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[1981] SLR (HC) 22High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

ESHUN vs. JOHNFIA [1982-83] GLR 441

8 June 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 19 min read

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OSCOLAESHUN v JOHNFIA [1982-83] GLR 441 [1981] SLR (HC) 22
APAESHUN v JOHNFIA [1982-83] GLR 441, [1981] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookESHUN v JOHNFIA [1982-83] GLR 441, [1981] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110.

(2) Halmond v. Daniel (1871) Sar, F.C.L. 182.

(3) Bede v. Sakyiama (1914) D.C.A.L. 201.

(4) Gyamaah v. Buor, Supreme Court, 17 June 1963, unreported.

(5) Manu v. Kuma [1963] 1 G.L.R. 464, S.C.

(6) Adjei v. Ripley (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 62.

(7) Edward v. Ferguson (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 113.

(8) Adjei v. Asantewah [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 629.

(9) Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 535.

(10) Krabah v. Krakue [1963] 2 G.L.R. 122, S.C.

(11) Quagraine v. Edu [1966] G.L.R. 406.

(12) In re Antubam (Decd.) [1965] G.L.R. 139.

(13) Okwabi v. Adonu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 268, W.A.C.A.

(14) Gyamaah v. Buor [1962] 1 G.L.R. 196.

(15) Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 164.

(16) Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377.

[p.444] of [1982-83] GLR 441 (17) Amarfio v. Ayorkor (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554.

(18) Swapim v. Ackuwa (1888) Sar. F.C.L. 191.

(19) Barnes v. Mayan (1871) Sar . F.C.L. 180.

(20) Amonoo v. Clement (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 180.

(21) Biney v. Biney [1974] 1 G.L.R. 318, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the children of a deceased intestate against his customary successor for, inter alia, a declaration that they have a life interest in all the self-acquired properties of their father. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the plaintiffs.

Isaac K. Winney for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

The plaintiffs, all petty traders, are surviving children of the late Ato Kwamina Essuman of house No. 70/8, Third Street, Sekondi. The defendant is the customary successor of the said Ato Kwamina Essuman (deceased). House No. 70/8, Third Street, Sekondi and five others were built on lands not family property by the plaintiffs’ said father and by his own exertions, unaided by the members of his family. That the late Ato Kwamina Essuman in his lifetime was ebulliently well-to-do is borne out by the numerous houses which he died possessed of. But true to the inexorable ironies of fate, this prosperous man did not live longer to enjoy the fruits of his labours. Upon his death, his uterine nephew, the defendant herein, was appointed his customary successor. The latter now lives with the plaintiffs in one of the houses, namely house No. 70/8, Third Street, Sekondi. The remaining buildings are: one at Nkroful junction near Ketan, one at Ekuase near Sekondi, three at Essaman, also near Sekondi. All the five latter houses have been let out to tenants by the customary successor.

The plaintiffs by this suit claim for:

(a) A declaration that as children of the late Ato Kwamina Essuman they have a life interest in all the self-acquired properties of their father.

(b) A declaration that the said life interest includes an interest or share in the income accruing from the rents from the said self-acquired houses of their father.

(c) That the court determine the nature or extent of such interest or share because, as they say, their late father’s family have denied the existence of any such interest and have failed, despite repeated demands, to determine their interest.

(d) An order that the defendant pay to the plaintiffs the interest so determined with effect from 1974 to the date of judgment.

[p.445] of [1982-83] GLR 441

The defendant avers that he has permitted a brother of the plaintiffs to occupy two rooms in house No. 70/8 and another brother to stay in one of the houses at Essaman. His counsel contends that the plaintiffs’ interest in the properties does not go beyond their right to reside in the house of their late father subject to good behaviour and that they are not entitled to a share in the rents accruing from the houses let out to tenants. The issue in the case resolved itself ultimately to one of law as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the rents accruing from the houses.

As usual, the point of departure in any discussion of a question of customary law is Sarbah’s invaluable book on Fanti Customary Laws 1968 (3rd ed.) especially where as in this case the parties are Fantis. Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the following passages in Sarbah’s book: First, the learned author states at p.50 that:

“On the death of the husband, his widows, him surviving, and their children by him, are entitled to reside in any house built by him, and the children and their issue have a life interest in such house, subject to good behaviour.

Secondly, the learned author states at p.105:

“When a person such as A dies, having his own acquired property, moveable and immovable, he is not succeeded by his sons, free-born or domestic, whose only right is that of a life intering to these passages, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that customary law recognises two interests: one being life interest invested in children in the house acquired by their deceased father on land not family property, and the other being occupational interest in a house acquired by their deceased father on land being family property. What counsel in effect seemed to say, if I understood him correctly, was that the enjoyment of life interest cannot be hamstrung by any misconduct on the part of the children as it is in the case of occupational interest.

Counsel for the defendant concurred in this view and I share in it. This distinction is judicially approved in Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110 at p. 131 where Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was), after an eclectic review of the

[p.446] of [1982-83] GLR 441 authorities on the subject made the following observation on the phrase “subject to good behaviour”:

“This phrase it is submitted can be tacked appropriately to only a house originally family property and not the self-acquired house of the deceased. In the latter case (i.e. where the house is designated self-acquired of the deceased) the customary law recognises the prior possessory life interest in the use and enjoyment, i.e occupation of the children and the widow’s right of occupation during widowhood.”

The use of the phrase” possessory life interest “ finds its authority in Halmond v. Daniel (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 182 at pp. 182-183 on which Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) relied. It is clear from this that the life interest referred to by Sarbah at p.105 of his book legally amounted to a right of the children to occupy for life without any condition of good conduct, the self-acquired house of their deceased father. However, the ratio decidendi of Halmond v. Daniel (supra) was, among other things, that title in self-acquired house vests in the family.

The vexed question before us is whether the possessory life interest would entitle the children to claim a share of the property or proceeds accruing therefrom. At pages 227-229 in his book The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana the learned author, Ollennu, discusses the case of Bede v. Sakyiama (1914) D.C.A.L. 201 where a widow sued for a one-third share of her late husband’s cocoa farm. The Akim Abuakwa Paramount Tribunal decided that the deceased’s cocoa farms be divided into three and that a one-third share should go to the widow in lieu of permanent maintenance of the widow by the successor. Ollennu made the following observations at pp. 228-229 of his book about the Bede case:

“From this decision of the Tribunal we deduce that in suitable cases, the Court can, in lieu of an order for permanent maintenance for wife and children of a deceased, direct that a specific share of the estate up to about one-third, be given to the widow or children.

A strong caveat must, however, be administered that the observation that a court can in an appropriate case, in lieu of an order for permanent maintenance of a widow and her children, commute such obligation to a specific share of the estate of the deceased does not represent the customary law of the Akans, including the Fantis. For example, in the case of Gyamaah v. Buor; Supreme Court, 17 June 1963, unreported which is incidentally cited by Ollennu at pp. 221-222 of his book The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana a local court demarcated a portion of the cocoa farms of a

[p.447] of [1982-83] GLR 441 deceased for his widow and children. The defendant, successor of the deceased, appealed to the High Court which reversed the order of the local court. Ollennu remarked at p. 222 of the same book: “The demarcation of part of the farm and the award thereof without the consent of the defendant and the family is ultra vires the Local Court.”

The Akim Abuakwa Paramount Tribunal decision in Bede v. Sakyiama (supra) did not go on appeal. Hence, Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) in Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo (supra) said obiter at p.131.

“… I am of the view that in appropriate circumstances the decision in Bede v. Sakyiama (supra) which calls for a share of the estate for widows [and children] will be given the blessing of a binding authority by the superior courts.”

It seems clear that Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) did not have the benefit of the decision of the High Court in Gyamaah v. Bour (supra).

There is also the case of Manu v. Kuma [1963] 1 G.L.R. 464, S.C. The deceased, an Akan, died intestate possessed of substantial properties including eight cocoa farms and two houses, all of which devolved upon his customary successor. The latter utterly disregarded the care and maintenance of the widow and surviving children of the deceased and enjoyed the properties to their exclusion. The widow instituted an action at the High Court, Kumasi, claiming all the expenses she had incurred towards the maintenance and education for the children.

The High Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that under customary law the children are the responsibility of the mother’s family upon the death of their father and that the successor’s obligation was merely moral, rather than legal. The question that fell for determination on appeal was whether customary law imposed a legal obligation upon a successor to maintain and educate the children of his predecessor whom he succeeds. After an exhaustive examination of the views of notable text book writers like Sarbah, Rattray, Danquah and Field, and the case of Adjei v. Ripley (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 62; see particularly p. 11 of Rattray’s Ashanti Law and Constitution; p. 192 of Danquah’s Akan Laws and Customs and Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (1st ed.) at pp.35-36, the Supreme Court said at pp. 468-469:

“From the above we are confirmed in the view that a man’s responsibility to support and maintain his child involves giving the child such maintenance, training and education as should make him a useful member of the society and community in which he lives …

[p.448] of [1982-83] GLR 441

We consider that the responsibility of a successor to maintain and train the child of his predecessor is a legal one, and the right enuring therefrom to the child is different in its nature from a right to succeed to or have a share in the estate of his deceased father…”

Thereafter, after referring to a passage at p. 19 of Ollennu’s book on Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana the court concluded:

“We say therefore that a successor under customary law is under an enforceable obligation not only to maintain but also to educate the children of his predecessor to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his possession and his dealings therewith.”

On the authorities, the question whether the children of a person subject to the matrilineal system of succession have a life interest in the self-acquired property of their deceased father and whether such interest includes an interest or a share in the property or its proceeds, e.g. rents can be answered in the following terms:

By customary law, when a person subject to the matrilineal system of succession dies intestate possessed of any properties, substantial or insubstantial, such properties devolve not upon his widow or children, but upon his matrilineal family and ultimately upon his customary successor in whom title or ownership of the property vests: see Edmund v. Ferguson (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 113 at p. 114; Adjei v. Asantewah [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 629; Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 535; Krabah v. Krakue [1963] 2 G.L.R. 122, S.C.; Quagraine v. Edu [1966] G.L.R. 406 and In re Kofi Antubam (Decd.) [1965] G.L.R. 138.

However, the widow and the children have a possessory life interest which is nothing more than a right to reside or occupy any house self-acquired by their late father on land not family property. A necessary corollary to the ownership rights of the successor is that in the extreme case where he reasonably requires the house or part of it for the occupation of himself or any member of the matrilineal family, the children may have to quit because they are, in the eyes of customary law, supposed to be entitled to the enjoyment of their matrilineal family’s property (see Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws, p. 105). The children can also forfeit their life interest if they claim adverse title to or commit waste or cause damage to the house. Subject to these conditions, they are entitled to live in the house for life.

Under customary law, until they become trained adults capable of fending for themselves, the children are entitled to be main only exceptional circumstance perhaps under which the widow or her children, as the case may be, can have enforceable right to a portion of any property or its proceeds is where the property was acquired jointly by the deceased and the widow or the children or both as co-owners. This can be established by evidence which is sufficiently strong to rebut the presumption under customary law that whatever property a wife or a child assists a man to acquire during the subsistence of a marriage or in the case of the child even after dissolution of the marriage is the sole property of the man: see Okwabi v. Adonu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 268, W.A.C.A. and Gyamaah v. Buor [1962] 1 G.L.R. 196.

In deserving cases, however, the successor or the family may in their own discretion commute the expenses to be incurred in maintaining and educating the children of the deceased to a payment to them of a specific sum of money to be paid periodically or in lump, or a portion of the property. This is the sole prerogative of the successor or the family. No court has the power to determine the specific amount of money or portion of the property. It is not a justiciable matter. This is the view I can possibly express on the issue before me, but there are other interesting general comments I wish to make. Before doing so, I wish to deal briefly with the decision in In re Kofi Antubam (Decd.) (supra) on which counsel for the plaintiffs relied. The plaintiff, the head of the family of the deceased who was an Akan, issued an originating summons at the High Court, Cape Coast, asking the court to determine (a) whether the widow and the children of the deceased had any interest in the deceased’s property and if so the nature and extent of such interest; and (b) the nature and extent of the interest of the deceased’s family.

All the three cases which were cited and discussed by Archer J. (as he then was) in that suit related to deceased persons who were Gas. These cases were Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 164; Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377 and Amarfio v. Ayorkor (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554. This of course does not imply that the principles enunciated in those cases were completely irrelevant to a case involving an Akan. For example, Vanderpuye’s case bears close affinity to an Akan situation since it dealt with succession among a portion of the Ga people who espouse the matrilineal system of succession.

Although Archer J. (as he then was), like Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) did not have the benefit of the cases of Gyamaah v. Buor (supra) and Manu v. Kuma (supra), he nevertheless relied

[p.450] of [1982-83] GLR 441 tremendously on Sarbah’s statements of the law in his book, Fanti Customary Laws, particularly pp. 50 and 105. Among other things, Archer J. (as he then was) concluded at p. 147:

“(b) The children and their issue also have a right to occupy as residence any house built on land self-acquired by the deceased during their lifetime subject to good behaviour.

(c) The interest of the widows and the children is equivalent to a determinable life tenancy which entitles them to a share of the income accruing from the houses in which they are entitled to reside.”

With respect to (b) above, it must be observed that under customary law a home built on family land brands the house with the stamp of family property and consequently a member of the family who builds such a house retains only a life interest in the house; and by operation of customary law, the children of such a person have a right to reside in the house subject to good behaviour: see Swapim v. Ackuwa (1888) Sar. F.C.L. 191; Halmond v. Daniel (supra); Barnes v. Mayan (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 180; and Amonoo v. Clement (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 180. But there is an important qualification which must be adverted to, and it is found in Biney v. Biney [1974] 1 G.L.R. 318, C.A. at p. 335 per Anin J.A. (as he then was) that:

“ On the other hand, if such a family member secures a grant from the family of a portion of unoccupied land for his building in the proper customary manner, the house built by him on such a site, by his own effort and means, becomes his self-acquired property which he can alienate inter vivos or by testamentary disposition..”

In the latter case, if the member dies intestate, the right of his children to reside in the house shall be a life interest not subject to their good behaviour. As regards (c) of the findings of Archer J. (as he then was), it is submitted that the view expressed by the learned judge cannot be construed as laying down any proposition of customary law that the children have the right to claim a portion or share in property which their father dies intestate possessed of because what the learned judge really meant was that a person having a life interest in a room allotted to him in his deceased father’s house could rent it and take the proceeds if he lived elsewhere.

In In re Kofi Antubam (Decd.) (Supra), Archer J. (as he then was), apparently out of sheer benignity for the children, made scathing, even pejorative, comments on the deleterious effects of the matrilineal system of succession with regard to the self-acquired property of a man who dies intestate. He advocated for reforms or changes in that

[p.451] of [1982-83] GLR 441 aspect of the customary law to accord with our process of modernisation in the social, cultural and economic spheres of life. He even questioned the rational basis of children in the matrilineal system not being regarded as members of their father’s family, even though there is a biological link between the father and his children.

With the greatest respect, sight should not be lost of the axiom that biological procreation of children is the result of reciprocal contributions from a man and woman with the latter bearing the ineluctable brunt of the process in her time of labour. It is submitted that the concept of customary succession, patrilineal or matrilineal, is a matter of value judgment depending largely upon the preferences and prejudices of the various tribal and national groups that practise one system or the other. However, if you want historical information about the matrilineal system: see Topics in West African History (by Professor Adu Boahen, chapts. 1 and 2).

In his book, Jurisprudence, The Philosophy and Method of the Law (1961 ed.), the learned author Professor Edgar Bodenheimer stated at p. 253:

“…customary law arises as soon as certain usages and customs felt to be legally obligatory are generally and continuously observed among the members of a family, group, tribe or people. No formal recognition or compulsory enforcement of these usages and arrangements by a superior authority is regarded as necessary for the formation of customary law…”

Customary law is defined under our successive constitutions as the “rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana”: see article 126 (4) of the Constitution, 1969 and article 4(3) of the Constitution, 1979 of Ghana. Thus customary law as understood and applied in Ghana comprehends the essential elements in the definition of that term by Professor Edgar Bodenheimer.

The existence of the matrilineal system of succession is primeval and a precious cultural heritage among most of the Akan tribes throughout Ghana, the Lobi tribe of the Northern Region, Ga Mashi (Accra Town), Tamale town and a section of the Dagarti tribe of the Northern Region. The patrilineal system of succession has similarly existed among the Ewes, all the tribes of the Northern Region excluding the Lobis, and a section of the Dargartis, the Ga-Adangbes, the Guans and the Kyerepongs in the Eastern Region: see The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana by Ollennu at p. 80. The point that ought to be emphasised and borne in mind is that the decision of a court can only operate retrospectively, declaring what the law is and has been, rather than what it ought to be or shall be in the future. This is especially true of customary law. A court

[p.452] of [1982-83] GLR 441 cannot make or change customary law by introducing or substituting its own judgments for that of the community without destroying its rational basis.

Since customary law consists of all customs and usages of the people, it is the people themselves who can change or modify it. The duty of a court is to endeavour always to ascertain and apply the customary rules and usages in force at any particular time in the community. Since customary law is elastic and progressive (see Danquah’s Akan Laws and Customs, p.192), our people who live in the modern world should be credited with the capability to adapt their customs and usages to modern situations without any coercion from an external authority.

Once external coercion, judicial or legislative, is brought to bear on the customs and usages of the people, there is bound to be the polarisation of what is actually practised by the people in their day to day lives on the one hand, and the judicial decisions or legislative enactments on the other. There should always be a judicious parallelism between the law making process and the advancement of the practices, customs and usages of the people to avoid frustration.

For instance, in 1962 and 1963, attempts by the legislature to introduce certain changes in the matrilineal system of inheritance by bills entitled “Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bill” failed even at the public opinion level and the government had to withdraw it. It is interesting to note that section 20 of the Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bill, 1963, provided that two-thirds of the self-acquired property of a person who died intestate would devolve upon his children as tenants in common and the surviving widow would also take one-sixth.

What many people overlook in evaluating the merits of the customary law among the Akans is that it allows a member of the family an unfettered discretion to alienate his self-acquired property to any person whether his wife or child, or even to charity in his lifetime and the family will not quarrel with the disposition. But if a member, for reasons known to him, does not exercise his customary rights, then the family is entitled to assume that he intended that the property devolve upon them. Even so, the customary law, in its wisdom and fairness, makes provision for the widow and the children of the deceased, e.g. maintenance. The fact that in certain cases this custom is violated, is a regrettable human shortcoming but it is no argument against the system.

Presently, one of the draft proposals before the Law Reform Commission is entitled Intestate Succession and Inheritance. We are itching to see its provisions and the public response to it. While the efforts directed towards the reform of our customary laws by the legislature continue, the existing law ought to be expounded by

[p.453] of [1982-83] GLR 441 the courts in a way not calculated to undermine the very basis of primordial customs of the people.

For the reasons given earlier in this judgment, the claim of the plaintiffs for a share of interest in the rents accruing from the house of their late father is dismissed but there will be a declaration that they have a possessory life interest to reside in the said houses. The plaintiffs shall have ¢500 costs.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff in part.

J. K. E. E.

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