WILMOT vs. WILMOT [1981] GLR 521
13 February 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 7 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 17Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Wiredu v. Mim Timber Co., Ltd. [1963] 2 G.L.R. 167, S.C.
(2) Anang v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd., High Court, Tamale, 2 May 1967, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 98.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PETITION for divorce by a husband in the High Court, Sekondi, where in the respondent-wife who was resident in Accra, raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the court under Order 5, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1107).
COUNSEL
Sekyi Hughes for the applicant.
J. A. Dawson for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
In this civil proceeding, the petitioner-husband, Isaac Kweku Wilmot (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), a chief engineer attached to the Black Star Line and resident at Takoradi, seeks an order for the dissolution of the marriage between him and his wife, Aba Baffoe Wilmot (hereinafter referred to as the applicant), an Entomologist working at the Ministry of Health, also engaged in a part-time lecturership at the University of Ghana, Legon, and resident in Accra.
Counsel for the applicant, Mr. Sekyi Hughes, argued a motion which sought to question the propriety of the proceedings being instituted in the Sekondi Registry of the High Court instead of the Accra Registry and, ultimately, the jurisdiction of the High Court Sekondi. By the same motion, counsel requested this court to transfer the case to Accra for hearing and determination. It became readily apparent that counsel for the applicant based his application on what he conceived to be the proper interpretation of the provisions of Order 5, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A). The sole ground for the application
[p.524] of [1981] GLR 521
was that the applicant was residing and carrying on business in Accra. For the purposes of the rules of court, he treats the respondent as the plaintiff and the applicant as the defendant in any civil action. Needless to emphasise, Order 5, r. 1 should be read as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1107), and, when it is so read, it becomes crystal clear that short of the substitution of the words “Judicial Division” used in the old rule for the word “Region” the amendment substantially re-enacts the old rule. “Judicial Division” as used in the principal rules meant a judicial division of the Supreme Court established in 1876 and the word “Region” as used in the L.I. 1107, means any region in contemporary Ghana.
In its conceptual sense, the jurisdiction of every court has two major connotations of varying degrees of importance: Firstly, there is the jurisdiction of a court to try well-defined causes and matters. This is the court’s substantive jurisdiction. Secondly, there is the jurisdiction with regard to venue. This is its procedural jurisdiction. Order 5, r. 1 unambiguously comprehends both concepts. The rules regarding venue are obviously designed to achieve some measure of convenience in the administration of justice throughout the country. This is the policy rationale behind the elaborate criteria under Order 5, r. 1 for the institution of actions in the various registries in the regions. This arrangement is advantageous to both litigants and counsel as well as the judicial machinery. It is clear from the new Order 5, r. 1 particularly sub-rule (8) that, what appears to many people to be the High Court’s jurisdictional omnipotence, exists only under well-defined conditions. This is borne out by the fact that a vigilant defendant can incapacitate the High Court by a timeous objection to its jurisdiction with regard to venue. The High Court’s jurisdiction is venue-neutral only: (a) where upon a report by a court, the Chief Justice refuses to exercise his discretion to transfer a case to the appropriate venue, and (b) where an unwary defendant relaxes in his objection to the jurisdiction or in rare cases, where he submits to the jurisdiction. A case in point is Wiredu v. Mim Timber Co., Ltd. [1963] 2 G.L.R. 167, S.C. The parties never raised objection to the jurisdiction of the court throughout the trial. They were therefore precluded from challenging the jurisdiction of the court and the validity of the proceedings. A further searchlight thrown at case law on the point takes us to the decision of Annan J. (as he then was) in Anang v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd., High Court, Tamale, 2 May 1967, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 98 where the High Court, Tamale, refused an application to report the pendency of a case
[p.525] of [1981] GLR 521 commenced at the Tamale Registry to the Chief Justice in Accra, the latter being the proper place where the writ ought to have been issued. In delivering himself of the reasons for the refusal of the application, Annan J. took as his point of departure, a retrospective look at the judicial divisions which, in his view, had ceased to exist with the repeal in 1960, of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.). The learned judge stated, by necessary implication, that the demise of the judicial divisions meant that the provisions of Order 5, r. 1 had no longer any validity.
What is susceptible to criticism about the reasoning in the above case is that the learned judge overlooked the fact that even though on paper the old judicial divisions had been abolished, they existed de facto and that for all practical purposes, Order, 5 r. 1 was still applicable. Indeed, the Supreme Court did recognise this fact in 1963 in Wiredu v. Mim Timber Co., Ltd. (supra), at a time when judicial divisions under Cap. 4 were supposed to have been abolished. The decision in Anang v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. (supra), induced the learned author, Mr. E.D. Kom, to address himself at p. 2 of his small but invaluable book Civil Procedure in the High Court (1976 ed.) as follows:
“There are no longer judicial divisions that existed under the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4: see Anang v.
Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. (1967) C.C. 98, and a plaintiff can commence his action stricto sensu in any branch of the High Court in any region, …”
There is little doubt that it was for the purpose of avoidance of all doubts about the validity of Order 5, r. 1 that the Rules of Court Committee, in their wisdom, made the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977. Under the new Order 5, r. 1, the judicial divisions created under Cap. 4 continued their existence under a new nomenclature.
Now each region of Ghana constitutes a judicial division of the High Court of Justice. Order 5, r. 1 (8) of the L.I. 1107 re-enacts the old Order 5, r. 1 (e) which is crucial for this application. There are two conditions under which the jurisdiction of the court where an action has been wrongly commenced can be ousted: The first is where the judge reports the pendency of the action to the Chief Justice and the latter orders transfer. The second is where a defendant raises objection to the jurisdiction before or at the time he is required to plead. In the latter instance, there is no discretionary power vested in the High Court to exercise. Once the defendant raises the objection as required by law, the jurisdiction of the court
[p.526] of [1981] GLR 521
is ousted outright and it is not open to the judge to exercise any discretion to report the pendency of the action to the Chief Justice. This, in my view, has been our law, even after the repeal of Cap. 4.
In the case before me, counsel for the applicant has raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the court before the time for pleading. Counsel for the respondent appears to be aware of the right of a defendant to raise an objection in an appropriate case under the rules, but he resists the application by an argument that a matrimonial cause is not an action within the meaning of Order 5. r. 1. Counsel for the applicant does not share this view. My view happens to coincide with that held by the applicant’s counsel. Order 1. r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 defines an “action” as “a civil proceeding commenced by writ or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of court …” It also defines a “matrimonial cause” as “any action for divorce, judicial separation, nullity of marriage …” The logical conclusion is therefore that a matrimonial cause is an action within the meaning,, of Order 5, r. 1.
What then is the legal effect where, as in this case, an objection to the jurisdiction with regard to venue is upheld by the court? Again I take recourse to the case of Wiredu v. Mim Timber Co., Ltd. (supra). In that case, one of the questions that arose was whether a validated concession should be declared null and void because the proceedings had taken place before the wrong High Court. To this question, the Supreme Court of the First Republic answered that the proceedings could not be invalidated inasmuch as neither party to the proceedings raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. There is little doubt that the conclusion of the Supreme Court on the validity of the proceedings would have been different if there had been evidence of an early objection to the jurisdiction. This court is therefore constrained to decline jurisdiction as any purported hearing of the case would be a nullity. The proceedings shall be stayed pending the signification of the pleasure of the Chief Justice upon a report by this court praying for transfer of the suit. The applicant is awarded ¢500 cost.
DECISION
Objection to jurisdiction of writ upheld.
J.K.E.E.
