FORSON vs. ADDISON [1981] GLR 518
24 February 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 4 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Pollard, Re (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 106; 5 Moo. P.C.C.N. 111.
(2) Amenlemah II v. Arizi Polley II [1965] G.L.R. 405.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for a writ of attachment for contempt of court wherein the respondent raised a preliminary objection on the ground that the application was incompetent upon a proper construction of Order 59, r. 21 of L.N. 140A. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.
COUNSEL
K. Brenu for the applicant.
Gaisie for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
On 23 January 1981, Mr. Ebo Bentsi-Enchill, counsel for the plaintiff herein, filed a motion on notice under Order 59, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A). By that motion, this court was called upon to exercise its prerogative, power to commit to prison, one J. K. Addison, the defendant in this suit. The motion accused J. K. Addison of wilful refusal to comply with an order of the court given on 7 March 1980, to file what the applicant described as “proper accounts” in respect of three named persons. According to the applicant, the court fixed one month from the date of the order as the deadline for its compliance. Inasmuch as the defendant defaulted in rendering the “proper accounts,” he was, in the opinion of the applicant, guilty of contempt of court and liable to imprisonment. The motion was duly served on the defendant and his solicitor, Mr. Gaisie. The
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latter has raised a preliminary point in law of procedural character. The point consisted of a complaint that the application was incompetent because it was not made in consequence of a prior leave of the court. In other words, the objectioner contended that the grant of leave of the court was a precondition for the institution of contempt proceedings. The buttress for this submission was the explanatory note in the English Annual Practice (The White Book) (1962 ed.), pp. 1742-1743. There was another criticism of the motion. It was argued that the application ought to have been brought under Order 52, rr. 2 and 4.
Needless to point out, Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 when carefully construed, deal with a motion for a rule nisi, an order to show cause, a motion to set aside, remit or enforce an award, or a motion for attachment, and they enjoin applicants to state in general terms, the grounds of their motions. No relevance whatsoever can, in my view, be attached to Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 in resolving the issue that has arisen for determination.
The focal point of the issue is the true construction of Order 59, r. 21. Here, as I have said, the view of Mr. Gaisie diverges sharply from that of Mr. Kweku Brenu for the applicant who argued, in effect, that the prior leave of the court was not required to validate an application for the committal of a person who has disobeyed an order of the court. And he urged the court to subscribe to that view as the true meaning of Order 59, r. 21. The latter rule, draws a sharp distinction between two categories of contempt.
The first category includes contempts committed in facie curiae (in the face of the court) such as insulting a judge or disturbing or obstructing the orderly proceedings of a court. Falling under this category also are acts committed or omitted in disobedience of a lawful order of a court. Contempts of this nature are committed either in the full view of the court or with the knowledge that the court will be aware of it when it comes to supervise an order made. Ex facie contempts or disobedience of court orders are punishable by imprisonment by a peremptory or instantaneous order on the court’s own motion: see Re Pollard (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 106.
The second category of contempt is less obvious than the first and is committed outside the view of the court and has nothing to do with the disobedience of an order of a court. This consists of acts prejudicial to or obstructive of the administration of justice, or the due course of the law; or prejudicial comments by newspapers on cases pending before the court; or intimidation or corruption of a judge or juror; or general attacks on the courts or judges. In all these cases, the court does not exercise its punitive powers on
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its own motion. It is first necessary to ask for leave to apply for a writ of attachment against the culprit. An application for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari, like an application for a writ of attachment, requires prior leave of the court and it must be accompanied by a statement and an affidavit of the grounds for the issue of the writ: see Order 59, r. 21 (1) and (2) and Amenlemah II v. Arizi Polley II [1965] G.L.R. 405.
The foregoing analysis crystallises the fact that the contempt complained of in the instance case, falls within the first category of contempt. Consequently, prior leave of the court is unnecessary. The motion is therefore competent. The objection is untenable and cannot be upheld. The applicant can therefore proceed. Case adjourned to 3 March 1981.
DECISION Preliminary objection dismissed.
J. K. E. E.
