SARPONG vs. THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 790
11 December 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 17 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 16Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283.
(2) Atinga Frafra v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 85.
(3) Marhaba v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 90.
(4) State v. Sowah and Essel [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. 11) 743.
(5) R v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.
(6) Agyeman v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 681, S.C.
(7) Amartey v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 256, S.C.
(8) Arthur v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 316, S.C.
(9) Rabbles v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 580, S.C.
(10) Atiemo v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 G.L.R. 117, S.C.
(11) Atsu v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 716, C.A.
(12) Osei v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 383, C.A.
(13) Commissioner of Police v. Kwashie (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 319.
(14) State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C.
(15) Kwashie v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 488, C.A.
(16) Moshie v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 287, C.A.
(17) Armah v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 136, S.C.
(18) R v. Abbott [1955] 39 Cr.App.R. 141, C.C.A.; [1955] 2 All E.R. 899; [1955] 2 Q.B. 497; [1955] 3 W.L.R. 369; 119 J.P. 526; 99 S.J. 544, C.C.A.
[p.793] of [1981] GLR 790 (19) Ampadu v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 71.
(20) Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] A.C. 462; 104 L.J.K.B 433; 153 L.T. 232;
51 T.L.R. 446; 79 S.J. 401; 25 Cr.App.R. 72, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction and sentence by a circuit court on a charge of fraud by false pretences. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
B. Lumor for the appellant.
Ahlijah, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
This is an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Emmanuel Victor Sarpong, on 30 September 1980, to a term of four years’ imprisonment by the Circuit Court, Sekondi, on a charge of fraud by false pretences, contrary to section 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).
The following are the original and additional grounds of appeal respectively filed and argued in the matter:
“(a) That the judgment was erroneous in law.
(b) That from all the evidence adduced at the trial and particularly with reference to exhibit C, the trial judge should have held that the transaction between the first prosecution witness and the appellant was one of legitimate business.
Additional grounds of appeal (1) The learned circuit judge erred in finding the accused person guilty before he opened his defence.
(2) The learned trial judge erred in that he failed properly to consider the defence of the accused.
(3) The learned trial judge erred in law when he convicted the accused person even though the prosecution failed to call relevant and material witnesses.
(4) The learned trial judge misapplied the cases referred to at the trial.”
The main submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant are that the holding made by the trial judge at the close of the prosecution’s case and before the appellant was heard that the appellant knew that the representation he was alleged to have made was false to his knowledge, was wrong in law. Counsel cited Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283, and submitted that all that the trial judge ought to
[p.794] of [1981] GLR 790 have said was that a prima facie case had been made out and no more. The court ought to have waited until the appellant had been heard. Counsel also submitted that by so holding at the close of the case for prosecution and before the appellant had been heard, the trial judge disenabled himself from later considering the defence. Counsel cited in support Atinga Frafra v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 85 and Marhaba v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 90 to the effect that where essential procedure is infringed, conviction following therefrom may be quashed. Counsel submitted further citing State v. Sowah and Essel [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 743 that to say at the close of prosecution’s case that the trial judge was convinced of the guilt of the appellant before he was heard, was wrong in law. Counsel also submitted that the falsity of the alleged statement made by the appellant must be proved before conviction and condemnation.
Learned counsel submitted further that the trial judge failed to hear a material witness and therefore the conviction was bad. He cited R v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A. and Agyeman v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 681, S.C. On this point, counsel submitted that the General Manager of Allied Chemicals mentioned ought to have been called by the prosecution to say whether or not he was the appellant’s friend or that he had, in fact, promised to give the appellant some roofing iron sheets.
Counsel also referred to exhibit C in the record of proceedings and submitted that the trial court failed to consider properly or at all, the defence offered by the appellant, because exhibit C talks about goods, not roofing iron sheets; the court also failed to consider the effect or purpose of exhibit C as being a promise to do something in the future.
Counsel submitted further that even if the defence was not believed, it ought to have been considered to be reasonably probable. He cited Amartey v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 256, S.C. The appellant must have made a statement of an existing fact but here there was no evidence that the appellant did make any such statement citing Arthur v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 316, S.C. and Rabbles v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 580, S.C. Counsel submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was woefully inadequate and the conviction based on it is bad and ought to be quashed.
In his reply, learned counsel for the Republic, Mr. Ahlijah, Chief State Attorney, argued forcefully that the findings made by the trial court must not be disturbed on appeal if supported by the evidence. He cited Atiemo v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 G.L.R. 117, S.C. and Atsu v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 716 at p. 721, C.A. If the evidence as a whole justifies the conviction, the same
[p.795] of [1981] GLR 790 must not be interfered with citing also Osei v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 383 at p. 392, C.A.
The learned Chief State Attorney, referring to the judgment of the trial court, submitted that the trial judge did give adequate consideration to the appellant’s case, and did prefer the prosecution’s case to that of the appellant, and could therefore convict as in the case of Commissioner of Police v. Kwashie (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 319 where the appellant was convicted on the evidence of a single witness.
On the question of submission of no case, learned counsel for the Republic was of the view that the learned trial judge holding, as he did, that, “From the circumstances, I hold that the accused knew that the representation he made was false to his knowledge and it was with intent to defraud,” did not amount to finding him guilty, since he did not say he was satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt, as in Sowah’s case (supra) but went further to say that a prima facie case had been established and thereupon called upon the appellant to enter into his defence. Counsel concedes, however, that before an accused person is called upon at the close of the prosecution’s case to open his defence, the prosecution must have established beyond all reasonable doubt the charge laid against the accused. He cited State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, at p. 148, S.C.
Learned counsel submitted further that there was no question of a material witness in this case since the appellant himself did not admit anywhere that the said general manager was his friend. The fifth prosecution witness was called from Allied Chemicals Ltd. and yet no question was put to him to show that the appellant was the general manager’s friend. Counsel also submitted that the appellant, being a civil servant, was precluded from engaging himself as a trader under section 26 (e) of the Civil Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 5).
Counsel urged further on appeal against sentence that the position of the law in practice is (as stated in Kwashie v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 488, C.A.) that the official position of the appellant must be taken into consideration. In his view, a heavier sentence, an exemplary one, should have been meted out; so the sentence of four years should not be disturbed.
It seems to me that the first ground of the additional grounds of appeal filed on 14 May 1981 and argued by both learned counsel in this appeal raises a fundamental principle of law which must be settled in line with the decided cases which I have read on the issues raised. This ground reads, “The learned circuit judge erred in finding the accused person guilty before he opened his defence.” It is
[p.796] of [1981] GLR 790 clear from the record of proceedings that the learned judge did not, in fact, state that he had found the appellant guilty at the close of the prosecution’s case, and after submission of no case to answer, but rather made certain fundamental and crucial findings of fact before he heard the appellant on his defence. It appears those findings meant a total acceptance of the case presented by the prosecution even at that stage, and it is here that the appellant complains that the trial judge erred in law. It seems to me that the trial judge would have erred in law if upon careful examination of the evidence thus far, it turns out that an ingredient or some ingredients of the charge laid, had not been established. This would be an error in law since the law enjoined the trial judge that if at the close of the prosecution’s case no sufficient evidence has been adduced to prove beyond all reasonable doubt, the charge laid against the accused, the court must hold that no prima facie case has been made out and that the accused is entitled to be acquitted and discharged forthwith. It would be wrong in law for the trial court to ignore this legal duty and instead call upon the accused to enter into his defence.
The following, inter alia, are the relevant findings made by the learned trial judge:
“There is nothing to show that he discussed the supply of roofing iron sheets with the general manager. In my view, the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established that the accused made a representation of existing fact to the complainant that the general manager wanted to provide him with roofing iron sheets. The complainant believed and relied on this representation and gave the money to the accused. The accused was never told that he was to get roofing iron sheets by the general manager for he only negotiated on behalf of the Sekondi-Takoradi City Council to get buckets for that council. From the circumstances, I hold that the accused knew that the representation he made was false to his knowledge and it was made with intent to defraud.”
It is clear here that the general manager himself was never called by the prosecution. Instead, Joseph Ackah Baidoo, working as an accountant with Allied Chemicals Ltd., Takoradi, was called as the fifth prosecution witness and it appears those findings were based mainly on what the fifth prosecution witness told the court. The appellant complains that this was not enough and the general manager himself ought to have been called.
[p.797] of [1981] GLR 790
Now the charge against the appellant read as follows:
“Defrauding by false pretences, contrary to section 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).
Particulars of offence Emmanuel Victor Sarpong, senior health officer, for that you during the month of March 1979, in Sekondi in the Western Circuit, did defraud by means of false pretence, to wit, by representing to one Nana Kwabena Obiri Yeboah that you could supply him with goods such as roofing iron sheets to the tune of ¢35,000 with the knowledge that such representation was false and made with intent to defraud one Nana Kwabena Obiri Yeboah obtained the consent of the said Nana Kwabena Obiri Yeboah to part with cash the sum of ¢35,000.”
Section 133 (1) of Act 29 gives the definition of and the provisions relating to a false pretence and it provides:
“133. (1) A false pretence is a representation of the existence of a state of facts made by a person, either with the knowledge that such representation is false or without the belief that it is true, and made with an intent to defraud.”
Now the prosecution’s case here, as the evidence goes, is that the accused did, on the day in question, go to see the General Manager of Allied Chemicals Ltd, at the factory and that when he came out of the latter’s office, he saw the complainant; he called the complainant outside and told him and here I quote:
“The accused said the general manager was his friend and that the general manager wanted to give him roofing iron sheets worth about ¢50,000. I told the accused that my mother needed some roofing iron sheets and I would go to tell her and that if she was interested I would come to his office to inform him. The accused then showed me his office situated at the top of the offices of the Magistrate Court Grade I, Takoradi. I went to my mother and informed her about what the accused had told me. My mother became interested to buy the roofing iron sheets. I believed what the accused told me. My mother gave me ¢40,000 and I went to pay ¢35,000 to the accused for the roofing iron sheets. That was 5 March 1979. The accused gave me a receipt for ¢35,000 in his handwriting . . .”
It is my view that to prove the falsity of the statement allegedly ascribed to the General Manager of Allied Chemicals Ltd., the proper person to testify would have been the general manager
[p.798] of [1981] GLR 790 himself, but unfortunately the prosecution failed to call him. Instead, they called the man who worked for Allied Chemicals Ltd. as an accountant, i.e. the fifth prosecution witness (Mr. Baidoo), and it appears he was called into the general manager’s office after the appellant had been into the general manager’s office earlier to see him, the general manager. Nobody was called to testify before the trial court as to what went on between the appellant and the general manager before the fifth prosecution witness was called in. Of course the fifth prosecution witness could not testify to that because he was not there. In his evidence he said:
“In this case the accused went to the general manager who called me. In the presence of the accused, the general manager instructed me to provide the buckets to the Sekondi-Takoradi City Council, payment of ¢702.00 to be made by the accused. This transaction was the first time I saw the accused . . .”
Now, is the possibility that the appellant and the general manager discussed the supply of ¢50,000 worth of roofing iron sheets to the appellant before the fifth prosecution witness was called in, ruled out? I think not, and it is my view that the two could have secretly discussed that apparent private transaction before the fifth prosecution witness was called in for the official one. The only person who could have put the matter beyond doubt was the general manager himself, but the prosecution here woefully failed to call him and that was certainly fatal to their case. It is my view that failure to call the general manager to say that he never told the appellant he wanted to supply him ¢50,000 worth of roofing iron sheets, amounts to failure to establish that the alleged representation was false to the appellant’s knowledge and that he made it with an intent to defraud. It seems to me therefore that since that vital piece of evidence was lacking at the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial judge was in duty bound to have held that no prima facie case had been established meriting a call upon the appellant to enter into his defence. Failure to do this, meant that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him so far, and thus misdirected himself as to what he was in law bound to do.
It is my view that the principle is what has been enunciated in Moshie v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 287 where the Court of Appeal held (as stated in the headnote at p. 288):
(1) It was a question of law for the trial judge whether or not ‘there is no evidence’ to establish that the accused had committed any offence known to our law. The duty to decide
[p.799] of [1981] GLR 790 the question was cast on the judge whether or not a submission of no case was made to him by the defence . . .
(2) In considering his duty under section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the judge should not leave a case to the jury if he was of the opinion that (a) there had been no evidence to prove an essential element in the crime, or (b) the evidence adduced by the prosecution had been so discredited as a result of cross-examination or (c) the evidence was so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable tribunal could safely convict upon it, or (d) the evidence was evenly balanced, that is to say, the evidence was susceptible to two likely explanations, one consistent with guilt, one with innocence. Where any of these elements was evident in the case for the prosecution the judge should charge the jury for acquittal and not leave the matter in such a case to the jury. Section 271 cast a positive duty on the trial judge to ensure that the accused was not deprived of his protection through either mistake or ignorance. In this case the failure of counsel for the defence to make a submission of no case could not absolve the learned trial judge of his responsibility under the section.”
It is my view that the same duty is cast on the trial judge under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), in a summary trial like the present case before this court on appeal. See also State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144 at p. 148 where the Supreme Court stated the principle so clearly by referring to their decision in Armah v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 136 at p. 141, where it was held:
“If at the close of the case for the prosecution counsel’s submissions are overruled on the ground that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused who is called upon to enter into his defence but refused to offer any defence he can be properly convicted upon the evidence given by the prosecution.”
The court further held at p. 149 in the Ali Kassena case with regard to section 173 of Act 30 as follows:
“Section 173 is concerned with summary trials where the judge decides both questions of law and fact. It is for the judge in a summary trial to weigh the evidence and then decide whether from the facts proved the guilt of the accused can be inferred. Evidence is said to be sufficient when it is of such probative force as to convince and which if uncontradicted will justify a conviction.”
[p.800] of [1981] GLR 790
And the English Court of Criminal Appeal also held in R v. Abbott (1955) 39 Cr.App.R. 141 (as stated in the headnote) that:
“. . . there being no evidence against the appellant at the close of the case for the prosecution, it was the duty of the judge to withdraw the case against him from the jury and that the conviction of the appellant must be quashed.”
See also Ampadu v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 71.
It is my view further that failure to call the general manager in this case amounted to failure to call a material witness and, that in itself alone, dealt a fatal blow to the whole of the prosecution’s case. For as has been settled in R v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.:
“In this case a material witness was available who, if he had been called by the prosecution, could have disposed of the case one way or another. The failure to call such a witness in such circumstances must mean that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.”
The prosecution in this case failed to call the General Manager of Allied Chemicals Ltd. to prove the falsity or otherwise of the statement of fact the appellant was alleged to have made and therefore that meant that at the close of their case, the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore the appellant was entitled to an acquittal.
It seems to me that if by the holding that the appellant knew that the representation he was alleged to have made was false to his knowledge, and that it was made with an intent to defraud, the trial judge must be understood to mean that he was satisfied of the guilt of the appellant, even at that stage, then again he erred. Because the judge could not have properly condemned the appellant before he heard him in his defence. That amounted to opening his mouth too wide and too early. The appellant was entitled to be heard before, and even though he carries no burden to prove his innocence, he could, in his evidence, cast a doubt, reasonable doubt, or give a piece of evidence which could be considered to be reasonably probable, even if it is not believed. In all such circumstances, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. Thus the Supreme Court in applying the English case of Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] A.C. 462, H.L., in State v. Sowah and Essel [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 743 held (as stated in the headnote at p. 744):
“. . . the expression ‘I was so satisfied before the accused gave evidence’ gives the impression that the learned trial judge prejudged the guilt of the accused before he heard him. It is
[p.801] of [1981] GLR 790 wrong to presume the guilt of the accused merely from the facts proved by the prosecution.”
It seems to me that by so holding, the learned trial judge failed to consider or did thereby disable himself from considering whatever defence the appellant was to offer or offered. This obviously amounted to a miscarriage of justice. For failure to consider the defence at all or adequately, amounts to failure to consider as required in law, as to whether or not the accused person’s story is true and it was also a failure to consider whether short of believing the story, it was reasonably probable.
It seems to me that on the whole, the learned trial judge fell into grave errors of law in this case, and that therefore the conviction and sentence of the appellant must not be allowed to stand for the reasons stated in this judgment. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is hereby quashed and the sentence set aside. The appellant is found not guilty and is acquitted and discharged.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. K. E. E.
