SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1981] SLR (HC) 19High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

AIDOO vs. AMISSAH [1982-83] GLR 989

26 February 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 19
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAAIDOO v AMISSAH [1982-83] GLR 989 [1981] SLR (HC) 19
APAAIDOO v AMISSAH [1982-83] GLR 989, [1981] SLR (HC) 19 (Ghana).
BluebookAIDOO v AMISSAH [1982-83] GLR 989, [1981] SLR (HC) 19 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Arghyrou v. Dapaah [1978] G.L.R. 236, C.A.

(2) Williams v. Fullerton (1961) 105 S.J. 280, C.A.

(3) Lang v. London Transport Executive [1959] 1 W.L.R. 1168; 124 J.P. 28; [1959] 3 All E.R. 609.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for damages for negligence in a road traffic accident. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Kojo Erskine for the plaintiff.

R.E. Gaisie for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

The plaintiff’s claim as indorsed on the writ of summons is as follows:

“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for ¢5,577.50 being special damages suffered by the plaintiff as cost of repairs on his taxi cab No. GJ 8187 which was damaged due to negligence of the defendant, and loss of profits for 64 days at ¢120 per day.”

Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim states:

“8. That the said mechanics finished repair works on the said taxi cab at the end of September and presented a bill of ¢5,577.50 less ¢1,900.

9. The plaintiff presented the bill to the defendant to pay, but the defendant failed to do so.” The plaintiff further claimed in paragraph 10 of his said statement of claim for loss of use the sum of ¢7,680 being loss for 64 days, excluding Sundays, at the rate of ¢120 a day.

The plaintiff amended his statement of claim by adding paragraph 11 in which he gave particulars of the special damages he claims. By this, having deducted the ¢1,900 paid by the defendant, he now claims under this head the balance of ¢3,677.50.

[p.991] of [1982-83] GLR 989 The defendant wholly denies liability and has counterclaimed against the plaintiff, the sum of ¢1,900 which he claims to have lent to the plaintiff only to enable the plaintiff to repair his vehicle after the plaintiff had approached him for financial assistance.

The evidence before this court is that the plaintiff was the owner-driver in charge of the taxi cab No. GJ 8187. The defendant was also the owner-driver in charge of the Bedford commercial vehicle No. AT 6178. On the day of the accident, that is 20 July 1979, the plaintiff was driving his said taxi cab along the old John Sarbah dual-carriage road from the Takoradi Market Circle towards the New Takoradi roundabout.

The defendant was also at the same time driving his said Bedford commercial vehicle from the opposite direction, i.e. from the New Takoradi roundabout towards the Takoradi Market Circle on the other side of the said dual-carriage road. According to the plaintiff, just when both vehicles were about to pass each other, the defendant suddenly attempted to turn left and cross the plaintiff’s lane on the other side and enter the Kumasi road which crosses the dual-carriage at that point. By so doing, the defendant’s vehicle ran into the left rear side of the plaintiff’s vehicle.

The plaintiff said the defendant did not give any indication that he was going to enter or cross the plaintiff’s side of the road. The defendant’s vehicle therefore pushed the plaintiff’s vehicle off its course, and off the road against a nearby stump of a tree. The plaintiff continued, “My vehicle turned left and ran across the road to the left side colliding there with an on-coming vehicle.”

The accident was reported to the police who went to the scene and took measurements. The plaintiff added that the defendant was moving with full speed at the time. He said, “The defendant never stopped at the entrance where he should have stopped before he crossed my side of the road. The defendant did not brake or do anything to avoid running into my vehicle.”

The plaintiff led further evidence that the defendant did admit, soon after the accident, that he was at fault and offered to repair the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendant did thereupon accompany the plaintiff, the very next day after the accident, to Kokompe, Takoradi, to see a fitter and a welder who offered to repair the plaintiff’s damaged taxi cab. The defendant there paid a deposit of ¢1,900 against the cost of the necessary repairs. The defendant, however, refused later to pay any further money and the plaintiff had to pay the balance and got his vehicle released to him after it had been repaired.

The plaintiff stated in his evidence that the vehicle remained at the workshop for 64 days while it was being repaired and he therefore claims ¢120 a day for loss of use. The plaintiff admitted that the 64 days included Sundays. That he used some of his earnings to buy outercovers, oil, grease and other necessary items.

[p.992] of [1982-83] GLR 989

The plaintiff called two witnesses, a welder-straightener and a fitter, being the two mechanics who repaired the plaintiff’s damaged taxi cab. Both witnesses are emphatic in their testimony that it was the defendant who bargained with each of them for the repair work on the plaintiff’s vehicle in the presence of the plaintiff himself. The defendant agreed to pay ¢2,400 to the welder-straightener, Kofi Boadi, for the necessary straightening and welding of the plaintiff’s damaged vehicle. In pursuance of that agreement, the defendant paid to Kofi Boadi, the first plaintiff witness, the sum of ¢1,900. The second plaintiff witness, Okyinaba, worked only on the back axle. He bargained directly with the defendant himself and charged ¢200 as workmanship which the defendant agreed to pay.

The defendant testified to the effect that it was the plaintiff’s car which rather ran into his Bedford vehicle. He admits, however, that the accident occurred at a junction. The following is what the defendant said, among other things. The defendant said that when he got to the neighbourhood centre junction, he had to branch to the left to go into the Kumasi road, by crossing the other side of the dual-carriage road along which the plaintiff’s vehicle was coming. He said he saw the plaintiff’s vehicle coming from the right heading towards the New Takoradi roundabout. He said:

“The plaintiff’s vehicle was in my estimation about 120 yards away. I therefore moved on to cross the road into the Kumasi road. After I had almost entered the Kumasi road, the plaintiff suddenly hit the right side of the bumper of my vehicle. I noticed that the plaintiff’s vehicle was moving with great speed…”

The defendant denies that he ever admitted that he was at fault or that he would be responsible for the cost of repairs on the plaintiff’s car. It was the plaintiff who approached him, the defendant, a day after the accident and pleaded for a loan to enable him effect repairs on his damaged vehicle. He agreed and offered the plaintiff a loan of ¢1,900.

When the defendant was cross-examined by counsel for the plaintiff he said, inter alia:

“It is true that when I attempted to cross the left side of the road I noticed the plaintiff’s vehicle coming. I noticed that he was moving with great speed.”

He added that he first sighted the plaintiff’s vehicle at a distance of 120 yards away, but when he started to cross the plaintiff’s side of the road, the plaintiff’s vehicle had come to only 60 yards from where the defendant was. He stopped at the junction for only about two seconds, before he moved to cross the road. The defendant denied the suggestion by counsel for the plaintiff that he, the defendant, misjudged the plaintiff’s speed and he therefore moved into the latter’s

[p.993] of [1982-83] GLR 989 lane without making sure that it was safe to do so. He admitted that he knew the plaintiff was on a major road and therefore had the right of way. The defendant stated:

“I maintain that the plaintiff’s vehicle grazed the front part of my vehicle and removed the bumper and ran off. It is correct that the front part of the plaintiff’s vehicle had passed and it was the back left door that hit my vehicle. It is correct that the plaintiff did not give me an I.O.U. for the ¢1,900.”

He admits he paid the ¢1,900 at Kokompe to one Korsah to be given to the plaintiff. The defendant admits he noticed that the plaintiff’s vehicle was badly damaged.

The evidence before me leaves me in not the slightest doubt that it was the defendant’s vehicle which ran into the left rear portion of the plaintiff’s passing vehicle. I find therefore that the defendant was obviously to blame because it is quite clear from the evidence that when he got to the junction and he turned left to cross the plaintiff’s lane of the dual-carriage to enter the Kumasi road, he failed to stop reasonably long enough so as to enable him make sure that it was safe to cross the road when there was another vehicle coming along it with “great speed.”

The defendant was here crossing a very busy main road in the centre of the city of Takoradi and he had a duty to stop and make sure (especially when there was another vehicle coming along that road towards him) that it was perfectly safe for him to cross; he had a duty to take every necessary precaution to avoid taking any rash action which was likely to endanger the lives and property of other users of the road. Having seen the plaintiff’s vehicle at a distance of 120 yards away and just within a few seconds that vehicle having covered 60 yards towards him, the defendant, as a careful driver, should have known that it was most unsafe to cross the road before the plaintiff’s vehicle at that time and at that point.

I am further satisfied from the evidence, and also from the resultant position of the plaintiff’s vehicle after the impact—the plaintiff’s vehicle having ran against the stump of a tree on the right side of the road, and having turned left, crossed his side of the dual carriage of the road, and having gone over the dividing embankment onto the other side of the dual-carriage road, to crash into an on-coming vehicle before it was halted—that the plaintiff’s vehicle was overspeeding at the time of the accident and he cannot therefore wholly escape blame. Here was a busy part of the city of Takoradi where every careful driver should know that it is not safe to drive too fast, or to do overspeeding. Here the evidence shows that the plaintiff’s vehicle covered 120 yards in a fraction of a second, and it was no wonder therefore, that the plaintiff’s vehicle could not be halted even

[p.994] of [1982-83] GLR 989 after it had ran into the stump of a tree, but had to turn back into the dual-carriage, and cross both roads only to be halted by another moving vehicle on the other side of the carriage road.

It seems to me also that because of the speed at which the plaintiff was driving along that road in the city, he could not see the defendant’s vehicle early enough to enable him, for instance, to either slow down, stop, or swerve to avoid a collision. It is however, my view that though the plaintiff was on the main dual-carriage road and had a right of way, he nevertheless owed a duty to take care so as not to run into other vehicles which might cross the dual-carriage along a cross-road.

The plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case, and considering the area through which he was driving, an area where other vehicles were most likely to cross to and from cross-roads, owed a duty to exercise proper care when he was approaching junctions and crossings. He ought to have taken due precaution of looking at traffic or vehicles which were more likely to branch at the junction or cross the cross-roads, so as to be able or ready to slow down or stop, should the situation arise, as it did, in the case before us now. The plaintiff failed to exercise that due care, and I hold, therefore, that he is guilty of contributory negligence.

I think the views I have taken in this matter are supported by the principles set out in the case cited by learned counsel for the plaintiff himself: Arghyrou v. Dapaah [1978] G.L.R. 236, C.A. The facts of that case are similar to the facts of the instant case before me. There, it was established that the defendant’s car entered a major road from a minor road and collided with the plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff contended that he saw the defendant’s vehicle approaching the major road at a speed consistent with an intention to stop, but he failed to do so and attempted unsuccessfully to accelerate across the road. The defendant’s driver denied seeing the other vehicle before impact. He contended that he had almost completed crossing the major road when the plaintiff’s car drove into his back. It was held, inter alia, as stated in the headnote in that case that:

“(1) The defendant was crossing a very busy trunk road and there was a duty cast on him to take the necessary and commonsense precaution of avoiding an action which would endanger the lives and property or other users of the road. He failed to do so and ought to pay for the consequences of this failure.”

Annan J.A. in his judgment stated at p. 240:

“What was in dispute was whether the defendant’s first witness actually stopped at the major road before he started to cross or whether he suddenly accelerated to cross the road. I do not think

[p.995] of [1982-83] GLR 989 this dispute is of any real importance. What seems to me to be of importance is that the defendant’s first witness started to cross a major road when another vehicle was on it and coming his way at what must be a reasonable speed, was so close to the junction that the probability of collision could not be ruled out. This seems to me the obvious conclusion from the facts and strong evidence of the defendant’s first witness’ negligence.”

And in considering the position of the driver on a major road, Annan J.A. cited Williams v. Fullerton (1961) 105 S.J. 280, C.A. and Lang v. London Transport Executive [1959] 3 All E.R. 609 and commented at pp. 241-242:

“Both cases emphasise that there is a duty of care on a driver on a major road in respect of traffic approaching from a minor road. He should approach the crossing exercising proper care, taking the precaution of looking at traffic on the side road and be ready to slow down or stop if necessary to deal with traffic on the minor road. These cases show that in a collision on the highway where a minor road crosses a major road there is no presumption that the driver on the minor road is wholly to blame. There is a duty of care on each driver in relation to the other…”

And after referring to other cases set out in Bingham’s Motor Claims Cases (6th ed.) at pp. 97-100, Annan J.A. also said at p. 242:

“A driver on a major road is not in any case entitled to ignore traffic on a minor road at cross-roads. He is under a duty to look out for such traffic. His own approach to the cross-roads should respond to the behaviour of traffic already on the minor road, or that may reasonably be expected or likely to come onto it, and moving towards the cross-roads or which may reasonably be expected to start to move towards it. In manifesting such response he may be required to reduce his speed, stop altogether, swerve or sound his horn.”

I think that on the principles stated I must hold that both the plaintiff and the defendant are to blame, in my view, in the proportion of one to two. That is the plaintiff is one-third to blame and the defendant is two-thirds to blame. I hold therefore that the defendant is liable to make good two-thirds of the damage caused to the plaintiff’s vehicle as well as the loss the plaintiff suffered as a result of the said accident.

I am satisfied that the total cost of repairs carried out on the plaintiff’s damaged vehicle came to ¢5,577.50. I am also satisfied that the plaintiff’s vehicle was off the road for 64 days when it was at the workshop being repaired. I am also satisfied that the plaintiff was

[p.996] of [1982-83] GLR 989 making ¢120 a day. I will, however, allow ten days off for Sundays and for maintenance, thus leaving 54 days at ¢120 a day for loss of use. I think this works out to ¢6,480. The total damages proved, therefore, comes to ¢12,057.50. And costs awarded shall be ¢1,442.50. This with costs therefore will be ¢13,500; two-thirds of which is ¢9,000. The defendant is also entitled to have judgment for the sum of ¢1,900 which I find he paid as a deposit against the cost of repairs he himself authorised to be carried out on the plaintiff’s said vehicle. This amount can therefore be set off against the sum of ¢9,000 which is recoverable from the defendant by virtue of this judgment.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff for two-thirds of the claim.

J. A. A.

Scroll to Top