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[1981] SLR (HC) 25High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

MONTA vs. PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 195

13 November 1981 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 16 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 25
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OSCOLAMONTA v PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 195 [1981] SLR (HC) 25
APAMONTA v PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 195, [1981] SLR (HC) 25 (Ghana).
BluebookMONTA v PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 195, [1981] SLR (HC) 25 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Harding v. Crethorn (1793) 1 Esp. 57.

(2) Ibbs v. Richardson (1839) 112 E.R. 1436.

(3) Henderson v. Squire (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 170.

(4) Reynolds v. Bannerman [1922] 1 K.B. 719.

(5) David Blackstone Ltd. v. Burnetts. (West End) Ltd. [1973] 3 All E.R. 782.

(6) Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd. v. Strutt [1954] 1 Q.B. 250; [1953] 2 All E.R. 1475, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the plaintiff for an order for possession, rent or mesne profits of a premises the lease for which had been determined but for which the defendants were unable to give up vacant possession of the whole premises. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Brobbey for the plaintiff.

Mensah-Bonsu for the defendants.

No appearance by or on behalf of the third party.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The original plaintiff, Joseph Monta, was the sub-lessee of plot Nos. 3, 4, 24 and 25, Amakom Abrotia New Layout, Kumasi, for a term of 45 years commencing from 1 January, 1940. Having developed the plots, he in turn, on 14 December 1960, granted a sub-lease to the defendants, Paterson Simons (West Africa) Ltd., a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and now Paterson Simons (Ghana) Ltd., for a term of fifteen years from 1 December 1960, at a rent of 5,100 pounds per annum. A proviso gave the defendants the right to determine the sub-lease at the end of the first ten years of the term upon giving not less than six months’ written notice. On 14 May, 1970 the defendants informed the plaintiff by letter that they intended to determine the sub-lease from 1 December 1970 and gave notice to other firms to which they had sub-let parts of the premises. All the sub-tenants, except one J. K. Agbemabiase, gave up possession to the plaintiff. The cost of effecting repairs to the premises, except the portion in the occupation of Agbemabiase, was agreed upon and settled by the defendants. The defendants also paid all rents up to 30 November 1970.

It was the case for the plaintiff that because the defendants failed to give him complete possession they remained his tenants after 30 November 1970 and he brought this action claiming an order for possession, rent or, in the alternative, mesne profits, up to the date of issue of writ, mesne profits from the date of issue of writ up to such time as they should deliver up complete possession, and damages for breaches of covenants. The present plaintiff was by an order of this court substituted for the original plaintiff who died on 3 June 1977.

[p.198] of [1982-83] GLR 195

It is the case for the defendants that they ceased to be sub-lessees from 1 December 1970 and are therefore not liable to pay rent. Any rent due must be paid by their sub-lessees who became statutory tenants of the plaintiff on holding over after the determination of the defendants’ sub-lease. As to the claim for damages, the defendants deny the alleged breaches and, in the alternative, say that such breaches were waived by the plaintiff.

The general rule of law is that a tenant is required to deliver up possession to his landlord at the end of the term. If he fails to do so he will be liable for the continued use and occupation, and may also be required to pay damages if any has resulted from his failure to give up possession. In this regard, it is immaterial that the failure arises, not from his own act, but from the act of a third person whom he has put in a part or the whole of the premises, and who wrongfully refuses to give up possession. In Harding v. Crethorn (1793) 1 Esp. 57 Lord Kenyon put it thus:

“When a lease is expired the tenant’s responsibility is not at an end; for if the premises are in possession of an under-tenant, the landlord may refuse to accept the possession, and hold the original lessee liable; for the lessor is entitled to receive the absolute possession at the end of the term.”

In Ibbs v. Richardson (1839) 112 E.R. 1436 it was held that the landlord was entitled to recover from the tenant rent for the period he was kept out of possession by an under-tenant wrongfully holding over at the expiration of the lease and against the wishes of the tenant. Said Littledale J. at p. 1437.

“No doubt the ordinary course under these circumstances would be to bring ejectment; but the plaintiff may waive the tort, and sue for use and occupation; or he might have maintained an action for not delivering up possession. After a recovery in ejectment, he might have recovered mesne profits until the day when the possession was tendered to him; so here he may recover for that period.”

And in Henderson v. Squire (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 170 Blackburn J. said at pp.173-174:

“Here the tenant had sublet the premises to a man who, under some fancied claim of right, held over without the consent and against the will of the tenant, this landlord . . . It is true that there is very little authority on the question under discussion; but, independently of authority, on principle, seeing that the landlord gives the tenant absolute possession, it is the duty of the tenant to restore absolute possession.”

[p.199] of [1982-83] GLR 195

An exception occurs where the sub-tenant has by statute a personal right not to have an order for possession made against him unless certain specified conditions are fulfilled. Such was the case in Reynolds v. Bannerman [1922] 1 K.B. 719, C.A. There, the defendant gave the plaintiff, his landlord, due notice to quit, and also gave due notice to his sub-tenant of part of the premises to quit at the termination of the defendant’s tenancy. The sub-tenant, who was entitled under the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 to continue in occupation, refused to quit. The defendant duly gave up possession of his part of the premises to the plaintiff, but was unable to give vacant possession of the whole. The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant for rent up to the time the sub-tenant left the premises and recovered judgment.

On appeal, Acton J. said at p.726:

“…Harding v. Crethorn, Ibbs v. Richardson and Henderson v. Squire.. are all old cases and deal with the law as it was before the recent legislation, at a time when the tenant had it in his power to get rid of his sub-tenant by giving him notice to quit, and by following that up, if necessary, by appropriate legal proceedings… In the present case, although the defendant did everything in his power to get the sub-tenant out, and could do nothing more, the sub-tenant stayed on and moreover was entitled to stay on by the operation of a statutory enactment quite independently of any right derived from the defendant as her landlord. That seems to me to make the clearest possible distinction between those cases and the present case.”

The relevant provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, have found their way into our Rent Control Ordinance (No.2 of 1952), now repealed, and the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), s. 17 (5) and (6) of the latter of which provide as follows:

“17. (5) An order or judgment against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of any premises or ejectment therefrom made or given under the provisions of this section or of subsection (2) of section 25 shall not affect the right of any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof were lawfully sub-let before proceedings for recovery of possession or ejectment were commenced, to retain possession under this section, and every such order or judgment shall declare whether it shall be enforced against a sub-tenant or not.

(6) Any sub-tenant against whom an order or judgment is not enforceable shall, if he remains in possession after notice

[p.200] of [1982-83] GLR 195 of the order or judgment, cease to be a sub-tenant of the tenant and become a tenant of the landlord.”

Section 17 (1) of Act 220 states that no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of premises or for the ejectment therefrom shall be made except in the circumstances set out therein. Section 25 (2) deals with offences and gives the courts power to order the ejectment of a principal tenant. The effect of these provisions is that where a tenant has, during the tenancy, lawfully sub-let part of the premises, and he later gives the landlord and the sub-tenant proper notices to determine the tenancy and the sub-tenancy, he is not liable to the landlord for rent or for use and occupation or damages, if the sub-tenant remains in possession as a statutory tenant, as he will have done everything legally possible to give the landlord vacant possession.

Exhibit 9 shows that the sub-letting was to J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros., a partnership. The offer was made by the defendants on 28 December 1966. The firm paid six months’ rent advance and on 12 January 1967, wrote to accept the proposed terms. On 13 February 1967, the defendants wrote to their solicitors to ask them to prepare a sub-lease from them to J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros. They sent a copy to the plaintiff, and at the bottom of the copy wrote: “We are proposing to let the above bungalow and the store to Messrs J. K. Agbemabiase & Sons…”

By giving notice of their intention to grant a sub-lease the defendants were doing precisely what their own lease required, for by clause 2(h) thereof they agreed not to assign, underlet or part with the possession of the demised premises or any part thereof without the written consent of the plaintiff. That the plaintiff did not give a written consent is admitted, but the defendants contend that in the absence of an objection from the plaintiff they were entitled to assume that he had none and to proceed with the assignment.

The complicating factor here, however, is that at the time the defendants sought to bring their sub-lease to an end, their sub-lessees were not J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros., but Agbe & Co. Ltd. This is shown by exhibit 61, a letter dated 9 October, 1970, by which the defendants were informed that the company had taken over the business of J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros. It was on account of this that Agbe & Co. Ltd. were, on the application of the defendants, joined as third party to this suit. A sub-tenant of Agbe & Co. Ltd., Kwaku Amoah, applied, and was joined as a defendant.

The situation which arose with the take-over of the business of J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros. by Agbe & Co. Ltd. is well illustrated by the case of David Blackstone Ltd. v. Burnetts (West End) Ltd. [1973] 3 All E.R. 782, C.A. In that case, the defendants, who were

[p.201] of [1982-83] GLR 195 sub-lessees of certain office premises, obtained the necessary consent to sub-let to two gentlemen, Atkins and Davis, trading as Up West Flat Agency. However, the agreement, as executed, was in favour of Flat Finders Ltd., a company formed by Atkins.

In an action to recover possession, although the court granted relief against forfeiture on the ground of waiver, it was agreed that there had been a breach of the covenant against sub-letting without consent. It appears that the defendants in this case did not realise that with the take-over of the business of J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros. by Agbe & Co. Ltd., a new situation had arisen which required that they obtain a fresh consent from the plaintiff.

Having regard to the fact that the assignment was made in breach of covenant, I hold that it was unlawful and that Agbe & Co. Ltd., are not protected by section 17(5) of Act 220: see also Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd., v. Strutt [1954] 1 Q.B. 250, C.A. Their assignee, Kwaku Amoah, is also not a lawful sub-tenant.

In the course of the argument, counsel for the defendants drew attention to a letter which his firm wrote to Agbe & Co. Ltd. on 10 December, 1970. The letter, exhibit 42, is in the following terms:

“REGISTERED Messrs Agbe & Co. Ltd., Post Office Box No. 672, Kumasi.

Dear Sirs, PREMISES ON PLOTS 3, 4, 24 AND 25 AMAKOM ASHANTI – KUMASI.

We have been consulted by the landlord and the original tenants J. Monta and Messrs Paterson Simons (Ghana) Limited respectively, concerning the above premises which were let to Messrs. J. K. Agbemabiase & Brothers whose assets and liabilities you have now taken over to demand from you the sum of N¢630 as the arrears of rent due and owing by you to them in respect of your occupation of the above described premises for the period up to and including 30 November, 1970.

We are instructed by our clients that their tenancy of the premises expired absolutely on 30 November 1970 leaving them no option for the renewal of the tenancy thereof. Accordingly, they have already given you notice of the expiration of their tenancy of the premises on 30 November 1970.

In the circumstances, we are instructed to request settlement of the outstanding rent of N¢630 within a week from the date of

[p.202] of [1982-83] GLR 195 this letter and also to give you a month’s notice with effect from 1 January 1971 within which to give up vacant possession of the premises to our clients, failing which our clients will be constrained to take the requisite action as they will be advised to eject you from the premises and also to recover the rent in respect thereof.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.)

(J.J. Peele & Co.)

NSA/DKD.

Copies to:

(1) J. Monta & Sons, P. O. Box No. 303, Kumasi.

(2) Paterson Simons (Ghana) Ltd., P. O. Box 480, Accra.

See letter GM 21A dated 14/12/70 to Monta.”

Counsel suggested that in view of the demand for rent the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that the occupation of the premises by Agbe & Co. Ltd. was unlawful.

The documentary evidence shows that both the plaintiff and the defendant engaged the services of J. J. Peele & Co. as their solicitors. The sub-lease, exhibit E, was prepared by them, and they made themselves responsible for the payment of rent to the Lands Secretariat on behalf of the plaintiff. When in 1962 they discovered that the Akomfro stool from which the plaintiff held the land had been abolished in 1960 they wrote to the plaintiff to suggest that he paid a courtesy call on the occupant of the Manwere stool which was the successor to the Akomfro stool. For their part, the defendants, whose principal place of business is in Accra, had Lynes, Quashie Idun & Co. as their solicitors. They however engaged the services of J. J.

Peele & Co. whenever any matter required attention in Kumasi. The ad hoc nature of their relationship with J. J. Peele & Co. is apparent from exhibit 41, a letter addressed to Lynes, Quashie Idun & Co., in which the defendants refer to J. J. Peele & Co. as the plaintiff’s lawyer. Exhibits 38, 40 and 41 show that the defendants consulted Lynes, Quashie Idun & Co. about their difficulty in getting Agbe & Co. Ltd. to vacate the premises. In exhibit 39 dated 4 December 1970 the defendants told J. J. Peele & Co. that if Agbe & Co. did not vacate the

[p.203] of [1982-83] GLR 195 premises they should institute proceedings against them in their and the plaintiff’s name. It was on receipt of this letter that the solicitor wrote exhibit 42. Copies were sent to both the plaintiff and the defendants. On 14 December 1970, the defendants wrote to the plaintiff a letter, exhibit 43, which reads.

“GM. 21A 14 December 1970 Plots 3, 4, 24 and 25 Amakom, Kumasi Messrs. Agbe & Company Limited Mr. J. Monta, J. Monta & Sons Ltd., P. O. Box 1960, Kumasi.

Dear Mr. Monta, You will have received a copy of J. J. Peele’s letter of 10 December to Agbe & Company in which Mr.

Agbemabiase is given until the end of January to remove himself from your premises. I presume this period has been laid down in agreement with your goodself but I suggest you keep a close watch on the proceedings and ensure that – (a) the tenant is preparing to move; and (b) that sufficient of his property is attached to cover his outstanding rent to the end of January, 1971.

Yours sincerely, (Sgd.) R. C. Price Managing Director Ref. J.J. Peele’s letter Brief (192/70) 3869 dated 15 December 1970.”

The assumption made by the defendants that the plaintiff was privy to exhibit 42 does not appear to be justified having regard to the fact that the plaintiff had adopted the attitude that it was the business of the defendants, not his, to get the sub-tenants out of the premises. The defendants were told as much in exhibit 49, a letter dated 17 November 1970. What is more, the plaintiff could have had no interest whatsoever in the recovery of arrears of rent from Agbe & Co. Ltd. for any period before 1 December 1970 since they paid no rent to

[p.204] of [1982-83] GLR 195 him. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that exhibit 42 was written on the instructions of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleged a host of breaches of covenants by the defendants, of which sub-letting without necessary consent is only one. Others are the making of structural alterations and additions to the premises and change of user. Apart from the sub-letting to Agbe & Co Ltd., the plaintiff complained of subletting to Iron Industries Ltd. and C.F.C. Furniture Co. Ltd. The evidence is that the plaintiff was made aware of the sub-letting to Iron Industries Ltd. by exhibit 2, a letter dated 18th February 1965 and that C.F.C. Furniture Co. Ltd. by exhibit 11, the letter of 13 February, 1967. In exhibit 14, a letter dated 6 November 1967, the plaintiff told the Secretary of the Kumasi Town Planning Committee that the defendants had with his permission sub-let part of the premises. It is significant that in the letter the plaintiff mentioned J. K. Agbemabiase as one of the permitted sub-lessees.

There is, however, abundant evidence that the plaintiff protested vehemently against the structural changes and the change of user. Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 18-22, 23, 23A, 24 – 30 bear testimony to this but J. K. Agbemabiase & Bros., who were responsible, would not budge. The letters are dated between August, 1967 and 17 May 1968. A look at exhibit B shows that there was no restriction as to user. However, clause 2(c) did provide that the defendants should not make or permit to be made any alterations or additions to the premises without the written consent of the plaintiff. This consent, it appears, was neither sought nor given. The alterations and additions were in breach not only of clause 2(c) of exhibit B, but also of the corresponding covenants in exhibit 9.

In view of the conclusion I have come to that the sub-letting to Agbe & Co. Ltd. was unlawful, I hold that an obligation was placed upon the defendants to give vacant possession of the whole premises to the plaintiff. In the circumstances of this case, it was not enough that they gave to the plaintiff proper notice to determine the tenancy, and to Agbe & Co. Ltd. proper notice to quit. Having failed to give complete possession of the premises at the end of the tenancy the defendants are liable for the period their sub-tenant has wrongfully held over.

It is not clear from the documentary evidence whether the plaintiff refused to accept possession of that part of the premises not in the occupation of Agbe & Co. Ltd. Although in exhibit 49 dated 17 November 1970, he warned that the defendants would still be liable for rent if their sub-tenants did not leave, by exhibit 51 written three days later, he submitted to the defendants an estimate of the cost of repairs to the premises on the determination of the sub-lease. These

[p.205] of [1982-83] GLR 195 repairs the plaintiff carried out himself and by exhibit 52, dated 5 July 1971, asked to be reimbursed in the sum of ¢4,531.25.

Significantly, the repairs to that part of the premises in the occupation of Agbe & Co. Ltd. were not carried out and the estimated cost amounting to C817.20 was deferred. Exhibit 54 shows that the cost of repairs was settled by the defendants crediting the plaintiff with an equivalent sum in their books, he being at the time indebted to the defendants in the sum of ¢9,675. 1 do not see how the plaintiff could have entered and effected the repairs unless he had been given possession of at least that part of the premises. Therefore, while rejecting the claim of the plaintiff to recover from the defendants rents for the whole premises, I hold that the defendants are bound to pay a proportionate rent for the part still in the occupation of their sub-tenants until the plaintiff recovers possession thereof.

I grant the claim for possession and order that Agbe & Co. Ltd. and Kwaku Amoah vacate the premises forthwith. Exhibit 9 shows that Agbe & Co. Ltd. paid rent of ¢156 per month. I order that the plaintiff recover from the defendants the sum of ¢20,592 being proportionate rent from 1 December 1970. I see from exhibit 51 that the cost of repairs to the part of the premises occupied by Agbe & Co. Ltd. was in November 1970 estimated at ¢817.20. In the absence of further evidence, I accept that estimate as the reasonable cost of repairs and order that it be paid by the defendants. In the result, I enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff, and against the defendants, in the sum of ¢21,409.20 with costs assessed at ¢3,000. The defendants have asked to be indemnified by the third party. I agree that they are entitled to an indemnity. Accordingly, I order that upon payment of the judgment debt and costs of ¢24,409.20 the defendants are to recover from Agbe & co. Ltd. the said sum of ¢24,409.20 together with their own costs assessed at ¢2,000.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

K. B.

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