REPUBLIC vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE OWUSU [1982-83] GLR 311
21 August 1981 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 14 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 32Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) De Bussche v. Alt (1878) 8 Ch.D. 286, C.A.
(2) Pergamon Press, Re [1971] Ch. 388; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 792; [1970] 3 All E.R. 535; 144 S.J. 569, C.A. affirming [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1075; [1970] 2 All E.R. 449; 114 S.J. 354.
(3) Republic v. State Hotels Corporation; Ex parte Yeboah [1980] G.L.R. 875, C.A.
(4) Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77; [1964] 3 All E.R. 865; 108 S.J. 896, P.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the applicant for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the government dismissing him summarily as the managing director of the Ghana National Trading Corporation. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman for the applicant.
J. O. Lindsay for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF KORSAH J.
By his motion the applicant seeks the following reliefs:
“(a) an order of certiorari to bring up and quash the report of the second respondents containing adverse findings against the applicant and recommendations for his dismissal from the post of managing director of the Ghana National Trading Corporation by reason of the ¢29 million watch straps affair;
(b) an order of certiorari to bring up and quash the decision of either the government or the third respondent or both purporting to dismiss the appellant from his post of
[p.315] of [1982-83] GLR 311 managing director of the Ghana National Trading Corporation; and (c) an order of mandamus directing the applicant’s reinstatement forthwith as managing director of the Ghana National Trading Corporation.”
The facts leading to the interdiction of the applicant on 23 March 1981, are as stated in the ruling in miscellaneous application No. 113/81. Before his interdiction on 23 March 1981, the chairman of the State Enterprises Commission (SEC) had addressed the following communication to the chairman of the board of directors of the Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC) with a copy to the applicant. The letter is dated 20 March 1981:
“Dear Sir, PURCHASE OF METALLIC WATCH STRAPS STATIONERY/NOVELS AND MOSQUITO NETS We write to confirm the discussions we had with you this morning in Parliament House concerning some purchases made by the Ghana National Trading Corporation recently.
Our information is that the corporation recently made the following purchases:
Watch straps — ¢29 million Mosquito netting — ¢2 million Novels — ¢10 million If our information is true, then we would like to ascertain the rationale in spending about ¢40 million on only two apparently slow moving items in a trading organisation which is supposed to stock a variety of items. In consequence, we understand the corporation is having difficulty in finding cash to meet other commitments.
As discussed, the commission has decided to request Mr. E. N. A. Thompson, a member of this commission, to carry out some investigations into the purchasing procedures and cash flows of the corporation with particular reference to the purchasing of the above items to enable the commission to advise you and the government.
We have already informed the managing director (i.e., the applicant) verbally of our intentions and we hope we can rely on your co-operation.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) I. D. Ewun-Tohma CHAIRMAN
[p.316] of [1982-83] GLR 311 cc: Managing Director, GNTC, Ghana House, Accra Principal Secretary, Ministry of Trade.”
The SEC is a statutory body set up under the State Enterprises Commission Decree, 1976 (SMCD 10). The functions of the commission are spelt out in section 4 (1) of the Decree. They include:
“(d) as a matter of urgency, undertake a thorough management audit to determine the suitability of present incumbents of top management positions in all statutory corporations;
(e) advise Government on the appointment of Managing Directors and their deputies, Secretaries and Executive Secretaries, and also advise on the suitability of persons being considered for appointments to Board memberships of statutory corporations;
(f) devise and introduce a proper appraisal system so as to be able to report objectively on the performance of the Managing Directors and other incumbents of top management positions of all statutory corporations and to recommend to the appropriate appointing authority any necessary remedial action.”
Representatives of the commission met the applicant before they commenced their investigation on 23 March 1981. At that meeting, the applicant furnished the commission with a copy of a reply which he had sent to the minister giving an explanation regarding the purchases, the subject-matter of the inquiry.
On Monday 23 March 1981, the day on which Mr. Thompson commenced his investigation on behalf of the commission, the applicant was, by a letter of even date, interdicted from work. The date on the report of the commission indicates that it was completed and bound by 28 April 1981.
On 8 May 1981, the government caused the government controlled Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast that the applicant had been summarily dismissed as managing director of GNTC.
The applicant claims that the decision of the government to dismiss him summarily was based on a recommendation of the board of directors which was in turn based on the recommendations contained in the report of the SEC. The main shaft of his attack is, therefore, against the recommendations of the report of the SEC.
The first ground on which relief is sought is that: “the appointment of the State Enterprises Commission to carry out an inquiry into the ¢29 million watch straps affair of the Ghana National Trading Corporation was irregular in procedure.” This challenge to the
[p.317] of [1982-83] GLR 311 appointment of the SEC to conduct an inquiry was not substantiated in the address of counsel for the applicant.
By section 4 (1) (a) of SMCD 10, the commission is imbued with both advisory and executive powers with authority to exercise and analyse critically the operation of any statutory corporation with a view to making detailed recommendations to the government. It seems to me therefore, that the commission does not have to be appointed to conduct an inquiry into any aspect of a corporation’s business. It is already there, set up for that purpose. All that is required to set them in motion is for information to reach the commission that some matter relating to the business management of a corporation demands their attention.
Indeed, it appears from the introduction to the report under attack and from the affidavit of Mr. Thompson deposed to on behalf of the commission, that the commission received a report concerning the purchase of ¢29 million worth of watch straps by GNTC, and the liquidity problems of the corporation; that as courtesy demanded, the chairman of the commission and another member met the chairman of the board of directors of GNTC and an agreement was reached between them to conduct the investigation which the commission was empowered by statute to conduct. In my view, there could be no appointment of the commission by GNTC and there was no such appointment of the commission by the corporation, which could be categorised as irregular.
It was the commission itself which, after deliberation, appointed Mr. E. N. A. Thompson, a member of the commission, to carry out a special investigation of GNTC with the following objectives:
“(a) to ascertain the circumstances leading to the purchase by Ghana National Trading Corporation of the following items:
(i) Watch straps — ¢29 million (ii) Mosquito netting — ¢2 million (iii) Novels — ¢10 million (b) to determine whether the purchase was financially and commercially prudent and in the interest of the corporation having regard to the cash position of the corporation at the time of the purchase and the rate of movement of the items; and (c) to examine the purchasing procedures and limits of authorisation and to see whether the purchasing procedures are sound.”
This appointment of Mr. Thompson by the commission also displeased the applicant. It was contended on behalf of the applicant
[p.318] of [1982-83] GLR 311 that the commission had no power under the instrument of its creation to delegate its authority and powers to one member.
I do not think there was any delegation of authority here. Mr. E. N. A. Thompson is an accountant. Other members of the commission have other skills and callings. The inquiry he was requested to conduct was essentially an audit inquiry. An audit inquiry—it is asserted by counsel for the commission and it was not challenged—is concerned principally with the examination of books of accounts, records of transactions, financial management procedures including purchasing procedures, and to assess whether these procedures are in line with sound economic procedures, and if so whether these procedures are being followed. Such an examination can best be done by a person who is an accountant. And it is the common practice of accountants to send one or more of their number to gather the information from which conclusions can be derived. Mr. Thompson, it seems to me, did no more than gather information for the consideration of the commission as a whole.
Even if asking Mr. Thompson to gather this information amounted to a delegation by the commission of its authority, it must be remembered that the general rule against delegation is subject to several exceptions. In certain instances an authority to delegate may be implied. As Thesigor L.J. said in De Bussche v. Alt (1878) 8 Ch.D. 286 at pp. 310-311, C.A.;
“[A]n authority to the effect referred to may and should be implied where, from the conduct of the parties to the original contract of agency, the usage of trade, or the nature of the particular business which is the subject of the agency, it may reasonably be presumed that the parties to the contract of agency originally intended that such authority should exist, or where, in the course of the employment, unforeseen emergencies arise which impose upon the agent the necessity of employing a substitute.”
In my view, there was no delegation of authority by the commission. The only reasonable way of carrying out their audit inspection was to despatch one of their number who is an accountant to gather for them the required information for the consideration of the commission. The report and advises which were sent to the government were that of the SEC and not that of Mr. E. N. A. Thompson.
The applicant also complains that: “the conduct of the said inquiry was vitiated by multiple breaches of the duty in natural justice to afford the applicant a fair and adequate hearing.” The particulars he listed under this complaint are:
(i) He was not informed of the true nature and purpose of the said inquiry but was misled about the same.
[p.319] of [1982-83] GLR 311
(ii) He was given only one day’s notice to appear before the one-man committee of inquiry which in the circumstances was inadequate and unfair.
(iii) By his unlawful interdiction on 23 March 1981 the applicant was denied access to all documentation he needed in order to make relevant explanations, give effective answers or to exculpate himself from blame.
(iv) The applicant was afforded no opportunity to confront and cross-examine any person who had said anything adverse about him.
From the documentary evidence before this court, as well as matters deposed to in the several affidavits, it is clear to me that before the chairman of the SEC wrote his letter of 20 March 1981, to the chairman of the board of directors of the corporation, the commission had already informed the applicant of the intentions of the commission: see the last paragraph of the said letter. It is likewise clear to me that the nature of the investigations and the persons to whom advises would flow from the commission were equally well set out in the said letter.
The said letter was copied to the applicant, and was confirmatory of information which had already been made known to him. It does not lie in his mouth to say that he was not apprised of the true nature of the investigation or that he was given only one day’s notice to appear. He was informed before the letter was written that an investigation was to be conducted. The letter was written on 20 March and he was interdicted on 23 March.
The investigation was purely an audit inquiry. It was mainly concerned with documents such as local purchase orders, invoices, store movement notes and payment vouchers which spoke for themselves. There is no allegation that during the investigation the applicant was refused access to any file or document which would throw a different light on the matters considered by the investigators. His interdiction was as beneficial to him as it was to the corporation—the corporation could not accuse him of having destroyed material documents nor could he destroy material documents to the detriment of the corporation. But this did not disentitle him to call for files and documents to explain any point he wished.
An audit inquiry is not a lis inter partes. In it, documents are your accusers, unless they be forged. A person making an audit inquiry is not under any duty to adopt a procedure analogous to a judicial procedure. He is not required to determine questions of law and fact. He does not exercise a limited or judicial discretion. But the SEC is not just an audit unit for the government. It has wide powers to make far-reaching recommendations which may have wide repercussions. To borrow the language of Lord Denning M.R. in Re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 535 at p. 539, C.A.;
[p.320] of [1982-83] GLR 311
“They may, if they think fit, make findings of fact which are very damaging to those whom they name. They may accuse some; they may condemn others; they may ruin reputations or careers. Their report may lead to judicial proceedings. It may expose persons to criminal prosecution or to civil actions . . .
Seeing that their work and their report may lead to such consequences, I am clearly of opinion that the inspectors [substitute State Enterprises Commission] must act fairly. This is a duty which rests on them, as on many other bodies, although they are not judicial, nor quasi-judicial, but only administrative: see R. v.
Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim [1970] 2 All E.R. 528. The inspectors can obtain information in any way which they think best, but before they condemn or criticise a man, they must give him a fair opportunity for correcting or contradicting what is said against him. They need not quote chapter and verse. An outline of the charge will usually suffice.”
It appears to me, from all the material available to the court that this is exactly what Mr. Thompson did. But even if he did not do so, is an order of certiorari available to the applicant to quash the decision of either or both the government and the third respondent purporting to dismiss him?
In Part V of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, it is provided under section 20 that:
“20. Until Parliament enacts an Act of Parliament in accordance with article 159 of this Constitution for the establishment or operation of a public corporation, a public corporation in existence before the coming into force of this Constitution shall continue its operations under the enactment under which it was established.”
Under the enactment under which it was established, the applicant was appointed managing director of the Ghana National Trading Corporation by a letter dated 21 May 1981, written under the hand of the President by virtue of Part VI, para (3) of the Ghana National Trading Corporation Instrument, 1965 (LI 395). The seventh paragraph of the letter of appointment recites that:
“The appointment may be terminated by either side upon giving three months’ notice in writing or the payment of three months’ salary in lieu of such notice. The President, however, reserves the right to dismiss you for stated misconduct.”
These conditions of service do not insist on the audi alteram partem rule before punishment is imposed or a dismissal effected. It is the
[p.321] of [1982-83] GLR 311 ordinary case of an employment by a master of a servant under a contract of service.
In such cases, there is a long line of authorities establishing that employers are legally entitled to dismiss their employees provided the relevant facts and the express or implied terms of the relevant contract of employment empower them to do so. If, however, an employer wrongfully dismissed an employee, the employee could maintain an action only to recover damages for wrongful dismissal, but not to obtain an order that he or she should be reinstated or that the dismissal is null and void.
This principle of the law was applied in Republic v. State Hotels Corporation; Ex parte Yeboah [1980] G.L.R. 875, C.A. Edusei J.A. quoted the following passage with approval from the opinion of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva [1964] 3 All E.R. 865 at p. 867, C.A.
“The law is well settled if, where there is an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, the master terminates the contract the servant cannot obtain an order of certiorari. If the master rightfully ends the contract there can be no complaint; if the master wrongfully ends the contract then the servant can pursue a claim for damages.”
The learned judge of the Court of Appeal then, continued at p. 880:
“It seems clear to me therefore that the remedy of certiorari is not open to the respondents to quash the decision of the State Hotels Corporation to terminate their appointments, and in this respect the trial judge faulted. If the respondents, as servants of the State Hotels Corporation, think that the termination of their appointments was wrongful, their remedy is to pursue a claim for damages for breach of contract, and not to bring up and quash the decision of dismissal by certiorari proceedings.”
In the present application as in that, the remedy of certiorari is not available to the applicant. If the applicant claims that his dismissal was wrongful, he may pursue a claim for damages for breach of contract.
If certiorari is not available to the applicant to quash the dismissal itself then it is not available to him to bring up and quash any intermediary proceedings leading up to the dismissal. This situation is different from one where the writ is available to an applicant, but will not lie to quash a decision. Here it is not available to him at all.
The applications for orders of certiorari to bring up and quash the report and decisions of the respondents are refused. It follows that no
[p.322] of [1982-83] GLR 311 order of mandamus can be granted directing the respondents to reinstate the applicant forthwith. I award cost of ¢500 to each respondent against the applicant.
DECISION Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
