SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1982] SLR (CA) 10Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

FIRI vs. FRIMPONG [1982-83] GLR 176

11 May 1982 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 33 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (CA) 10
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAFIRI v FRIMPONG [1982-83] GLR 176 [1982] SLR (CA) 10
APAFIRI v FRIMPONG [1982-83] GLR 176, [1982] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookFIRI v FRIMPONG [1982-83] GLR 176, [1982] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Owoo v. Owoo (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 81.

(2) Beyeden v. Bekoe (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52 – ‘55, 38.

[p.179] of [1982-83] GLR 176

(3) Ansah v. Sackey (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 325.

(4) Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.C. 218; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 81; [1955] 3 All E.R. 864; 120 J.P 54; 100 S.J. 32; 54 L.G.R. 91; [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655,H.L.

(5) Williamson v. London and North Western Railway Co. (1879) 12 Ch.D. 787; 48 L.J.Ch. 559; 27 W.R. 724.

(6) Kwakye v. Tuba; [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. 11) 535.

(7) Allotey v. Abrahams; Tamakloe v. Abrahams (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 280.

(8) Eburahim (Decd.), In re; Ansah v. Ankrah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 317.

(9) Ennin v. Prah [1959] G.L.R. 44.

(10) Atta v. Amissah, Court of appeal, 4 May 1970, unreported; digested in [1970] C.C. 73. (11) Dotwaah v. Afriyie [1965] G.L.R. 257; S.C.

(12) Chahin v. Boateng [1963] 2 G.L.R. 174, S.C.

(13) Ashitey v. Dodoo [1967] G.L.R. 125.

(14) Antu v. Buedu (1929) F.C. ‘26 – 29, 474; Griff. Dig. 100.

(15) Yamuah IV v. Sekyi (1936) 3 W.A.L.R. 57.

(16) Acquah III v. Ababio (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 343.

(17) Serwah v. Kesse [1960] G.L.R. 227.

(18) Boateng alias Beyeden v. Adjei [1963] 1 G.L.R. 285.

(19) Adjubi v. Mensah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 93, C.A.

(20) Jasi v. Tohum (1911) Ren. 684.

(21) Larkai v. Amorkor (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the head of family from the decision of the High Court granting, inter alia, an order of possession in respect of family property in favour of the customary successor to a deceased member of family rather than the head. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Francois and Edward Wiredu JJ.A.

COUNSEL

Yaw Manu for the appellants.

No appearance for or on behalf of the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A

The parties to this appeal are members of the Adaati family of Takyiman in the Brong-Ahafo Region. The family owns a stool the occupant of which is the linguist to the Takyimanhene. The respondent to this appeal is the present occupant of the Adaati family stool, having succeeded thereto on the death of one Kwaku Twi a member of the family. The name of Kwaku Twi appears prominently in this case and the central core of this appeal revolves around his activities in relation to the disputed house during his lifetime. The defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the [p.180] of [1982-83] GLR 176 defendant) claims to be the head of family. His capacity in this regard was challenged by the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) but the trial court found that he had been performing most of the duties of a head of family and styled him as acting head of family. The co-defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the co-defendant) is an ordinary member of the family. The dispute between them is about the status of two houses which according to the plaintiff, were in the possession and occupation of his predecessor, the late Kwaku Twi. These houses are situate at Takyiman and are numbered D/16 and D/27, respectively. The two disputed houses are family properties having been built by deceased members of the family who died intestate. The plaintiff’s claim as indorsed on his writ reads:

“STATEMENT OF CLAIM The plaintiff’s claim is for:

1. A declaration of title and recovery of possession of the following houses, (a) house No. D/16 at Takyiman being self-acquired property of the late Kwaku Twi, bounded by the houses of Yaw Firi, Nana Kwesi Tabiri, Akosua Noa and the Dwemer Street, and

(b) house No. D/27 at Takyiman bounded by the house of Kwabena Ameyaw, Kwadwo Fordjour, Opanin Akwa and the Dwemer Street being a family property which was inherited by the late Kwaku Twi who was succeeded by the plaintiff, which houses the defendant refused to hand over to the plaintiff who is the customary successor to the late Kwaku Twi both in his personal capacity and as the Adaatihene of Takyiman.

2. Perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from collecting the monthly rents of the said houses”.

In his pleadings the plaintiff claimed to have succeeded the late Kwaku Twi both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Adaatihene. His evidence in relation to the disputed houses, however, showed that his claim to them was founded in his traditional constitutional position as the new Adaatihene, whilst the defendant contended that they are ordinary family properties. He therefore claimed the two houses as being stool property. This stand taken by the plaintiff is made clear in his answers to questions in cross-examination. His evidence-in-chief was vague and unhelpful in this regard. The relevant portions of his answers read:

“Q. House No. D 1/2 is the stool house of the Adaati family?

[p.181] of [1982-83] GLR 176 A. The stool house is where the stools are.

Q. Do you know one Okyeame called Adom?

A. No Q. You know he lived in house No. D1/2?

A. Yes the stools were there then. The stool house is where the stools are now.

Q. What about Kwasi Daah who was also a linguist?

A. I know him.

Q. He also lived in house No. D 1/2?

A. Yes, this was because the stools were housed there.

Q. When Daah was linguist D 1/2 was the stool house?

A. Yes.

Q. What about when Kwabena Oppong was linguist?

A. He lived in that house.

Q. At that time that house was the stool house?

A. Yes.

Q. When Adom Oppong and Daah were linguists, house No. D 1/2 was the only house in their possession?

A. Yes.

Q. It was Kwaku Firi who removed the black stool from D1/2 to D1/16?

A. Yes.

Q. This was to enable him renovate D1/2?

A. He took it there because that was a stool house.

Q. He could not renovate D 1/2 because he died soon after removing the stool to the new house?

A. When he took it there he was not able to renovate D 1/2 when he died.

Q. When Firi removed the stool to the other house he called a meeting of the family and asked for assistance to renovate D 1/2?

A. Yes.

Q. House No. D/16 was built by Komfo Saah?

A. No.

Q. It is not correct that Firi succeeded Yaw Donkor but Kofi Ameyaw?

A. Kwabena Gyan succeeded Yaw Donkor, Kwaku Firi succeeded Kwabena Ameyaw.

Q. So it was not Ameyaw Kofi who succeeded Yaw Donkor?

A. No.

Q. Did (you) Yaw Donkor ever occupy the stool?

A. No.

Q. House No. D/27 was built by Yaw Donkor?

A. Yes.

[p.182] of [1982-83] GLR 176 Q. He gifted this house to Abena Gyato?

A. No.

Q. This was with the consent of the entire family?

A. It is not true.

Q. And since then Abena Gyato has been paying rates and rents?

A. No. Kwaku Firi pays.

Q. When the defendant put you on the stool, he gave you the stool properties including D 1/2 but he refused to give you the two other houses because they are not stool properties?

A. He has not given me any properties. They are stool properties the stools are there now.

Q. The stool is in another house because Firi took them there and not because it is a stool house?

A. He took it there because it is a stool house. The issue thus raised for determination in the court below was whether the disputed properties were a stool property or ordinary family property. The learned trial judge fully appreciated this and resolved the issue in favour of the plaintiff in respect of one of the houses on finding that that disputed house was stool property. The question which arises in this appeal is, whether his finding in favour of the plaintiff that that house was stool property was right? It is clear from his reasoning that he gave possession to the plaintiff in his capacity as the Adaatihene as there was no direct evidence that he was claiming in any other capacity. It could then appear that the family stool is being challenged by the plaintiff.

The finding by the learned trial judge in respect of house No. D/27 presented no difficulty in this appeal and learned counsel for the defendant and the co-defendant took a commendable stand by shortening his submission on this aspect of the appeal. The learned trial judge rejected the plaintiff’s claim to this house. He also did not accept the co-defendant’s case that the property was gifted to her. No appeal was brought by the plaintiff against the trial court’s finding rejecting his claim in respect of this house. He cannot therefore be heard in this court to complain against the rejection of his case in respect of house No. D/27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff’s submission against the finding by the trial judge cannot therefore be entertained in this court.

For the defendant and the co-defendant it was submitted that there being no counterclaim it was wrong for the learned trial judge after rejecting the plaintiff’s claim to that house to have proceeded to dismiss a non-existing counterclaim and made a consequential order in respect of that house.

[p.183] of [1982-83] GLR 176

We accept the submission of learned counsel for the defendant that the purported dismissal of a non-existing counterclaim by the learned trial judge and the consequential order he made when he found that the plaintiff’s claim to that house was not made out as unwarranted. The true position of the law is that where a plaintiff in a claim for a declaration of title fails, the proper order is to dismiss his action and in the absence of a counterclaim, enter judgment for the defendant. We will therefore in respect of house No. D/27 delete that part of the trial court’s order purporting to dismiss a non-existing counterclaim and the consequential order decreeing that house a general family property. In substitution thereof we make an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and entering judgment for the defendant.

In respect of house No. D/16 the evidence which the trial court accepted shows that the land on which it was built originally had a swish house built by one Komfo Saah, the mother of Kwaku Twi. The evidence shows that this swish building was later pulled down by the late Kwaku Twi out of his own resources and he rebuilt a house with sandcrete blocks long before he was enstooled on the family stool.

The evidence further shows that before his enstoolment the late Kwaku Twi was staying in the disputed house and that at that time the house No. D 1/2 was the ahenfie where the black and white stools of the family as well as other stool paraphernalia were kept. On his enstoolment, Kwaku Twi convened a meeting of members of the family and solicited financial support to enable him rehabilitate house No D 1/2, the ahenfie, in view of its poor state or condition. There is evidence also that he sought the permission of the family to remove the stools to house No. D/16 to which the meeting agreed. The evidence further shows that he was unable to renovate the ahenfie before his death. The complaint of the plaintiff as found by the learned trial judge was that “having succeeded Nana Kwaku Twi the defendant who is not the head of that family has refused to hand over the said house to him “(The emphasis is mine.)

The significance of the above complaint should not be overlooked. It signifies an acknowledgement by the plaintiff that the head of family and for that matter whoever for the time being is exercising the functions of such head is the proper person to keep custody and protect family properties as well as the family stool properties and to hand them over to the proper person entitled to possession at the appropriate time.

The learned trial judge proceeded and made the following findings:

[p.184] of [1982-83] GLR 176

(a) that Kwaku Twi gave house No. D/16 to the stool and transferred the ahenfie to that house;

(b) that on his death Kwaku Twi was buried in that house; and (c) that the plaintiff’s case is that as the new Adaatihene the keys to that house be handed over to him to enable him occupy that house as the stool house.”

Having made the above findings he continued:

“There is evidence that since 1956 the ceremonies of feeding the stool during the yam festivals have been performed in this house. I think (that I should) therefore declare title in him and order that he recover possession of house No. D/16 from the defendant.”

In respect of house No. D/16 learned counsel for the defendants argued ground (a) of the original grounds of appeal which reads: “(a) The judgment of the court is against the weight of evidence.” In his submission, learned counsel for the defendants argued that the issue which the trial court was called upon to determine was whether the disputed house was a family stool property or an ordinary family property. Learned counsel submitted that there was no evidence from the plaintiff to show how the disputed house became a stool house.

He submitted that the evidence accepted by the learned trial judge was that the house originally, was a swish house of the late Komfo Saah and nowhere in his evidence did the plaintiff show how what was originally a personal property of a member of family subsequently became a stool property. Continuing, learned counsel argued that the mere transfer of the stools from the ahenfie to the disputed house without more was not enough to turn it into a stool house. He submitted that the finding by the trial judge that the late Kwaku Twi gave the disputed house to the stool and transferred the ahenfie to that house was wrong.

I find a great deal of force in this argument. The history of house No. D/16 as found by the trial judge shows that it was originally a self-acquired property of Komfo Saah, the mother of the late Kwaku Twi which the latter pulled down and in its place put up a sandcrete block house. This was when he was an ordinary member of the family with his own means. The house thus became the property of the immediate family of Komfo Saah with Kwaku Twi enjoying a life interest in it. Even though he had the right to alienate his life interest he had no capacity to deal with the property beyond this limited interest: see the case of Owoo v. Owoo (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 81; Beyeden v. Bekoe (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52 – ‘55, 38 and Ansah v. Sackey (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 325. It follows that Kwaku Twi as an individual member of the family did not have the capacity to alienate the disputed house beyond his lifetime.

[p.185] of [1982-83] GLR 176

I must say that there is evidence by the fourth witness called by the plaintiff, a former Adontenhene of Takyiman, a non-member of the family, which the learned trial judge accepted as amounting to a gift of the disputed house to the stool by Kwaku Twi. I find this evidence so terse that its paucity and isolated nature cannot stand the test of establishing a gift under customary law.

In any case that was not the case put up by the plaintiff in either his pleadings or in evidence. It is trite law that the acceptance in favour of a party of a case entirely different from that which he has put in and by his pleadings is unjustifiable and wrong in law. Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.C. 218 at p. 244, H.L. and Williamson v. London & North Western Railway Co. (1879) 12 Ch.D. 787 are cases in point. The plaintiff’s claim was not founded on a gift. His case appeared to have been based on the facts that the stools were kept in that house and that ceremonies were also performed there.

The mere transfer of the black and white stools from the ahenfie to house No. D/16 under the circumstances as established in this case without more could not convert what is otherwise an ordinary family house into a stool house. In fact, the plaintiff failed to establish his claim. The finding of a gift of the disputed house to the stool by the learned trial judge is wrong in law. The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The judgment in favour of the plaintiff is hereby set aside. In substitution I make an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and entering judgment for the defendants.

I have not given any consideration to the other capacity of the plaintiff, i.e. as customary successor to the personal estate of the late Kwaku Twi, firstly, because from the way he challenged the family’s right to title and possession of the disputed houses by asserting that they were stool properties he deliberately took an easier path which if successful would give him immediate control and occupation of the disputed houses, he being the undisputed Adaatihene. Secondly, he knew very well that the disputed houses were not the types of property he was automatically entitled to the possession of as the customary successor of the late Kwaku Twi.

I am inclined to believe that his claim that the disputed houses were stool properties was a deliberate attempt to take possession, I consider his claim in this regard as made in bad faith. I have been constrained to make the following observations on the capacity of the plaintiff in view of the stand taken by the president of the court and my brother Coussey J.A. in this appeal which has formed the basis of their conclusion to support the judgment appealed from.

It is not disputed that the plaintiff has a dual capacity, having succeeded to the late Kwaku Twi both in

[p.186] of [1982-83] GLR 176 his personal capacity and in his constitutional capacity. In the court below the plaintiff chose to base his claim to the disputed houses on his capacity as the Adaatihene.

His reason being that the houses were stool properties and it was on that basis that the defendant performing the functions of the head resisted the claim. Having lost in that capacity it will not be fair in my opinion for the court to find for him in a capacity he did not put up in his evidence, for this would mean the court suo motu building a case for him. It is likely that had he claimed in the other capacity the case would not have gone to a full trial. I have dealt at some length in this judgment with answers to questions which show clearly the capacity in which the plaintiff was laying claim to the disputed houses.

Even if the above views expressed are wrong, I think the plaintiff must still fail for the understated reasons. As a customary successor of the late Kwaku Twi the plaintiff could only succeed to such property as formed part of his estate. In other words, properties which go to him automatically in that capacity are such properties as the late Kwaku Twi died possessed of as his self-acquired properties. Properties which Kwaku Twi himself inherited do not form part of his estate which would go to him unless the family decides otherwise.

The plaintiff’s pleadings in respect of house No. D/16, contrary to the evidence, aver that this house was the self-acquired property of the late Twi. The plaintiff denied that house No. D/16 was originally the property of Komfo Saah but the trial court found against him. He denied through one Kwame Nyame, a condition rejected by the trial court. It is clear from the findings of the learned trial judge that house No. D/16 was not the self-acquired property of the late Kwaku Twi which would automatically devolve on his customary successor. In like manner house No. D/27 was not the self-acquired property of the late Kwaku Twi, he having inherited same from other members of the family so that on the basis that the plaintiff is the customary successor of the late Kwaku Twi, the two houses in dispute not being the late Twi’s self-acquired properties could not go to him, unless the plaintiff was given those properties by the family.

Evidence, however, was that the family did not give the disputed houses to the plaintiff on his appointment as Twi’s successor. Hence this case now being fought against the family whose title to the disputed houses is undisputed. I would have acceded to upholding the plaintiff’s claim subject to some amendments in his claim. As between a stranger and the plaintiff the latter has enough capacity which would entitle him to succeed. As against the family the plaintiff has no automatic claim to the disputed houses which are not the self-acquired properties of his predecessor but are considered ancestral family properties.

The appeal succeeds and I accordingly allow it. I hereby set aside the judgment in favour of the plaintiff. In substitution thereof, I [p.187] of [1982-83] GLR 176 dismiss the plaintiff’s action and enter judgment in favour of the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I regret I cannot fully indorse the conclusion of my learned brother Wiredu J.A., and I am constrained therefore to state my own views. I think it is important that the dual nature of the plaintiff’s status is recognised as it is the linch-pin in this appeal. The facts have been fully stated and I do not wish to lengthen this judgment unduly by repeating them. I would, however, emphasise the matters which I consider crucial, and I begin with what I have already adverted to, namely the plaintiff’s dual capacity of natural successor and stool occupant. His uncle Kwaku Twi, whom he succeeded, also combined in his person the roles of stool occupant and successor of his family properties.

The evidence is preponderant that Kwaku Twi built house No. D/16 on family land and lived in it until his death. The law is that his determinable estate ended with his death intestate and the property reverted to his family. In Kwaku Twi’s lifetime, he inherited house No. D/27, which was built by Yaw Donkor, a uterine brother. This was pleaded in paragraph 6 of the claim and admitted by the co-defendant in paragraph 3 of her defence. This property had descended to him through Kwabena Ameyaw. Since Kwaku Twi enjoyed the disputed properties, his successor, appointed unanimously, should customarily inherit the same and he was fully entitled to question any attempt to deny him his patrimony. In my view, the onus probandi is on the appellant to justify his refusal to hand over the properties to him especially as he unreservedly and fully participated in his choice as successor.

In Ollennu’s Customary Land Law in Ghana, the author states at p.155, the following principles:

“It is the successor, i.e. the head of the branch or immediate family and not the head of the wider or trunk family who is the proper person to deal with property of the branch family.”

And again at p.156, he quotes from an unreported judgment the following:

“… as between a head of the wider family and the successor to a deceased, the successor, who is head of the immediate or branch family of the deceased, is the proper person entitled to manage and control the self-acquired property of which the person whom he succeeds died possessed, and not the head of the wider family of which the family of the said deceased is a branch.”

See Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. 11) 535; Allotey v. Abrahams (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 280; In re Eburahim (Decd); Ansah v. Ankrah

[p.188] of [1982-83] GLR 176

(1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 317; Ennin v. Prah [1959] G.L.R. 44; Atta v. Amissah, Court of Appeal, 4 May 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 77 and Dotwaah v. Afriyie [1965] G.L.R. 257 at p.259, S.C.

The plaintiff’s case was neatly stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement of claim, as follows:

“8. On the death of Kwaku Twi, the plaintiff was appointed the successor by a unanimous decision of the whole family including the defendant.

9. The plaintiff succeeded the late Kwaku Twi both in his personal capacity as well as in his capacity as the Adaatihene and all customary rites were performed. The defendant took the plaintiff to Nana Takyiman to swear the oath”

The defendant’s reply to this in paragraphs 22 and 23 of his defence was an unqualified admission of the plaintiff’s said averments. With such an admission, the barrenness of the appellant’s subsequent stance is glaring. One notes for instance, this question to the plaintiff:

“Q. When the defendant put you on the stool, he gave you the stool properties including D 1/2 but he refused to give you the two other houses because they are not stool properties.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The defendant lost sight of the fact that the plaintiff was also a customary successor to Kwaku Twi besides being the Adaatihene. In that capacity it was not for the head of the wider family to deny him his customary birthright. The fact that there was a suggestion that the properties were attached to the stool, rightly or wrongly, does not take away the respondent’s entitlement to them in his capacity as successor simpliciter.

The subterfuge of the defendant is seen again in this further question:

“Q. You know by Takyiman custom when a person succeeds another, the family are entitled to apportion the property, give some to the successor and retain some for the family?”

Nowhere on the evidence was this special custom which was not in consonance with customary law, proved. It was not pleaded either and it was starkly contradictory of the earlier admission in his pleading. The deviation should not have been entertained. In any event, this question, which sought to confess and avoid, was not followed by the adduction of evidence in its support even though no objection had been taken. But the falsity underlying the question is plain. The successor of family property is a trustee for the entire family. He has a determinable interest for life and while he remains in office he is the

[p.189] of [1982-83] GLR 176 one who disposes of property and may be removed for mismanagement. It is a fallacy to consider it as an inheritance for the sole enjoyment of the successor.

Turning to the pleadings once more, the admission by the defendant that the plaintiff succeeded his uncle Kwaku Twi in the two capacities of customary successor and stool occupant meant that the only issue the plaintiff had to fight was whether those properties had been converted into stool properties by the action of his predecessor. It was certainly otiose on the state of the pleadings, to re-agitate the issue of succession to the customary properties of his family. The defendant’s admissions became part of the sum total of evidence which preponderantly favoured the plaintiff’s assertion on the succession matter; and this was one prong of his claim. There was every justification, therefore, to concentrate on the issue of stool ownership of the properties. I therefore disagree with the view that the plaintiff relied on his traditional constitutional position as Adaatihene to the exclusion of his claim as customary successor, so as to render that claim forfeit.

This leads to the findings by the trial judge, that D/27 was general family property. It seems to me that the learned judge failed to examine critically the significance of his own finding. That finding at law could only mean that the successor was the natural heir to that property. It seems to me that throughout, there has been a lack of appreciation of the term”successor.” As I understand it, a successor is the family head of the immediate family of the person he succeeds and succeeds to the property which was previously in his care, in contradistinction to the head of the wider family who would be dealing with ancestral property. Ancestral property was not involved in this case. Perhaps an authoritative position from Ollennu’s book, Customary Land Law in Ghana, would not be out of place. At p.151 of that book, the learned author states.

The person who is appointed successor to the deceased in the family, is by virtue of his said office, the head of the immediate, or branch family, originating with the particular deceased person, his father or mother; while the person appointed to take charge of the ancestral family, or the property which has descended from a remote ancestor and all smaller immediate or branch families together, is the head of the ancestral, the wider or the trunk family.”

(The emphasis is mine) The defendant’s specious claim of authority to deny the plaintiff his rights to succession was not made out, and the proposition in my view is rather contrary to and offends known customary usage. The fact that Kwaku Twi enjoyed both disputed properties, paying the

[p.190] of [1982-83] GLR 176 rates and taxes due on them while on the Adaati stool, belies the assertion that Takyiman custom was different or that there should be apportionment of properties to the customary successor.

The plaintiff’s mother sums it up in a poignant passage: “Since the plaintiff succeeds to Kwaku Twi all his property should go to the plaintiff but the defendant refused to hand over the house to the plaintiff.” The issue whether the appellant had any right to place an embargo on the disputed properties must be categorically answered in the negative. It cannot be defended by rhyme, reason, law or logic. The plaintiff should have succeeded on his claim to both houses.

It was clear that Abena Gyato who applied to join the suit ostensibly to protect her interest of a gift in house No. D/27, failed to counterclaim and her pretensions were rightly dismissed. It was a misnomer to describe her assertion as a counterclaim. This slip should have had no further relevance in the determination of the matter except the dismissal of the claim of gift and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff on the clarity and abundance of the evidence marshalled in that behalf. Although the plaintiff has not cross-appealed, I think the justice of the matter requires the application of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218),rr. 31-32 to grant the declaration sought:see Chahin v. Boateng [1963] 2 G.L.R. 174, S.C. and Ashitey v. Dodoo [1967] G.L.R. 125.

Turning to the nature of the properties, I agree with Wiredu J.A., that the properties never lost their family character. There is a growing body of authority which has considerably modified the old rigid rule relating to undeclared self-acquired property being mixed up with stool property. The former rule enshrined in Antu v. Buedu (1929) F.C.’26-’29, 474 operated in effect to divest ownership of self-acquired property in favour of the stool if its occupant “failed to make a pre-enstoolment declaration of his properties” while on the stool.

A long line of decisions like Yamuah IV v. Sekyi (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 57; Acquah III v. Ababio (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 343; Serwah v. Kesse [1960] G.L.R. 227; and culminating in Boateng alias Beyeden v. Adjei [1963] 1 G.L.R. 285, have turned the rule into an evidential one rather than one of substantive customary law. In effect, now, the entire facts must be examined to disclose whether there was an intention to enrich the stool at the expense of the family or not. The risk of a family or an individual losing self-acquired property by default for non-declaration on accession to the stool, no longer obtains.

Indeed, Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) reading the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court in the Boateng v. Adjei case (supra), said at p. 296:

“… it has never been a principle of the customary laws of Ghana that the self-acquired properties (whether acquired before or after

[p.191] of [1982-83] GLR 176 his succession to the stool) of a stool occupant become merged into stool properties by the mere reason either of the owner of such properties occupying a stool or of the absence of a pre-enstoolment declaration or earmarking of such properties.”

He followed this with the pronouncement at p.300 of the report, which has since rocked the very foundation of Antu v. Buedu. He said:

“…the customary law is that every person (be he head of family, an ordinary member of a family or a stool occupant) is entitled to the full enjoyment of his own property and is free to do what he likes with it, and the property of a citizen of Ghana does not become stool property merely because he occupies a stool.”

Adjubi v. Mensah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 93 at p.99, C.A. takes the matter a stage further. A clear shift in emphasis is discernible. It is no longer the positive earmarking or exclusion that protects self-acquired property from being merged with stool property, but rather a general exclusion is raised if the facts warrant it unless there is cogent evidence of a gift to the stool. Where the stool holder is also family head, the union of capacities only means that no adverse claim to family properties is evident during his occupancy of the stool. Any disputes are kept in cold storage till a stranger assumes the mantle of chief. It is therefore strange that a dispute over the properties should have occurred on the plaintiff’s succession to the stool.

A brief recapitulation of the stool history seems necessary. The Adaati stool does not appear to have had much ancestral stool property. The paraphernalia that existed was stored in a dilapidated stool house. With the consent of the family, Kwaku Twi broke this house down, removed all the stool regalia to his house No. D/16, till the stool house could be renovated. Since he himself lived in house No. D/16, it was natural that customary rites and observances associated with the stool should be performed there.

It did not brand the house stool property. Indeed, the limited time when the stool would be kept in house No. D/16 until the stool house would be renovated was a public acknowledgment which firmly prevented a conversion of the properties into stool assets. That position is no different with Kwaku Twi’s successor in the saddle as stool occupant and the temporary accommodation cannot divest the family of its property no less than deprive the plaintiff of his customary entitlement.

I shall accordingly affirm the judgment appealed against, but vary it to grant a declaration to the plaintiff of the two disputed houses D/16 and D/27 as customary successor to Kwaku Twi.

[p.192] of [1982-83] GLR 176

JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.

The two defendants who are now appellants were the unsuccessful parties in an action for declaration of title and possession of two houses at Takyiman. The houses in question are Nos. D/16 and D/27. The identity of the houses were not in dispute. The defendants’ counsel argued two grounds of appeal. They are: (a) that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence in regard to house No. D/16, and (b) that the co-defendant’s evidence on the gift was unsatisfactory. I have read the draft judgments of my learned brothers and I fully indorse the judgment of my learned brother Francois J. A. who presided in this court. But I have some observations of my own to contribute to the judgment just delivered.

I have gathered from the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff herein that the declarations sought are simple. They are that he is the Adaatihene and also customary successor to the late Kwaku Twi. He described how Kwaku Twi came to build house No. D/16 and how he succeeded to the other house No. D/27. The defendants do not deny that the respondent is the Adaatihene and also customary successor to the late Kwaku Twi.

The pleadings bring out the issue in contention except that counsel for the first defendant; who settled the defence filed, complicated matters by tying up one of the properties with the Adaati stool, and so extensive evidence was led which in my opinion was misleading, creating the impression that Kwaku Twi in his lifetime had turned house No. D/16 into stool property and that was the basis of plaintiff’s claim. It should not have been the case because it is settled custom in the Takyiman area that a chief vacating his stool, and this includes his demise, deposition or abdication, retains the property acquired by him with his personal allowance, except paraphernalia which he might offer to his stool as his contribution to the stool property.

This decision was taken in 1943 at the Ashanti Confederacy Council when Takyiman was a member of that council – see Warrington’s Notes on Ashanti Custom and the minutes of the Ashanti Confederacy Council from 1935-1949 at pp. 14-15. This was a departure from the ancient custom that when a chief is in occupation of a stool he is incapable of owning any property apart from the stool. He and the stool are one. Before he accepted the stool he was entitled to dispossess himself of his private property, particularly farmland, and any family property which he is in possession of will revert to the family. My brother Francois J. A. has dealt with the chain of cases from Antu v. Buedu [1929] F.C. ‘26-’29, 474 to Boateng alias Beyeden v. Adjei (1963) 1 G.L.R. 285. I will also add Jasi v. Tohum (1911) Ren. 684.

They deal with notions of the chief’s private property. But I should think in very ancient times the occupant of a stool could not also be customary successor to private family property.

[p.193] of [1982-83] GLR 176

Times indeed have changed! I wonder whether it is for the better. Speaking for myself, I think the ancient custom of divesting himself of especially family property and reverting it to the family was probably a safer measure and in the interest of the family as well. I do not think there can be a shortage of customary successors.

However, there is no evidence that house No. D/16 ever became stool property. On this, both the defendants and the plaintiff are agreed despite the stool and paraphernalia being moved in there. For all intents, that was a temporary measure. The case as regards house No. D/16 as I see it was fought on the issue as to whether that house was in the hands of Kwaku Twi before his death for the plaintiff as his customary successor to succeed to it. The evidence is there that Kwaku Twi built house No. D/16 on family land and lived in it until his death.

The house, therefore, would become family property and vest in the head of the family until the family met and made a formal appointment. Did the family meet to appoint the plaintiff as customary successor to house No. D/16? It is the evidence that the late Kwame Nyame built the swish house on the land on which house No. D/16 stands and the said Kwame Nyame was the son of the late Komfo Saah. Kwame Nyame was succeeded by Kwaku Twi. There is the evidence that the plaintiff was appointed to succeed to Kwaku Twi and therefore it would follow that house No. D/16 should fall into his hands when he was appointed successor to Kwaku Twi by members of the family including the first appellant. It is inconceivable that Kwaku Twi would succeed Komfo Saah.

The learned judge in the court below, and I think he was misled by the nature of the evidence adduced, on the rather tenuous evidence of the Adontenhene Kwaku Poku (the fourth plaintiff witness) held that Kwaku Twi gave house No. D/16 to the stool and transferred the ahenfie to that house. He, therefore, made a declaration in the plaintiff’s favour and an order for him to recover possession. Before such a finding can be supported, there must be the evidence that house No. D/16 was the individual property of Kwaku Twi, which it was not.

It was a house built on family land; and even if there was such a gift it may have been made in his lifetime and the gift must be strictly proved: see Larkai v. Amorkor (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323. The evidence on the transfer of the stool and paraphernalia to house No D/16 indicates clearly that it was a temporary measure until the house was rebuilt. I am sure that if the trial judge had adverted his mind to the claim before him he would not have come to the conclusion he arrived at. I will make a declaration of title in house No. D/16 to the plaintiff and an order of possession on the basis that the plaintiff is the accredited customary successor to the late Kwaku Twi and therefore the defendant should hand over the house to him.

[p.194] of [1982-83] GLR 176

It was not doubted that house No. D/27, the other house in dispute, was built by Yaw Donkor who was succeeded on his death by Kwabena Ameyaw. The defendant in paragraph 12 of his statement of defence averred that:

“The defendant is not in a position to admit that the late Kwaku Twi inherited the late Kwabena Ameyaw as contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim and will at the trial put the plaintiff to strict proof”.

If therefore, the contention of the defendant was that during the lifetime of Yaw Donkor he made a gift of the said house No. D/27 to Abena Gyato, the co-defendant, and this was rejected by the trial court, and it is my opinion that the trial judge was right in rejecting the gift to Abena Gyato on the evidence before him, then if the plaintiff proved that he was in the line of succession to Kwabena Ameyaw, then surely he would be the successor to house No. D/27. The plaintiff in evidence said: “Kwaku Twi died possessed of houses Nos. D/16 and D/27. The house No. D/27 was in the hands of Kwebena Ameyaw when he died, it went to Kwaku Twi.” This piece of evidence was supported by Yaa Num, the third plaintiff witness, and Kwaku Poku, the fourth plaintiff witness, the Adontenhene of Takyiman from 1953 to 1978.

When the defendant was cross-examined and asked who succeeded Kwabena Ameyaw he said it was Kwaku Twi. The co-defendant also said when Kwabena Ameyaw died Kwaku Twi had not gone on to the stool, so he succeeded Kwabena Ameyaw. I think it is only logical to conclude that on the available evidence Kwaku Twi succeeded Kwabena Ameyaw. Therefore, the plaintiff on the evidence before the trial court was the customary successor to Kwaku Twi, having been appointed by the family, and must therefore succeed to the house No. D/27.

The striking point throughout the case remained the issue of whether or not the plaintiff had been appointed customary successor to Kwaku Twi, and therefore, the two houses in dispute should be handed over to him to administer for and on behalf of the family; and I consider that treating the suit purely as an action for a declaration of title and possession to two houses by a successor who as regards house No. D/16 was appointed to succeed to family property because Kwaku Twi built the house on family land; and also as regards house No. D/27 which was built by Yaw Donkor who was succeeded by Kwabena Ameyaw and thence by Kwaku Twi, the plaintiff proved the declaration sought by him.

I should accordingly affirm the judgment appealed against; but vary it to grant a declaration to the plaintiff of the two disputed

[p.195] of [1982-83] GLR 176 houses Nos.D/16 and D/27 as customary successor to Kwaku Twi; and in the case of house No. D/16 not as part of the Adaati stool properties. I will also treat the word “counterclaim” used by the learned judge in his judgment as one of semantics. I cannot imagine he was unaware that there was no counterclaim by the appellants in the case for him to have dismissed it.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment varied.

D. R. K. S.

Scroll to Top