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[1981] SLR (HC) 4High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ESSUON vs. KWAW [1981] GLR 653

8 May 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 4
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OSCOLAESSUON v KWAW [1981] GLR 653 [1981] SLR (HC) 4
APAESSUON v KWAW [1981] GLR 653, [1981] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookESSUON v KWAW [1981] GLR 653, [1981] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Tackie v. Baroudi [1977] 1 G.L.R. 36, C.A.

(2) Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 115.

(3) Ofori v. Donkor [1976] 1 G.L.R. 275.

(4) Grisby v. Jubwe (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 637.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION by the defendant resident and doing business in Kumasi, objecting to the jurisdiction of the High Court, Sekondi, under Order 5, r. 1 (6) and (8) of L.N. 140A, to hear a suit filed against him after he had first entered a conditional appearance. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Acquaye for the defendant-applicant.

Forson for the plaintiff- respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

Upon receipt of the writ of summons, the defendant herein caused his solicitor to enter a conditional appearance or appearance under protest. Thereafter, the solicitor filed a motion on notice praying this court for an order that: (a) the plaintiff’s statement of claim be set aside as being irregular and (b) the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Counsel argued only the second limb of the relief he sought. He referred to Order 5, r. 1 (6) and (8) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), as substituted by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1979 (L.I. 1107), and submitted that since the defendant in this case resides and carries on business in Kumasi, it is the High Court, Kumasi, which has jurisdiction over the matter and that the action has been instituted in the wrong court.

Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that Order 5, r. 1 (6) was applicable to the case since it requires that this action ought to have been instituted at the High Court, Kumasi, because the defendant resides and carries on business in Kumasi. The concession made by the counsel for the plaintiff implied an admission that he had sued in the wrong court. He contended, however, that under Order 5, r. 1 (8), this court could still exercise jurisdiction over the matter. Rule 1 (8) provides that notwithstanding the institution of an action in the wrong court, the action can still be tried by the court unless the court reports the pendency of the case to the Chief Justice and the latter orders a transfer or if the defendant raises an objection to the jurisdiction of the court before or at the time he is required to plead in the action.

[p.656] of [1981] GLR 653

Counsel’s arguments were therefore concentrated on the question of whether the applicant who had entered a conditional appearance and followed it up with a motion objecting to the jurisdiction, had properly availed himself of the provision. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that on a proper construction of rule 1 (8), the time required for pleading commenced right from the time the defendant files an entry of appearance and that since the defendant filed an appearance, he had by conduct, submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. He referred to Straud’s Judicial Dictionary (4th ed.) (Vol. 4), p. 2039 on the definition of “pleading.” There it is stated:

“Pleading: In the Judicature Acts ‘pleading’ shall include any petition or summons, and shall also, include the statements in writing of the claim, or demand of any plaintiff, and of the defence of any defendant thereto, and of the reply of the plaintiff to any counter-claim of a defendant.”

This definition of “pleading” has been adopted hook, line and sinker under the interpretation section, i.e. Order 1 of our High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954. It therefore becomes obvious that the definition of “pleading” under our rules does not include the appearance filed by the defendant because an appearance is not a statement in writing of the defence of the defendant. It follows, in my view, that the time required of the defendant to plead is when he is required to file a statement of defence. Counsel’s submission therefore, unfortunately, carries its own refutation, or still worse, the seeds for its destruction. Never, throughout the practice of the courts, has a notice of entry of appearance, conditional or unconditional, been subsumed under the rubric of pleadings. It is a tribute to the draftsmanship of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954, that a separate Order (Order 12), is devoted for the rules relating to “APPEARANCE” distinguishing it from Order 19 which is devoted to “PLEADING.” If appearance formed part of pleadings, the draftsman would for convenience sake, if for no other reason, have treated it under Order 19.

Counsel for the plaintiff, still undaunted, argued that the purpose for entering a conditional appearance was to enable the defendant take out a summons or serve notice of motion to set aside the service upon him of the writ or notice of the writ; or to discharge the order authorising such service but not to object to the jurisdiction of the court. There is no gainsaying the omission of a provision in our rules of court to the effect that a conditional appearance may be entered for the purpose of taking

[p.657] of [1981] GLR 653

objection to the jurisdiction of the court. But this hiatus is air-tightly filled by Order 74 of our rules which provides:

“Where no provision is made by these Rules the procedure, practice and forms in force for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England shall, so far as can be conveniently applied, be in force in the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast.-”

The practice in force in the High Court in England has been succinctly stated at p. 183 of the English Annual Practice (The White Book) (1962 ed.) and it is to the effect that:

“. . . a conditional appearance may be entered to prevent judgment in default, where there is a bona fide intention to apply promptly to set aside the writ or service of the writ on the ground of irregularity of the writ or service, or do deny the jurisdiction.”

I think the practice of entering a conditional appearance for the purpose of denying the jurisdiction of the court has so firmly gained ground in our courts that it cannot be blown off by a side-wind. A few cases referred to me by counsel for the applicant in which the practice has been recognised by our courts are: Tackie v. Baroudi [1977] 1 G.L.R. 36, C.A.; Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 115 and Ofori v. Donkor [1976] 1 G.L.R. 275. There may be cases where a defendant may be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he has taken a vital step in the proceedings. Thus in Grisby v. Jubwe (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 637 a diplomat who had entered appearance and argued in opposition to a motion by the plaintiff and further accepted an order of the court that the parties should file pleadings was not allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction. The facts of this case are distinguishable because the defendant attended the hearing and lost the suit and later on raised the question of jurisdiction on appeal. A party who enters a conditional appearance cannot be said to have taken any step resembling submission to the jurisdiction. The applicant in the instant case has taken a timeous objection to the jurisdiction and his application succeeds.

The applicant is awarded ¢300 costs.

DECISION

Application granted.

J. K. E. E.

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