FYNN vs. STATE FISHING CORPORATION AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 887
25 May 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 35 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Amadjei v. Opoku Ware [1963] 1 G.L.R. 150, S.C.
(2) Onogen v. Leventis & Co. Ltd. [1959] G.L.R. 105.
(3) Appiah v. Mensah [1978] G.L.R. 342.
(4) Chic Fashion (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 201; 132 J.P. 175;
112 S.J. 16; [1968] 1 All E.R. 299, C.A.
(5) Ghani v. Jones [1970] 1 Q.B. 693; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1158; 113 S.J. 854; [1963] 3 All E.R. 1700, C.A. affirming 113 S.J. 775; [1969] 3 All E.R. 720.
(6) London and Northern Trading Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Sanyaolu (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 126.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for wrongful seizure of the plaintiff’s fish. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. K. K. Akrasi for the plaintiff.
G. M. Quaye for the first and second defendants.
T. Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, for the third and fourth defendants.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
By his amended writ of summons and statement of claim, the plaintiff claims against the defendants herein, jointly and severally, the sum of ¢47,115 being the cost of 117 crates of fish and empty crates wrongfully seized from the plaintiff’s cold store at Takoradi by the first defendant-corporation per her agents or servants, the second, third and fourth defendants. The plaintiff, in addition, claims against the defendants damages for wrongful seizure of the said fish and for the disgrace, inconvenience and the ignominy brought upon. him. The plaintiff claims further, interest at the rate of eighteen and half per centum on the sum of ¢47,115 as from 26 October 1978 up to the date of final judgment.
The evidence before this court is that the plaintiff, a retired deputy superintendent of police, owns the African Grocery and Cold Store at Takoradi. The plaintiff buys and sells all types of fish. He used at times to obtain his supply of fish from the first defendant-corporation, the State Fishing Corporation, and at times from private boat owners and fish dealers, one of whom was a Mr. Narh. The plaintiff’s said cold store, where he stored and sold fish was operated by his own son, J. S. Fynn Jnr.
By the early hours of 26 October 1978, the plaintiff’s agent, J. S. Fynn Jnr. had obtained and purchased two consignments of
[p.891] of [1981] GLR 887 fresh fish, red snappers, totalling 117 crates, from one John Tetteh Narh, a fisherman and the owner of a fishing boat. The first consignment of 55 crates of fresh fish, was bought on 23 October 1978 and the second consignment of 62 crates was bought on 26 October 1978. The plaintiff claims he has a standing order of fresh fish, red snappers, from the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation at Obuasi, and having therefore consigned all the 117 crates of fresh red snappers to his customers, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, he sent his agent, J. S. Fynn Jnr. out in the morning of the 26 October 1978, to buy rubber bags and empty crates for him to enable him get the consignment ready for conveyance to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation at Obuasi.
The plaintiff was consequently in his cold store on 26 October 1978 at about 11.30 a.m. waiting for his son, when two policemen, one in uniform, entered the cold store with the second defendant, who was introduced as a security officer at the State Fishing Corporation; the two policemen were the third and fourth defendants respectively. The following is what the plaintiff said, among other things:
“When they entered my cold store, the policeman showed me a search warrant that they had come to search the cold store for stolen fish in cartons and pans belonging to the State Fishing Corporation. J. S. Fynn Jnr. returned just at that time. People had come round to buy fish but they had to wait on because of the search; they stood outside and watched on.”
The plaintiff stated further that after the search, the second defendant said the fresh fish found in the cold store belonged to the State Fishing Corporation and that he would therefore take the same away. The plaintiff said:
“I protested vehemently, saying that I bought same from a boat owner, Narh, at Sekondi. The fish I bought were red snappers. The second defendant would not listen to whatever I said, and he said he would take the fish away.”
The evidence is that while arguing with the second defendant and others, a van belonging to the State Fishing Corporation arrived with their workmen. The plaintiff continued:
“As soon as the van arrived the second defendant opened my cold store and ordered his men on the van to collect my fish, red snappers, and put same on their van and they did so. They collected all the 117 crates of fish away. The defendants did not give me any receipt for the fish they collected from my cold store. They took it away.”
[p.892] of [1981] GLR 887
The evidence is that the plaintiff sold a crate of his fresh fish of 40 lbs. at ¢400 to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. The police later went and collected a statement from the plaintiff, the plaintiff, having waited till 22 November 1978, without getting his fish back, caused the letter, exhibit A, dated 22 November 1978 to be written to the managing director of the defendant-corporation, Tema, without copying it to the police, but copied to the Regional Manager, State Fishing Corporation, Sekondi. The indications are that the first defendant-corporation did not reply to this letter, exhibit A, which reads:
“Dear Sir, We write for and on behalf of Mr. J. S. Fynn, owner of African Grocery and Cold Store.
We are instructed to say that on or about the 26 October 1978 your security officer by name F. A. Gyimah led some policemen and other employees of your corporation to our client’s store and collected one hundred and seventeen (117) crates of fish together with 45 empty crates from the said store under the pretence that the said fish which our client had just purchased from a fishing boat, belonged to your corporation.
Our client’s protests were not heeded to and the fish was carried away in your own vehicle.
We are instructed to claim the cost of the fresh fish and the empty crates which amount to ¢29,565 plus some compensation for the disgrace, embarrassments and inconvenience caused our client by this unlawful action of yours.
Our client would wish to state that since the fish was not returned still fresh he does not need it any more but would like the cost stated above to be paid to him together with some compensation which would be agreed upon.
Take notice and notice is hereby given that legal action would commence against you one month from the date of this letter unless we received your cheque for the above sum and the matter of compensation is settled one month from the date of this letter.
Please be advised.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) E. K. K. Akrasi”
There is very little doubt here that even at that early stage of the ensuing controversy, the plaintiff knew and insisted that the first defendant had wrongfully seized 117 crates of his fresh fish along with 45 empty crates, the cost price of which he claimed as ¢29,565 plus some compensation. The plaintiff obviously did
[p.893] of [1981] GLR 887 regard the remaining defendants herein as agents through whom the first defendant-corporation committed those tortious acts. It is also evident that if the fish had been returned fresh, the plaintiff would only possibly have been entitled to some compensation. Again, if having failed to return the fresh fish the defendants had paid the amount claimed in the letter, exhibit A, as quoted supra, that being within a period of just about one month, the plaintiff could possibly have obtained another consignment of fresh red snappers at the same cost price and sold same to their customers at Obuasi at the stated agreed price ¢400 per crate. Very little loss, financially, perhaps, would have been caused as far as the plaintiff’s fish trade was concerned. This, perhaps, was the reason why the plaintiff only claimed ¢29,565 being the cost price at the beginning of the proceedings. It therefore seems to me that the subsequent amendment is in order, should the plaintiff succeed in recovering damages from the defendants at all.
It is, perhaps, significant to note at this stage that unknown to the plaintiff, a letter exhibit B (which was not copied to the plaintiff), dated 3 November 1978, had been written to the first defendant-corporation by the Chief Superintendent of Police, Railway and Ports, Takoradi. This was barely within eight days from the date of seizure. This letter to which the first defendant again failed or refused to respond promptly, is quoted here below:
“Seizure of fish from African Grocery and Cold Store—Takoradi 26 October 1978 On 26 October 1978, following a tip-off, the Railway Police in conjunction with the State Fishing Corporation security searched the cold store of African Grocery at Takoradi and seized 45 crates of red fish together with some quantity of loose fish which were suspected to have come from one of the State Fishing Corporation vessels on the high seas.
2. The 45 empty crates as well as loose ones were conveyed to the State Fishing Corporation warehouse at Sekondi. The loose ones weighed 1,218 kilos.
3. One John Samuel Fynn who operates the cold store on behalf of Nana Kow Duodu, his father, told the police that he bought the fish from one Joseph Tetteh Narh, a fisherman and owner of a fishing trawler named ‘Confidence’. Joseph Tetteh Narh in a statement to the police stated that he sold the fish, the catch he and his crew on board trawler ‘Confidence’ T.F. 390 made on 26 October 1978. He also maintained that he had been trading with the Fynn Company for the past two years.
[p.894] of [1981] GLR 887
4. The onus of proving a charge of either stealing or dishonestly receiving against any of the parties to the suspected crime lies squarely on the police.
5. I regret to comment on the totality of the evidence so far at our disposal which unfortunately falls short of elements that go to support the charges envisaged and to inform you that in absence of any further clue the matter is treated as ‘closed.’ 6. The exhibit, to wit, 45 crates and 1,218 kgs. of loose fish which were seized on warrant by the police being held in your storage be restored to the owner of the African Grocery and Cold Store, please.
(Sgd.) C. K. Atanudzi for: Chief Superintendent/Rlys.”
It is obvious that this letter, which stated in no uncertain terms that the plaintiff’s fish and the empty crates were seized on suspicion only and that there was no evidence whatsoever to ground a charge of stealing or that of dishonestly receiving, discloses that the fish was seized by the police in conjunction with security men from the first defendant-corporation. The police by this letter virtually begged the first defendant to return the plaintiff’s fish which had been wrongfully seized to him, but the first defendant would not do so and have, up to now, refused or failed to do so. It therefore seems to me that the plaintiff’s contention that the second defendant, being the first defendant’s agent, was the person who directed operations and had his fresh fish wrongfully seized from his cold store is further strengthened by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement of defence filed on 16 March 1979 by Mr. T. Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, Western Region, as solicitor for the third and fourth defendants which provide:
“3. The second defendant led the third and fourth defendants to African Grocery and Cold Store, Takoradi and the store was searched on a warrant and 45 empty crates and 1,218 kilograms of loose fish which the second defendant claimed belonged to the corporation were removed to the State
Fishing Corporation cold store at Sekondi for storage pending investigation.
4. That the police conducted an investigation into the complaint of the second defendant and advised the corporation on 3 November 1978 that there was no evidence to sustain a charge of either stealing or dishonestly receiving and that the fish should be released to African Grocery and Cold Store, Takoradi.”
[p.895] of [1981] GLR 887
The plaintiff’s contention for his other claims is that when his fish was being carried away on the first defendant-corporation’s van, he heard some of the people who had gathered round near his cold store saying that the defendants’ action indicated that the plaintiff had been selling stolen fish. The plaintiff considered this as disgraceful and highly injurious to his reputation and his trading business. The evidence, under cross-examination, is that the plaintiff’s fish business was affected adversely by the defendants’ action for only about one month. The plaintiff bought his fresh fish from Narh at ¢200 a crate.
The first prosecution witness, I. M. Azu, a chief port officer for the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and stationed in Takoradi, confirmed that the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation did, prior to the incident which resulted in the seizure of the plaintiff’s fish, buy the plaintiff’s fish, red snappers, at ¢10 per lb. weight, and a crate of 40 lbs. at ¢400. According to the first prosecution witness, the corporation used to buy fish from the State Fishing Corporation at the control price but since they had to feed over 10,000 people they had to buy more fish from other sources at reasonable prices. He did not, however, consider the cost of 40 lbs. of fish at ¢400 as reasonable. The witness was, however, instructed to stop buying fish from the plaintiff until further notice because of the incident which culminated in the seizure of fish from the plaintiff’s cold store.
The third prosecution witness, John Tetteh Narh, also confirmed that he sold 55 crates of fresh fish, red snappers, to the plaintiff on 23 October 1978 and again 62 crates of fresh fish, red snappers, to the plaintiff on 26 October 1978, the very fateful day. This witness’ evidence which stands unchallenged, went on that he was called by the police the very day, 26 October 1978, soon after he had made the last sale to the plaintiff; and he made a statement admitting selling the fish to the plaintiff.
The fourth prosecution witness, Ebenezer Abban, who also went to the scene at the time the defendants were taking the plaintiff’s fish away, heard some of the people who had gathered round saying: “afterall these people have been stealing fish and so they have been selling stolen fish.”
The defendants’ side of the story was told by the second and fourth defendants. The second defendant who spoke for himself and for and on behalf of his employers, the first defendant herein, had the following to say among other things. The second defendant, Francis Adjei Gyimah, employed as senior security officer said:
[p.896] of [1981] GLR 887
“On 26 October 1978, when I reported for duty in the morning at about 8.15 a.m., I was called to the office of the area manager, Mr. A. S. Kwadede. He told me he had had information that one of our vessels, that is, the corporation’s vessels, was off-loading cartons of fish to another vessel at Ngresia near Sekondi. I did upon that information to go to Ngresia with the accountant, Mr. Asafo Adjei on his car U.R. 4717. We also went to the police, but our visit to the beach did not disclose anything. We reported back to the area manager who instructed that we should go to African Grocery at Takoradi. We therefore went to the African Grocery.
When we got there we found red snappers being off-loaded into their cold store and the vehicle which brought same was moving away.
We made a report to the police in respect of the information we had. The report we made to the police was that we had had information that one of our vessels had off-loaded fish at Ngresia and we believed that the fish off-loaded into the plaintiff’s cold store that same day belonged to the first defendant.
The police immediately took down our report and went with us to the plaintiff’s cold store at Takoradi. I went with the police to show them where the fish had been off-loaded.”
The second defendant stated further that after that, he just stood by; he did not take part in the search neither did he order that the fish should be taken away. It was, however, the accountant who telephoned for a fish van which arrived from the main depot, and the fish was taken straight to the State Fishing Corporation cold store at the depot. The second defendant also stated that the fish they collected weighed 1,218 kilos plus 45 crates of fish all being red snappers.
The first defendant witness, M. A. Mensah, an Accountant of the first defendant-corporation who told the court he had a hand in the internal pricing of fish by the corporation, said in October 1978, the prince of a crate of 20 kilos red snappers was fixed at ¢65. This was contained in an Executive Instrument No. 5, which he agreed dealt with frozen fish only.
The fourth defendant, who also spoke for himself and for and on behalf of the third defendant, said among other things:
“On 26 October 1978, at about 10.30 a.m., we received a complaint from Mr. Gyimah, the second defendant in this case, that a vehicle was discharging fish at African Grocery and Cold Store at Takoradi. He said he suspected that the fish being off-loaded there had been stolen from one of their
[p.897] of [1981] GLR 887 vessels . . . The second defendant took us to the cold store and there we met the plaintiff in the cold store . .
.”
The foregoing should summarise the main facts in this case and it is from these that the court is called upon to determine the issues agreed upon as follows:
(a) Whether or not the third and fourth defendants acted on the instructions of the second defendant.
(b) Whether or not there was any warrant issued.
(c) Whether or not 1,218 kilograms of loose fish or 117 crates of fish were carried away.
(d) Whether or not the police advised that the fish should be returned to the plaintiff.
(e) Whether or not the plaintiff was injured in his reputation.
(f) Whether or not plaintiff lost any interest on the capital locked up by the defendants.
(g) Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his claim.
The evidence before this court leaves no room for any doubt that whoever gave that information to the area manager of the first defendant-corporation, Mr. A. S. Kwadede, was obviously actuated by malice, for he knew that that information was false. There has been no scintilla of evidence before this court to suggest that, in fact and in truth, any of the first defendant-corporation’s vessels was seen at or anywhere near Ngresia at Sekondi on 26 October 1978. No one was called by the defendants to say that he did in fact see one of the first defendant’s fishing vessels discharging fish to anybody at Ngresia on that fateful day. Where and how Mr. Kwadede, the area manager of the first defendant- corporation, got that information has not been disclosed, and yet, it appears that the said area manager did so recklessly believe in that false information (if he did not himself maliciously originate it; I, however, think it was a figment of his own imagination) that even after the second defendant and the accountant had visited Ngresia and had of course, found no shred of evidence to support that false information, he insisted and directed that the second defendant and the accountant should go to the plaintiff’s cold store at Takoradi, that is, the African Grocery and Cold Store, Takoradi to trace the alleged stolen fish.
The second defendant and the accountant did go to the police on their trip to Ngresia and apparently gave that information upon which the police did not act immediately, because there is no evidence that police went with them to Ngresia. It is therefore, again, abundantly clear that the second defendant and the accountant went to the plaintiff’s cold store upon the area manager’s
[p.898] of [1981] GLR 887 directions and instructions to look for the corporation’s alleged stolen fish. It is m view that when the second defendant and the accountant got to the plaintiff’s cold store and saw fresh red snappers being off-loaded into the plaintiff’s cold store they did readily and recklessly jump to the wrong conclusion that the fish being off-loaded from the vehicle into the plaintiff’s cold store belonged to the first defendant-corporation. They did therefore go back to the police, and this time, told them they had seen the corporation’s stolen fish off-loaded into the plaintiff’s cold store. It was upon that false information that no time was lost in preparing a search warrant. The police, having armed themselves with that warrant, were not allowed by the second defendant to go it alone. The second defendant, in fact, led the police to the plaintiff’s cold store, and there, identified the fresh loose fish, red snappers found as belonging to the State Fishing Corporation, the first defendant herein. The second defendant, a former police sergeant of the Ghana Police Service, who had just about eight months then resigned from the service and had been employed by the first defendant-corporation as a senior security officer, apparently forgot that he was no longer in the service. I find that being a former sergeant, he felt he knew what he was about; and believing, quite erroneously and without any reasonable ground, that the fish was stolen, assumed control over the operation, and having insisted that the fish found there belonged to the first defendant-corporation, ordered same to be taken away. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that it was the second defendant who directed that the plaintiff’s fish should be taken away to the corporation’s cold store. It was the first defendant’s accountant who telephoned for the corporation’s fish van which arrived with workers from the first defendant’s cold store and collected the plaintiff’s fish from this cold store, loaded same unto the first defendant’s fish van, in the full view of the surging crowd and conveyed same away straight to the first defendant’s cold store.
It is my view that the second defendant just used a policeman in uniform, armed with a search warrant, so as to be able to enter the plaintiff’s cold store and take his fish without opposition, perhaps, knowing well that the plaintiff, a retired deputy superintendent of police, would not wish to obstruct a policeman in the execution of his duties. It is my view that if the police in this matter had acted independently, the second defendant would have stopped at the point he lodged the complaint, and would not have led them to the plaintiff’s cold store to do what he did. If the police had acted independently, it might have taken them some time, perhaps,
[p.899] of [1981] GLR 887 to go to the plaintiff. They might have accepted the plaintiff’s claim to the fish, especially when he readily indicated his identifiable source. If the police had wanted to conduct further investigation, they should have weighed the fish found, if they still suspected it stolen, in the plaintiff’s presence. They would normally, thereafter, take a sample as exhibit, and would enter all their findings in the station diary. Here, the undisputed evidence is that all the fish found in the plaintiff’s cold store were taken directly to the first defendant’s cold store; obviously, the first defendant-corporation being, positive that the fish belonged to them. There is no evidence that any entry of that operation was made in the police station diary. Exhibit 1, which was tendered without objection, for what it is worth (because counsel considers it as self-serving evidence), shows that 45 empty crates of fish plus loose fish weighing 1,218 kilos. The evidence is that this was not done at the police station but at the first defendant’s cold store.
It is my view here that the policemen employed by the second defendant in that operation were not allowed to use their own discretion and judgment in the matter. For if the police had not been used as mere agents, and I find they should obviously have, after collecting statements from the plaintiff and his named and available witness, considered the complaint as baseless and have closed the matter, as they purported to do eight days later. The area manager of the first defendant-corporation obviously instructed the second defendant on false information and the evidence which has been placed before me shows that the second defendant had no reasonable ground or probable cause to believe that the fish found in the plaintiff’s cold store on 26 October 1978, by him and others was stolen fish, and that the same belonged to the first defendant-corporation. The second, third and fourth defendants did act, in my judgment, as agents of the first defendant, and they did act recklessly; the seizure of the plaintiff’s fish by them was wrongful since the second defendant, in my judgment, went beyond the role of a mere informer: see Amadjei v. Opoku Ware [1963] 1 G.L.R. 150, S.C. This is a case of false imprisonment and unlawful arrest but the principle stated therein is equally applicable here. There, two policemen, on normal patrol duty, were informed by the respondent, the Kwabenghene, that the appellants, A, B, C, D and E, were holding unlawful meetings and should be arrested. The policemen went to A’s house, where on their orders, they were joined by B, C, D and E. The appellants were being questioned when the respondent also arrived at A’s house and demanded their arrest, whereupon one of the policemen said to the appellants, “You are arrested.” Shortly afterwards, the appellants were
[p.900] of [1981] GLR 887 taken by the police to the respondent’s house. They were followed by a large crowd. At the ahenfie, the police asked the respondent what offence the appellants had committed. When they received no satisfactory answer, the police allowed the appellants to go home. The whole incident lasted two hours. The appellants sued in the High Court, Accra, claiming damages for false imprisonment.
The Supreme Court held on appeal, inter alia, as stated in the headnote at p. 151, that:
“(Per Crabbe J.S.C.) An arrest is malicious or unlawful when it is made without reasonable or probable cause . . .
(Per Blay J.S.C.) The respondent went beyond the role of a mere informer. His complaint, which was false and recklessly made, was the cause of the arrest of the appellants . . .”
These principles, which I hold are applicable in the case before me now were thus fully stated in the headnote of the case: Onogen v. Leventis & Co. Ltd. [1959] G.L.R. 105 at p. 106:
“(1) a person who authorises or directs the arrest or detention of another by a merely ministerial officer of the law makes the officer his agent, and he himself would be responsible for the arrest or detention.
But in an action for false imprisonment, actual direction or authorisation must be proved; mere information given to the officer, on which he acts at his own discretion, is no ground of liability;
(2) a person reporting a theft to the police does not become answerable for malicious prosecution as himself the prosecutor unless he has authorised or requested the prosecution on the particular charge brought;
(3) but even though the prosecution was not technically conducted by him, he cannot escape liability for malicious prosecution if the charge was false to his knowledge, if he brought suborned witnesses to support it, and if he influenced the police to assist him in sending an innocent man for trial.”
As I have held already, the defendants here had no reasonable and probable cause to complain that the plaintiff had stolen fish belonging to the first defendant-corporation. As stated in Onogen v. Leventis (supra.) at p. 106:
“ ’reasonable and probable cause’ involves an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reason- [p.901] of [1981] GLR 887 ably lead any prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed.”
These principles were equally applied by my brother Sarkodie J. in Appiah v. Mensah [1978] G.L.R. 342 as stated in the headnote at p. 343, which, with all due respect, I cite with approval:
“Where a person gave information to a police officer, and the officer acted according to his own judgment, and made an arrest, the person incurred no responsibility in tort for false imprisonment. But where he did not merely give information but directed the officer to effect the arrest, the officer in that case was considered as the servant of that person for that purpose and the person would incur liability in tort for false imprisonment.
In the present case, the first defendant never left the soldiers to act independently. It was the first defendant who led the soldiers to the house of the plaintiff to arrest him, and it was he who provided transport to convey the plaintiff to Accra. Furthermore he accompanied the second defendant to seize the tractor and also to arrest the plaintiff. The conduct of the first defendant went beyond that of a person merely making a complaint. He actually participated in the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff . . .”
In the instant case, there is evidence that when the second defendant and others entered the plaintiff’s cold store on 26 October 1978, they showed him a search warrant, and it is common ground that exhibit 3 is the search warrant upon which the defendants entered, searched and conveyed the plaintiff’s fish away. The search warrant specifically requested and authorised the persons holding it only to look for and take, if possible, items of goods or articles specifically mentioned in the warrant: here cartons of fish and pans containing fish for the State Fishing Corporation. It is my view that the search warrant could only have been properly and lawfully executed if the defendants found fish belonging to the corporation in cartons and pans. Again, if the fish was found, as they did, loose and not in cartons and pans but they had reasonable and probable cause to believe that the same belonged to the first defendant-corporation and that they were stolen goods, the holders of the warrant could lawfully execute the warrant and seize the fish irrespective of the fact that they have not been adequately mentioned or described in the warrant. If, however, the fish found were not in cartons and pans and they turned out not to be stolen fish or not belonging to the first defendant-corporation, as in this case, then the defendants’ action not based
[p.902] of [1981] GLR 887 on reasonable grounds, amounted to trespass to the plaintiff’s goods and the seizure of the fish was therefore wrongful: see Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299 at p. 313, C.A. where Lord Denning M.R. said:
“. . . when a constable enters a house by virtue of a search warrant for stolen goods, he may seize not only the goods which he reasonably believes to be covered by the warrant, but also any other goods which he believes on reasonable grounds to have been stolen and to be material evidence on a charge of stealing or receiving against the person in possession of them or anyone associated with him.”
Then see again Ghani v. Jones [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, at pp. 706 and 708, C.A. In Ghani v. Jones, police officers inquiring into a woman’s disappearance searched, without a warrant, the house of her father-in-law. At their request he handed to them documents including the passports of himself, his wife and daughter, the plaintiffs living in the house. The plaintiffs, who were Pakistanis, later asked for the return of the passports and documents as they wished to visit Pakistan. The police refused to return them. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant, a senior police officer, for a mandatory order for the delivery up of the passports and documents, an injunction restraining their detention and damages for detinue.
Lord Denning M.R. had the following to say in the course of his judgment at p. 706.
I would start by considering the law where police officers enter a man’s house by virtue of a warrant, or arrest a man lawfully, with or without a warrant, for a serious offence. I take it to be settled law, without citing cases, that the officers are entitled to take any goods which they find in his possession or in his house which they reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation to the crime for which he is arrested or for which they enter. If in the course of their search they come upon any other goods which show him to be implicated in some other crime, they may take them provided they act reasonably and detain them no longer than is necessary. Such appears from the speech of Lord Chelmsford L.C., in Pringle v. Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 Macph., H.L. 55, 60 and Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299.”
And at p. 708 His Lordship said:
“What is the principle underlying these instances? We have to consider, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual. His privacy and his possessions are not to be invaded
[p.903] of [1981] GLR 887 except for the most compelling reasons. On the other hand, we have to consider the interest of society at large in finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime. Honest citizens should help the police and not hinder them in their efforts to track down criminals. Balancing these interests, I should have thought that, in order to justify the taking of an article, when no man has been arrested or charged, these requisites must be satisfied:
First: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence has been committed—so serious that it is of the first importance that the offenders should be caught and brought to justice.
Second: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that the article in question is either the fruit of the crime (as in the case of stolen goods) or is the instrument by which the crime was committed (as in the case of the axe used by the murderer) or is material evidence to prove the commission of the crime (as in the case of the car used by a bank raider or the saucer used by a train robber).
Third: The police officers must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of it has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it, or is accessory to it, or at any rate his refusal must be quite unreasonable.
Fourth: The police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longer than is reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence. If a copy will suffice, it should be made and the original returned. As soon as the case is over, or it is decided not to go on with it, the article should be returned.”
It is my view that in these instances, if it turns out that the police are wrong and have no reasonable grounds for seizing and retaining the goods or articles concerned, they are clearly in law liable in damages, so that, as in the present case before me, the second defendant and the police, i.e. the third and fourth defendants, being agents of the first defendant, the first defendant must be held responsible for the tortious acts they committed as such agents.
[p.904] of [1981] GLR 887
On the question of the quantity of fish so wrongfully seized by the defendants, I have had no difficulty in accepting the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendants collected 117 crates of red snappers fish from the plaintiff’s cold store on 26 October 1978 and conveyed same on the first defendant’s fish van to the first defendant’s cold store and kept same there. The defendants who failed to weigh the fish in the plaintiff’s cold store, and in his presence, claim that they took 106 crates and not 117, a figure short of only eleven crates. The defendants maintain they did the weighing in the presence of a relative of the plaintiff, who the plaintiff says is unknown to him, and whom the defendants failed to call. It is therefore difficult to ignore or disbelieve the plaintiff’s counsel’s contention that exhibit 1, is a self-serving evidence. I therefore find that the defendant did wrongfully seized 117 crates of fish belonging to the plaintiff, accepting plaintiff’s evidence.
The fish was so wrongfully seized on 26 October 1978, and barely within eight days from that date, i.e. 3 November 1978, the third and fourth defendants realising that the had been falsely misled, caused the letter, exhibit F to be written to the first defendant-corporation cautioning the corporation that the information upon which the plaintiff’s fish was seized from him had been found to be baseless as the police were not in possession of a shred of evidence which could sustain a charge of stealing or dishonestly receiving. They had located the right source of the plaintiff’s said fish, and did, therefore, earnestly advise the first defendant to restore, in other words, convey the plaintiff’s fish back to him. It is regrettable to note that this sound piece of advice which was so timeously tendered to the first defendant-corporation was stubbornly ignored by her obviously still erroneously and unreasonably believing that the fish was hers. The corporation stubbornly stucked to her guns; she refused to return the fish to the plaintiff, the rightful owner thereof. It was almost seven weeks thereafter that the first defendant-corporation per the area manager, wrote the letter, exhibit B asking that the plaintiff himself should go to their cold room to collect his fish. It is difficult to understand why the first defendant who was so enthusiastic in providing a fish van to convey the plaintiff’s fish away would refuse to provide their van to convey the fish back to where they conveyed same from. It is my view that it was the first defendant who was in duty bound to take the fish back to the plaintiff. By so doing the corporation would have perhaps, reversed the erroneous impression her earlier action of conveying the fish away had created, to wit, that the plaintiff had stolen her fish and had therefore been
[p.905] of [1981] GLR 887 selling stolen fish. The first defendant’s conduct in authorising the seizure of the plaintiff’s fish from his cold store and the subsequent refusal to return same to the owner must be considered most unreasonable and most reprehensible, and be condemned in no uncertain terms. They must be made to pay adequately for the damage and injury caused to the plaintiff’s reputation.
I am satisfied that the defendants’ conduct at the plaintiff’s cold store on 26 October 1978, undoubtedly gave the impression to the many people who came to the scene at the material time, that the plaintiff had stolen fish from the first defendant-corporation, and that he had been selling stolen fish. I find he lost some customers thereby and for about one month he could not trade in fish again. This to my mind, gave rise to some financial loss to the plaintiff and, what is more, greatly injured his reputation as a trader.
On the question of the value of the fish so wrongfully seized by the defendants, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that he bought the fish from Mr. Narh at ¢200 a crate, and that he had a standing order from the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation who used to buy fresh red snappers from the plaintiff at ¢400 a crate. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that he had consigned the whole of the 117 crates of the fresh fish, red snappers to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and was in fact going to obtain ¢400 for each crate. It would be most unreasonable, therefore, to expect or call upon the plaintiff, a private fish dealer, to conform to internal regulations which the State Fishing Corporation applied to its frozen, and not fresh fish, by selling those fresh red snappers at ¢65 a crate. The plaintiff is a private fish dealer and there is no evidence that he bought the fish from the State Fishing Corporation at the rate they offered it at the time. We should not lose sight of the fact that, the plaintiff bought that fish from a private boat owner and a fisherman, who had to add his cost of production and make allowances for reasonable profit. The plaintiff in turn, apart from the basic cost price of ¢200 a crate, would have to pay handling charges, cost of transportation, and cost for storage and preservation; he, as a trader, was also entitled to earn profit. The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation which had the unhappy task of providing fish (protein) for their teeming 10,000 workers were prepared, considering that it was necessary for the workers to be strong enough to enhance productivity, to buy fish at that rate and, perhaps, sell same at a subsidised rate, to the numerous workers. The evidence is that the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation got some of the fish from the State Fishing Corporation, but, because what they did get was woefully inadequate, they had to buy some at
[p.906] of [1981] GLR 887 that high rate from private dealers. There is no evidence that the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation had ever complained against the price of fish they bought from the plaintiff and other private dealers; this is because they, as prudent gold miners, knew, perhaps, that the average cost per crate of fish taken together with those they bought form the State Fishing Corporation and those from private dealers, like the plaintiff, came down reasonably. This they gave to their workers with the obvious aim of making them happy in order to boost productivity in their mining concerns. It is my view, therefore, that so long as the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation did not consider the price of one crate of fresh red snappers at ¢400 excessive, the plaintiff too, having taken the cost price thereof and the overhead and incidental cost into consideration, was entitled to sell his red snappers at ¢400 a crate to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.
As I have held already, the original seizure of the plaintiff’s fish by the defendants was wrongful ab initio, as the defendants had no reasonable or probable cause for so doing. It follows therefore that the very moment the police wrote to the first defendant-corporation and requested her to restore the fish to the plaintiff and she refused to do so, and have even up till now not done so, even if the seizure was done by police alone (and it has been held already to the contrary) the first defendant’s subsequent keeping of the seized fish in itself, amounted to a wrongful and unlawful detention of the plaintiff’s fish and the plaintiff was entitled to sue in detinue for damages. See London and Northern Trading Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Sanyaolu (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 126. There the company advanced money to the respondent to buy a lorry with an agreement that the company would hold a lien over the lorry. The defendant-company thinking erroneously that it had a right to detain the lorry by virtue of the supposed lien as security for the debt owed by the plaintiff, seized and detained the lorry. It was held on appeal by West African Court of Appeal, at p. 126:
“The taking of the lorry by the Company was undoubtedly unlawful and when the Company refused to return the lorry to the plaintiff on demand being made it became abundantly clear that the detention was also unlawful.”
The plaintiff was awarded special and general damages for wrongful detention of his lorry.
On the question of interest, I think the plaintiff is here again entitled to recover the current bank rate of interest as claimed by him on his capital locked up since 26 October 1978. If the defendants had not wrongfully seized his fish, the plaintiff would have
[p.907] of [1981] GLR 887 sold his fish at the rate of ¢400 a crate. Can it be denied or disputed that considering the present rate of inflation which started long before 1978 (incidentally, the State Fishing Corporation now sells a crate or carton of fish at ¢200), the plaintiff could have traded with the amount he would have realised from the sale of those fish to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and would have possibly doubled that capital by now?
I am satisfied from the foregoing discussions that the plaintiff has established his claim against the defendants herein and that he is therefore entitled to judgment against them jointly and severally. I do therefore enter judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants as follows:
1. There will be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants for ¢47,115 being the cost of 117 crates of fish and 45 empty crates.
2. The plaintiff is further entitled to recover interest on the above amount at the rate of eighteen and half per centum per annum and I so order.
3. For the wrongful seizure of the plaintiff’s fish and for the disgrace and injury to his reputation, inconvenience and ignominy, coupled with the unreasonable and most irresponsible and reprehensible conduct, exhibited in this case by the first defendant, the plaintiff is awarded punitive damages of ¢25,000.
4. On the question of costs, again the defendants, have by their own recalcitrant behaviour and conduct mulcted themselves in heavy costs.
It is my view that being fish dealers themselves, when it became clear by 25 January 1979, about three months after they had refused to return the fish to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff would not take the frozen fish and was asking for the value thereof plus some compensation, as a prudent business concern, they should have sold the fish as fish dealers, and would have kept the proceeds against these eventualities. I see that the first defendant-corporation applied through their solicitor for an order to sell the fish, the necessity of which application I fail to see, and yet even though this court granted that unnecessary application on 28 July 1980, with an order that the amount realised from the requested sale should be paid into court pending the determination of this case, there is no indication that any money realised from the sale has been paid into court. The first defendant does not appear to realise the serious nature and the effect of their action against the plaintiff’s
[p.908] of [1981] GLR 887 reputation and his business and this court should condemn them in heavy cost, which I assess at ¢5,000 inclusive of counsel’s costs.
DECISION
Action upheld.
J. K. E. E.
