RAMIA vs. RAMIA [1981] GLR 275
14 April 1981 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 13 min read
[1981] SLR (CA) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Shephard v. Cartwright [1955] A.C. 431; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 967; [1954] 3 All E.R. 649; 98 S.J. 868, H.L.; reversing sub nom Shephard, Re, Shephard v. Cartwright [1953] Ch. 728; [1953] 3 W.L.R.
378; [1953] 2 All E.R. 608; 97 S.J. 524, C.A. reversing [1953] 1 W.L.R. 460; [1953] 1 All E.R.
569; 97 S.J. 151.
(2) Kwantreng v. Amassah [1962] 1 G.L.R. 241, S.C.
(3) Paradise Motor Co., Ltd., In re [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1125; [1968] 2 All E.R. 625; 112 S.J. 271, C.A.
(4) Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 255; [1970] 2 All E.R. 780; 114 S.J. 550; 21 P. & C.R. 702, H.L.; reversing [1969] 2 Ch. 85; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 525; [1969] 1 All E.R. 1043; 113 S.J. 187; 20 P. & C.R. 276, C.A.
(5) Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966; [1969] 2 All E.R. 385; 113 S.J. 344; 20 P.
& C.R. 991, H.L. reversing [1968] 1 W.L.R. 443; [1968] 1 All E.R. 1053; 112 S.J. 111; 19 P. & C.R. 245, C.A.
(6) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.
(7) Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1964] P. 233; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 271; [1962] 3 All E.R. 1108, D.C.
(8) Taylor, In re; Taylor v. Taylor [1961] 1 W.L.R. 9; 105 S.J, 37; [1961] 1 All E.R. 55; 111 L.J. 150, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by a husband against the refusal of the trial court to, inter alia, order the wife to convey a house to him. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.
COUNSEL
M. Atadika (with him Mawuko) for the appellant.
Thompson for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
The appellant is a foreigner resident in Ghana. In April 1958 he abandoned his Christian faith to embrace the Moslem religion. This was the price he had to pay to win his wife, the respondent. The marriage was celebrated in accordance with the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance, Cap. 129 (1951 Rev.), and registered on 25 April 1958. There had before then been three early years of cohabitation under the umbrella of a customary union.
This brief account of the marital history of the parties assumes some significance later in this judgment and it is recapitulated to dispose of a submission that the parties were not legally married. It is enough, however, to say for the present, that the parties admit these facts in their pleadings and in their testimony in the court below.
Turning again to the facts, long before this action was brought, the period of conjugal bliss had run its course. A number of incidents which are not relevant to a decision in this matter, had soured relationships to the extent that the respondent had evinced a clear dislike for sharing the matrimonial roof with the appellant. While
[p.278] of [1981] GLR 275 the honeymoon lasted, however, the appellant bought various properties in the name of the respondent. He confessed he was then deeply in love with her and wished to provide for her security. Some of these properties were sold with the respondent’s consent and new ones acquired still in her name. A house numbered EI.16/2, Kojo Thompson Road, Accra, and christened “Ramia House” was one such acquisition held in the name of the respondent. Its disposition has provoked the maelstrom of this case, turning all other issues into trivial.
The appellant acquired a lease of the land on which he developed a five storey building in 1964 and spent ¢125,000 on it. It is conceded that the respondent did not contribute a pesewa. The appellant claims he retained the beneficial interest of the estate in the property and the wife only held the bare legal estate in trust for him. The respondent on the other hand maintains that the appellant divested himself of any beneficial interest in the property and made an outright gift of the property to herself and her children. She urges the application of the presumption of advancement in support of the gift. Clearly she and her children are in a class that can claim the benefit of this presumptive rule provided an intention to benefit her can be discerned from the contemporaneous circumstances and further, if no matters in rebuttal exist. As to matters in rebuttal, unless there is evidence contemporaneous with the acquisition, casting doubt that the beneficial ownership in the property was being conveyed to the respondent, an attempt to rebut the presumption can hardly have any prospects of success. The contemporaneous nature of the evidence required is well illustrated by cases like Shephard v. Cartwright [1955] A.C. 431, H.L. and Kwantreng v. Amassah [1962] 1 G.L.R. 241, S.C.
On the issue of establishing a gift by way of advancement the law is quite clear: If the facts are consistent with a presumption of advancement, “the onus is on those who dispute the gift, while if there is no presumption of advancement, there is primarily a resulting trust in favour of the person who paid the money, which has to be rebutted by effective evidence”: see In re Paradise Motor Co., Ltd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1125 per Danckwerts L.J. at p. 1139, C.A.
Sometimes the loose relationship between husband and wife which takes neither future difficulties nor the mutability of human emotions into account, may present problems to the courts in arriving at a fair decision as to the spouses respective proprietary interests. As Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said in Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886, at pp. 897-898, H.L.:
“When questions arise between spouses or between former spouses or in relation to the affairs of one or another of them
[p.279] of [1981] GLR 275 concerning the beneficial ownership of property the task of a court will often be one of much difficulty. But this should not be because the principles of law are in any way obscure or in doubt. It will be because in the nature of things the evidence will often not be specific and precise.”
No unsurmountable problems beset us in the ascertainment of intention in this case because the path to a decision is indeed floodlit by clear evidence. What is the evidence? The following passages are culled from the appellant’s own testimony:
“I willingly took the assignment in the name of the defendant (respondent). She did not trick me into doing that. I did that voluntarily; without any reservations. It was not a gift at all. I had been unwell. I had vomited blood at the harbour and in my house in Accra. I also had ulcer. That was why I took the assignment in her name, so that in case I died she could take it with her children…
I put it in her name in case I die she takes it for herself and the children. Now that she has deserted me and the children I am taking the house back…
There is nothing stopping me from holding property in my own name. I put all my properties and businesses in the defendant’s name as security for her when I die, but as long as I am alive I am security for her. I know about wills. But I did not make a will because wills engender troubles when the testator dies, while if the properties are already in the name of my wife when I die, there will be no trouble…
As long as I am alive I am security for the defendant but if I die these properties I have put in her name will be her security.”
The best construction to be put on these passages is that an intention to benefit the wife and children existed but it is qualified to the extent that it was made in fear of an imminent danger of departing this life. It must be noted, however, that no serious argument on a donatio mortis causa has been raised before us to test its viability. The respondent, however, states that she was left in no illusion that the appellant intended to benefit her and her children without any reservations or qualifications whatsoever. In fact, the appellant’s wish to recall the gift on the allegation that the respondent had deserted him, fully supports the respondent’s view of the matter.
I do not see how an expressed desire to provide for one’s dependants loses its force merely because it is coloured by thoughts of imminent death. In my view it only emphasises the intention to benefit them and makes its accomplishment more urgent. If death
[p.280] of [1981] GLR 275 had followed it would not have detracted from the gift. In this case, as I have observed before, no donatio mortis causa has been seriously urged and no form of revocation seems either to exist or to have been exercised. Again no attempt was ever made by the appellant when his health was restored to seek a reconveyance of the legal estate to himself.
On the evidence, there was a clear intention to benefit the respondent and her children, and no matters in rebuttal to demonstrate the existence of a resulting, implied or constructive trust, in the appellant’s favour have been established.
It was seriously urged that the doctrine of advancement as between husband and wife has been eroded by a number of authoritative decisions of the English courts. In those cases the presumption is said “largely (to have) lost (its) force under present conditions” see Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777, H.L. In that case sympathy was also expressed at pp. 793, 811 and 824, H.L. for the view that unjust consequences might follow the application of presumptions which were developed in a social climate which has little in common with the widely accepted view that marriage is really a partnership of equals. True, the importance of the doctrine of advancement has been whittled down to levels bordering on obsolescence because of the changing evolution in the status of women. The modern English lady has shed the disabilities of her Victorian ancestress, and the postulates of equality require the same treatment for either spouse. But though in-roads have been made in the doctrine, it has not been totally eroded and its application is by cold legal reasoning on particular facts than by any emotional route. As I understand it, then, the law is that if a clear expression of a gift to the wife is established, the presumption of advancement will prevail. But if despite the fact that the legal estate has been conveyed to the wife, there are clear expressions to negative an intention to benefit her on the one hand or there exist positive facts to demonstrate a retention of the beneficial interest in the purchaser, on the other, the presumption will be rebutted. Applying this synthesis to the present case, I am in no doubt that the conveyance to the wife with the expressed intention of benefiting her and her children made a gift clearly manifest.
Mr. Atadika’s brave essay at rebutting the presumption must now be considered. He urged for serious examination of the appellant’s exclusive control of “Ramia House.” This he said, displaced any intention of making a gift of it to his wife. In support of this contention, he listed the following circumstances:
[p.281] of [1981] GLR 275
“(a) The appellant’s act of mortgaging the building and depositing the title deed with the bank.
(b) His previous retention of the title deeds in his safe.
(c) His use of the property as security for a certain company.
(d) His collection and use of rents from tenants he had placed in the premises himself, without let or hindrance from the respondent.
(e) His payment of all property rates and his settlement of all but minor bills in relation to “Ramia House.”
To prop his stand, Mr. Atadika places reliance on the local cause celebre, Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A. Factually, there is dispute about the exclusiveness of the control the appellant exercised in respect of “Ramia House.” The parties operated a joint account. Rents from “Ramia House” were paid into this account. The fact that the respondent did not feel the need to draw from the account does not detract from her authority to do so. For all dealings in respect of this property, including ejectment of tenants the respondent’s consent was sought. Even when other properties in her name were being sold, this could only be effected on the understanding that other property would be purchased in replacement. The safe seems to have been a matrimonial safe in joint use, for in it was, kept the marriage lines of the respondent. Even if the facts were not disputed, in the context of our local circumstances, a husband’s control of a wife’s property, to enable his expertise to be exercised in the matrimonial interest, is not unknown and does not detract from a gift.
I do not think the appellant can derive much assistance from Ussher v. Darko (supra). That case emphasises that the principle of advancement cannot be extended beyond recognised limits. Thus a paramour cannot take advantage of it whereas a wife can. In Ussher v. Darko there was no explicit declaration by the purchaser to benefit the alleged donee. In the instant case, as we have shown above, the appellant’s overflowing love was demonstrated in his desire to benefit the respondent. The two cases are poles apart. In short, whereas the resulting trust in the purchaser was not displaced in Ussher v. Darko and the doctrine of advancement could not be validly pressed into service, the contrary is the case in the present appeal, where a prima facie presumption was buttressed by plain words indicating an intention to make a gift.
As a final fling, counsel for the appellant has urged that there was no subsisting marriage between the parties to enable the respondent to invoke the doctrine of advancement. His argument that the marriage was not registered within a week of its celebration
[p.282] of [1981] GLR 275 and therefore offended the Mohammedans Marriage Ordinance, is not supported by any material on record. I think exhibit A, the marriage certificate, sets the matter at rest. It shows conclusively that the registration was on the same day the marriage was celebrated. The appellant faces two hurdles: the presumption of validity, and the presumption of legality. It has often been said that the presumption of the legality of a marriage is so strong that it can only be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable doubt: see Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1962] 3 All E.R. 1108, D.C. and In re Taylor; Taylor v. Taylor [1961] 1 All E.R. 55, C.A. Nothing has been advanced to establish the contrary. The parties are ad idem on this. The appellant still calls the respondent his wife even though they are estranged. In my view the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance Cap. 129 was not breached, and the presumption of advancement cannot be defeated on that score.
In conclusion, I must observe that nothing has been urged to fault the reasoning or final conclusion of the learned judge in the court below who dealt in great detail with all the matters raised in this case.
In the event, the appeal fails and it is dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
The judgment of my brother Francois J.A. has ably dealt with all the main arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, and I share his conclusion that the appeal be dismissed as, in my view, it is completely devoid of any merit.
The equitable doctrine of advancement is so well-entrenched in our legal system that it requires evidence of the actual intention of the donor that a gift was never intended to rebut it and there was none in this case.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
I also agree with the judgment so ably written and read by the president of the court. I, however, wish to add an observation to dispel the notion held by learned counsel for the appellant that the doctrine of advancement can only be invoked under a monogamous marriage.
The doctrine of advancement (as pointed out by Edusei J.A. in his short concurring view just read) is so well-entrenched in our legal system that any attempt to limit its application exclusively to monogamous marriages at so late a stage, a move which tends to make nonsense of its recognition by our courts which thrive in a society essentially polygamous, should be strongly resisted as being untenable.
[p.283] of [1981] GLR 275
The doctrine as I understand it, is equitable, based not on the type of marriage contracted by the parties but on recognised legal relationship which exists between the person providing the money in acquiring the property and the one in whose name the property is taken. In the instant case, between husband and wife whether married customarily, under the Ordinance or otherwise, it is such relationship which forms the essential basis of the doctrine and not the type of marriage as was urged on us by counsel. I would therefore on the established facts of this case hold the subsisting customary marriage between the parties as a justifiable relationship to uphold the decision appealed from.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
