IN RE AGYEPONG (DECD.); POKU vs. ABOSI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 254
6 July 1981 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 37 min read
[1981] SLR (CA) 14Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Agyepong (Decd.), In re; Donkor v. Agyepong [1973] 1 G.L.R 326, C.A.
(2) Agyepong (Decd.) In re; Abosi v. Poku [1973] 2 G.L.R 456.
(3) Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; [1843-1860] All E.R. Rep. 378; 1 LT (O.S.) 410; 67 E.R. 313.
(4) Foli v. Agya-Atta (Consolidated) [1976] 1 G.L.R 194, C.A.
(5) Morris v. Monrovia (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 70.
(6) Whittaker, In re; Whittaker v. Whittaker (1882) 21 Ch.D. 657.
(7) Bater v. Bater [1951] P. 35; [1950] 2 All E.R. 458; 66 TLR (Pt.2) 589; 114 JP 416; 94 S.J. 533; 48 L.G.R 466, C.A.
(8) Gyan-Fosu (Decd.), In re; Boafo v. Akwatia-Pekoh III [1974] 1 G.L.R 145, C.A. (9) Mohan v. Broughton [1900] P. 56, C.A.
(10) Mahon v. Quinn [1904] 2 lr.R. 267.
(11) Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1964] P. 233; [1963] 2 W.L.R 271; [1962] 3 All E.R. 1108. (12) Taylor, In re; Taylor v. Taylor [1961] 1 W.L.R 9; [1961] 1 All E.R. 55, 105 S.J. 37, C.A. (13) Thomas v. Butler (1672) 1 Vent 217.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Sekondi wherein at the instance of the respondent, letters of administration granted to the appellant by the High Court, Kumasi and affirmed by the Court of Appeal were revoked. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Jiagge J.A.
COUNSEL
Hayfron-Benjamin for the appellant.
Akainyah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
The appellant, by an ex parte motion, applied to the High Court, Kumasi, for letters of administration in respect of the estate of
[p.258] of [1982-83] GLR 254 her late husband and on the orders of the court the usual notices were posted.
Three caveats were entered. The first caveat was entered by Afua Donkor of Kumasi who disclosed in her affidavit that house No. BA 147, Kumasi, was assigned to her on 9 June 1970 by the deceased J. K. Agyepong and that the said house should not be included in the list of properties belonging to the deceased at the time of his death.
The second caveat was entered by Broadway Cinema and Hotel Co., Ltd. One Emmanuel Victor Addo-Boamah who described himself as a law clerk of Benyin Chambers, Kumasi swore to an affidavit stating that:
“I am informed and verily believe that the under-mentioned properties belong to the Broadway Cinema and Hotel Co., Ltd.:
(a) Zenith Hotel, Takoradi.
(b) Prempeh Cinema Palace, Takoradi.
(c) Gyandu Cinema Palace, Sekondi.
(d) Rex Cinema, Sekondi.
(e) Afia Cinema, Effiakuma.
(f) Fiasco Cinema Palace.
(g) Ambassador Cinema, Obuasi.
(h) Abesi Cinema, Dunkwa.
(i) Rex Cinema Equipment, Sunyani.”
There was nothing to show that Addo-Boamah had any personal knowledge of the facts deposed to nor that he was a director or secretary of the company. It would appear that he was the law clerk of counsel representing the company.
The third caveat was filed by Kwame Abosi of Kumasi. In this affidavit of interest one James Emmanuel Apprey of Benyin Chambers, Kumasi deposed to the following facts:
“I am informed and verily believe that the under-mentioned properties belong to the family of J. K.
Agyepong (deceased):
(a) House No. 19C/1, Kitson Avenue, Takoradi.
(b) House No. 18, S.M. Block, Market Circle, Takoradi.
(c) Plot 22, Market Circle, Takoradi.
3. The said Kwame Abosi has been appointed as the successor to J. K. Agyepong (deceased).” In her affidavit in support of her motion on notice for the grant of letters of administration, the appellant averred that the properties listed as being claimed by the Broadway Cinema and Hotel Co., Ltd. were originally the self-acquired properties of the deceased and that the company should have disclosed in its affidavit how it came to [p.259] of [1982-83] GLR 254 acquire such properties. That Addo-Boamah of Benyin Chambers who swore to the affidavit was neither a director nor the secretary of the company and that he exhibited no power of attorney to swear to the said affidavit. She averred that the affidavit had no substance and that the caveat should be removed.
In reply to the affidavit filed by Kwame Abosi, the appellant averred that as a wife, married under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.), her interest in the estate of her husband was greater than that of the caveator and that she was entitled to letters of administration. On the caveat filed by Afua Donkor, the appellant averred that she “hotly disputed” the assignment. At the hearing before the High Court, Kumasi, counsel for the respondent submitted that letters of administration should not be issued because some of the properties listed as belonging to the deceased were family properties and properties belonging to a limited liability company and that under Order 60, r.21(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) the court was bound to order a writ to issue in the matter.
The High Court, Kumasi in its ruling held:
“By court: My understanding of Order 60, r. 21(2) is that when there is a dispute as to which of two or more applicants is entitled to administer the estate of a deceased person each of them having an interest in the estate, then the court should order a writ to issue if the parties do not agree and to try the issue and to determine who is the proper person to administer the estate. There are no such conflicting claims in this case.
I will therefore uphold the application and order that the caveats be removed and letters of administration issue to the applicant. Costs of ¢40 each against the three caveators in favour of the applicant.”
The respondents appealed against the ruling of the High Court, Kumasi. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court, Kumasi: see In re Agyepong (Decd.) Donkor v. Agyepong [1973] 1 G.L.R 326, C.A., but varied the order for letters of administration by adding the name of Comfort Agyepong, aged 38, a daughter of the deceased, on the ground that the mandatory requirement of section 77 (1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63) that where some of the beneficiaries were infants the grant of letters of administration should be made to at least two persons, was not complied with.
The Court of Appeal in its judgment, inter alia, held at pp. 333-334:
“If Order 60, r. 21(2) confers a discretion on the court to order or decline to order the issue of a writ as it thought fit, the only question to which we must now address ourselves is whether in
[p.260] of [1982-83] GLR 254 the instance case, the judge exercised his discretion properly against the issue of a writ. We think that he did.
It is clear that the caveatrix and the company caveator at least have said nothing which on a most charitable view of the case can be construed as taking issue with the respondent on her right to administer her husband’s estate. The caveator Abosi was equally more concerned in advancing his family’s claim to the three properties described in the affidavit than raising any issue with the respondent as to her right to administer the estate. It is only at the tail end of it that the information is proffered that he had been appointed successor to the deceased and this was apparently done to disclose a right to lay claim to these properties on behalf of the family.
That it is the extent of the property of the deceased rather than the right to administer it that the caveators complained about, is supported by the recorded submissions of their counsel Mr. Akainyah. And nowhere in his submissions, did he claim, even faintly, that any of the caveators was entitled as against the respondent to letters of administration or that any of them expressed a wish to administer the estate.
But it is plain that under Order 60, r. 21(2) the writ, if taken, had ‘to determine the issue as to who is entitled to a grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be’… [w]e are entirely satisfied that there was no conflict in the court below as to who was entitled to administer the estate. In these circumstances, had the learned judge ordered the respondent to issue a writ, he would have foisted pointless litigation on the parties. The judge no less than ourselves owed it to the parties not to constrain them to purposeless litigation and we whole heartedly support the judge’s order.”
The reaction of the respondent Abosi to the judgment of the Court of Appeal was to issue a writ in his capacity as head of family, in the High Court, Sekondi claiming a declaration that the self-acquired and family properties of which the late J. K. Agyepong died possessed were vested in him by virtue of his appointment as successor and head of family. He sought a further declaration that the marriage of the late J. K. Agyepong with the appellant was not in accordance with the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.) and that perpetual injunction should issue to restrain the defendant from interfering with the properties of which J. K. Agyepong died possessed and an order that the defendant surrender the properties taken from the deceased’s premises and for an account.
Paragraph 16 of the statement of claim averred that the grant of the letters of administration to the appellant was irregular and fraudulent. The particulars of the fraud set out were:
[p.261] of [1982-83] GLR 254
“(a) the defendant falsely described herself in the application for letters of administration as a wife married under the Marriage Ordinance, and (b) the fact that the deceased had wives and many children was not disclosed by the defendant.”
The writ was sealed on 24 January 1973. On that same day, a citation was filed by the respondent seeking the court’s order calling on the appellant, Mrs. Cecilia Agyepong, to produce the letters of administration that the respondent might “proceed in due course of law for the revocation of the same.”
The appellant moved the court for an order striking out the writ and all the papers associated with it on the ground, inter alia, that the respondent and co-respondent were both present at the letters of administration proceedings in the High court, Kumasi and neither challenged the appellant’s status as the lawful widow of the late Agyepong married under the Marriage Ordinance, although they had every opportunity to do so. That if the respondent who was a party to the earlier suit wanted to seek revocation, the proper venue was either the High Court, Kumasi or the Court of Appeal, the courts which dealt with the earlier proceedings and not the High Court, Sekondi.
The learned trial judge in his ruling on the motion: see In re Agyepong (Decd.); Abosi v. Poku [1973] 2 G.L.R. 456 made adverse comments on both the decision of the High Court, Kumasi and that of the Court of Appeal. He held that since the parties did not agree, it was up to the court to order the issue of a writ of summons to determine who was entitled to a grant of letters of administration. He continued at p. 470:
“But the court held that there were ‘no conflicting claims.’ In my view there were. Could letters of administration be granted to a widow of a shareholder of a limited liability company to administer the property of the company? I think not . . . Could letters of administration be granted to a widow to administer . . . the family properties of the husband as against the customary successor in whom such properties are vested by operation of law? I think not.
. . . I respectfully agree with the Court of Appeal that the judge had a discretion to exercise. But it seems to me that the Court of Appeal did not distinguish between the power of the judge, that is, his discretion and the duty of the judge, that is to say whether in the circumstances of the particular case before him there was no obligation upon the judge to exercise the power to order the issue of a writ of summons.”
[p.262] of [1982-83] GLR 254
Commenting on the case before the High Court, Kumasi the trial judge held at p. 472:
“In my view the court cannot say that there were no conflicting claims and refuse to order the issue of a writ to determine to whom letters of administration should issue.
What right had the widow in the circumstances of this case better than the successor to administer the family property? Where does she come in at all as far as the family property is concerned?
Can a widow sell the family property of her deceased husband? I think not. Since there are ‘other children’ their interests had to be protected; which raises in itself substantial legal questions.”
Continuing with his adverse comments on the decision of the High Court, Kumasi and the Court of Appeal, the learned trial judge noted that if the judge had ordered a writ of summons to be issued then all the facts would have come to his knowledge; that the mandatory provisions of section 77(1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 would also have been brought to his notice, and that the proper interpretation of the section should be that the judge was obliged to order the writ of summons to issue. He lamented the fact that although the Court of Appeal found it necessary to ascertain the wishes of the respondent in that case, it did not consider it necessary to ascertain the wishes of the caveators who were the appellants before that court. The judge held further at pp. 473-75:
“The Court of Appeal thus completely ignored the position of the customary successor in such matters which position in view of the combined effect of the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of section 1, and subsection (4) of section 79 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1962… was entitled to consideration.
“would there really be a harmonious administration of the estate, which, it is claimed, includes family property and property belonging to a limited liability company if the successor to the family property is left out?…
The mere fact that there was a caveat meant that the right of the applicant to administer the estate was being challenged . . . But the court held there was no conflict.
And so the court did not go into the very fundamental issue whether, in the circumstances of that particular case the judge was obliged to order the issue of a writ . . .
[p.263] of [1982-83] GLR 254
In all the circumstances of this case, as demonstrated there is no question of law decided by the Court of Appeal which binds this court.”
The judge held that there were “triable issues of substance” and dismissed the application to strike out the writ. It is obvious from comments of the trial judge that there was some misapprehension of the issues and the decisions of the High Court, Kumasi, and the Court of Appeal. The application in the previous proceedings was made under Order 60, r. 21(2) to determine who was entitled to a grant of letters of administration. There was no other applicant for the grant and no objection to the application was raised in any of the three affidavits in support of the caveats. The caveators raised issues as to the extent of the deceased’s properties but not on the right to administer.
Under the circumstances it could not be said that there was a dispute as to who was entitled to the grant. The issue of summons becomes necessary only when there is a dispute as to who is entitled to a grant of letters of administration.
The person applying for a grant of letters of administration must issue a warning to the caveators and disclose his interest in the estate. A caveator may decide to withdraw his caveat or enter an appearance, stating in his affidavit his claim if he has one, or oppose the applicant on the ground of lack of interest or that he has a superior right to letters of administration or that the applicant was not entitled to such a grant. The judge’s comments that “The mere fact that there was a caveat meant that the right of the applicant to administer the estate was being challenged” cannot be the correct position. A caveator, though he has an interest in the estate may not wish to administer it or participate in its administration or even oppose the application for letters of administration.
It is only when the affidavit filed after appearance disclosed contentious issues that it may become necessary for the court to order a writ to issue. But where the affidavit does not disclose any contentious issue, an order for summons to issue would merely encourage litigation where none was necessary. If the learned trial judge had adverted his mind to the issue of who was entitled to a grant of letters of administration under Order 60, r. 21(2) which was before the High Court, Kumasi, he would have realised that the affidavit filed by the three caveators did not disclose any contentious issue to necessitate an
[p.264] of [1982-83] GLR 254 order for a writ to issue. The following were the main issues agreed by the parties for trial:
“1. Whether the late J. K. Agyepong’s marriage with Madam Afua Num was subsisting at the time he married under the Ordinance.
2. Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to have the grant of letters of administration made to the defendant revoked on the ground of fraud.
3. Whether or not the late Agyepong died possessed of family properties.
4. Whether or not the said family properties form part of the estate of the late J. K. Agyepong.
5. Whether or not the properties of the Broadway Cinema and Hotel Co., Ltd. form part of the estate of the late J. K. Agyepong.
6. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed.”
Additional issues agreed were:
“1. Whether or not the plaintiff herein is estopped by his conduct on various material occasions from challenging the validity of the marriage between the deceased J. K. Agyepong and the defendant herein.”
The appellant as the defendant in the court below was granted leave to amend her defence by raising estoppel by conduct against the plaintiff as follows:
“The plaintiff is estopped from saying that there was a subsisting customary marriage between the late J. K.
Agyepong and the said Afua Num because of the following:
“(a) He failed to raise the alleged impediment when banns were published in both the Methodist Church in Sekondi and the Methodist Church in Kumasi.
(b) The plaintiff did not raise this issue of alleged impediment during the marriage ceremony itself . . . when the officiating priest announced that anybody who knew of any impediment to the marriage of the deceased and the defendant should declare it there and then or forever hold his peace, although the plaintiff and other members of his family were present at the time and signed the marriage certificate as witnesses.
(c) The plaintiff did not raise the issue of the alleged marriage between Afua Num and the deceased in the affidavit filed on entry of appearance at the High Court, Kumasi nor did he raise an objection to the application for letters of administration.”
[p.265] of [1982-83] GLR 254
On the submission of the counsel for the appellant (the defendant in the court below) that at no time had the caveators in the previous proceedings challenged the status of the appellant and that the matter of status could not be raised again in a court of law, the learned judge held:
“It seems to me that on this question of the status of the defendant, more is being read into the judgment of the Court of Appeal relied upon than is really the case.. Afua Donkor was by her affidavit claiming as a beneficiary under an assignment… I doubt whether in law it can be said that it is not a sufficient show of legal interest. It is all a question of proof whether indeed there was such an assignment whether that assignment was valid. No such questions had been entertained by the Court of Appeal – whether as a matter of fact or as a matter of law…
Again I doubt whether it can be said that in law what had been deposed to does not disclose a sufficient interest which would require that the deponent establish the interest as alleged. There had been no such determination, whether as a question of law or as a question of fact by the Court of Appeal. Again, I would very much doubt if it can be said that in law what has been deposed to does not disclose sufficient interest which calls for determination whether these properties are in fact the self-acquired properties of the deceased or whether they are family properties.
If it is established that the properties concerned are family properties, could the defendant administer such properties notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63), which vest such properties in a customary successor until the appointment of a personal representative?”
The learned trial judge continued to express more doubts on whether the appellant’s interests could be greater than those of the directors of the company who had definite obligations under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) as regards the properties before the High Court, Kumasi.
The learned trial judge reproduced in full the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi and expressed even more doubts on its validity. On the issue of the exercise of discretion, he held:
“The substantive law, as opposed to the objective law in this regard, clearly requires a judge in exercising his discretion to take into account the provisions of section 79(2). This subsection requires the judge to take into consideration the rights of all persons interested in the estate including the successor, if any, under customary law . . . It is a discretion, the exercise of which has to take into account certain provisions of an Act of
[p.266] of [1982-83] GLR 254
Parliament. So the interests of the head of family and successor and the interests of the company have all got to be taken into account . . .
So no questions of law or of fact were determined by the High Court sitting at Kumasi whether as regards the status of the defendant she was lawfully married under the Marriage Ordinance or otherwise. No findings were arrived at, based upon any evidence as to which of two people or a number of people were qualified to administer the property. That submission is a question of fact to be determined upon proper findings . . . The exercise of the judge’s discretionary power is no substitute for a finding of fact or law, based upon evidence.
There has been no determination of any issue on the merits. But then also fraud is alleged and where fraud is concerned it cannot be argued that the matter cannot be dealt with, that a status obtained cannot be questioned.”
It would appear from the opinion expressed by the learned trial judge that he considered both the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi and that of the Court of Appeal as given in error and unacceptable and he welcomed the opportunity to put things right. The error, however, was not to be found in the two judgments referred to but in the learned trial judge’s comprehension of them. The two judgments properly resolved the only issue before the court in the previous proceedings. The learned trial judge’s misapprehension of the issue before the High Court, Kumasi as to who was entitled to a grant of letters of administration made a proper perspective difficult for him and tainted the proceedings before the court below making the conclusions arrived at unsatisfactory.
Under Order 60, r.21(2) of LN 140A there is no mandatory provision compelling the court to order a writ to issue on a matter that was not in dispute. The judge in that case exercised his discretion properly. On the affidavit before him, the applicant for letters of administration was the wife of the deceased and none of the caveators disputed that fact. She was the only one applying for letters of administration, none of the caveators applied for letters of administration and as far as the issue of who was entitled to the grant of letters of administration was concerned there was no controversy on the face of the affidavits before the court.
There was no competing claim for the grant of letters of administration; there was no challenge to the right of the appellant as the lawful wife of the deceased, to apply for the grant of letters of administration. There were no disclosures of lack of interest in any of the affidavits and there was nothing to show any greater interest than that of the wife and children. Since the three caveats filed and the affidavits of interest all go to the extent of the property and not the right to
[p.267] of [1982-83] GLR 254 administer the estate, the question of ownership of property cannot be inquired into under Order 60, r. 21(2) of LN 140A which provides:
“(2) Failing the parties coming to an agreement, however, the Court may order that the applicant do issue a writ of summons against the caveator within a specified period from the date of such order, to determine the issue as to who is entitled to a grant or Probate or Letters of Administration, as the case may be.”
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that there was no conflict before the court in the previous proceedings as to who was entitled to administer the estate and stated: “In these circumstances had the learned judge ordered the respondent to issue a writ, he would have foisted pointless litigation on the parties.” A decision of the Court of Appeal is binding on the High Court. However the numerous doubts expressed by the learned trial judge show clearly that he was convinced that there were valid grounds on which the right of the appellant herein to letters of administration could have been challenged by the respondent and co-respondent as caveators in the previous proceedings. But the fact remains that they did not challenge her right to letters of administration.
“Where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not, except in special circumstances, permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but which was not brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.
The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”
See Henderson v Henderson [1843-1860] All E.R. Rep 78, as stated in the headnote. If the caveators wanted a grant of letters of administration or had facts to challenge the appellant’s right to letters of administration and failed to state them, they cannot complain if the court held that there were no conflicting claims.
The rule that a person cannot bring an action where the cause of his claim or the issue which he sought to have determined had as between the parties or their privies, already been disposed of by a competent court, covers not only matters actually dealt with in the
[p.268] of [1982-83] GLR 254 previous judgment, but also those which ought to have been brought up then but were not: see Foli v. Agya-Atta (Consolidated) [1976] 1 G.L.R 194 at p. 195, C.A.
If the learned trial judge had adverted his mind to the affidavits of the caveators in the previous proceedings and also to the fact that the application in that case was brought under Order 60, r. 21(2) he would not have entertained the numerous doubts listed in his judgment. However, in spite of his doubts, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is binding and will continue to be binding until vacated by the judgment of a superior court.
A grant of letters of administration may, however, be revoked if the person to whom it was made was not entitled to it. A grant obtained by fraud, mala fide or by concealing information which should have been disclosed to the court, may also be revoked.
The respondent in the particulars of fraud in his statement of claim averred:
“The defendant falsely described herself in the application for letters of administration as a wife married under the Marriage Ordinance (Cap. 127). The fact that the deceased had wives and many children was not disclosed by the defendant.”
The learned trial judge found that there was fraud and ordered the revocation of the grant.
Before a grant of letters of administration is revoked the court must be satisfied that there was lack of interest and that the person to whom the grant was made was in fact not entitled to it. The burden of proving fraud is on the party who alleges it. The circumstances surrounding the alleged fraud must be inconsistent with any other view but that of fraud.
The learned trial judge listed the evidence which in his opinion supported the allegation of fraud: the most relevant of which are as follows: “Two years before their marriage under the Ordinance in the Methodist Church in Kumasi, the appellant and her late husband were married under customary law and lived together as husband and wife.”
The trial judge held that the appellant and her late husband made false declarations before their marriage under the Ordinance and:
“Thus to describe themselves as bachelor and spinster respectively, when they knew they were legally married was to state what they knew was not true in law and in fact. They thus made a false declaration contrary to sections 4 and 5 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 9 . . . the defendant herself had admitted that by November 1954 she had become married to Agyepong. She was then at the time of her marriage on 6 October 1956, the wife,
[p.269] of [1982-83] GLR 254 according to the customary law, of Agyepong, yet she described herself as a spinster. It has also been established that previous to her marriage to Agyepong she had a baby by a man who had not claimed the child. Her status was that of an unmarried mother, not that of a spinster.”
According to the Oxford dictionary a spinster is an unmarried woman. An unmarried mother is also an unmarried woman. The scathing remark that the status of the appellant was that of an unmarried mother and yet she called herself a spinster, apart from being uncharitable did not in any way enhance the learned trial judge’s argument. A spinster is an unmarried woman just as much as an unmarried mother is.
On the appellant’s marital status the learned trial judge had this to say:
“I cannot help feeling that a disclosure of their marital status as being husband and wife under customary law would have put the officiating clergy on his inquiry whether all was well under the customary law before the entry into the marriage under the Ordinance . . .
I consider it unconscientious to allow the defendant to avail herself of the advantage she had obtained by her acquiescence, and her part in the suppression of the truth. This is where public policy should be called in aid so that our girls who are married under customary law are not thrown away as chattel . . .”
The learned trial judge had even more to say on the non-disclosure on the marriage certificate that the parties were married under customary law. In his opinion the parties hid an impediment which if known to the officiating officer would have caused a ban to be placed on the marriage. The trial judge continued:
“In the case of the customary law marriage, it was a perfectly valid marriage. So what was there to hide? And if there was nothing to hide, why the representation which she knew was not true. It was not a matter of she ought to have known. It is a case of she knew . . . I suspect that they were all aware that if the husband and wife had truthfully described themselves as married under customary law, which was a potentially polygamous marriage, at best, those concerned with the registration would have asked whether all was well…
That is to say, whether there were impediments or not. So they concealed the truth.. This is a deliberate suppression of truth . . . The acquiescence of either of them is indeed evidence of fraud.”
[p.270] of [1982-83] GLR 254
The learned trial judge attempted in his judgment to set new standards of conduct and morality higher than those set up in the Marriage Ordinance. With respect, what is relevant is the standard set in the Marriage Ordinance.
Cap. 127, s. 14(4) provides: “That neither of the parties to the intended marriage is married by native law or custom to any person other than the person with whom such marriage is proposed to be contracted.” (The emphasis is mine.)
The Marriage Ordinance makes a provision for parties married under customary law to be married under the Ordinance if they so desire. It is difficult to understand how the circumstances of the marriage of the appellant could lead to an irresistible conclusion that there was criminal deception or fraud when the parties complied with section 14(4) of Cap. 127.
If the learned trial judge had applied the law to the facts before him he could not have concluded that there was a deliberate suppression of the truth or that the acquiescence of either of them was indeed evidence of fraud.
The marriage certificate itself came under serious attack, that although all sides were agreed that the wedding took place at the Methodist Church, Kumasi, the certificate showed that the marriage was celebrated in the Registrar’s Office, Kumasi City Council. Counsel for the respondent urged this court to regard the marriage certificate as stating a lie about itself that at the time of the marriage there was no city council in Kumasi. What existed, was a municipal council.
It is provided by Cap. 127, ss. 30 and 34-35 that marriages may be celebrated in a licensed place of worship by a recognised minister between 8a.m. and 6p.m. Section 34 provides that immediately after the marriage, the officiating minister shall make the required entries in the marriage certificate and section 35 provides that the certificate shall be signed in duplicate by the officiating minister, the parties and their witnesses and the duplicate certificate shall be sent to the registrar within seven days of the marriage and the registrar shall file the certificate in his office. There was no evidence that the Methodist Church, Kumasi was not a licensed place of worship for the purposes of the Marriage Ordinance.
The certificate tendered was a certified true copy of the marriage certificate taken from the registrar’s office and entered on forms specifically printed for the purpose. The grounds of attack on the marriage certificate lack merit. Moreover, the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance make the grounds of attack pointless. Cap. 127, s. 42 provides “. . . But no marriage shall after celebration be deemed invalid by reason that any provisions of this Ordinance other than the
[p.271] of [1982-83] GLR 254 foregoing has not been complied with.” The “foregoing” referred to relate to marriages that are void on the ground of kindred or affinity and marriages that are invalid because the parties knowingly and willingly acquiesced in its celebration at a place not registered for that purpose or where the parties married under false names or without the registrar’s or marriage officer’s certificate of notice or where the marriage was celebrated by a person not being a recognised minister of some religious denomination or registrar of marriages. None of these is relevant in this case. Section 43 provides “All marriages celebrated under this Ordinance shall be good and valid in law to all intents and purposes.”
The learned trial judge held that when the defendant put in the application for the grant of letters of administration, the validity of the marriage upon which she was basing her claim had not then been challenged. He did not therefore consider her description of herself as a widow by virtue of a marriage under the Ordinance as being false. But the trial judge also held that “if the claim were that she knew that her marriage under the Ordinance was not a valid one then, of course, to describe herself as she did, she could not say that she did not know that the marriage was not valid.” The applicant, according to the learned judge could not escape blame.
The learned judge had earlier in his judgment declared that at the time of the marriage between the deceased and the defendant, the deceased had not divorced Afua Num and that Afua Num was still married to the deceased and that he was living together with her as husband and wife till his death.
The respondent sought to show that although the late Agyepong told the world that he had divorced all his wives, he, in fact, kept Afua Num his first wife. The burden is on the respondent to show not only by his own deposition but also by other material evidence that on 6 October 1956 before the marriage of the late Agyepong to the appellant under the Marriage Ordinance, Afua Num was still married to Agyepong in spite of Agyepong’s declaration to the world that he had divorced all his wives.
“The well-established rule of law is that a person making a claim against the estate of a dead man cannot sustain that claim by his or her own deposition; and unless there be some corroboration of it something to satisfy the Court that the assertion is literally true, the Court can take no notice of it.”
See Morris v. Monrovia (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 70 at p. 74, and also In re Whittaker; Whittaker v. Whittaker (1882) 21 Ch.D. 657.
There was no evidence of any kind during the lifetime of Agyepong to indicate that at the time of his marriage under the Ordinance
[p.272] of [1982-83] GLR 254 he was still married to Afua Num.
The evidence was that all the other wives accepted ¢2,000 compensation and Afua Num accepted a house. She, herself testified that the house was given to her by Agyepong before his marriage to the appellant under the Ordinance. The usual banns were published but there was no caveat. There was evidence that Afua Num’s children attended the wedding. There was evidence that Afua Num and the late Agyepong had eleven children but there was no evidence that any of them was born after the marriage under the Ordinance.
The late Agyepong openly enjoyed the status of a man married under the monogamous system and became not only a leader but a pillar of the Methodist Church, Kumasi. He could not have attained that height if he had been married to more than one woman. No one ever challenged his right as a leader on the ground that he had more than one wife.
The evidence tendered to show that Afua Num was not divorced was that in 1970 Agyepong transferred to her the title deeds of the house he had given her before his marriage under the Ordinance. That on his death Afua Num performed the customary rites of a wife and that during his illness Afua Num nursed him. None of the evidence proffered can support the allegation that before his marriage under the Ordinance Agyepong was still married to Afua Num. The most charitable view that can be taken of the evidence may be that it supports what is commonly called in Ga, lai momo (the resumption of relations between ex-husband and ex-wife or ex-concubine and ex-boy friend). The finding of the trial judge that Afua Num was married to the late Agyepong at the time of his marriage under the Ordinance to the appellant cannot be supported by the evidence before the court.
Even if as the evidence seems to suggest, Agyepong before his death resumed marital relations with Afua Num, such relations could not have ripened into any valid marriage. Agyepong after his marriage under the Ordinance had lost his capacity to contract a valid marriage during the continuance of his marriage to the appellant. Section 44 of Cap. 127 provides:
“44. Any person who is married under this Ordinance, or whose marriage before the commencement of this Ordinance is declared by this Ordinance to be valid, shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage of contracting a valid marriage under any native law or custom . . .”
There was no evidence of any divorce of the partner married under the Ordinance. The appellant was the lawful wife of Agyepong at the time of his death. The status of the appellant as found by the Court of Appeal is that of a wife married under the Ordinance. The finding is binding on the High Court.
[p.273] of [1982-83] GLR 254
Another allegation of fraud against the appellant was that on her application for letters of administration she did not disclose that her late husband had several children; that she disclosed that she had two children when, in fact, she had three; and that although her first child was not the child of the deceased he had adopted her.
On this issue the learned trial judge held:
“She had had a baby with a man who did not care to claim nor accept responsibility for the child. In the event Agyepong, with christian charity, adopted that child. Yet she, the defendant, did not regard her as one of Agyepong’s children in her application for the grant of letters of administration. She lacked sheer christian charity in this regard, let alone the de facto or de jure nature of the adoption.
The evidence is that the child was named Joyce Agyepong… In 1972 when she applied for the grant of letters of administration she did not mention any of the children of the deceased except the two she had for the deceased, excluding also, the adopted child, Joyce Agyepong. She also made no mention of the other children in her affidavit supporting the application. These two documents did not speak the whole truth.
They suppress material facts.”
With respect, there is no mandatory provision under Order 60, r. 21(2) calling on the applicant to exhibit a full list of all beneficiaries before a grant of letters of administration is made.
Fraud must not only be pleaded but clearly and distinctly proved by the man who alleges it. The standard of proof required is stated by Denning L.J. in Bater v. Bater [1951] P.35 at p.37 as follows: “A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher degree of probability than that which it would require when asking if negligence is established.” Fraud in civil proceedings requires a higher standard of proof than any ordinary civil matter.
The burden of proof is on the man who alleges fraud and there must be proof of criminal deception. The allegation of fraud on the court in the application for grant of letters of administration must be proved by sufficient evidence. The allegation of fraud to nullify a marriage under the Ordinance after the death of one of the parties to the marriage requires strict proof. There can be no relief unless such fraud is proved strictly and clearly. The respondent and co-respondent failed miserably to prove the fraud alleged, and there can be no revocation of the grant of letters of administration without such proof.
In the application for the grant of letters of administration in the previous proceedings before the High Court, Kumasi, the usual inventory of the deceased’s properties was exhibited. The caveats filed were concerned only with the extent of the properties listed. But the
[p.274] of [1982-83] GLR 254 judge in that case under Order 60, r. 21(2) was required to determine who was entitled to a grant of letters of administration. The learned trial judge in the previous proceedings properly confined his inquiry to the issue that was before him and in the absence of conflicting claims and declarations of lack of interest made the grant to the one and only applicant before the court.
The question of ownership of the list of properties exhibited is a different issue which must be tried separately and not combined with an application under Order 60, r. 21(2). In a determination of the issue as to who was entitled to letters of administration in a summons under LN 140A, Order 60, r. 21(2) the court should not couple that determination with that of ownership of properties listed in the inventory. The issue of ownership of disputed properties should be left at large and determined in the appropriate proceedings if the parties so desired: see In re Gyan-Fosu (Decd.); Boafo v. Akwatia-Pekoh III [1974] 1 G.L.R 145, C.A.
This decision is applicable to this case. The issue of what was the self-acquired property of Agyepong at the time of his death may be determined in a separate action if the parties so desire.
The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the court below is set aside. The respondents have liberty to bring a fresh action to determine the extent of the properties if they so desire.
Joint letters of administration should issue to the appellant and Comfort Agyepong.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I agree with the judgment of the learned president, but out of respect for the trial judge from whom we are differing, I would like to add a few words of my own on the appellant’s status.
The confirmation of the decision of the High Court, Kumasi by the Court of Appeal, established conclusively the appellant’s interest in the deceased’s estate qua widow. The failure of the caveators to challenge the appellant’s capacity when opportunity offered itself should debar them from re-opening the issue of administration, for a court should not revoke a grant if the applicant has been guilty of laches and acquiescence in the first grant: see Mahon v. Broughton [1900] P. 56, C.A. and Mahon v. Quinn [1904] 2 lr. R. 267.
In this case the respondents are estopped by conduct as well as by record. The whole point about estoppel per rem judicatam is to prevent the harassment occasioned by repetitive actions which should have been concluded in one and the same action.
The Court of Appeal held (see [1973] 1 G.L.R. 326, C.A.) that the appellant had contracted a marriage under the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance with the deceased. It held further at p.333 that:
“It is clear that the caveatrix and the company caveator at least have said nothing which on a most charitable view of their case
[p.275] of [1982-83] GLR 254 can be construed as taking issue with the respondent [now appellant] on her right to administer her husband’s estate.”
But even if stare decisis was flung out of the window, the evidence led in the court below did not impeach the appellant’s status as a lawful widow. The presumption of validity and regularity of marriage can only be displaced by evidence that satisfies beyond reasonable doubt; see Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1962] 3 All E.R. 1108 and Re Taylor [1961] 1 All E.R. 55, C.A. Our own Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), s.31 adopts the common law presumption.
It seems to me that even on the basis of commonsense, the deceased’s act of divorcing his customary wives before marrying the appellant can only be explained on the hypothesis of putting his house in order. Whether before God and the church or before the law and man, or even as an act of a loving husband to brush away any future matrimonial difficulties, it was only a clean break with his former customary wives that would make sense, and in the context of this case, retain for him the distinction of being a pillar of Methodist society, save him from criminal prosecution for bigamy, and ensure harmony in the matrimonial home.
If there was a single customary wife undivorced before the deceased married the appellant, then the whole exercise of sending the wives away would have been to no avail. In my view, the gifts of money and a house the deceased gave to his customary wives when he broke with his past, can only be rationally explained as parting gifts expended to regain his absolute freedom to enable him to wed the appellant without impediment. The evidence led by the respondents, indeed, supports this view, but surprisingly single out for exception, the first wife, Afua Num! But to urge this to any serious extent, is to shut one’s eyes to the tenor of the evidence and put up barricades to its comprehension.
The question of status is of considerable importance. If the respondent who is a brother of the deceased is right in his contention, he would have succeeded in bastardising his own nieces by an indirect action to which the children are not even parties. In my view, the respondent not having breathed a word of disquiet in the lifetime of his deceased brother on the legitimacy of his marriage to the appellant and having kept his peace in the earlier trial right up till the pronouncement in the Court of Appeal, the door should be firmly shut against him.
A final comment. I agree with the learned president that no fraud was proved to sustain proceedings for revocation of the letters of administration granted. Letters of administration are not revoked at the whim and fancy of an applicant. There must be good and substantial grounds for recourse to an exercise that is in itself an admission or error on the part of the court since the court is expected to be exacting
[p.276] of [1982-83] GLR 254 in its scrutiny before the order for a grant is made, and should also take sufficient precautions to prevent maladministration: see Thomas v. Butler (1672) 1 Vent 217.
I am consequently of the view that the appeal should be allowed but this should be no bar to the respondents pursuing any course they may feel disposed to embark upon to protect their family’s proprietory interests in contradistinction to the deceased’s self-acquired estate which are properly to be administered by the widow and one of the deceased’s children, Comfort Agyepong.
JUDGMENT OF MENSAH BOISON J.A.
I have in advance had the privilege of reading the leading judgment read by the president. I concur in the judgment and reasoning thereof, and subscribe to the opinion of my brother Francois J.A. which I have likewise read beforehand.
The appeal should be allowed.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D.R.K.S.
