiffs are claiming that there is a violation of their rights so they must at least show that they have those rights which have been infringed. They must also show that they cannot be compensated by damages. The plaintiffs’ position will not change whether or not the royalties which the publisher may be liable to pay to the first defendant are paid to the latter directly or paid into court.
No inconvenience will be suffered by them if the first defendant is paid the amount. If at the end of the trial, they are adjudged to be entitled to the royalties or part of them, it will be a matter of ordering the amount to be paid to them. The plaintiffs do not need to be protected against such payment. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R. 504 at p. 509, the House of Lords per Lord Diplock stated in a case for interlocutory injunction:
“The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiffs need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiffs undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant’s favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies.”
The plaintiffs will suffer no inconvenience if payments of royalties are paid to the first defendant, but the first defendant will. The application to direct the payment to court is therefore refused.
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Since the plaintiffs have not shown that they have the copyright in the albums, I cannot see what inconvenience they will suffer if the second defendants continue to publish the records. They do not claim a permanent injunction to restrain the publication. Their complaint is that the royalties are due to them and not the first defendant. There is therefore no ground for imposing a ban on the release of the records, albeit, temporary until the final determination of the suit. The application is dismissed on that leg. The plaintiffs will suffer no hardship or inconvenience if the second defendants continue to produce and sell the records.
There is no allegation that the defendants are impecunious so that they would not be able to refund royalties received from the sale of the record, should the plaintiffs succeed in their claim. The plaintiffs’ only loss in this alleged infringement of right is financial, and damages will be adequate remedy, and the defendants would be in a financial position to pay: see American Cyanamid case (supra), where the House of Lords per Lord Diplock made this statement of the governing principles at p. 510:
“. . . the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendant’s continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage.”
This is a case where I think damages will be an adequate remedy, should the plaintiffs succeed in their claim. But I cannot readily say that the plaintiffs are in a financial position to pay damages to the defendants should the application be granted and in the end the plaintiffs lose their claim. It is my view that no basis has been established to restrain the second defendants from releasing the records complained about. By section 7 of Act 85 a copyright in a gramophone record is the exclusive right to control the distribution in Ghana of copies of the record. This exclusive right has not been shown to be in the plaintiffs.
The application on that leg also fails. So far as the musical instruments are concerned both the plaintiffs and the first defendant contend they bought them. The material pleaded and deposed to show that the plaintiffs were employees and their employer supplied them with materials or instruments for their work. The plaintiffs also pleaded
[p.345] of [1982-83] GLR 337
and deposed that the first defendant treated them in such a mean way that they had just enough funds to survive on in America. Before they left for the trip they were paid all their salaries for three months or so in cedis at home. It is therefore hard to see the source of funds from which they could have purchased the instruments. On such a flimsy claim, it would be unjustifiable to seize the instruments from the first defendant for purposes of preservation. Preserving them for whom? There are no grounds to justify the order. It is refused.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
E. P. -T.
