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[1981] SLR (HC) 21High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

ESSOUN II vs. YEMO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 562

17 March 1981 · WUAKU J · ≈ 23 min read

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OSCOLAESSOUN II v YEMO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 562 [1981] SLR (HC) 21
APAESSOUN II v YEMO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 562, [1981] SLR (HC) 21 (Ghana).
BluebookESSOUN II v YEMO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 562, [1981] SLR (HC) 21 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ababio v. Nsemfoo (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 127.

(2) Abena Nketia v. Dompre (1954) D.C. (Land) `52-`55, 227.

(3) Frempong v. Effa (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 389.

(4) Attah v. Lagos [1960] G.L.R. 42.

(5) Akoto III v. Agyiman 1; Dua III v. Agyiman 1 (Consolidated) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 524, s.c. (6) Foli v. Agya-Atta [1976] 1 G.L.R. 194, C.A.

(7) Golightly v. Vanderpuye [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II) 716.

(8) National Real Estate and Finance Co., Ltd. v. Hassan [1939] 2 K.B. 61; [1939] 2 All E.R. 154; 108 L.J.K.B. 380; 160 L.T. 373; 55 T.L.R. 570; 83 S.J. 238, C.A.

(9) Burrows v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 816; 68 L.J.Q.B. 545; 80 L.T. 591; 63 J.P. 532; 48 W.R. 13; 15 T.L.R. 286; 43 S.J. 351.

(10) Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 475, C.A.

(11) R.B. Policies at Lloyd’s v. Butler [1950] 1 K.B. 76; [1949] 2 All E.R. 226; 65 T.L.R. 436; 93 S.J.

553.

(12) Freeman v. Cooke (1848) 2 Exch. 654; 6 Dow. & L. 187; 18 L.J. Ex. 114; 12 L.T.O.S. 66; 12 Jur.

777; 154 E.R. 652.

(13) Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & E1. 469; 112 E.R. 179.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on, inter alia, a preliminary objection raised by the defendants on the ground that an action by the plaintiff for, inter alia, an order on each of them to attorn tenant to the plaintiff was statute – barred. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the plaintiff.

J. D. Hammond for the defendants.

[p.565] of [1982-83] GLR 562

JUDGMENT OF WUAKU J.

The plaintiff by the indorsement on his writ of summons claims for:

1. An order on each of the defendants to attorn tenant to the plaintiff in respect of all the pieces of the plaintiff’s Ansmina land bounded on the north by the Dumawora River, south by Anyinasu to Bisease foot-path, east by the Baku Forest Reserve and by Bedum stool land and west by the Dumawora respectively, or in the alternative;

2. an order for recovery of possession of all the said pieces of the plaintiff’s said land; 3. an order for perpetual injunction restraining each and every defendant, his agents, privies, licensees, workmen and all persons claiming through every defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s ownership and possession of the said pieces of land; and 4. ¢20,000 each for trespass.

After the defendants had entered their appearance through a solicitor, the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim. And for the purpose of this ruling, I propose to reproduce hereunder, the pleadings: 1. The plaintiff is the ohene of Bedum in the Breman Asikuma Traditional Area and brings this action on behalf of the stool of Bedum.

2. The defendants are stranger farmers on Bedum stool’s Ansmina land.

3. By the decision of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission of 9 January 1979, the boundary between Bedum stool land and the stool land of Anyinasu was determined and in consequence thereof the piece of land bounded more or less on the north by the Dumawora River, south by Anyinasu to Bisease foot-path, east by the Baku Forest Reserve and by Bedum stool land and west by the Dumawora River, occupied by the defendants, respectively fell within the ownership of the Bedum stool.

4. The defendants are among a large number of stranger farmers occupying portions of the land mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

5. Following the decision of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner aforesaid, the plaintiff sent circulars to the defendants calling upon them to attorn tenant to the plaintiff and to enter into tenancy agreements with the plaintiff.

6. The defendants have refused to accede to the plaintiff’s call.

[p.566] of [1982-83] GLR 562

Wherefore the plaintiff claims as per his writ.

Then the statement of defence is as follows:

1. Save as hereinafter expressly admitted, the defendants deny each and every allegation in the statement of claim as if the same were set out and specifically traversed seriatim.

2. In 1930 a group of persons from Boso in the Eastern Region of Ghana led by one Opanyin Kwadwo Offei (the fifth defendant who has been wrongly described or named in the writ of summons as Offei Yaw) bought from the stool of Anyinasu a large, vast tract of forest land for a consideration of two thousand and sixty cedis (¢2,060), exclusive of one hundred and forty-six cedis (¢146) trama or guaha. In compliance with custom, a live sheep and a bottle of schnapps were also given to the stool. The area of the forest land absolutely bought was 1,449.68 acres.

3. Soon thereafter another group of persons from Boso led by one Yaw Dankwa also absolutely bought from the stool of Anyinasu another forest land adjacent to Opanyin Kwadwo Offei’s land for a consideration of one thousand and sixty-six cedis (¢1,066), exclusive of ¢30 trama. Again in conformity with custom, one live sheep and a bottle of schnapps were given to the stool.

4. Immediately after the said purchases and acquisitions the members of the two companies or syndicates, including the defendants, exercised conspicuous overt acts of ownership by breaking down the virgin forest and cultivating cocoa farms and economic and cash crops thereon. Thus, they have been in uninterrupted, undisturbed occupation and possession of the disputed land (which form but a portion of the virgin forest land and reduced to cultivation) for their livelihood for many, many years.

5. In fact, the said absolute sale transactions were reduced into writing on 14 November 1947 and 31 December 1948, respectively. Both documents were accordingly registered upon the expiry of the statutory period of three months’ public notice.

6. Thus the stool of Bedum is fully aware as to the title of the defendants to the disputed land. In fact, the defendants and the other members of their group or company have had various dealings with the people of Bedum since 1930 such as buying and selling in the market of Bedum and sometimes using a house belonging to one Yaw Kwadum, a blood relative of the then chief of Bedum, as their lodging place for their dependants on the way to and from Anyinasu as the bush-path leading from Anyinasu

[p.567] of [1982-83] GLR 562 to Besease passed through Bedum. Arrangement exists as between the people of Bedum and Opanyin Kwadwo Offei and his men as to the clearing of the bush-path.

7. The defendants and their group of company farmers have built houses, schools and churches on the land bought apparently and surely in the honest belief that with the said purchases they have absolute unincumbered title to it.

8. It is seriously contended that the defendants cannot be divested of their absolute title in consequence of any judgment obtained by the plaintiff. Any judgment obtained is subject to the rights, interests and estate of the defendants.

9. Further, the plaintiff is estopped by conduct and acquiescence amounting to laches. The action is also statute-barred and must be dismissed forthwith.”

The plaintiff’s reply to the defence is as follows:

1. The plaintiff denies paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the defendants’ statement of defence and joins issue thereon with the defendants.

2. The plaintiff in particular replies to paragraph 8 of the defendants’ statement of defence and avers and contends that by the judgment of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner of 9 January 1979, a completely new cause of action arose in favour of the plaintiff and that the defendants can only remain on the plaintiff’s land upon the plaintiff’s terms or be ejected therefrom and the defendants have no defence at all to the plaintiff’s action.

3. The plaintiff denies in reply to paragraph 9 of the defendants’ statement of defence that he is at all estopped in any way or that he is statute-barred.

The issues set down by the plaintiff for hearing are:

1. Whether or not the defendants have defence at all to the plaintiff’s action.

2. Whether or not the plaintiff is not entitled to his relief.

3. Any other issues appearing on the pleadings.

4. That issue (1) above be set down for hearing under Order 25, rr. 2 and 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A)

Mr. Mercer has argued that by the judgment of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner dated 9 January 1979, the land occupied by the defendants falls within the Bedum stool lands belonging to the plaintiff. And that either the defendants attorn tenant to the plaintiff or they dispossess themselves. The judgment referred

[p.568] of [1982-83] GLR 562 to by counsel was in respect of Enquiry No. 14/76 entitled “In the Matter of the Boundary Dispute between Bedum and Anyinasu.” Counsel said that the defendants who farm on or occupy Bedum stool lands were invited by the Bedum stool to come to attorn tenant to the plaintiff who is the Bedumhene, but the defendants have refused to do so. That the Bedumhene and Anyinasuhene by themselves referred the dispute to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner.

Counsel finally argued that it is the contention of the plaintiff that the statement of defence filed by the defendants does not disclose a defence to the plaintiff’s action, therefore the defendants cannot continue to occupy land being occupied by them except upon terms of the plaintiff, and unless they do that the plaintiff is entitled to eject them. That the defendants must attorn tenant to the plaintiff. Counsel cited the following cases in support of his arguments namely:

1. Ababio II v. Nsemfoo (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 127.

2. Abena Nketia v. Dompre (1954) D.C. (Land) `52-`55, 227.

3. Frempong v. Effa (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 389.

4. Attah v. Lagaos [1960] G.L.R. 42.

5. Akoto III v. Agyiman 1; Dua III v. Agyiman 1 (Consolidated) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 524, S.C.

6. Foli v. Agya-Atta [1976] 1 G.L.R. 194, C.A.

The first case sprang from the well-known case of a land litigation between the stools of Essumeja and Offoasi. Judgment was given in favour of the Essumejahene. It was held that the Essumejahene should have notified the farmer tenants who farmed on the land adjudged to be his, and not the Offoasihene, to come before him for tenancy agreements and if they failed, the Essumejahene could sue them in a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why they farm on his land and refuse to enter into tenancy agreement with him.

I do not agree with learned counsel’s submission on the Nketia case (supra) that it decided the point that one can only remain where one is upon coming into agreement with the stool concerned. In the Nketia case (supra), the stools concerned themselves agreed to settle their boundary dispute and agreed upon the rights to be enjoyed by the subjects who found themselves to be on the other’s stool land after their boundary demarcation. It is to be observed at this stage that this court is not furnished with the respective claims put forward before the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner, nor was the alleged plan, exhibit A, used in the inquiry made available to this court. The Frempong v. Effa and Attah v. Lagos cases (supra) were decisions of the High Court, both were judgments by Adumua Bossman J. (as he then was). It was held that the authority in the Ababio v. Nsemfoo case (supra) applies in the former case and per curiam in the latter case.

[p.569] of [1982-83] GLR 562

In Akoto III v. Agyiman 1 (supra) it is stated in holding 4 that:

“[A]n order for recovery of possession is justified, where, as in this case, subjects farming in a disputed area, being well aware of litigation concerning the land, and in the knowledge that the litigation had ended in favour of the neighbouring stool, nevertheless persist in asserting rights to the land in dispute.”

The judgment distinguished that case from Ababio v. Nsemfoo (supra).

It is to be observed that in the Akoto case (supra), the defendants were not only relying on long occupation, but they had also put forward a different boundary apart from the boundary accepted by the court as the true demarcated boundary and that the subjects of the defendant’s stool, the Likpe – Kukurantumi, were still claiming the said land as forming part of Kukurantumi stool land. In the present case, it has not been shown that the defendants are still claiming or persisting that they are on Anyinasu stool land. The instant case is, therefore, distinguishable from the Ababio v. Nsemfoo case. The principle in Ababio v. Nsemfoo was applied in the Foli case.

Mr. Hammond’s reply was brief, he relied on the statement of defence. He submitted that every case must be decided on its own facts and that his clients were absolute purchasers with notice to the plaintiff since 1930. That the defendants have a good defence of laches and acquiescence. He further submitted that evidence should be taken and opportunity given to the defendants to defend. Counsel finally submitted that the decision by the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner does not by itself vest title in the plaintiff and that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by statute. Counsel relied on the case of Golightly v. Vanderpuye [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 716.

Order 25, rr. 2. and 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) on which learned counsel for the plaintiff has raised an objection in point of law states:

“2. Any party shall be entitled to raise by his pleading any point of law, and any points so raised shall be disposed of by the judge who tries the cause at or after the trial, provided that by consent of the parties, or by order of the Court or a Judge on the application of either party, the same may be set down for hearing and disposed of at any time before the trial.

3. If, in the opinion of the Court or a Judge, the decision of such point of law substantially disposes of the whole action, or of any distinct cause of action, ground of defence, set-off, counterclaim, or reply therein, the Court or Judge may thereupon dismiss the action or make such other orders therein as may be just.”

[p.570] of [1982-83] GLR 562

Any point of law which necessitates legal arguments as, for example, the validity of a custom may be raised under the rule and it must state succinctly the objection grounds for the case and it should be taken that a real point of law is being taken and that there should be a clear definition of what the point of law is: see per MacKinnon L.J. in National Real Estate and Finance Co., Ltd. v. Hassan [1939] 2 K.B. 61 at p. 77, C.A. I think Mr. Mercer has stated succinctly the grounds for the objection in paragraph 2 of his reply and because of the nature of the defence and argument put forward particularly by the plaintiff, the emphasis should be laid on the last sentence that the defendants have no defence at all to the plaintiff’s claim.

It is also stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 30, p. 17, para. 35 that:

“Any party pleading is entitled to raise by his pleading any point of law(s); a point of law so taken is called an objection in point of law. It assumes as true the facts alleged by the other party and declares that those facts are not sufficient to raise the legal inference or to afford the ground of relief, for which the other party contends.”

It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff in this case assumes as true the facts alleged in the defence, but is saying that those facts are not sufficient to raise the legal inference or to afford them the defence raised in their pleadings.

Our Order 25 is identical to the English rule: see Annual Practice (1958 ed.) The notes to the rules are therefore of great help. It is also stated in the notes to rules 2 and 3 that “For the purpose of such an argument, the party objecting is taken to admit all the facts alleged in his opponents pleading.” A case cited is the case of Burrows v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 816 at p. 821, D.C. This case arose from the notorious Jameson raid in South Africa, an event which students of the history of the British Empire may remember: it is further stated that a plaintiff who objects to a defence may find himself called upon to defend his statement of claim.

Having thus so far tried to consider the sort of argument expected to be advanced by the party raising the objections, I will now endeavour to examine the grounds upon which the objection is being raised.

The plaintiff bases his case on the decision of the then Acting Commissioner, Mr. V. T. C. Amorin’s judgment dated 9 January 1979 in the matter of the dispute between Bedum and Anyinasu. That judgment was filed in this court on 6 November 1980 and it is also referred to in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim. Whatever interpretation that one may put on that judgment, one thing is clear and certain, that is it settled or purported to settle the boundary between

[p.571] of [1982-83] GLR 562 the stool of Bedum, i.e. the plaintiff’s stool and that of Anyinasu stool, i.e. the defendants’ alleged vendor stool.

The demarcation of the boundary ordered by the commissioner was based on a plan, exhibit A, made for the inquiry. That plan is not before this court. It is incompetent for this court to review as if on appeal or otherwise the commissioner’s aforesaid judgment, but I think I am bound to ascertain whether on the available facts before this court, the commissioner’s findings point conclusively to the fact that the defendants’ lands fall within the area adjudged to belong to the Bedum stool: see the case of Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 473 at p. 480, C.A. (full bench).

According to the defendants, the fifth defendant described as Opanyin Offei Yaw is really known as Opanyin Kwadwo Offei. During the inquiry, the fifth defendant gave evidence, representing a syndicate which allegedly bought land from the Anyinasu stool. At pages 5 and 6 of the judgment, the commissioner recorded the summary of what the fifth defendant said thus:

The next witness for Anyinasu was one Kojo Offei, the second defendant witness, a farmer at Anyinasu aged 75 years but native of Anum Boso. He claimed to belong to a group, a syndicate which bought portion of Kojo Essiam land. He has been farming there for the past 40 years. He knows Dunawora stream and the said stream passes through his farm. He does not know whether it forms boundary with any stool land. He alleged that Bedum is between his farm and Anyinasu and that he forms boundary with Bedum stool land; under cross-examination he admitted that no representative of Bedum stool was present when the land was sold him although there should have been at least one to witness the sale.

Summing up the evidence before him, the commissioner at p. 7 of the judgment made the following observations:

“Kojo Offei, the second defendant witness, a farmer aged 75 years claimed to have bought the land for his syndicate from Anyinasu stool for cocoa farms but there is no indication of these farms on any or near the rival boundaries. He made a mess by alleging that Bedum is between his farm and Anyinasu. If that is so, then on whose land is this witness farming? One may pertinently ask. He claims, however, that the Dumawora stream passes through his farm. This may be true but at what point and where is it on exhibit A?”

Mr. Mercer admitted that the fifth defendant did, in fact, give evidence for the Anyinasu stool.

[p.572] of [1982-83] GLR 562

From the above quotations, two things at least emerge. First, accepting Kojo Offei’s evidence on its face value, he does not farm on Bedum stool land, but rather forms boundary with it. Secondly, this assertion is rejected by the commissioner. What I can make out of the judgment is that Kojo Offei or the syndicate he represented has no farm or land on exhibit A (the plan) which formed the basis of the judgment of the inquiry. Kojo Offei, according to the commissioner, was the one who bought the land for his syndicate among whom undoubtedly are the other defendants. If my deductions are correct it follows that the plaintiff has failed to defend his own statement of claim that the lands occupied by the defendants form part of the subject-matter of the inquiry No. 14/76 and, even if it formed part of it, there is nothing to show that the area occupied by the defendants was adjudged by the commissioner as falling within the Bedum stool land.

If on the other hand I am wrong in my deductions that the defendants’ land do not fall within the Bedum stool land after the boundary settlement between Bedum and Anyinasu stools, then I will consider the effect when I come to consider the defendant’s case, i.e. if the defendants’ land falls within the Bedum stool land.

The facts of the defendants’ case are well put in paragraphs 2 – 7, both inclusive, of the defence. It shows that the defendants have been in possession since 1930 to the knowledge of the plaintiff who was aware all the time of the overt acts of ownership exercised by the defendants over the land.

It was submitted on behalf of the Bedumhene that it was by agreement that reference was made to the Stool Lands Boundaries Commissioner to determine the common boundary between Bedum stool and that of Anyinasu stool. It is conceivable that there had never been any prior serious boundary dispute or litigation between the Bedum stool and the Anyinasu stool; that being the case I am of the opinion that as in the case of Nketia v. Dompre (supra), that the two stools should have between themselves determined the rights to be enjoyed by their subjects who may as a result of the demarcation find themselves on the other’s stool land. Should that happen, my view is that the new stool should not enter into new terms with the new tenants other than those they had had with the former stool. In other words, each stool steps into the shoes of the other, and will only have a cause of action against a tenant who has refused to recognise or accept the new situation.

One of the defences raised by the defendants is that the plaintiff’s claim is statute-barred. The effect of the statute of limitation can properly be tried as a preliminary point of law. It may be necessary in this regard to refer to the Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54). Section 10 of the Decree is relevant, and I will refer in particular to subsections 1, 5 and 6:

[p.573] of [1982-83] GLR 562

“10. (1) No action shall be brought to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person . . .

(5) For the purpose of this Decree, no continual or other claim upon or near any land shall preserve any right of action to recover the land.

(6) On expiration of the period fixed by this Decree for any person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.”

The plaintiff’s claim although primarily is for an order that the defendants attorn tenant to him, he is also asking for recovery of possession and perpetual injunction if the defendants fail to attorn tenant to him. Although not stated by the plaintiff, it could be said that because the plaintiff had continual or other claim upon or near the disputed land which boundary had just been settled by the commissioner, that is why he is claiming his first relief on the writ of his summons. This is clearly what section 10 (5) is meant to prevent. Because the plaintiff’s rights to recover is extinguished he cannot now ask the defendants to attorn tenant to him, otherwise the purpose of the Decree will be defeated.

All the cases cited by Mr. Mercer were decisions based on customary law and practice. I have not myself come across any case where the Limitation Decree, 1972 was pleaded in bar. However, section 30 (3) of the Decree makes its provisions applicable to matters regulated by customary law. The section provides that “This Decree shall apply to actions in respect of matters regulated by customary law.” I hold that the Decree applies to this case.

The next question to be considered is: When did time start to run against the plaintiff? The defendants say that they went into possession in 1930 to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It follows that since 1930, and in so far as the plaintiff’s rights are concerned, the defendants have been in continuous adverse possession for over 40 years.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that after the commissioner’s judgment, a new cause of action arose and that an absolute purchaser is unknown to customary law and the custom that the defendants must attorn tenant applies equally to leases, purchasers, subjects of stools and tenant alike, i.e. anybody who finds himself on the wrong side after the boundary demarcation.

I am unable to subscribe to that submission, because under the Limitation Decree, 1972 it is only in the case of fraud or mistake that time does not begin or accrue until the fraud or mistake is discovered. In R.B. Policies at Lloyd’s v. Butler [1950] 1 K.B. 76, a case dealing with limitation of action, the headnote to the report reads:

[p.574] of [1982-83] GLR 562

“A motor car was stolen in 1940. The identity of the thief was not known and the car was not traced until 1947. The plaintiffs (successors in title to the owner of the car) then brought an action against the defendant, an innocent purchaser for value of the car, for its recovery. The defendant relied on the Limitation Act, 1939.

Held, that a cause of action accrued against the thief in 1940, notwithstanding the fact that his identity was unknown, and the plaintiffs’ right of action against the defendant was, therefore, barred by s, 3. sub-s. 1, of the Limitation Act, 1939.”

Section 7 of NRCD 54 is in identical terms with the English Limitation Act of 1939. In the course of his judgment, Streatfeild J. said at p. 80:

“And it seems to me, therefore, that prima facie as soon as there is a cause of action (as there clearly was in the present case the moment the motor car was stolen) time begins to run notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of the defendant.”

And again at p. 82 he concluded his judgment thus:

“This is a case in which one of two unfortunate innocent parties must suffer. And, in my view, on the proper construction of the word `accrued’ the cause of action in the present case did accrue in 1940 when the car was stolen, and it was the misfortune of the plaintiffs that they were unable to pursue that cause of action through their ignorance of the identity of a possible defendant.”

In the present case, the identity of the defendants was known to the plaintiff since 1930. I am of the view that the plaintiff herein is in the same position as the plaintiffs in the motor case. I do not think that the plaintiff can avoid the specific provisions of NRCD 54 by trying to revive his right that had extinguished by operation of statutes by the alleged judgment of the commissioner, to ask the defendants to come to attorn tenant to him, for to do so now will defeat the purpose of NRCD 54 which is meant to provide for automatic termination of litigation after a fixed period of time.

The defendants have also pleaded that the plaintiff is estopped by conduct and acquiescence amounting to laches. The particulars upon which this plea is based are contained in paragraph 6 of the defence. As I have pointed out earlier on in this ruling, the plaintiff assumes to be true the particulars given.

In Freeman v. Cooke (1848) 18 L.J. Exch. 114, Baron Parke in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in 1848 dealing with estoppel by conduct indorsed the following proposition from Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 469 at 474:

“ . . . where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.”

The plaintiff has by his conduct caused the defendants to act in the belief, actually or passively encouraged by the plaintiff, that they, the defendants, are adjoining land owners with whom the plaintiff could trade, have social intercourse and clear together their common bush path. I hold that the plaintiff is estopped by conduct and acquiescence.

Conclusion:

(1) The plaintiff has failed to establish conclusively that the lands occupied by the defendants fall within the land adjudged as belonging to him by the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner in his judgment dated 9 January 1979. In the middle of the evidence of the Anyinasuhene, the commissioner suo motu, on the grounds of doing substantial justice between the parties, sent back the surveyor, one Mr. Smith, to the land to gather more information. This is what the commissioner said in his judgment:

“The surveyor was recalled into the box to show whether he had carried out the assignments given on 14 November 1978. He disclosed that he went with the representative of both sides. That in the field, the Anyinasuhene pointed out to him Baku Forest Reserve as Kukram Forest Reserve. In answer to a question by Mr. James Mercer, Mr. Smith informed the commission that he saw Kukram village which is about 1,000 feet north of Baku Forest Reserve and that the said village is within Baku land and no farm of Offei was shown to him.”

In effect it means that the defendants are not on the land adjudged as belonging to the plaintiff or on the portion of the land in dispute.

(2) All the authorities cited by learned counsel, where a party was asked to attorn tenant to another stool, were results of court actions with the exception of Nketia v. Dompre (supra). In that case, the stools themselves agreed to have their boundary settled and the stools agreed prior to the settlement the rights to be enjoyed by their subjects who may find themselves on another stool’s land. All those cases cited are distinguishable from the present case.

(3) All the cases cited were either decided before the coming into force of NRCD 54 or without reference to the Decree.

[p.576] of [1982-83] GLR 562

(4) The plaintiff’s claim is statute-barred and he is estopped by conduct.

In the result, I hold that the defendants have a defence to the plaintiff’s claim. Having already held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the commissioner’s judgment covers the lands occupied by the defendants and adjudged as forming part of the Bedum stool land, it follows that the plaintiff’s other reliefs must fail. I will, therefore, dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.

I wish to state that matters such as this should if necessary go on full trial. The point which was argued was not by consent but was raised by the plaintiff. I hope I have been able to resolve the points so raised and argued and will have the satisfaction of knowing that if I am wrong my decision can be reviewed on an appeal.

There will be costs for the defendants.

DECISION

Judgment for the defendants with costs.

K. A. A.

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