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[1981] SLR (CA) 8Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ANDANI vs. ABUDULAI [1981] GLR 283

16 April 1981 · EDUSEI JA · ≈ 19 min read

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OSCOLAIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ANDANI v ABUDULAI [1981] GLR 283 [1981] SLR (CA) 8
APAIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ANDANI v ABUDULAI [1981] GLR 283, [1981] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ANDANI v ABUDULAI [1981] GLR 283, [1981] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana Ct. App. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Green (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 548; 1 Nev. & P.K.B. 631; Will. Woll. & Dav. 291.

(2) Darkwa v. The Republic [1981] G.L.R. 241, C.A.

(3) Ababio v. Tutu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 489, S.C.

(4) Hernaman v. Smith (1855) 10 Exch. 659; Samd. & M. 59; 24 L.J.Ex. 175; 24 L.T.O.S. 261; 19 J.P.

88; 1 Jur. N.S. 190; 3 W.R. 208; 3 C.L.R. 435; 156 E.R. 603.

(5) Cooke v. Gill (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 107; 42 L.J.C.P. 98; 28 L.T. 32; 21 W.R. 334.

(6) Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1976] 2 G.L.R. 5, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the Ya-Na, Yakubu Andani, to have the earlier order of the Court of Appeal granting leave to the respondent to appeal against the findings of the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry and making an order for summons for directions rescinded. The facts are fully set out in the ruling of Edusei J.A.

COUNSEL

Miss Akua Asabea Ayisi for the applicant.

Appiah for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

In order to appreciate the reasons for the ruling about to be given, I consider it necessary to set out very briefly the history of this case which has come to be known as the “Yendi Skin Affairs.” A sole committee of inquiry was appointed to probe the Yendi Skin Affairs. The government accepted the findings of the committee and enacted legislation to enforce them. This legislation is the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299), and it denied the aggrieved person, Mahamadu Abudulai, a right to challenge those findings on appeal. Be that as it may, the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238), which came into force on 25 May 1979 conferred that right. Accordingly, Mahamadu Abudulai on 9 August 1979 filed an appeal in the registry of the Court of Appeal in the usual and conventional form. Since there were no rules governing such an appeal, Mahamadu Abudulai applied to the court for directions. Both the notice of appeal and the application for directions were served on Yakubu Andani, the Ya-Na of

[p.286] of [1981] GLR 283

Yendi. The court accordingly gave directions but it does seem that neither Yakubu Andani nor his counsel was present at the hearing of the application and the court graciously granted liberty to the said Yakubu Andani, for good reason, to have those directions varied, rescinded or otherwise set aside or to obtain additional directions as it may seem fit to the court.

As would be expected, Yakubu Andani took advantage of this reserved right, and his solicitor filed an application on 14 January 1981 seeking to set aside the order of the court which is contained in the ruling of 8 December 1980. This application by Yakubu Andani, hereinafter referred to as the applicant, has provoked the instant controversy between him and Mahamadu Abudulai, hereinafter referred to simply as the respondent.

The contention of the applicant as set out in his supporting affidavit is that in view of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) (Repeal) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 32), the respondent’s appeal and subsequent summons for directions resulting in the ruling of 8 December 1980, have been rendered nugatory. A.F.R.C.D. 32 sought to repeal S.M.C.D. 238 which had given the right of appeal to the respondent. The respondent also in his opposing affidavit maintains that the A.F.R.C.D. 32 never had any force in law and therefore S.M.C.D. 238 is still in full force and the respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeal stands valid. It is abundantly clear that the bone of contention between the parties revolves around the legal validity or otherwise of A.F.R.C.D. 32.

The respondent in his opposing affidavit deposed as follows:

“3. That at the hearing of the motion brought by Yakubu Andani,, counsel will on my behalf contend that A.F.R.C.D. 32 does not in any way affect the appeal filed herein on my behalf and consequently that the Decree does not affect the directions given by the honourable Court of Appeal on 8 December 1980.

4. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe that the contentions which will be urged upon the honourable Court of Appeal by my counsel are:

(a) that A.F.R.C.D. 32 never had any force in law, and (b) that even if A.F.R.C.D. 32 had any existence in law, which is denied, at the time of its printing and publication in the gazette its operation had been so much affected by the Constitution, 1979, of the Republic of Ghana as not to have any possible effect on my appeal herein. I am further advised by counsel and verily believe that to raise these contentions it is first requisite

[p.287] of [1981] GLR 283 to have established a question of fact, namely, the dates for the printing of A.F.R.C.D. 32 and its publication in the gazette.

5. That the publication of A.F.R.C.D. 32 was made in the Ghana Gazette bearing particulars No. 44 of Friday, 21 September 1979.

6. That I have good grounds to believe that each of them both the A.F.R.C.D. 32 and the said Gazette No. 44 was printed and published after 24 September 1979 and that both of them were in fact printed in October 1979”.

The respondent went on to state the grounds for his belief and therefore sought leave for the issuance of a subpoena on the Managing Director of the Ghana Publishing Corporation or his representative to come to give the required evidence. The substance of the respondent’s application undoubtedly was to call evidence to establish the fact mentioned in his affidavit. The court after hearing arguments on this matter of calling evidence ruled thus:

“A serious issue has been raised as to the date of publication of A.F.R.C.D. 32. We think in the interest of justice we should allow evidence to be led to establish the true facts. Application to adduce fresh evidence accordingly granted. Matter adjourned to tomorrow.”

This was on 16 February 1981.

On the following day, one Wilfred Richard Quansah, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Works, Assembly Press, Accra, and a printer by profession, gave evidence on behalf of the respondent. His testimony is that on 20 September 1979 he received a letter also dated 20 September 1979 from the Attorney-General’s Department requesting the Ghana Publishing Corporation to let the Attorney-General’s Office “have proof of the attached Decree as soon as possible.” This letter is exhibit A. He went on to say that on receipt of exhibit A his corporation went through a process to obtain a proof of the matter to be printed. The various stages of the process of printing were all noted down in a document called “work instruction sheet” and this was tendered in evidence as exhibit B. According to the witness, the proof of the Decree was made, and on 26 September 1979 it was sent to the Attorney-General’s Office for approval. It was duly approved and returned with insertions or corrections to the Ghana Publishing Corporation on 28 September 1979 and this is confirmed by exhibit C. This exhibit C consists of the letter which was sent together with the

[p.288] of [1981] GLR 283 proof of the Decree. On the letter accompanying the proof of the Decree, appeared the words “approved for publication as corrected” and signed by a Principal State Attorney and dated 28 September 1979. On the proof itself were two dates written in ink—black and red. The black ink date states, “Made this 8th day of September, 1979 and the red ink date of “21st September” is sandwiched between the words “date of Gazette notification” and the figure “1979.” It does seem ex facie that the A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published on 21 September 1979 in view of the words: “Date of Gazette Notification 21st September” appearing on the Decree, but it will soon be seen whether or not A.F.R.C.D. 32 was in fact published on 21 September 1979. This is the whole crux of the matter. The witness testified that he saw these two dates for the first time when he received the proof on 28 September 1979 from the Attorney-General’s Office. He, however, gave instructions for the printing of the proof as corrected by the Attorney-General’s Office. The proof according to this witness actually went to the machine section on 1 October 1979 and the printing was done on 2 October 1979. After this they were sent to the binding section and were put in bundles. As soon as the job was completed the work was sent to the despatch section and the date of despatch from the despatch section insofar as A.F.R.C.D. 32 was concerned was 19 October 1979. The testimony of the witness is that a member of the public could only have a copy of any such document after it had been published in the Ghana Gazette. The evidence of this witness is very revealing when he set out to give explanation to certain letters and figures that appear at the foot of A.F.R.C.D. 32, namely GPC/ A719/4920/9/79. I think it is appropriate at this stage to quote his evidence verbatim. He said:

“‘GPC’ means Ghana Publishing Corporation ‘A’ stands for Assembly Press; ‘719’ is the job number-work instruction order; number ‘4920’—stands for the quantity actually printed ‘9’ stands for the month in which the order was received before the process for printing started; ‘79’ stands for the year.”

It is abundantly clear from the evidence of the witness that the request to print A.F.R.C.D. 32 was made on 20 September 1979 and the proof was sent to the Attorney-General’s Office on 26 September 1979 for approval. The proof was returned with the additions or corrections on 28 September 1979, and the printing was done on 2 October 1979. By the time the proof of the A.F.R.C.D. 32 even went to the Attorney-General’s Office on 26 September 1979 for approval, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had

[p.289] of [1981] GLR 283 left the scene and handed over the administration of the country to the present government on 24 September 1979 when the Constitution, l979, came into force.

Let me also consider Gazette No. 44 of 21 September 1979. In this connexion the witness, Mr. Quansah, testified that instructions for the printing of the gazette were given on 1 October 1979 and the printing was completed on 11 October 1979. It was sent for storage and sale to customers on 19 October 1979. These dates appear on the work instruction sheet, exhibit B. The code number at the back of the Gazette No. 44 is “GPC/A777/4,700/10/79,” and the witness further testified that, “the Gazette should accompany A.F.R.C.D. 32. In other words, if the gazette is not ready for sale, the Decree would not be sold to the public.” Under cross-examination the witness said “there is a distinction between printing and publishing.”

It must be appreciated that statements in a public document like an Act of Parliament (or a Decree) or gazette are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 17, p. 111, para. 151; see also R. v. Green (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 548, where Denman C.J. said, “I agree that the mention of a body corporate in connection with Gateshead in schedule A of Statute 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, makes prima facie case.” The statute to which reference was made was an “Act to make regulations for Municipal Corporations.” Indeed a provision in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, has by its express, clear and lucid wording, settled the matter of rebuttal as regards printing and publishing such document, and put it beyond all shadow of doubt. The perspicuity of section 3 (11) of the said Proclamation provides:

“3. (11) Any document purporting to have been printed or published by the Government Printer and purporting to be a decree of the Revolutionary Council (including this Proclamation) duly made in accordance with the provisions of this Proclamation shall be prima facie evidence of the due making thereof.”

It follows as a matter of course therefore that the existence of A.F.R.C.D. 32 affords a prima facie evidence only. In other words, the date of publication of A.F.R.C.D. 32 in Gazette No. 44 purported to be 21 September 1979 is prima facie evidence only and such evidence is rebuttable. Indeed A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published in Gazette No. 44 but from the evidence on record Gazette No. 44 was printed in October 1979 and also published in October 1979. This is also borne out by reference to the code number at the back of Gazette No. 44 itself. It is eminently clear therefore that Gazette No. 44

[p.290] of [1981] GLR 283 was never printed in the month of September 1979, let alone published on 21 September 1979. By deductive reasoning A.F.R.C.D. 32 which appeared in Gazette No. 44 was not published on 21 September 1979 or in the month of September 1979 at all. The evidence on record shows without a shadow of doubt that both A.F.R.C.D. 32 and Gazette No. 44 were printed and published in October 1979. Thus the publication of A.F.R.C.D. 32 in Gazette No. 44 as having taken place on 21 September 1979 (which is rebuttable) has successfully been rebutted by the evidence of the sole witness in this case, together with the exhibits he tendered, notably exhibits B, C and D, and also by reference to the code number at the back of Gazette No. 44.

The applicant tendered through the witness, exhibit I which is Ghana Gazette No. 45 of 22 September 1979. I must confess that I am at a loss to appreciate the real purpose for the tendering of this exhibit I except perhaps to show when it was published which on the face of it, it could be said that it was published on 22 September 1979 but at the foot of the exhibit I appear the following letters and figures: GPC/A780/4,700/10/79. The testimony of the witness in regard to exhibit I, which came out in cross-examination by Miss Ayisi, is as follows:

“We followed the same procedure in printing Gazette No. 45 as we did Gazette No. 44. At the back of exhibit I, there are some references—GPC/A780/4,700/10/79.

Q. Does this mean that it was actually printed in October 1979?

A. It was printed in October but I have not got the sheet. But on the face of it it would be in October 1979. We received the order in October.”

This evidence is very revealing indeed. It is clear therefore that Gazette No. 45 was printed in October 1979 and therefore it could not have been published on 22 September 1979, that is, before 24 September 1979 when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council handed over the governance of the country to the present civilian administration. Exhibit I could only at best have come into force on a date in October 1979. Indeed the code number—GPC/A780/4,700/10/79—at the foot of exhibit I clearly demonstrates that the order to print Gazette No. 45 was received by the Ghana Publishing Corporation in October 1979, and the earliest date of publication would have been in October 1979.

The evidence of Mr. Quansah could not seriously be challenged; indeed there is no evidence of rebuttal from the applicant. On the evidence, I find that the irresistible conclusion that can be reached

[p.291] of [1981] GLR 283 is that both A.F.R.C.D. 32 and Ghana Gazette No. 44 were printed in October 1979. If consideration is also given to the fact that the approval of A.F.R.C.D. 32 was given on 28 September 1979 by the officers of the Attorney-General’s Office then the additions in the proof made to the effect that the said Decree was “made on 8 September 1979” and that the gazette notification of the Decree was on 21 September 1979 must certainly be false to the knowledge of the officers who made the insertions. This certainly is not a salutary remark on that office. It must never happen again. No blame, however, can be attached to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council who depended on the legal experts of the Attorney-General’s Office.

What legal consequences flow from these findings? Section 3 (7) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, stipulated, “A decree made by Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of the publication of that decree in the Gazette.”

A Gazette must be printed before it can be published. A Decree must also be printed before it can be published in a Gazette. The reverse is an obvious impossibility. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that both A.F.R.C.D. 32 and Gazette No. 44 were printed in October 1979 and it follows as a matter of course and of commonsense that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published at the earliest opportunity in October 1979 when Gazette No. 44 was also printed and published. Again section 18 (2) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979 states, “Upon the coming into force of this Constitution the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979 shall cease to have effect.” The Constitution came into force on 24 September 1979 and therefore A.F.R.C.D. 32 which was published in Gazette No. 44 which was itself printed and published in October 1979 could not have been the handiwork of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council who left the scene before the two documents came into existence in October 1979. In plain language A.F.R.C.D. 32 does not in the eyes of the law exist. and its contents can only be described as brutum fulmen. Consequently what it sought to do—the repeal of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238), is now a wild-goose chase, and S.M.C.D. 238 is in full force and of legal validity.

As a result the application of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani, the applicant herein, fails and it is dismissed and the appeal of Mahamadu Abudulai, respondent herein, is still pending in this court.

I wish finally to state that with the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, a litigation of the sort now dealt with, will not see the court-room, and thus save parties unnecessary monetary

[p.292] of [1981] GLR 283 expenditure. The question of enacting legislation to give a right of appeal to an aggrieved person in a commission of inquiry and subsequently attempting to take away that right by another legislation will not arise, for article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, states in no uncertain terms, the right of appeal reserved to an aggrieved person against whom adverse findings have been made by a commission of inquiry. This provision in the Constitution, I must say, without any reservations whatsoever, is salutary and commendable, and it is an embodiment of the notions of justice that Ghanaians have in times past been crying to have. But Ghanaians must be on their guard to fight against unjustified encroachment in this regard since legal sophistry or the ingenuity of man is always looking for new areas to conquer, and Sophocles had something like this in mind when he opined in his Antigone that “marvels are many but man is the greatest.”

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.

I have read the judgment just read by my brother Edusei J.A. and I agree with both his conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion, but I intend to add some observations on two matters touched on by counsel in their submissions.

The first was by Miss Ayisi, counsel for the applicant. She referred the court to the provisions of section 15 (2) of the First Schedule of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. She did not say so in many words but I understood her to say that by virtue of that section the court was debarred from embarking on an inquiry into the circumstances under which A.F.R.C.D. 32 came to be made.

I have no doubt that the main purpose for enshrining section 15 (2) above in the Constitution was to ensure stability but it has become clear that this objective is being negated by the way the courts are frequently being invited to gloss over even apparent injustices under the cloak of this so-called ouster clause, i.e. section 15 (2). (For the extent and scope of section 15 (2): see Darkwa v. The Republic [1931] G.L.R. 241, C.A.

The main objective of the judiciary is to dispense justice in accordance with the judicial oath taken by judges. Where therefore, there exist excesses in some acts of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the courts in the name of the provisions of section 15 (2) (supra) choose to close their eyes to any such excesses by giving their blessing to them contrary to the judicial oath taken by judges to administer justice without fear or favour, instability becomes the obvious result.

[p.293] of [1981] GLR 283

Section 3 (11) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, provides:

“3. (11) Any document purporting to have been printed or published by the Government Printer and purporting to be a decree of the Revolutionary Council (including this Proclamation) duly made in accordance with the provisions of this Proclamation shall be prima facie evidence of the due making thereof.”

The document, A.F.R.C.D. 32, as has been rightly pointed out in the judgment just read by my brother Edusei J.A. is prima facie evidence of the due making thereof: see Ababio v. Tutu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 489, S.C. This having been rebutted by evidence and on consideration of the fact that under section 18 of the First Schedule of the transitional provisions, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation 1979, ceased to exist by the 24 September 1979, saving such laws as were in force immediately on the coming into force of the Constitution, which arc not inconsistent with a provision thereof, any strict adherence to the provisions of sections 15 (2) and 16 of the First Schedule of the transitional provisions of the Constitution will make nonsense of the administration of justice in this country. It is my considered view that the two sections above should be read in such a manner as to give consistent meaning to at least the other sections of the transitional provisions, if not the Constitution as a whole.

Since A.F.R.C.D. 32 has been found to have been published after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had left the scene and that the date it purported to have been made has on the available and unchallenged evidence been proved to be false, its publication offends section 18 of the First Schedule to the transitional provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of which brought the Proclamation under which it was enacted to an end on 23 September 1979. The same therefore ought to be struck down as being void.

No institution under the Constitution (after 23 September 1979) had power to authorise the publication of that Decree. The evidence shows that authority for the publication of A.F.R.C.D. 32 was given on the 28 September 1979 by the Attorney-General’s Office. The purported exercise of that power by the Attorney-General’s Office to authorise the publication of the A.F.R.C.D. 32 is therefore void not only for want of authority but also the power of Parliament as the legislative body under the Constitution was usurped. And by causing the date to be back-dated, article 98 (1) (b) of the

[p.294] of [1981] GLR 283 Constitution was violated. Like my brother, Edusei J.A. I have also come to the conclusion that S.M.C.D. 238 is of full force and that the application fails and is accordingly dismissed.

The second matter I would like to touch on is based on the assumption that the view I have expressed above on the validity of A.F.R.C.D. 32 is wrong. In that event can it be said that the right of appeal conferred by S.M.C.D. 238 is “a cause of action” within the language of A.F.R.C.D. 32 so as to be affected by its provisions? “Cause of action” has not been defined in A.F.R.C.D. 32. In Sanders’ Words and Phrases Legally Defined (2nd ed.) at p. 227 “cause of action” is defined to mean all those things necessary to give a right of action whether they are to be done by the plaintiff or a third person: see Hernaman v. Smith (1855) 10 Exch. 659 per Parke at p. 666. “Cause of action” has also been held to mean “every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed . . . every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse”: see Cooke v. Gill (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 107 per Brett J. at p. 116. Thus the phrase “cause of action” as used in A.F.R.C.D. 32 by its ordinary legal acceptation does not include an appeal: see Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1976] 2 G.L.R. 5 at pp. 9 and 10, C.A.

It is therefore clear from the ordinary legal meaning of the phrase “cause of action” that the repeal envisaged under A.F.R.C.D. 32 did not affect the right of appeal conferred under S.M.C.D. 238. The respondent’s right of appeal under it therefore remains unaffected and the applicant’s attempt to attack its validity under the provisions of A.F.R.C.D. 32 fails on this ground also.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. F. L.

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