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[1980] SLR (HC) 69High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

WOLEDZI vs. AKUFO-ADDO AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 421

20 March 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 39 min read

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OSCOLAWOLEDZI v AKUFO-ADDO AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 421 [1980] SLR (HC) 69
APAWOLEDZI v AKUFO-ADDO AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 421, [1980] SLR (HC) 69 (Ghana).
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Baiden v. Ansah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 407.

(2) Mbadiwe v. Yaya (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 613.

(3) Nyame v. Tarzan Transport [1973] 1 G.L.R. 8.

(4) Hollington v. Hewthorn (F.) & Co., Ltd. [1943] K.B. 587; [1943] 2 All E.R. 35; 112 L.J.K.B. 463;

169 L.T. 21; 59 T.L.R. 321; 87 S.J. 247, C.A.

(5) Teper v. R. [1952] A.C 480; [1952] 2 All E.R. 447; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 162; 116 J.P. 502; 96 S.J. 493, P.C.

(6) Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43, P.C.

(7) Randall v. Tarrant [1955] 1 W.L.R. 255; 99 S.J. 184; [1955] 1 All E.R. 600.

(8) Grunshie v. Yeboah [1967] G.L.R. 290, C.A.

[p.424] of [1982-83] GLR 421

(9) Ivanov v. Speedy Travel & Tour Ltd. [1974] 2 G.L.R. 227.

(10) Powell v. Phillips [1972] 3 All E.R. 864; 116 S.J. 713; [1973] R.T.R. 19, C.A.

(11) Coote v. Stone [1971] 1 All E.R. 657; [1971] 1 W.L.R 297; [1970] 115 S.J. 79; [1971] R.T.R. 66, C.A.

(12) Hill-Venning v. Beszant [1950] 2 All E.R. 1151; [1950] W.N. 538; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 921; 94 S.J.

760; 49 L.G.R. 12, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for damages for personal injuries and loss sustained by him as a result of an accident involving his car and a car driven by the first defendant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Michael Atadika for the plaintiff.

Amoako-Glover for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

This is a case with a very checkered history, and it is a case which has been fought and defended with tooth and nail. The writ of summons was filed on 18 September 1967 and summons for directions was taken on 21 December 1967. Several factors have militated against the speedy disposal of the case. Hearing began on 21 March 1968 before Anterkyi J.

He took two witnesses for the plaintiff and then after a number of adjournments, he decided not to hear the case and caused it to be placed before another judge. After several adjournments before another judge, the matter eventually came on for trial before Charles Crabbe J. (as he then was) and judgment was delivered on 15 January 1969. He dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff appealed against the judgment. I am informed by Mr. Atadika, counsel for the plaintiff, who has been in the case throughout, and I read a note to this effect from the record of proceedings, that the record book containing the whole of the evidence taken by Charles Crabbe J. could not be traced.

The result being that the record of proceedings presented at the Court of Appeal was not complete, it did not include the great bulk of the proceedings before Charles Crabbe J. It contained only his judgment. The Court of Appeal therefore did not hear the appeal, it ordered a re-trial. This is the judgment of the re-trial.

By his amended writ of summons, the plaintiff claims ¢100,000 damages for personal injuries and loss sustained by him as a result of the defendants’ negligence and breach of statutory duty. Originally, the writ was indorsed with ¢25,000 claim; later it was amended to read ¢50,000 and finally ¢100,000. The basis of the claim is that on 14 January 1967 the plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred on the Ring Road involving the plaintiff’s car and the first

[p.425] of [1982-83] GLR 421 defendant’s car. The circumstances of the accident are so much in dispute that it is necessary to reproduce the facts as recounted by each party.

The plaintiff’s version of how the accident happened, in his own words, is as follows:

“I was driving along the Ring Road and I was in the right lane near the island. I was moving towards the Police Headquarters. When I was almost opposite the UNESCO building, I had a burst tyre. It was the right back tyre. I stopped and parked the car on the island. In 1967 we were driving left, so I was driving on the side of the Mandarin Restaurant . . . I got out of the car, removed the spare tyre from the car, and took out the jack, I jacked the car, removed the punctured tyre and fixed the spare tyre. Then I started to remove the jack.

When I was removing the jack, I heard the noise of an approaching car from behind me. Then I heard the impact; the vehicle hit me from behind. I did not know what happened again.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The plaintiff was driving an Oxford Morris car No. SG 400 which he had converted to a taxi. After the accident, the plaintiff was rendered unconscious, and he remained in a deep coma for a period of three weeks at the hospital. On regaining consciousness, he learnt that the car which hit him was the first defendant’s car. He suffered head injuries with a “fracture of the right parietal and the petrons temporal bones of the skull extending down to the base.” As a result of the fractures of the skull and the contusion of the brain and its appendages, he suffered blindness in the right eye and deafness in the right ear. There is right facial palsy, left hemiplegia and slurred speech. He also had a fracture of the left ulna which would not heal, so it became necessary to operate him and insert a metal plating.

The first defendant conceded that he was driving in the same direction as the plaintiff, i.e. from Danquah Circle towards the Liberation Circle, and he said the time was before 8.p.m. His evidence of the event was:

“My recollection of it was that prior to getting to the UNESCO building, I was driving in the inner lane. I was going almost abreast a taxi. There was also a car ahead of the taxi travelling in the same direction. I suddenly found the taxi swerve in front of me . . . The way I saw it, he was overtaking the car and he was going past me . . .”

And after he had answered a question from his counsel indicating that he was travelling at about the same speed as the taxi, he continued.

[p.426] of [1982-83] GLR 421

“The manner in which he swerved in front of me, I had no option but to hit him . . . We had been driving from the Danquah Circle with the same speed and almost abreast. Then suddenly he swerved in front of me at the same speed. His speed was not high enough to clear him from me. I braked but it was not enough to avoid collision. I remember I hit the right rear wing . . . The impact was in the lane closest to the island.”

This is the account given of the same incident. The two stories diverge widely. There is no other account given by anybody to help to tilt the scales one way or other. Each party was in his car alone and nobody saw the accident so far as the evidence goes. But a police officer tendered a sketch which was made of the scene of the accident soon afterwards.

The policeman who took measurements could not be traced to give evidence. He was a constable class II called Henry Tetteh who had resigned from the Police Force. But his sketch has been tendered, and both parties rely on it. From these facts, the plaintiff in his statement of claim averred at paragraph 4 that the first defendant caused or permitted his car “to go onto the said verge of the laterite and there violently did collide with the rear of the plaintiff’s said motor car.”

The usual details of negligence were listed as particulars of negligence. The plaintiff maintains he was stationary when the defendant hit him, and his counsel has submitted that the accident raised a presumption of negligence against the first defendant. The defendants on the other hand denied the charge of negligence and pleaded that “the cause of the collision was due to the plaintiff suddenly and without due care and attention driving across the path of the first defendant. “The first defendant contends that both vehicles were in motion at the time of the collision, and as it was the plaintiff who crossed his (the first defendant’s) path, the plaintiff is the author of his own injuries.

Negligence is a question of fact. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s negligence caused the accident. He must adduce evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant was negligent. The evidence of the plaintiff in this case, if accepted, would raise a presumption of negligence. The Ring Road is a well-known road in Accra. It is a dual-carriage way with a flower bed separating them. If a car was parked on the flower bed and another car came from behind and hit it, then the inference may be drawn from these facts that the driver of the car which hit the stationary car on the flower bed was negligent unless he explained his conduct. The defendant has explained his conduct, so it is necessary to determine from the two divergent stories, how the accident occurred.

[p.427] of [1982-83] GLR 421

Mr. Amoako-Glover, counsel for the defendants, has submitted that since the only evidence that the court has to draw inference from is an oath against another, the court must look at the demeanour and other matters which make the story of one or other probable. He relied on the inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s case, the medical evidence, the sketch, and for authority he referred to Baiden v. Ansah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 407; Mbadiwe v. Yaya (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 613 and Nyame v. Tarzan Transport [1973] 1 G.L.R. 8. That is the right approach to evaluate the evidence.

On the demeanour of the parties, I must say that if that is the only criterion by which to decide the veracity of the parties, then I would say the defendant would win the day. But I must say that great injustice would be done to the plaintiff if he is merely to be judged by his demeanour. Undoubtedly, the first defendant was very articulate in his evidence and much more impressive than the plaintiff in the manner by which he delivered his evidence.

This is not surprising when it is considered that he is a lawyer of no mean standing. He is the offspring of a very sophisticated and well-to-do-family. He was very articulate and very confident in himself and what he had to say. He knew exactly how to deal with and treat every question from his own counsel or his opponent’s.

On the other hand, the plaintiff, has been so much deformed by the accident that he cannot see properly, the right eye is blind. In fact he has squints, he does not appear to focus on you even when he is staring at you. He is deaf in the right ear so most of the time questions had to be repeated several times before he would hear what was said to him.

He did not appear to have a very sharp intellect; on a number of occasions questions from his own counsel had to be explained in various ways to get him to comprehend fully what was being put to him. He gave his evidence in English, and he was not very fluent in the English language; he was very limited in his choice of words.

When all these matters are considered, it will be very difficult to determine whether the change in demeanour at any particular moment was attributable to difficulty in hearing or comprehending or of finding the right word or expression, or that it was induced by falsehood. Mr. Amoako-Glover’s argument has force and attraction, but more important, is to determine the probability of his story and not his comportment when he told the story.

Even though his disabilities have reduced his reactions and fluency, and he sometimes was hesitant in his answers to questions in examination-in-chief and cross-examination, the plaintiff generally impressed me as a truthful witness.

I will at this stage examine the inconsistencies which counsel listed in his evidence. The occasion for these inconsistencies has been created by the history of this case and the path it has trodden upon.

[p.428] of [1982-83] GLR 421

The plaintiff has given evidence on three occasions in respect of this same matter. The first occasion was the trial for a motor offence preferred against the first defendant in respect of the same accident. The first defendant was tried before the Labadi District Court Grade I before his Worship Mr. Opare Addo, and was acquitted and discharged of the offences of careless driving and negligently causing harm.

The record of proceedings was tendered in the case. Then the record of proceedings in the abortive trial before Charles Crabbe J. was also tendered. The proceedings of the abortive trial did not contain the evidence, but in his judgment, the learned judge quoted extensively from the evidence so that all the salient points on which counsel wanted to rely in respect of the plaintiff’s evidence were contained in the judgment.

Counsel’s submission on these previous proceedings are firstly, that they show inconsistencies in the evidence of the plaintiff so he cannot be a reliable witness and no reliance should be placed on his evidence. In respect of the proceedings before the district magistrate court, he referred to the evidence of the police constable, i.e. Tetteh who investigated the motor offence aspect of the matter and made a sketch, and submitted that even though he could not be traced to give evidence, his evidence, as appearing in the record of proceedings, should be looked at in deciding what weight to give to the present evidence of the defendant.

He said it is an exception to the hearsay rule because it is a statement made contemporaneous with the events giving rise to this action. He submitted that the rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn [1943] K.B. 587, C.A. does not preclude the court from looking at Tetteh’s evidence. He finally submitted that Tetteh’s evidence forms part of the res gestae and it helps to determine what actually took place because he went to the scene and made a sketch.

Counsel dwelt at length on the contemporaneity of Tetteh’s evidence. A contemporaneous event is an event which originates, exists or happens during the same period of time as another or each other. This has been elaborated upon by the law into a term or art, meaning that which takes place at the same time as an event or immediately after the event, so that two happenings or events may be regarded as having taken place at the same time. When a statement is made contemporaneously with the occurrence of an event into which the court is inquiring, such statement may be admitted in evidence because it throws light on the fact in issue by reason of proximity in time, place or circumstances. As Cross expresses it in his invaluable book Cross on Evidence (3rd ed.) at p. 33, “A fact may be relevant to a fact in issue because it throws light on it by reason of proximity in time, place or circumstance.” Such an item of evidence which is relevant on account of its contemporaneity with matters under

[p.429] of [1982-83] GLR 421 investigation is expressed as forming part of the res gestae. It is counsel for the defendant’s contention that the evidence of the police constable before the magistrate court that he investigated the case and made a plan is contemporaneous with the issue before this court, and that the issue is whether or not the first defendant drove without due care and attention. In Teper v. R. [1952] A.C. 480 at p.488, P.C., Lord Normand said of res gestae:

“. . . the event with which the words sought to be proved must be so connected as to form part of the res gestae, is the commission of the crime itself, the throwing of the stone, the striking of the blow, the setting fire to the building or whatever the criminal act may be.”

It may be discerned from this dictum that for a statement to be admitted in evidence under this head, it must be contemporaneous with the event and it must directly concern the event in issue. Evidence that is given in a case of an investigation that took place soon before the trial can by no stretch of imagination be regarded as something that took place at the same time or contemporaneous with the event in respect of which the evidence was adduced. Generally, evidence in a previous trial cannot in law be used in a subsequent trial.

Such evidence may fall within the hearsay rule or offend against the principle of relevancy. It may only be admitted when it falls within the exceptions allowed by law and for special purposes; for instance, when it may be admitted to test the credibility of a witness or contradict the evidence given in the present case. But proceedings in a previous trial cannot be used as evidence of the fact contained in the evidence at a subsequent trial. In Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43 at p.47, P.C., Sir Arthur Channel explained:

“. . . when a witness has sworn to certain matters in one action, the record of what he has so sworn cannot be used in another action as evidence of the facts which he has sworn to. This is so even when the second action is between the same parties as the first and a fortiori where it is not.”

The record of proceedings which was tendered in this case can have no probative value in resolving the issue of negligence in this case. Nevertheless, it was admissible to test the credibility of the plaintiff. With regards to the sketch which was tendered by another policeman who knew the signature of the constable who prepared it, both parties signed and they both agreed that it depicts correctly the scene of the accident as shown and described by them to the constable. The sketch therefore is primary evidence against both parties, and its probative value may be assessed along with the other evidence before the court. I must say that due to the unfortunate history of this

[p.430] of [1982-83] GLR 421 case, the evaluation and assessment of the evidence before this court should be done without any gloss or interpolation from the decisions in the previous trials affecting this matter.

The acquittal and discharge of the first defendant of the motor offences by the district magistrate and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s case by Charles Crabbe J in this court have no relevance to the evidence before the court. Even though in determining the credit-worthiness of the parties I shall refer to their evidence, the matter should be determined purely on the balance of probability of evidence before this court. I find it necessary to make this comment because of the insistence by the first defendant that he has won two of the three trials initiated as a result of the same incident, and that the district court and the High Court, differently constituted, preferred his story to the plaintiff’s.

First, the point of impact must be determined. The plaintiff said he stopped on the island. During cross-examination, he said he parked partly on the island and partly on the road. He elaborated on this when he said; “No. I did not park completely off the road. The right side of the car was off the road, the left side was on the road. “I understand this to mean that the right tyres were on the flower bed and the left ones on the road. In the statement of claim, paragraph 3, it was pleaded on his behalf that “the plaintiff thereby parked his said motor car off the road on the verge of the laterite and started fixing a spare tyre.” In the subsequent paragraph, it was averred that the first defendant permitted the car to go into the verge of the laterite and there collided with the plaintiff’s car. On the sketch of the locus in quo, exhibit H, which was tendered at the plaintiff’s instance, the point of impact is depicted on the road in the inner lane but near the island.

The debris, i.e. broken glass, was found 25 ft.3 ins. away from the alleged point of impact, and the resultant positions of the cars is 29 feet from the point of impact marked. The debris is shown around the spot where the resultant position of the cars are marked. At the spot where the point of impact has been marked, is a red spot which, from the key to the plan, depicts a pool of blood.

The plan was signed by both parties on 15 August 1967, eight months after the accident. The deputy superintendent of police who tendered the sketch had no personal knowledge of the circumstance whereby the parties came to sign the sketch or that the sketch was made. The plaintiff made no mention of the sketch. At the time he gave evidence, it had not been tendered so my mind was not drawn to it. However, when the first defendant gave evidence, I asked him whether both vehicles were at the scene when he went to the scene for the measurements to be taken. This was his answer:

“I do not recollect that I went to the scene to take measurements. My recollection of the events is not very clear but [p.431] of [1982-83] GLR 421

I think the police brought me the sketch to sign if it coincided with the events.”

He signed to the events as recorded in the plan so they must have coincided with his view of what took place. From the evidence, the plaintiff could not have been in a state to assist with the making of a sketch. He remained in a coma for three weeks subsequent to the accident, and he was in hospital for six months. The police officer who made the plan must have drawn it from his own view of the events as he found them at the scene but which was agreed upon by the parties later on.

Mr. Atadika, counsel for the plaintiff, has urged the court to accept the spot stained with a pool of blood as the place where contact of the two cars occurred and to accept that the blood was the plaintiff’s. Where there is an accident, resulting in casualty of the passengers or driver, and blood is found at the scene, I think there is sufficient basis to make the inference that the blood spilt on the road or scene of accident must have been spilt by the person who was injured in the accident. There were only the two drivers in the two cars. The first defendant had no external injury or any injury at all. But there is evidence that the plaintiff had very serious head injuries and fracture of the left arm. Therefore blood on the ground at the scene may resonably be said to be that of the plaintiff.

There is no evidence to explain how the blood came to be where it was found on the road. Mr. Atadika urged the court to find that the plaintiff was hit where the blood was. Mr. Amoako-Glover has made a number of suggestions. One of them is that the plaintiff must have been jammed behind his steering wheel and that blood seeped onto the road from his car. He also suggests that the plaintiff must have been laid on the spot of the pool of blood after he had been taken from his car. My mind about the matter is that all these suggestions cannot be inferences from the evidence. They are mere conjectures, they are mere guess work. There are no objective facts from which to infer how the pool of blood came on the spot marked on the plan. On conjecture refer to Nyame v. Tarzan Transport (supra) and the reference to English cases made in that case.

Be it as it may, I do not think that the pool of blood shows the correct point of impact. From the plaintiff’s own evidence the point of impact could not have been at the point indicated on the sketch. The debris which drops from vehicles which come into violent contact with each other, does not drop down away from the point of impact. Common sense and experience would dictate that the debris would start dropping from the very moment the contact is made. Therefore the most likely place where the two vehicles could have come into contact with each other would be the spot where it is marked “broken

[p.432] of [1982-83] GLR 421 glass on the plan”. This is also inside the inner track, and not on the verge or island. The positions of the cars as shown are entirely within the inner track (facing Liberation Circle and driving left at the time). No part of the plaintiff’s car was on the verge. It is most unlikely that the defendant’s car entered the island and dragged the plaintiff’s car onto the road.

The plaintiff’s evidence that he parked on the island or partly on the verge and partly on the road is not probable. At the time of the accident, his car was all in the inner track of the dual-carriage. I think that this is what has been inconsistent in the various pieces of evidence he has given of the matter. Mr. Atadika has urged the court to amend the plaintiff’s pleadings to accord with the evidence, should the court find that the plaintiff did not park on the island but on the road.

He submitted that such an amendment will not embarrass the defendant because they have contested the case on both fronts, i.e. either that the plaintiff was on the verge or in the road. He said if in spite of the divergence in the plaintiff’s story, the accident happened in circumstances which make the defendant negligent, then the court would do justice in the matter if it amended the pleadings and found the defendant liable.

The submission is ingenious but will not hold in this case. The rule of procedure regarding amendment of this nature, as I know it, is that the court may allow an amendment of pleading in appropriate cases so as to bring the pleading in line with the evidence led by the party seeking the amendment. But the court need not amend the pleadings of a party in a suit so as to bring those pleadings in line with the inference drawn by the court from the evidence as a whole. Such an amendment becomes necessary when there is a variance between the statement of claim and the evidence given at the trial. An amendment of this nature does not become necessary because other evidence in the matter shows the plaintiff’s evidence is incorrect or inaccurate.

If the plaintiff’s car was not parked, as he maintains, but on the road, will the first defendant still be held to be negligent in running into the rear? It has not been challenged that the first defendant hit the rear of the plaintiff’s car, but there is an acute conflict of evidence as to whether the plaintiff’s car was stationary or in motion. Negligence as it is said, is a question of fact. There is no rule of law which makes any particular conduct of the motorist a negligent act. The test is whether the particular conduct which calls for inquiry measures with the conduct of a reasonable prudent man placed in the same circumstances. However, negligence may be inferred from certain proved facts unless the contrary was proved.

Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that where a moving vehicle hits a stationary one, there is a presumption of negligence on

[p.433] of [1982-83] GLR 421 the part of the driver of the moving vehicle. He relied on Randall v. Tarrant (1955) 1 All E.R. 600. The facts of that case are that the plaintiff parked his car in a country lane, which was a public highway leading only to a farm. The lane where he parked was narrow. The defendant driving a tractor to which was attached a baley by articulator coupling came by and tried to pass the plaintiff’s stationary car. In doing so, he damaged the plaintiff’s car. It was held on appeal that the defendant did not take all the careful steps which a reasonable man in those circumstances should have taken in the case. The English Court of Appeal did state generally at p. 603 per Sir Evershed M.R.:

“Prima facie, given the circumstances of a stationary motor car on a highway and another car approaching with room to pass, the onus is on the driver of the moving vehicle, if an accident occurs, to show that ‘all possible care’ was taken.”

Counsel also referred to Mbadiwe v. Yaya (supra); Grunshie v. Yeboah (1967) G.L.R. 290 and Ivanov v. Speedy Travel and Tour Ltd. [1974] 2 G.L.R. 227. In Mbadiwe v. Yaya (supra) the plaintiff’s lorry was parked at night on the left side of the road. He put a lamp on the load. The defendants’ lorry hit it from behind, The court held that in circumstances like those, the accident raised a presumption of negligence against the defendants and the onus of proving otherwise was upon them. In Ivanov v. Speedy Travel and Tour Ltd. (supra) the second defendant knocked down a whiteman in broad daylight along a straight road, the Kimbu Road, the driver’s view was not in any way obscured; the plaintiff did not step into the road suddenly, yet the driver driving an ordinary private car, an Opel Kadett 1300, did not see him at all and knocked him down. On these facts, Abban J. commented at p.232:

“To my mind, if on a clear day a driver, with good eyesight and with his view not in any way obscured, knocks down a pedestrian on a straight road without seeing the said pedestrian, then that is strong prima facie evidence that he was either not keeping a sufficient lookout or that he was driving too fast, having regard to the limited lookout that could be kept.”

These observations are true of any situation like the one he was presented with, but negligence is always a question of fact, not of law.

If this matter were that simple, as those referred to, uncomplicated by the acute conflict, then the circumstances of the accident as recounted by the plaintiff would shift the burden on the defendants to disprove negligence. But the defendants deny the plaintiff was stationary. The first defendant insists that both of them were in motion and the plaintiff crossed his path in circumstances which made it impossible to avoid hitting him. The plaintiff on the other hand said he was

[p.434] of [1982-83] GLR 421 stationary. The evidence of the parties is not corroborated by any other witness; there is only one oath against another. The only other piece of evidence independent of the parties is the sketch; but the person who went to the scene and made it did not give evidence. As was stated in Baiden v. Ansah (supra) at p. 413, by the Court of Appeal per Sowah J. A. (as he then was):

“In every collision case, the drivers involved often give very divergent accounts of how the accident happened, and the mere fact that both are eyewitnesses to the accident, does not stamp their evidence with the mark of truth. In such circumstances it is for the court to look at the independent pieces of evidence which would tilt the case one way to the other and in the absence of such evidence to come to the conclusion that both drivers were to blame: see Bray v. Palmer (1953) 1 W.L.R. 1445, C.A.”

Apart from the bare sketch in this case, there is no other independent evidence.

Both parties rely heavily on the sketch, it must therefore be pitched against their respective stories and find out who is telling the truth, or whose story is probable. From the sketch the resultant positions of both vehicles were on the road with the defendant’s car attached to the rear of the plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff’s car is seen from the sketch to be standing very close to the verge, but it tilts, slighty slant-wise towards the centre of the inner track-road so that the front right tyre would appear to be aligned with the verge while the rear right tyre appears to be a few inches on the road away from the verge. The defendant’s car is entirely away from the verge, with the rear portion slanting towards the centre of the road, i.e. the inner lane. The debris is scattered along the right side of the resultant positions of the vehicles, from the rear portion of the plaintiff’s car, along the entire space between the defendant’s car and the island to what appears from my estimation and calculation from data given on the sketch, to be 3ft. 9 ins. beyond the defendant’s car. This spot, i.e. 3 ft. 9 ins. behind the defendant’s car, is where I find to be the probable point of impact. It follows that after the impact, the cars moved only 3 ft. 4 ins.

This would not be possible if both vehicles were moving, with the defendant doing 40 m.p.h. to 45 m.p.h. But it would be possible to stop 3 ft. 9 ins. after the impact if the obstacle the first defendant ran into was stationary; the force of impact would only push the obstacle, depending upon the speed of the moving car and the weight of the obstacle, ahead only a few paces. From the evidence, the plaintiff would be doing about the same speed as the first defendant. The first defendant said, “His (plaintiff’s) speed was not high enough to clear him from me. “If a moving vehicle collides

[p.435] of [1982-83] GLR 421 into the rear of another moving one, both doing about 40 m.p.h, the vehicles cannot be brought to such an abrupt halt. In fact at that speed, and in such circumstances described by the defendant, it would be most likely that one or both vehicles would be thrown off the road.

Considering all the circumstances of the case, the inference I make from the evidence is that vehicle No. SG 400, the plaintiff’s, was stationary, parked alongside the border of the island but it was on the road. I also find that the plaintiff was standing at the side of the car near the rear right wheel. It has been urged that if the plaintiff were standing at the back of the car, he would have been smashed to pulp in the collision. Dr. K. G. Korsah was asked of what would have happened to a person who was squeezed between the rear of one car and the front of another. In view of the evidence before the court, this is mere hypothesis.

The plaintiff’s evidence was that he was kneeling by the right side of the car bending towards the car and removing the jack from under the car. Under cross-examination he demonstrated his position and then said, “I was kneeling on the right knee with my head bending towards the jack I was removing. In that position, he would be so close to his car that the force of impact resulting from the collision would bring him into violent contact with his own car and then the defendant’s. The type of injuries he received are consistent with this position.

His head was likely to come into contact with his car as he was bending towards it. From the nature of damages recorded on the vehicles the force of impact must have been considerable. It was so great to have inflicted those injuries on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were in the car, and the car was hit from behind, he could not possibly have sustained such severe injuries. The impact would have been more felt by the driver of the car applying the force from behind.

If the first defendant who was driving the car which hit the plaintiff’s car from behind suffered no injury at all, it is hardly probable that the plaintiff at the wheel of the car in front would have sustained such severe injuries. I find the nature of his injuries consistent with his position at the time of the accident. He was on the ground, not in the car.

Counsel for the defendant dwelt at great length on the inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s evidence, at the three trials. There have been inconsistencies only in one aspect of his evidence and that concerns the place where he parked. In his evidence before the magistrate court he said in examination-in- chief, “I parked on the right side of the road off the road. “ But under cross-examination he said, “It is correct that I parked off the road, No, I did not park on the island, Yes, I signed the sketch.” Then in his evidence before Charles Crabbe J., part of his evidence reproduced in the judgment, he is recorded to have said: “I stopped the car and I parked it very well . . . the car was on the right

[p.436] of [1982-83] GLR 421 side near the island. I applied my hand-brake.” In this court, he said he parked on the island but when he was asked under cross-examination, to explain exactly where he parked he said the right side tyres were on the island, and the left side were on the road. What I deduce from his evidence expressed in such diverse ways is that the car was off the lane of moving traffic and that he did not obstruct the traffic. In the course of his evidence under cross-examination he said, “I allowed enough room for traffic to pass.”

There is some basis in counsel’s argument that he is not consistent but I think that it is unfair to brand his whole evidence as lies because his evidence on the place he parked is contradictory. There is no space between the flower bed and the road which one can call off the road. The edge of the flower bed is reinforced with about 5 ins. high concrete wall which divides the road and the flower bed. The plaintiff could not have parked any where else but in the road albeit, close to the verge. His evidence that he parked off the road is misleading.

But as misleading as this part of his evidence is, when the whole evidence is considered, there is sufficient data from which to conclude that he parked on the road but very close to the verge bordering the island. If the state of the evidence were such that no reasonable inference could be drawn as to where he parked, then the inconsistencies would have been fatal to his cause. My view of the matter is that whether the plaintiff parked on the road, or on the island, it did not give the defendant the carte blanche to run into him. Mr. Amoako Glover argued that if the plaintiff’s car was parked on the road, then he caused an obstruction to other users of the road and also breached regulations 10, 11 (1), (2), (3), 44 and 49 (g) of the Road Traffic Regulations, 1970 (L.I. 675).

To this submission Mr. Atadika replied that breach of statutory regulations cannot be used as a presumption of negligence. He relied on Ivanov v. Speedy Travel and Tour Ltd. (supra). In Ivanov’s case, Abban J. relying on Powell v. Phillips [1972] 3 All E.R. 864 held that a breach of any of the provisions of the Highway Code did not create a presumption which called for explanation.

The legal effect of a breach of the Highway Code is different from a breach of a statutory regulation. The Road Traffic Regulations were made under the provisions of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1958, so they form part of the Ordinance. Therefore breach of a duty under the regulations may give a right of action to anyone who can prove that his injury resulted from it. In Powell v. Phillips (supra) the court held that a breach under the Highway Code ought not be elevated into a breach of statutory duty which gave a right of action to anyone who could prove that his injury resulted from it. Therefore if the plaintiff were in breach of statutory regulations made under the Road Traffic Regulations, it would not ipso facto, amount to negligence on his part.

[p.437] of [1982-83] GLR 421

The plaintiff parked on the road for a short time just to fix a tyre; it was most unfortunate that the defendant came along just at that time. It was most imprudent for any driver to park on a fast moving road like the Ring Road. That section of the road is not well lit even now, with the introduction of the All Afra lighting system. The section near the Police Headquarters is well lit now. But in 1967 when this accident occurred, the road would be lit by the ordinary fluorescent street lights.

These do not give clear illumination as the modern type of street light we have now in certain parts of Accra, like the Independence Road and Giffard Road. Coming from the Danquah Circle, the distance the first defendant had to travel would be only about 200 meters to the area of the UNESCO buildings where the plaintiff parked his car. If one came with speed, there would barely be any time to observe the presence of the obstacle in the way. There is no evidence that the plaintiff had his parking lights on.

No indication whatsoever was given to approaching vehicles except the presence of the vehicle itself. But if the first defendant approached it with normal speed, which I presume must have been 40 m.p.h. at the time, with good light, he ought to have seen the car on the road. He said his speed was 40 m.p.h. I must admit that the Ring Road is not a place where one would expect to find a vehicle stationary fixing a tyre. All the same, no prudent driver would drive anywhere as if he is, so to speak, the king of the road.

I do not find that the plaintiff’s car has been on the road long enough to constitute a nuisance or an obstruction, and the fact of being in breach of the Traffic Regulations did not make it one. In Coote v. Stone [1971] 1 All E.R. 657, C.A. the defendant stopped his car on a clearway which was contrary to the English Various Trunk Roads (Prohibition of Waiting) (Clearways) Order, 1963. The plaintiff’s car collided into it. It was held on appeal that: stopping on the highway for a short time was not a nuisance or the fact of being in breach of the relevant regulations did not make it one.

In this case, the plaintiff said he had to stop at where he did because he was in the inner lane and to have crossed the left could have caused an accident. This is a lame excuse. A prudent and experienced driver placed in similar circumstances would have slowed down, waited until the way was clear and then gradually moved out of the road to the gravel path on the left. There is a wide gravel path which runs along the entire section of the road between the Danquah Circle and the Independence Circle.

The plaintiff could have moved into this path and left the road free. I do not think that it was the mere parking which was negligent; it was the fact that no warning was given of it to approaching vehicles which I find negligent. An unlighted vehicle on a fast motor road is a danger to traffic. That this collision occurred is eloquent testimony that the defendant did not see

[p.438] of [1982-83] GLR 421 the plaintiff’s car at all.

This would hardly be the case if the car was lit or that the plaintiff put warning signs to approaching vehicles. Both parties in this case cannot escape some blame for what happened. They both contributed to it. The time of day that the accident happened and the absence of any cogent evidence that the stationary vehicle was lit and the absence of evidence on the part of the plaintiff that any extra effort had been made to indicate the presence of the vehicle on the road make me come to the conclusion that he was to some degree responsible for the accident.

His involvement, however, could not have been as gross as that of the first defendant. With his headlights on he should have seen the stationary vehicle in good time to avoid a collision had he not either been travelling too fast or had he been keeping a proper lookout. In apportioning blame therefore I will hold that the first defendant was two-third negligent and the plaintiff one-third: see Hill-Venning v. Beszant [1950] 2 All E.R. 1151, C.A.

Before I assess the damages, I should mention the claim against the second defendant for breach of statutory duty, by failing to insure the car. Before the trial, the plaintiff was in possession of evidence which showed that the second defendant was originally the owner of the car which the first defendant was driving, but either by sale or gift, he had given the car to the first defendant’s mother. Even though formalities for transfer at the Licensing Office had not been complied with, the evidence is clear that the first defendant’s mother had management and control of the car and the duty to insure was on her. When this was pointed out to counsel for the plaintiff, he conceded to the point and abandoned his claim on the line. Nothing therefore need to be said about it.

Now the damages: There is controversy over the nature of the plaintiff’s occupation. He says that he was a mails supervisor at the Post and Telecommunication Corporation but he was retired on health grounds following this accident. It has been strongly challenged that he is a mails supervisor. The basis of this challenge is that the plaintiff at the magistrate court said he was a taxi driver. The plaintiff denies this and maintains strongly that he never testified before that court that he was a taxi driver. It is difficult to explain the inconsistencies, but the plaintiff tendered his driving licence, which is an ordinary private driving licence. He could not drive a taxi on that licence.

I think that his inconsistency has come about because the plaintiff had converted his car into a taxi cab, which was used commercially by his employed driver during the day, and in the evening he used it as his private means of transport.

No other evidence was tendered on the matter, but I would say that the general appearance of the plaintiff and his standard of literacy were higher than a taxi driver. Throughout the trial, he always came to

[p.439] of [1982-83] GLR 421 court dressed up in a complete suit, tie, etc. He did not speak Oxford English but his English was quite good. I would say it was above the standard of an ordinary taxi driver. I do not think that sufficient cause has been given me to reject his evidence that he was a supervisor of mails. I accept his evidence, and in assessing his damages I shall proceed on that premise that he was a supervisor of mails.

The plaintiff is now unemployed. He received no retiring benefits, after fifteen years of service. He said he received only ¢150 on his retirement because he had not reached the retiring age. He said his contemporaries who are still at the job are now senior inspectors receiving annual salaries of ¢4,360. This is a new scale which came into effect in 1970. He was 41 years when he was compulsorily retired.

He is married with seven children, but he is completely incapacitated by this accident. In July 1976, when a medical report was issued on him, Dr. K. G. Korsah found him to be 70 per cent incapacitated. In 1979, when he conducted a further examination to assess his improvement, he found that his condition had retrogressed, and he assessed his incapacity at 100 per cent. There is total blindness in the right eye, with pains in it. The doctor’s full report on his examination is as follows:

“Patient walks much better than he did 12 years ago. Gait however is still inco-ordinate. Shoulder movement in full. There is a permanent internal squint with paralysis of the lateral rectus in both eyes, due to involvement of the 6th cranial nerve. There is no vision in the (R) eye. The visual field in the (L) eye is diminished because of the fixed squint in the (L) eye.

Patient has no hearing in the (R) ear—total deafness. The (R) ear drum is perforated. Speech is still slurred due to the facial palsy. The fracture of the ulna is united and there is full range of movement of the elbow.

He is still in no fit state to resume his employment. He is still slightly demented.

Abdominal reflexes are absent, suggestive of a permanent brain damage. Co-ordination tests show lack of co-ordination in the lower limbs and to a lesser extent in the upper limbs. I assess a permanent incapacity of 100 per cent for the loss of hearing in the (R) ear, loss of sight in the (R) eye, loss of over 50 per cent of the visual field in the (L) eye, the (R) facial palsy and bilateral squint.”

The plaintiff is a different person from what he was before the accident. His appearance is terrible; his mouth is twisted to one side and it droops. This was caused by the loss of sensitivity on the right

[p.440] of [1982-83] GLR 421 side of the face. His eyes are so pronounced with the squint and he walks gingerly without co-ordinating his limbs. He moves as if he is going to trip at any moment. He still continues to take treatment for the after effects of his injury. He was in a coma for three weeks after the accident, but he remained in hospital for six months for his treatment. The broken arm was set in P.O.P.

The big question mark is how much is sufficient, reasonable and satisfactory to compensate this man for the very terrible state he has been put into by this accident. His pain and suffering must be considered; loss of amenities, loss of earnings, and incapacity are all relevant heads which apply in this case. His pain and suffering must be considerable. He had a fracture which would not unite with P.O.P. so a plate was inserted in the left-upper arm; and this would cause pain.

He still carries the plate in his arm. He still complains of pain in the right blind eye. Considering the time of the accident, but discounting the three weeks he remained in a coma, up to date and his general condition presently, his damages for his pain and suffering should be considerable.

The plaintiff is deformed; the squint and the twisted mouth have deformed him. He is a man who has lost his self-confidence due to his present appearance. In his present condition there is little he can enjoy; a man who is so affected and afflicted with pain can hardly be said to enjoy full amenities of life. He has also lost his pension rights.

Lastly, his inability to make a living to support himself and family – he is 54 years old; he was only 41 at the time of the accident. Considering the heights he would have attained in his job if he had not been disabled by this accident, he should be compensated for that loss. His damages should take seriously into account his pension rights which he lost and his total incapacity. I assess his damages at ¢45,000. It is made up as follows:

Pain and suffering .. .. .. .. .. – ¢ 3,000 Loss of amenities including blindness in right eye and deafness in one ear .. – ¢ 5,000 Disfigurement .. .. .. .. .. – ¢ 2,000 Disability .. .. .. .. .. .. – ¢20,000 Since I find that the blame should be apportioned one-third to two-thirds, I give judgment to the plaintiff for ¢30,000. I assess the total costs at ¢1,500 to be apportioned one-third to two-thirds. DECISION Judgment for Plaintiff in part.

J. K. E. E.

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