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[1981] SLR (HC) 27High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

NANA HYEAMAN II vs. OSEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 495

6 April 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 27
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OSCOLANANA HYEAMAN II v OSEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 495 [1981] SLR (HC) 27
APANANA HYEAMAN II v OSEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 495, [1981] SLR (HC) 27 (Ghana).
BluebookNANA HYEAMAN II v OSEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 495, [1981] SLR (HC) 27 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ofori Attah II v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 32.

(2) B.P (West Africa) Ltd. v. Boateng [1963] 1 G.L.R. 232.

(3) Frimpong v. Nana Asare Obeng II [1974] 1 G.L.R. 16.

(4) R.v. Loxdale (1758) 1 Burr. 445; 97 E.R. 394.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on preliminary objection raised by the defendants regarding the capacity of the plaintiff, a stool occupant, to institute an action challenging the validity of a purported concession affecting his land.

COUNSEL

Mr. Polley for the plaintiff-respondent.

Mr. Boateng for the first defendant-applicant.

Mr. Gwira for the second defendant.

Mr. Amaning, Senior State Attorney, the fourth defendant.

Dr. Tackie Otoo for the co-defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

The preliminary question that erupted in this proceeding is whether the plaintiff, who is the divisional chief of Gwira Banso in the Gwira Traditional Area, has capacity to institute an action for the cancellation and setting aside of a timber lease of a piece or parcel of land attached to his stool. Counsel for the defendants and co-defendants submitted that there is no such capacity and referred to the Concessions Act, 1962 (Act 124) in substantiation of their submission, particularly section 16 thereof. The answer to the question therefore requires the interpretation of section 16 of Act 124 which provides:

“16. (1) All lands referred to in subsection (2) or subsection (4) of section 4 of the Forests Ordinance (Cap. 157) and which have been constituted or proposed to be constituted as forest reserves under that Ordinance and all lands deemed to be constituted as forest reserves under subsection

(7) of this section are hereby vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned:

[p.497] of [1982-83] GLR 495

Provided that all rights, customary or otherwise, in such lands validly existing immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue on and after such commencement subject to this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force.

(2) All lands which in the future shall be proposed to be constituted as forest reserves under the Forests Ordinance (Cap. 157) shall become vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned with effect from the date of the publication of the notice relating to such land and prescribed under section 5 (1) of that Ordinance.

(3) Any land, other than land referred to in the preceding subsections, subject to the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 and in respect of which rights have been granted with respect to timber or trees under any concession and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act are vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned, subject to the terms of the concession, this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force.

(4) All rights with respect to timber or trees on any land other than land specified in the preceding subsections of this section are vested in the President in trust for stools concerned.

(5) It shall be lawful for the President to execute any deed or do any act as a trustee in respect of lands or rights referred to in this section.

(6) Any revenue from lands or rights vested in the President under this section or derived under subsection (11) shall be collected, paid in and disbursed as provided by the Administration of Lands Act, 1962.”

As seems clear from their plausible submissions, counsel for the defendant and co-defendants were apparently influenced in their view by the magic words “vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned” used in the section and were thus induced to opine that the Act had in effect taken away the tradition-clothed powers of our chiefs over stool lands. They submitted in concert that only the President could institute proceedings, as trustee, on behalf of the stools concerned. That there has been in the preand immediate post-independence decades, a sustained legislative incursion into the traditional powers of our chiefs over their stool lands needs hardly be over-emphasised. The policy rationale assignable to this piecemeal legislative nibbling of the authority of our chiefs has been the compelling need to ensure efficient administration of stool lands for the public benefit because land has ever been and still is the fulcrum to our economic survival. It seems therefore necessary to throw a searchlight on the amplitude of the relevant statutes and case law in order

[p.498] of [1982-83] GLR 495 properly to appraise their impact and effect on the traditional authority of our stools.

First in the series was the Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 64 (1951 Rev.), ss. 72 and 75 of which vested the management of stool lands in the urban or local councils and insisted upon the concurrence of these councils in the disposal of stool lands. In Ofori Attah II v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 32 at pp. 34-35, Ollennu J. (as he then was) said:

“In my opinion the powers of management of stool lands given to local government bodies by statute and the statutory provisions that transfer of any stool land in a state should be with the consent of the state council has not changed the native custom as to who is entitled to litigate in respect of stool lands. The position remains as it was, title in stool land is vested in the particular stool, and definitely it is only the occupant of that stool who is vested with authority to litigate the stool’s title to the land.”

The next important legislation was the Stool Lands Control Act, 1959 (No. 79 of 1959), s. 7 of which transferred to the Governor-General the powers of urban and local councils over stool lands. In interpreting this section, Akainyah J. (as he then was) held in B.P. (West Africa) Ltd. v. Boateng [1963] 1 G.L.R. 232 at p. 237 that the statute did not take away the ownership of stool land from the stools concerned. The Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), followed in sequence and by its section 1, the management of all stool lands was vested in the minister to whom functions under the Act were assigned by the President. On the authority of Ofori Attah II v. Mensah (supra), the management of stool lands by the minister did not imply that the rights of the occupants of a stool land had been taken away by the Act. Three sections of the Act are most germane to our inquiry. These are sections 2, 7 and 8 respectively of Act 123 which read as follows:

“2. The President may direct the institution or defence of, or intervention in, any proceedings relating to any Stool land in the name of the Republic, on behalf, and to the exclusion, of any Stool concerned, and may compromise or settle any such proceedings . . .

7. (1) Where it appears to the President that it is in the public interest so to do he may, by executive instrument, declare any Stool land to be vested in him in trust and accordingly it shall be lawful for the President, on the publication of the instrument, to execute any deed or do any act as a trustee in respect of the land specified in the instrument . . .

[p.499] of [1982-83] GLR 495

8. (1) Any disposal of any land which involves the payment of any valuable consideration or which would, by reason of its being to a person not entitled by customary law to the free use of land, involve the payment of any such consideration, and which is made,

(a) by a Stool;

(b) by any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under customary law, has acquired possession of such land either without payment of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal consideration, shall be subject to the concurrence of the

Minister and shall be of no effect unless such concurrence is granted.”

In my opinion, any interpretation of sections 2, 7 and 8 of Act 123 to the effect that the Act takes away completely the ownership rights of a stool to lands attached to it would be an unwarranted detour from well-articulated judicial opinion on the legislative intention in enacting such laws. A careful look at the words “in trust” or “as a trustee” used in sections 2 and 7 of Act 123 reveals that they are not intended to mean that the stools have no rights whatsoever over stool lands. For example, under section 8 of the Act, the stool can make grants of stool land vested in the President. The only fetter on this right is that the concurrence of the minister is required to validate the grant. If the legislature intended that all rights vested in a stool should be taken away, it would not have enacted section 8 of the Act. In Frimpong v. Nana Asare Obeng II [1974] 1 G.L.R. 16 at p. 20, Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) had this to say:

“. . . I am of the view that section 2 of Act 123 does not take away the inherent right of occupants of stools to maintain actions in respect of their respective stool lands. The very wording of section 2 of Act 123 recognises this fact . . .”

Now it becomes crystal clear, when section 2 of Act 123 is read in conjunction with sections 7 and 8 of the Act, that the words “in trust” used in section 7 do not exclude the inherent right of stools to maintain actions in respect of stool lands even though the Act says that stool lands are vested in the President in trust for the stool. The views of Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) on the construction of Act 123 are unexceptionable and I fully indorse them.

Having perhaps hopefully succeeded in prying into the ambit of statutory provisions affecting stool lands, the problem facing us becomes a good deal narrower than it initially was because the statutes so far examined bear close affinity to Act 124. The juxtaposition of Acts 123 and 124 is in itself of tremendous significance, for they reflect a continuing legislative response to one identifiable [p.500] of [1982-83] GLR 495 problem, namely how best stool lands can be administered to optimum public advantage. Under section 16 (3) of Act 124 all lands subject to Act 123 and all lands referred to in the subsection are vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned. The sole purpose of the Act was to provide that the Concessions Ordinance, Cap. 136 (1951 Rev.), with certain exceptions spelled out in section 1 of the Act shall cease to apply to stool lands. The Concessions Act therefore did not in any way affect the operation of Act 123. Rather, the Act extended the Presidential trusteeship idea to cover lands subject to existing or future concessions.

There is one sure way of grasping the nettle in this case and it is by no means difficult. One just has to identify the areas of material similarities in the congeries of statutes affecting lands. I prefer to subsume them under what I call “praedial legislation,” that is to say, legislation pertaining to land. It becomes obvious, if we adopt the purpose—oriented policy of statutory interpretation, that the legislature had never had the intention of depriving the stools of this country of their inherent right to ownership of stool land, notwithstanding statutory provisions entrusting stool lands to the President for the stools.

This is made manifest by the fact that in one statute, Act 123, there is a provision in section 8 to the effect that stools can make grants of stool lands even though the same lands may have been entrusted to the President. The meaning of such words as “vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned” should be construed univocally in both Acts 123 and 124. The provisions are “in pari materia” and ought to bear the same construction. As Lord Mansfield enunciated with typical lucidity in R. v. Loxdale (1758) 1 Burr. 445 at p.447:

“Where there are different statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other.”

After an incisive study of the provisions of Acts 123 and 124, I am impelled irresistibly to the firm conclusion that there is nothing, open or esoteric, in the two statutes which would suggest, even faintly, that the legislature by enacting that stool lands including those subject to existing or future concessions shall be vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned intended that the stools should be denuded of their inherent rights to ownership of stool lands. The statutory powers of the President must be construed as running side by side with the powers of the stools as the allodial owners of stool lands.

No doubt a stool land can lawfully be taken away to a concessionaire under the provisions of the Concessions Act, but before such a

[p.501] of [1982-83] GLR 495 process is brought into fruition, the right of the stool to deal with the land in a manner not inconsistent with the provisions of Act 123 still persists. For example, the stool can sue in trespass to the land. It follows that the occupant of the stool can without any inhibition challenge the validity of a purported concession affecting his stool land. This is exactly what the plaintiff in this case seeks to do. He cannot be hamstrung by facile arguments that stool lands are vested in the President. For these reasons I hold that the objection to the capacity of the plaintiff is untenable and is accordingly overruled. The plaintiff is awarded ¢300 costs.

DECISION

Preliminary objection overruled.

J. K. E. E.

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